Indian Defence Review

“Future conflicts are going to be short but intense wars before international pressure forces a cease fire. Both sides will try to gain maximum territory to use as a bargaining counter in subsequent negotiations.” This has been (or possibly still is) the standard preamble to all tactical exercises. Concept of limited war is not just the basis of operations oriented exercises but consciously or sub-consciously forms the basis of strategic planning.

Such a major modification of theories of war ought to have been proceeded by through discussion/debate of which the author is unaware. Over time it has assumed the role of being a virtual principle of war in Indian context.

In 21st century after a five decade long practice this has become the accepted mythology or shall one say the ‘Holy Cow’ of strategic discussions/thinking in India.

Mythology is not pure fiction but neither is it history. Unlike fiction there is a kernel of truth that is embellished with imagination. Over a period of time these become so imbedded in public mind that mythologies are then confused with history by some while others denounce it as pure fiction. Truth lies somewhere in the middle. Concept of limited war is no exception to this dilemma of truth (history) turning into mythology.

Even in pre-nuclear weapons era, wars were limited by the means of destruction available and limit on weapon ranges. There were also geographical limits due to these very factors. In addition, ethics/morality and tradition limited violence in war, be it sparing women and children in ancient times or not bombing hospitals in modern era warfare! Yet at the philosophical level, as so aptly put by Clausewitz, theoretically wars of total violence is the norm. He warned,

“Woe to the side that with shackled military takes on a foe that like a forces of nature know no other law than its own power” (paraphrased)

The term ‘limited war’ entered the strategic debate after the advent of nuclear weapons. As nuclear deterrence became mutual and world became aware of long term effects like ‘nuclear winter’, nuclear war became unthinkable. While the advances in technology indeed made an all-out war including use of nuclear weapons politically unacceptable, the causes and geo-politics remained unchanged and conflicts in world continued. Thus defined, limited war came to subsume under it all conflicts short of nuclear war.

Within this classification there were two major divisions, a limited conventional conflict, mainly between non-nuclear nations and insurgencies or ‘People’s War’. After the demise of Communism these conflicts have been re-name as ‘low intensity conflicts’.

This classification, especially of the wars between two non-nuclear powers, was misleading. What was a ‘limited war’ from Super Power’s perspective, say the several Arab Israel wars (1948,1967 or 1973) were ‘Total Wars’ from the perspectives of the combatants themselves. They used all the means available to them and their aim was also destruction of enemy. It is like a difference in the perspective of a Hen and a Pig when they offer an Egg and Ham breakfast to their masters! For the Hen it was mere involvement while for a Pig it was ‘total commitment’.

Countries like India that fought at least four conventional wars with Pakistan and China in pre-nuclearization era ie before 1998, the similar logic ought to apply. While these were indeed limited wars for Super Powers, they were total wars for us. But this fact has not been understood at the strategic level in India. We mistook the ‘limited means’ for fighting for a limited aim. India (and China to an extent in 1962) had limited aims. In 1947 and 1965 it was to stop aggression in Kashmir and in 1971 it was liberation of Bangladesh.

Since then India has been essentially ‘reacting’ to initiatives by its enemies. Mere reaction to the enemy action and trying to gain an advantageous position cannot be a war aim. What it did to us is that in 1965 we missed many strategic opportunities to earn a victory like the push to Lahore. In 1971 the thinking dominated by ‘limited aim’ thinking lost out on the chance to score major gains in Jammu and Kashmir and strengthen our defensive position. Instead of concentrating forces in the West on J&K we launched minor forays across International border.

It is scarcely appreciated that whether in limited war or all-out war at tactical level for the fighting men it is a ‘total’ conflict-there are no half measures at tactical level. But the lack of clarity and vague aim at strategic level has crucial detrimental effect on morale at the tactical level. It is Napoleon who said that in war, moral (or morale) to the physical is like three is to one.

Another form of limited war is variously called ‘insurgency’, people’s war or low intensity conflict. Here again, due to political factors like concern for human rights etc, one side, that is counter insurgents do not use the full spectrum of weapons at their command. Weapons like tanks, artillery or air power are avoided so as to minimize co-lateral damage and casualties. The counter insurgent’s, besides limit on means; also have a limited aim of getting the insurgents to give up violence while the insurgents aim at total war and defeat of their opponents.  There is even more misinformation about this form of limited war than the conventional one.

It is often unknown to the peace NGOs or judges and lay people that in this so called low intensity and limited conflicts, at the tactical level engagement, full force is used and rules of war apply.

There is no difference between an ambush, raid or patrolling in this so called low intensity conflict and regular war. Rules of war of total use of available force apply and not civil or criminal law. It is to protect the soldier from these consequences that legislation like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1956 has been enacted. Civil organizations or judiciary often lose sight of this very basic fact and are sometimes horrified at the killings that take place.

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This lack of understanding of what low intensity wars in reality means, is the basis of many wrong actions by the society and judicial system against the law enforcing soldier.

In conclusion one can clearly state that limited wars are limited by the ‘means’ used in conflict, but within these limits either side or both sides may be fighting a total war. In a conflict that is stretched over long periods, like the insurgencies, the insurgents are fighting a total war while the counter insurgents have a limited aim.

In both these cases, often it is the side that has clear aim that often triumphs. This is a lesson worth learning in Indian context for much of our misfortune in past stems from this basic theoretical weakness.