Indian Defence Review

PM Narendra Modi, confident of victory in the ongoing 2024 election has declared that he has already ordered ministers and officials to work on a programme for first 100 days. Taking him at his word, one feels that India ought to prioritize tackling the Chinese adversarial posture. It is not an easy task as India faces geopolitical constraints to change over from strategic defensive to strategic offensive as it has successfully done against Pakistan. Only a credible threat perception will ensure ‘good behaviour’ from an expansionist China.

In the second week of April 2024, India delivered the first batch of Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles to Philippines as part of its strategy to counter China on the sea. This is in response to long standing Chinese policy of promoting Pakistan proxy against India. This is also part of countering Chinese aggressive actions on the land border with India. These actions have been dictated by India’s geo political dilemma vis a vis China whereby border geography  favours China.

In the 1980s, as a part of the study and writing of history of 1962 India China border conflict, I had the privilege of travelling the entire border areas extensively. As a result of those travels, some conclusions stood out,

• • China enjoyed tactical mobility and flexibility vis a vis India as it was deployed on the Tibetan plateau.
  • On the Indian side there were tactical objectives like Leh or Tawang while on the Tibetan side there were no tactical or strategic objectives that India could threaten in retaliation with possible exception of Chumbi valley.
  • From Tibetan border most Indian strategic targets like capital Delhi or Indo Gangetic plains were within the range of medium range ballistic missile (MRBMs) while China’s strategic targets on the Pacific Sea board could only be targeted by Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM’s) or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
  • Politically India had no claims on Tibetan territory while China claimed Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
  • The only strategic advantage India has is in shorter lines of logistics.

Much water has flowed down the Brahmaputra since that time and some major changes have taken place in the situation. India has built up border communications and has improved its tactical mobility and China has built a railway line to improve its logistics. Both these measures have indeed modified the military situation and reduced the asymmetry. Nonetheless, it will be fair to say that the basic issues remain, China still has better tactical mobility and India’s logistics is still far better.

Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986-87 and more recent Galwan clash and subsequent Indian response have shown how India can exploit its shorter lines of communication to check mate the Chinese.

It is doubtful if China ‘really’ has any territorial ambitions vis a vis India, despite the belligerent rhetoric and newly minted term ‘Southern Tibet’ to describe and lay claim to Arunachal Pradesh. Militarily, China is well placed in Ladakh and its Sinkiang-Tibet road link has enough depth. 

China is well aware that in the given military balance, Leh in the North is beyond its grasp. Capture of Arunachal Pradesh is also beyond its military means nor can it be occupied without prohibitive cost. 1962 military debacle in Arunachal Pradesh was an aberration and a result of local military failure. A situation not likely to repeat itself. Whenever China boasts of repeating 1962, it should be reminded of the hard time it had inthat war in Ladakh and even in Walong.

Chinese strategy is also based on the premise of exploiting Indian democratic structure. To keep India off balance and engaged on the border is China’s strategic aim. The latest salvo in this has been the Chinese move to re-name Indian towns and villages in Arunachal. This is part of its policy to keep alive the fiction that Arunachal Pradesh is ‘Southern Tibet’ and hence part of China. These Chinese moves are then taken up in the Indian media and by the opposition grouping to corner the ruling government.

Chinese strategic aim appears to be to tie down Indian Army on the border, impose economic costs and shore up its proxy Pakistan’s resistance to Indian domination in South Asia. It has also been wooing Bangladesh and Nepal.

India’s maritime strategy in collaboration with Quad (India, US, Australia and Japan) is a part of search for finding pressure points against China. While arms supply to countries threatened by Chinese is certainly a beginning, the strategy has severe limitations.

In 1971, during the Indo Pak war, China was restrained by the massing of 44 Motorized/Armoured Divisions (in place of normal 5-6) by USSR that stopped China from coming to help of Pakistan. China, after the demise of an antagonistic Soviet Union, faces virtually no land threat. Its entire land force, less amphibious force, can be concentrated against India. There is an upper limit of the quantum of force that China can utilize on the mountainous border with India. The constraint is NOT resources but the geography and space.Inducting very large forces into TAR is a sure giveaway and make these forces extremely vulnerable to air and missile actions by India.

The component of Chinese military power that is deployed against India is purely land based. It has no maritime significance. Neither is it relevant to China’s possible operation against Taiwan. Indian maritime counter threat in that sense has only a limited value. Remember, even in 1962, India foolishly activated Eastern Sector to reduce pressure in Ladakh. The move failed spectacularly and boomeranged.

The only component of Chinese military power that is common to land and maritime (read Taiwan) is the manned air power. This is one area that India can directly pose a strategic challenge to China. The US and Western powersif desirous to help Taiwan can do so by strengthening Indian air power on the border. Chinese missile threat, more as a deterrent, is taken care by Indian development of Agni IV and V. The 2020 Galwan crisis did indeed show how Indian deployment of air power checked the Chinese.

Besides the development of air power, another area in which India has marked advantage is ‘soft power’. This author has travelled extensively in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia for over a decade. The dominant impression gained is that the people in all these countries (barring Cambodia somewhat) are deeply suspicious of the China and its intentions. Anti-Chinese feelings simmer just under the surface.

On the other hand, India and Indians have deep and old cultural roots in the region. Indonesia is culturally Indian. What Pu shrine to Shiva in Central Laos was built in 8^th century. MySon near Danang was the Capital of Champa Kingdom for over a thousand years. India has yet to exploit its Buddhist connection fully. Bollywood remains immensely popular throughput SE Asia.

India should counter China with its soft power in SE Asia to mount a credible deterrent. Indonesia is to China is what Turkey is to Russia in maritime domain. Our first priority should be to re-establish our deep cultural ties to this most important SE Asian country.