The suggestion to draw on the experience of ex-servicemen (including officers) merits pragmatic and detailed discussion. Undoubtedly ex-servicemen are in a state of penury and are badly in need of financial support. They have the skill but there is no motivation for taking up such a job! They may be desperate enough to take up any job but certainly not as mercenary soldiers to be used as cannon fodder and then once more discarded when the deed is done.
Create a central authority to coordinate anti-Maoist operations in various states and sharing of intelligence. Similarly create such bodies at the state level too.
Such suggestion spring from another wrong notion that they by themselves will perform at the same level they did during their stint with the military, if they do come forward and accept this absurd offer of contract of two or three years. They did well and met all challenges during their active service with the military, because they formed part of well knit, highly motivated units with high morale and above all ably commanded by officers who led them from the front. These officers ran greater risk and took far more casualties (in percentage terms) than their men. When these veterans are now called upon to come forward and join the CPOs and if at all they do so, it would be wrong to expect them to do as well as they did while with their units in the military. Infact they are more likely to fall in line with the culture, ethos, ways, means and methods of the CPOs.
Another factor to bear in mind is that they are a disillusioned lot who were retired in the very prime of their lives ( at ages 35-37 years ) denied the compensation for this early retirement, which was in all fairness due to them. Now the same government which has treated them so shabbily and with disdain, turned deaf ear to their pleas for justice and fair play and retracted from all promises call them to take on yet another heavy burden, burden which the much pampered and home ministry’s very own forces’ are unable to carry, what can be veteran’s response! Are they to be once more exploited and then discarded!
Incase ex-servicemen are to be roped in, they need to be assured of fair play by granting them OROP as a first step. Re-engage those below 42 years age on a 12 year term. They will have to be offered an acceptable package in pay, perks and second pension and given proper insurance cover etc. These ex-servicemen should be grouped into units, where possible retaining their old groupings and these units/sub units should be officered by military officers (similarly engaged) and preferably from the same groups. These units should then be grouped into brigades and so on and given three months to organize themselves. Brigade and divisional headquarters and support services may have to be provided by the army, may be by taking good percentage of ex-servicemen in these headquarters. Further, AFSPA must come into play in their case
The Maoist threat cannot be ignored any longer and has to be dealt on war footing. At the same time excesses by security forces must be avoided at all costs and collateral damage minimized.
To tackle Maoists it would be essential to take some or all of these steps, but before that, it needs to be clearly understood that this problem will not go away in a hurry and would take over a decade of concerted effort on all fronts to resolve. Some of the recommended steps are:
- Pass legislation to bring all affected areas/states under central control, for the purpose of conducting operations against Maoists.
- Create a central authority to coordinate anti-Maoist operations in various states and sharing of intelligence. Similarly create such bodies at the state level too.
- Conduct full scale operations in at least three adjacent states at a time. Two states with the CPOs and one with the ex-servicemen units under two to three divisional size headquarters and a corps size headquarter provided by the army, with good number of retired officers in these. This is of course contingent on veterans coming forward for this task.
- Commence development work, particularly making of roads on priority, as soon an area is secured from Maoists. Allocate sufficient funds for development work.
- Hand over district administration to officers of proven integrity, who are willing to go out and take risk by moving around in the districts to check for themselves progress on works connected with development.
- Identify the Maoist leadership and eliminate it.
- Have embedded journalists with units to report excesses and fake encounters.
- Establish counter insurgency schools exclusively for the CPOs with the help of veterans.
- Those whose lands have been acquired and paid inadequate or no compensation to be given adequate compensation.
- Establish checks on the supply of explosives, arms and ammunition to these groups.
- Prevent possible support to these groups from Nepalese Maoists.
The Maoist threat cannot be ignored any longer and has to be dealt on war footing. At the same time excesses by security forces must be avoided at all costs and collateral damage minimized. It is imperative to re-establishing friendly, sympathetic and purposeful administration which can undertake development in all its facets, with dedication and expeditiously. Political class needs to keep national interest in focus, overriding parochial and personal compulsions.
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