Counter-insurgency is a complex phenomenon demanding a complex solution. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Although it is very much a form of warfare fitting into the description given by Jomini as ‘wars of opinion’ or Clausewitzian ‘wars of resistance’, these are inadequate definitions and it is better to treat insurgency as armed politics and a distinct form of warfare that needs a separate set of principles of war.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, there was euphoria about a peaceful world. The Cold War had ended and the world saw spurt in economic growth rates and globalisation as the inevitable destiny of mankind. Some even went on to claim the ‘End of History’. But within a year, dreams of peace were shattered with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in the US on September 11, 2001 plunging the world into turbulence. The ensuing conflict was described as a ‘Global War on Terror’ or even, a clash of civilisations. One way to look at happenings of the last decade is to see it as an Islamist insurgency against the world order. The sheer spread of conflicts to countries from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia and the Middle East, justifies this rather broad title. The insurgents used tactics of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The assassination of Osama Bin Laden on May 02, 2011, may not signify an end to this insurgency. In light of this challenge, a deeper understanding of the phenomena of insurgency and counter-insurgency is essential.
Unlike conventional warfare, counter-insurgency is a highly regulated affair with rules and boundaries. Use of unbridled force is not an option. Counter-insurgency may be considered akin to sports such as tennis or golf, where skill and subtlety count for more than brute force.
The very nature of the problems of insurgency that has contextual peculiarities precludes any kind of formulation of rules or laws. The case studies of the Naga and Mizo tribes in North East India, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Maoist insurgency called Naxalism in the heart of India, problems of Northern Ireland and South African insurgencies show clearly that there is no possibility of formulating any template for universal application, say in Afghanistan, Thailand, Philippines or Iraq. But the various co-relations that these studies unearthed and certain commonalities that were observed, can help formulate the principles of counter-insurgency. These are on the same lines as the Principles of War that most armies follow and are a concept that was originated by German military thinker, Clauswitz.
Creation of a ‘No-Win’ Perception
It has become a popular cliché to describe insurgency and counter-insurgency as ‘the struggle for hearts and minds’. But it is also a struggle between the hearts and the minds, a conflict between lofty goals and realistic expectations. Thus, instead of this nebulous catch all concept, the author prefers more precise aim – creation of perception of ‘no win’.
‘Selection and Maintenance of Aim’ is the crucial first Principle of War. Insurgents aim at ‘regime change’, the counter-insurgents, at ‘behavioural change’. Counter-insurgency operations are fought primarily to win the population over to one’s own point of view. Aims such as destruction of enemy or his resources or capture of territory are not applicable. In fact, there is no enemy, only misguided elements. But for the insurgents, total destruction of the regime is the aim and thus there is an inbuilt asymmetry at the level of application of force. Yet it would be incorrect to call this an ‘asymmetrical warfare’ as many do. Essentially, both insurgents and counter-insurgents envisage and accept the use of force. A truly asymmetrical conflict would be the Gandhian ‘non-violent protest’, where one side completely abjures the use of force.
Insurgents and counter-insurgents both aim to create a ‘no win’ situation for the other side. The counter-insurgents hope that the insurgents give up violence and change their behaviour. While on the other hand, insurgents hope that if the adversary state feels that it cannot win, it would lead to the collapse of the system, rebellion in the military and eventual victory of the insurgents.
The creation of a ‘no win’ perception in the minds of leaders as well as followers or soldiers is a major concern even in conventional warfare. ‘Morale’ is a major target and Napoleon is quoted as having said that it is three times more important than the physical factor. But in the case of counter-insurgency, it is even more seminal since physical destruction of the adversary is not the aim.
While the creation of a perception of a ‘no win’ situation is a psychological concept, it has both physical and psychological dimensions. Here, the skilful management of perception is as important as the physical factors.
The first and the foremost dimension of the ‘no win’ situation is obviously the military one. Results of an insurgency depend on this psychological battle. If the insurgents believe that they are in a ‘no win’ situation then sooner or later, the counter-insurgents will succeed. But if, on the other hand, as in the case of the South African Apartheid regime, the counter-insurgents come to this conclusion, then the insurgents win and effect a regime change. When the ‘no win’ is mutual, a compromise is possible through negotiations that would involve give and take and partial attainment of objectives for both the sides. If negotiations take place when a clear ‘no win’ situation has not been created, often they are mere tactical ploys to gain time. The history of numerous failed negotiations in insurgency situations is a pointer in this direction.
Strictly from a theoretical point of view, the American strategy of ‘shock and awe’ in the Second Iraq War was a correct formulation. The problem is that once the insurgents embark upon a guerrilla war, the definition of victory changes. The occupation of territory or display of superior fire power produces neither shock nor awe. The guerrillas retreat into the population, survive the assault and continue to fight.
Since almost by definition, the insurgents take recourse to tactics of guerrilla war, a massive use of force for a short duration can seldom produce the military ‘no win’ situation. Insurgency and counter-insurgency are like a long duration slogging match, where endurance and resolve to stay on course matters more than the sophisticated arsenals at the disposal of the counter-insurgents. Shock and awe in a traditional sense is not an option in counter-insurgency as there are severe restrictions on the kind of force that can be used. Technically, when insurgents hide in an urban area termed concrete jungles or in actual jungles, the counter-insurgents do have the option to blast the entire locality at least in urban areas, in forests even that option is not available. But the issue of human rights of the innocents preclude this in urban complexes.
Use of massive force, disproportionate to the task at hand, also violates the ‘principle of legitimacy’. This may appear contradictory but so are the Principles of War in use of force when one talks of concentration of force and economy of force in the same breath. Since the aim of use of force is to effect behavioural change, this cardinal difference has to be clearly understood, as from this flow the strategy and tactics that severely circumscribes the use of ‘blunt’ instruments and weapons of mass destruction. This also automatically lends primacy to psychological and not physical effect of force. The counter-insurgents have to be extremely careful that in exercising force and coercion, they do not reach a psychological ‘point of no return’ after which force, instead of changing behaviour in desired direction, produces desperation. This suggests that use of force must alternate with periods of peace. Thus, in order to achieve the psychological goal of convincing the insurgents/counter- insurgents that they are in a ‘no win’ situation, the force used has to be neither minimum (as in a situation of civic unrest) nor maximum as in the case of an all out war between two states but should be legitimate as well as adequate in terms of quality, quantity and duration.
| Editor’s Pick |
If one looks at the history of counter-insurgency and counter guerrilla wars of the last several decades, one can clearly discern an inflexion or ‘tipping point’. An event or an occurrence that changed the ultimate outcome in favour of one or the other side is the result of perception of ‘no win’ by one side. In most cases, the inflexion point was the beginning of process of perception that it was a lost cause. Looking at the cases where the insurgents or the guerrillas came up trumps in Vietnam, in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in South Africa, one can clearly see the impact of these turning points. In case of the two-decade long Vietnam War, it was the Tet Offensive in January 1968. Coinciding with the Vietnamese New Year, during which generally both sides observed ceasefire, the Vietnamese guerrillas launched a successful attack on all the provincial capitals in South Vietnam as well as Saigon and Hue, the biggest cities in South Vietnam. The attack shook the Americans in its scope and breadth.
The earlier optimism of the Americans gave way to pessimism and domestic opposition to the war mounted. Militarily, the Vietnamese guerrillas suffered heavy casualties and American forces quickly regained the cities but the perception that they could not win the war took root, both in the minds of the military and general public in the US. After this it was a matter of time before Americans withdrew from Vietnam. The Tet Offensive succeeded in creating the perception of ‘no win’ in the minds of the Americans. The end however came only in 1975 when the North Vietnamese forces finally captured Saigon on April 29, 1975 that is seven years after the Tet Offensive. The end was hastened when South Vietnamese regular forces defected or surrendered en masse to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong guerrillas. The Vietnam War was lost, not in the paddy fields of Mekong delta, but in the drawing rooms of America. The unprecedented television coverage brought the horrors of war right into the American homes, and it is the withdrawal of public support for the war that ultimately led to military disengagement. The Tet Offensive had succeeded in creating a situation of ‘no win’ in the minds of the general American public.1
In the First Afghan War between the Mujahedeen guerrillas and the Soviet Union, victory came to the guerrillas only in April 1992, nearly three years after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The war that began in December 1979 with the arrival of Soviet forces did not end in February 1989 with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The Mujahideen forces, a horde of Islamist warriors from all over the world (though the bulk were the local Pashtuns, from Afghanistan as well as Pakistan) were supported by the Americans, funded by Saudi Arabia and trained and sheltered by neighbouring Pakistan. But the fall of the Afghan regime came about only in 1992, when a powerful warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, defected to the other side.
The defection of Dostum was the end result while in all fairness, the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 began the process of the end of the Soviet-backed regime. The Vietnam and Afghanistan examples have a lesson in that ultimately the guerrilla forces can only win if the adversary conventional forces desert or defect. Survival of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan is a pointer in the direction of the power of modern conventional forces.
The perception of a ‘no win’ situation in South Africa came about essentially due to loss of international political support. But even in this case, the military dimension cannot be ignored. The defensive victory of the ANC supported forces in Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in October 1987 and simultaneous loss of air superiority ushered in the perception that South African apartheid regime was on a losing streak. Many South Africans continue to assert that the battle was actually won by the apartheid regime. But Nelson Mandela could not disagree more. “Cuito Cuanavale,” he asserted, “was the turning point for the liberation of our continent, and of my people, from the scourge of apartheid.”2
This coincided with the waning of political support of the Western nations, as the Cold War was winding up and the South African apartheid regime was no longer an asset but a liability in the rest of Africa. Many military analysts ignore the psychological effect of a battle on war. In the case of the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam war, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu lost by the French and the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, it is material that the insurgents believed that they had won. Battles and wars are, after all, won or lost in the minds of the adversaries.
The ‘no win’ inflexion point in case of successful counter-insurgencies in North East India was the liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971 that led to the loss of bases and military support that the erstwhile East Pakistan had provided. In case of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 saw a similar loss of support to the Tamil cause in India. The ultimate defeat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) came about almost a decade later but it can be safely asserted that loss of Indian support was crucial. The ‘Easter Agreement’ of May 1998 that brought to an end the Irish insurgency can be similarly attributed to the American lead. The insurgency in Northern Ireland was sustained largely due to the support, overt and covert by the Irish community in the US. The Easter Agreement heralded a change in American attitude and led the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to believe that an armed resistance was no longer feasible. It is true that the economic and political integration through the European Union had made the parochial conflict largely redundant. That it spluttered on for such a long time showed the longevity of historical animosities.
The secessionist insurgency movements like the ones in Kashmir, Northern Sri Lanka, North Eastern India, Chechnya, Tibet or Northern Ireland face a major problem. It is not enough that the insurgents have popular support in their own area’s but in order to succeed they have to win the hearts and minds of the rest of the country and create a perception of ‘no win’ situation. Till such time that this is not achieved, secessionist insurgency is not likely to succeed.
The perception of a ‘no win’ situation has an economic dimension as well. In a long-drawn out conflict, people in the conflict zone suffer untold hardships. Over a period of time, conflict weariness settles in and the yearning for peace is palpable. The mundane chores of raising a family and leading a normal life begin to loom large in people’s consciousness. In the case of South Africa for instance, economic sanctions began to bite and there was flight of capital from the country. Growth rate began to stagnate at less than one per cent and the big industrialists with capital switched sides and brought pressure on the apartheid regime to give up its policy of racial discrimination. An economic ‘no win’ can produce the desired results depending upon who suffers more deprivation. A bleak economic future can bring to senses even the most ardent revolutionaries. In conversation with this author in May 1988, Mr Ton Luia, then a minister in the Mizoram government and erstwhile Chief of Mizo National Army, told of the economic privations undergone by the rebels while staying in the jungles of Myanmar, the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT). Talking of the long-drawn out negotiations with the Indian government, he mentioned that for an insurgent a pair of clean trousers was more important than some articles of constitution. The counter-insurgents have to follow a multi-pronged approach with economic measures a major part of it.
It must be noted that while dealing with insurgency that has religious motivation no amount of force or fear of death, destruction or deprivation can bring about a ‘no win’ perception since the conflict is seen as one between the true followers of God and mere mortals. The only way out in these situations is to get God/religion on your side.
Battle for Legitimacy
In a situation where a group is using violence against the state it is ipso facto also challenging the legitimacy of the use of force by the other side. Here we come across a major problem when faced with the ideological conflicts. When the insurgents are fighting for a religion, identity or such like non-material cause, use of force has no effect on the insurgents’ morale as their ideology convinces them that the ultimate victory is theirs. The Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan/Pakistan are convinced that they are fighting a Holy War (Jihad) and death and destruction is God’s will. A somewhat similar sentiment exists in the Middle East conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. Unfortunately, counter-insurgents have steadfastly refused to pick up this ideological gauntlet.
In order to achieve a ‘no win’ situation and legitimacy, there is no short cut to confront the ideology of the insurgents. The current farce of good Jihadists and bad Jihadists or sympathy for the Communist/Maoists just because they claim to be fighting for the poor and dispossessed, is a recipe for disaster and defeat. The three step approach to ideological conflicts is to contain, neutralise and reform. In this important aspect of the battle, media and communication (both verbal and non-verbal) play a major role. The social and political front of counter-insurgency lays great emphasis on the rule of law as the main differential between an insurgent and counter-insurgent. In an ideological conflict of this nature, economic aid or incentives plays a minor role. In fact, it is more likely to strengthen the insurgent as he can present the economic gain as consequence of his successful actions. Instead of reducing, economic aid may actually fuel further violence. India has seen some of this happening in Kashmir, Nagaland and the Naxal-hit areas where economic wellbeing is taken for granted as their due and endemic violence continues like the Friday stone pelting in Srinagar or frequent attacks on police forces and government servants by the Maoists. The NATO forces led by the US are falling in precisely the same trap in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
There are many dimensions for force to be considered legitimate. The first is the ideological one. A state founded on universal principles and a system that grants every citizen fundamental rights without discrimination, automatically enjoys a legitimacy that is not available to racist, theocratic or ideology based dictatorships. The core values of the state have to be such as to appeal to not only the majority but also to the minority groups. Universal Humanism has to be the basis of these core values. For instance, if India was to be a Hindu state on the lines of Islamic states, or like Sri Lanka a Buddhist state, then in confronting a religion based separatist movement in Kashmir, it would lack legitimacy. The problem confronting the UK in Northern Ireland is similar. With UK, ideology based on loyalty to the Queen as the defender of faith, the Irish Catholics have every reason to reject it. After the demise of the Soviet Union and ushering of the Nation State of Russia, the Russian Federation faces similar dilemma in the Muslim-majority Caucasus where the Chechen rebels have been battling the state for over one and half decades. Essentially, a multi-ethnic state has to adhere to universal values and norms in order to be legitimate.
One of the most successful counter-insurgency operations was by India in Mizoram. During the two-decade long conflict India gained unmatched legitimacy in 1978. In that year, a trenchant critic of the armed forces and government, Brigadier T Sailo (Retd) led his People’s Party in the elections to the local assembly and was successful. This proved a point to the Mizo people that India meant to not just preach but practice democracy. Form this point on, the ideological foundations of the MNF were weakened beyond repair, with the insurgents finally giving up in 1986.
Legitimacy of a state is not the function of de jure constitution and core values alone. The legitimacy must also be based on the ‘reality’ of how the state behaves and its administrative practices. This is different from rhetoric and is an issue of management and checks and balances. Che Guevara had stated, “If a government has come to power through some form of popular vote, whether fraudulent or not, and if that government maintains at least an appearance of constitutional law, a guerrilla uprising cannot be brought about until all possible avenues of legal procedure have been exhausted.”3
Mao, in his manual on guerrilla war, emphasises the aspect of discipline and probity in behaviour by the guerrillas. What is true of an insurgent is equally applicable to the counter-insurgent as well. The common perception of murgi chor (chicken stealing) soldiers or policemen does greater damage to the legitimacy of counter-insurgency than any amount of adverse propaganda. The British, faced with one of the longest running insurgencies in Northern Ireland, realised that in order to be effective, the police force must have both credibility and support of the general population. In a divided society such as that in Northern Ireland, the public perception of the local police as a partisan force was strongly held by the Catholic community. The secret operations to deal with IRA underground and brutal methods of elimination of the insurgents added fuel to fire. But once the peace process was initiated and violence came under control, establishing law and order became a priority. It is to this end that the British created an institution of ‘Independent Commission for Police Complaints’.4
This was also called the civilian oversight over police function, in short an attempt to answer the question, “Who will police the police?” The independent body has no authority to initiate proceedings and is purely recommendatory yet through the use of media it can generate moral pressure and its findings are taken seriously by the superior governmental authority. In the conditions where there is a long tradition of obedience to law, it is possibly a workable model but given the pressures in a counter-insurgency situation and charged atmosphere, it may not always work. Possibly, this model is more suited when the violence has been brought under control.
There is no gainsaying the fact that ‘checks and balances’ on the use of force are needed, both to deal with individual aberrations or institutional bias. In this regard, a combination of internal organisation on lines of discipline and vigilance department with a village level informal organisation on complaints is the best alternative. But in order to preserve legitimacy and avoid excesses, internal checks of reward and punishment would work best.
The quantum and quality of force being used is also important in deciding its legitimacy. In order to have legitimacy, force must be discriminative but not excessive. This forces the counter-insurgents to fight the conflict on the terms dictated by the guerrillas. A way out of this dilemma is to create special weapons/forces harnessing technology that can carry out precision attacks. The American armed drones ‘Predators’ are an excellent example of this innovation.
| Editor’s Pick |
Legitimacy is also a function of the conduct of the security forces. Respect for human rights is an integral part of the counter insurgency operations. Here is a dilemma, since the insurgents deliberately use tactics like hiding behind people or in a populated areas, any retaliatory or action in self-defence can cause collateral damage. This is unavoidable and can best be countered through media and propaganda that puts the blame squarely on the insurgents. But insurgency is also war, a guerrilla war. In the heat of the battle, there is a temptation to target the sympathisers for acts of violence by the armed insurgents. Here, the need to educate troops and commanders at all levels is paramount. It must be understood that retaliation against the innocents would only help the insurgents recruit the kin of the victims thus defeating the purpose of counter-insurgency. To curb these abuses, it would be best to create internal organisation within the security forces rather than have an external agency. Self correction is better than external censure and is far more effective.
As a matter of interest, in fighting the tribal insurgency in India, the relationship between the insurgents and soldiers never verged on total enmity. As they came into close contact with the tribal society, soldiers were amazed and impressed with the cohesion and democratic functioning at the village level. Both sides observed an unwritten code of conduct that ensured that the women and children were never targeted, neither were the army’s medical personnel, who often treated the insurgents knowingly. Over a period of time personal relationships developed between the foes; the classic example of this was when niece of the supreme leader of Naga rebels married an Indian army officer.5
Please wait...
