The call for talks with the Maoists is misplaced and inopportune. Such renegade groups should be invited to the table for talks when they have been driven against the wall.
Then there is the issue of deploying army (and air force) against own people. The army and air force chiefs appear to have advised the government against the use of their forces in the present situation. Defence Minister AK Antony too appears to agree with the recommendations of the service chiefs. The army chief has rightly assessed that the situation is not desperate enough to call in the army and that it is well within the capability of the state and central police to handle the situation provided they are sufficiently energized. Further the existing commitments of the army both in counter-insurgency operations in the North East and J&K as also the imperatives of maintaining adequate defensive posture in the North and along the LoC in J&K must have weighed on his recommendations to keep the army out of another heavy commitment. The DGP who conducted the inquiry into the Dantewada incident too has expressed his opinion against deployment of military. He fears, that poor Adavasis and Tribals will suffer all the more. Rightly the government, for the present, has decided against deploying the army.
There is a flood of solutions on offering to tackle Maoist menace. These range from ‘quick fix’ types to the more nuanced approach of combating Maoists on the one hand and on the other undertaking development of the affected districts, in other words, ‘clear, hold and develop,’ concept — constituting co-operatives of tribals etc to manage forests. Then there is the call inviting Maoists to lay down arms and come forward for talks. Yet another proposal is to get ex-servicemen, on short term contract, to join CPOs, as also engage sappers (ex-engineers) to clear roads of mines etc. Yet a comprehensive and viable solution seems to elude the planners.
Elimination of Maoists has become the top priority without regard to means and methods. Terms like revenge, enemy and war are being freely bandied about. What may follow are excesses by the police: provincial and CPOs. Arrests, interrogations, torture and torching of villages, dislocations and fake encounters etc will become common occurrence, more so when senior leadership stays away from the field and leadership in the field and intelligence continues to be poor. Troops with low morale, poor discipline and ineffective leadership are more prone to brutalities. Remember, My Lai massacre in Vietnam.
Some arm chair strategists have tried to argue that the police forces available are totally inadequate, drawing ratios between population and policemen and relating the two with the square kilometers of area per policeman. As an example the Bastar division of Chhattishargh, (spread over an area of 40,000 square kilometers) where, besides the state police, (5000 policemen) there are 14 battalions of CRPF, (1000 men each) 5 battalions of BSF, 7 battalions of armed police and this large force is considered inadequate! These figures are being related to troops in the Kashmir valley, forgetting that in J&K security forces face well trained hardcore insurgent from across the border, border that has to be defended, while Maoists in their present state are a rag tag group. It is further argued that the ratio of security personnel to Maiosts be 12:1 if not more! But it is not realized that by themselves numbers alone are of little consequence.
“¦the higher hierarchy in the CPOs and the affected state police have no ground level experience in such operations and have never led policemen from the front”¦
The call for talks with the Maoists is misplaced and inopportune. Such renegade groups should be invited to the table for talks when they have been driven against the wall. Only then there can be hope of arriving at a viable and acceptable solution. To expect them to shed arms when they are winning is a bit unrealistic. Often, as has been our experience in the past too, this period of cease-fire and talks is used by the insurgents to regroup and reorganise themselves. We should therefore seek talks once we have put them completely on the defensive and in a bind. Yet keep the door for talks open, even while we go whole hog after them.
CRPF has 210 battalions and many more are now being raised. Most of these units, along with others from the remaining CPOs, have been operating in the Red Corridor long enough, so they ought to have acquired sufficient experience in fighting the Maoists, build a viable intelligence grid and create own schools for counter insurgency training. The answer to this intriguing question perhaps rests in the fact that, the higher hierarchy in the CPOs and the affected state police have no ground level experience in such operations and have never led policemen from the front, there is no accountability and there is little central and state policy or doctrine on the subject.
Fighting insurgency is a serious business and leadership in the forces has to lead from the front, setting example in discipline and risk taking. Military has been in this business for a long time and the casualty ratio between officers and troops in these operations is 1 to 13.4.. The figure of officer killed in the last decade and a half is, by now, well over 575. These are commissioned officers, from Lt to Cols and in a few cases even of higher ranks. Military has been combating motivated, well trained and hard core insurgents in the North East and J&K, whereas the Maoists are a ‘rag – tag’ force in its present state. Yet success has eluded the police and there are hardly any casualties amongst the IPS officers while policemen (including those from CPOs) have died in thousands.
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To achieve results police leadership will have to be upfront and run the same risk their subordinates routinely face. During the Punjab problem in the eighties, it is only, when the army was deployed that the police emerged out of its secure places and started operating in a meaningful manner, though their excesses were conveniently overlooked. Such a system should not become a pattern and CPOs and state police should not require military crutches every time. Else there would be little justification to have such large bodies of CPOs and state armed police etc.
To achieve results police leadership will have to be upfront and run the same risk their subordinates routinely face.
It would be inappropriate to replicate the North East, J&K or Punjab template in the Red Corridor. Nor can the Malayan experience in dealing with communist insurgency be applied here. Dealing with the Maoist menace in the Red Corridor is going to be a different ball game. It calls for out of the box thinking, planning and action.
While law and order remains a state subject, the present situation cannot be taken as mere law and order problem. Though centre would extend all help to the states to combat Maoists, the states will have to show greater involvement. To take this challenge ‘head-on’ there is need to bring in legislation where centre can take direct control over operations against Maoists in the Red Corridor , create central controlling authority which co-ordinates intelligence and operations of CPOs with the state police and administration. Grey Hounds, Cobras, Vipers and Wasps: all should join the fight in a coordinated and planned manner. India can ignore the Maoist threat at its own peril. Combating Maoists requires the most energetic steps, leadership which operates up front and firm action while avoiding collateral damage: at all costs.
There is much talk of better equipment and weapons for the police and CPOs. This is perhaps an alibi for poor performance. It is more an issue of training, effective leadership which is willing to face the same set of risks and dangers encountered by their men and their motivation which is of relevance. There is no need for mortars and machine guns foliage penetrating radars etc to deal with Maoists.
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