In the First Afghan War between the Mujahedeen guerrillas and the Soviet Union, victory came to the guerrillas only in April 1992, nearly three years after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The war that began in December 1979 with the arrival of Soviet forces did not end in February 1989 with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The Mujahideen forces, a horde of Islamist warriors from all over the world (though the bulk were the local Pashtuns, from Afghanistan as well as Pakistan) were supported by the Americans, funded by Saudi Arabia and trained and sheltered by neighbouring Pakistan. But the fall of the Afghan regime came about only in 1992, when a powerful warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, defected to the other side.
The defection of Dostum was the end result while in all fairness, the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 began the process of the end of the Soviet-backed regime. The Vietnam and Afghanistan examples have a lesson in that ultimately the guerrilla forces can only win if the adversary conventional forces desert or defect. Survival of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan is a pointer in the direction of the power of modern conventional forces.
The perception of a ‘no win’ situation in South Africa came about essentially due to loss of international political support. But even in this case, the military dimension cannot be ignored. The defensive victory of the ANC supported forces in Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in October 1987 and simultaneous loss of air superiority ushered in the perception that South African apartheid regime was on a losing streak. Many South Africans continue to assert that the battle was actually won by the apartheid regime. But Nelson Mandela could not disagree more. “Cuito Cuanavale,” he asserted, “was the turning point for the liberation of our continent, and of my people, from the scourge of apartheid.”2
This coincided with the waning of political support of the Western nations, as the Cold War was winding up and the South African apartheid regime was no longer an asset but a liability in the rest of Africa. Many military analysts ignore the psychological effect of a battle on war. In the case of the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam war, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu lost by the French and the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, it is material that the insurgents believed that they had won. Battles and wars are, after all, won or lost in the minds of the adversaries.
The ‘no win’ inflexion point in case of successful counter-insurgencies in North East India was the liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971 that led to the loss of bases and military support that the erstwhile East Pakistan had provided. In case of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 saw a similar loss of support to the Tamil cause in India. The ultimate defeat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) came about almost a decade later but it can be safely asserted that loss of Indian support was crucial. The ‘Easter Agreement’ of May 1998 that brought to an end the Irish insurgency can be similarly attributed to the American lead. The insurgency in Northern Ireland was sustained largely due to the support, overt and covert by the Irish community in the US. The Easter Agreement heralded a change in American attitude and led the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to believe that an armed resistance was no longer feasible. It is true that the economic and political integration through the European Union had made the parochial conflict largely redundant. That it spluttered on for such a long time showed the longevity of historical animosities.
The secessionist insurgency movements like the ones in Kashmir, Northern Sri Lanka, North Eastern India, Chechnya, Tibet or Northern Ireland face a major problem. It is not enough that the insurgents have popular support in their own area’s but in order to succeed they have to win the hearts and minds of the rest of the country and create a perception of ‘no win’ situation. Till such time that this is not achieved, secessionist insurgency is not likely to succeed.
The perception of a ‘no win’ situation has an economic dimension as well. In a long-drawn out conflict, people in the conflict zone suffer untold hardships. Over a period of time, conflict weariness settles in and the yearning for peace is palpable. The mundane chores of raising a family and leading a normal life begin to loom large in people’s consciousness. In the case of South Africa for instance, economic sanctions began to bite and there was flight of capital from the country. Growth rate began to stagnate at less than one per cent and the big industrialists with capital switched sides and brought pressure on the apartheid regime to give up its policy of racial discrimination. An economic ‘no win’ can produce the desired results depending upon who suffers more deprivation. A bleak economic future can bring to senses even the most ardent revolutionaries. In conversation with this author in May 1988, Mr Ton Luia, then a minister in the Mizoram government and erstwhile Chief of Mizo National Army, told of the economic privations undergone by the rebels while staying in the jungles of Myanmar, the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT). Talking of the long-drawn out negotiations with the Indian government, he mentioned that for an insurgent a pair of clean trousers was more important than some articles of constitution. The counter-insurgents have to follow a multi-pronged approach with economic measures a major part of it.
It must be noted that while dealing with insurgency that has religious motivation no amount of force or fear of death, destruction or deprivation can bring about a ‘no win’ perception since the conflict is seen as one between the true followers of God and mere mortals. The only way out in these situations is to get God/religion on your side.
Battle for Legitimacy
In a situation where a group is using violence against the state it is ipso facto also challenging the legitimacy of the use of force by the other side. Here we come across a major problem when faced with the ideological conflicts. When the insurgents are fighting for a religion, identity or such like non-material cause, use of force has no effect on the insurgents’ morale as their ideology convinces them that the ultimate victory is theirs. The Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan/Pakistan are convinced that they are fighting a Holy War (Jihad) and death and destruction is God’s will. A somewhat similar sentiment exists in the Middle East conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. Unfortunately, counter-insurgents have steadfastly refused to pick up this ideological gauntlet.
In order to achieve a ‘no win’ situation and legitimacy, there is no short cut to confront the ideology of the insurgents. The current farce of good Jihadists and bad Jihadists or sympathy for the Communist/Maoists just because they claim to be fighting for the poor and dispossessed, is a recipe for disaster and defeat. The three step approach to ideological conflicts is to contain, neutralise and reform. In this important aspect of the battle, media and communication (both verbal and non-verbal) play a major role. The social and political front of counter-insurgency lays great emphasis on the rule of law as the main differential between an insurgent and counter-insurgent. In an ideological conflict of this nature, economic aid or incentives plays a minor role. In fact, it is more likely to strengthen the insurgent as he can present the economic gain as consequence of his successful actions. Instead of reducing, economic aid may actually fuel further violence. India has seen some of this happening in Kashmir, Nagaland and the Naxal-hit areas where economic wellbeing is taken for granted as their due and endemic violence continues like the Friday stone pelting in Srinagar or frequent attacks on police forces and government servants by the Maoists. The NATO forces led by the US are falling in precisely the same trap in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
There are many dimensions for force to be considered legitimate. The first is the ideological one. A state founded on universal principles and a system that grants every citizen fundamental rights without discrimination, automatically enjoys a legitimacy that is not available to racist, theocratic or ideology based dictatorships. The core values of the state have to be such as to appeal to not only the majority but also to the minority groups. Universal Humanism has to be the basis of these core values. For instance, if India was to be a Hindu state on the lines of Islamic states, or like Sri Lanka a Buddhist state, then in confronting a religion based separatist movement in Kashmir, it would lack legitimacy. The problem confronting the UK in Northern Ireland is similar. With UK, ideology based on loyalty to the Queen as the defender of faith, the Irish Catholics have every reason to reject it. After the demise of the Soviet Union and ushering of the Nation State of Russia, the Russian Federation faces similar dilemma in the Muslim-majority Caucasus where the Chechen rebels have been battling the state for over one and half decades. Essentially, a multi-ethnic state has to adhere to universal values and norms in order to be legitimate.
One of the most successful counter-insurgency operations was by India in Mizoram. During the two-decade long conflict India gained unmatched legitimacy in 1978. In that year, a trenchant critic of the armed forces and government, Brigadier T Sailo (Retd) led his People’s Party in the elections to the local assembly and was successful. This proved a point to the Mizo people that India meant to not just preach but practice democracy. Form this point on, the ideological foundations of the MNF were weakened beyond repair, with the insurgents finally giving up in 1986.
Legitimacy of a state is not the function of de jure constitution and core values alone. The legitimacy must also be based on the ‘reality’ of how the state behaves and its administrative practices. This is different from rhetoric and is an issue of management and checks and balances. Che Guevara had stated, “If a government has come to power through some form of popular vote, whether fraudulent or not, and if that government maintains at least an appearance of constitutional law, a guerrilla uprising cannot be brought about until all possible avenues of legal procedure have been exhausted.”3
Mao, in his manual on guerrilla war, emphasises the aspect of discipline and probity in behaviour by the guerrillas. What is true of an insurgent is equally applicable to the counter-insurgent as well. The common perception of murgi chor (chicken stealing) soldiers or policemen does greater damage to the legitimacy of counter-insurgency than any amount of adverse propaganda. The British, faced with one of the longest running insurgencies in Northern Ireland, realised that in order to be effective, the police force must have both credibility and support of the general population. In a divided society such as that in Northern Ireland, the public perception of the local police as a partisan force was strongly held by the Catholic community. The secret operations to deal with IRA underground and brutal methods of elimination of the insurgents added fuel to fire. But once the peace process was initiated and violence came under control, establishing law and order became a priority. It is to this end that the British created an institution of ‘Independent Commission for Police Complaints’.4
This was also called the civilian oversight over police function, in short an attempt to answer the question, “Who will police the police?” The independent body has no authority to initiate proceedings and is purely recommendatory yet through the use of media it can generate moral pressure and its findings are taken seriously by the superior governmental authority. In the conditions where there is a long tradition of obedience to law, it is possibly a workable model but given the pressures in a counter-insurgency situation and charged atmosphere, it may not always work. Possibly, this model is more suited when the violence has been brought under control.
There is no gainsaying the fact that ‘checks and balances’ on the use of force are needed, both to deal with individual aberrations or institutional bias. In this regard, a combination of internal organisation on lines of discipline and vigilance department with a village level informal organisation on complaints is the best alternative. But in order to preserve legitimacy and avoid excesses, internal checks of reward and punishment would work best.
The quantum and quality of force being used is also important in deciding its legitimacy. In order to have legitimacy, force must be discriminative but not excessive. This forces the counter-insurgents to fight the conflict on the terms dictated by the guerrillas. A way out of this dilemma is to create special weapons/forces harnessing technology that can carry out precision attacks. The American armed drones ‘Predators’ are an excellent example of this innovation.
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Legitimacy is also a function of the conduct of the security forces. Respect for human rights is an integral part of the counter insurgency operations. Here is a dilemma, since the insurgents deliberately use tactics like hiding behind people or in a populated areas, any retaliatory or action in self-defence can cause collateral damage. This is unavoidable and can best be countered through media and propaganda that puts the blame squarely on the insurgents. But insurgency is also war, a guerrilla war. In the heat of the battle, there is a temptation to target the sympathisers for acts of violence by the armed insurgents. Here, the need to educate troops and commanders at all levels is paramount. It must be understood that retaliation against the innocents would only help the insurgents recruit the kin of the victims thus defeating the purpose of counter-insurgency. To curb these abuses, it would be best to create internal organisation within the security forces rather than have an external agency. Self correction is better than external censure and is far more effective.
As a matter of interest, in fighting the tribal insurgency in India, the relationship between the insurgents and soldiers never verged on total enmity. As they came into close contact with the tribal society, soldiers were amazed and impressed with the cohesion and democratic functioning at the village level. Both sides observed an unwritten code of conduct that ensured that the women and children were never targeted, neither were the army’s medical personnel, who often treated the insurgents knowingly. Over a period of time personal relationships developed between the foes; the classic example of this was when niece of the supreme leader of Naga rebels married an Indian army officer.5
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