Indian Defence Review

Let us ponder what the War Doctrine of India should be like. In the ‘real’ world where nations and peoples exist, ‘pacifism’ is a word only to be mouthed in global forums. Pacifism actually does not translate into weakness in politics and international relations, rather it means having more moral strength and more physical strength but be humble enough not to display it or be boastful. Our country’s often mouthed foreign policy doctrines are very nice to hear, and well suited to score brownie points at international conferences. But the reality of the employment of national strength when required should never be wished away. ‘Teddy’ Roosevelt the American President who discarded the phony veil of ‘isolationism’ at the beginning of the 20th century had aptly said, “Speak softly but carry a big stick.” He went on to make America a global power by the end of his single term Presidency overcoming all opposition and inhibitions.

Similarly, India needs to learn to speak softly and be eternally patient while dealing with her neighbours but also to never neglect the usefulness of military power to influence decision making. The best answer for a tank is another tank. Similarly, having substantive offensive capabilities is what will guarantee peace in a troubled world. All bellicose entities understand the consequences of defeat, especially after their passions have cooled and reality hits their heads hard. In order to remain a mighty land power in the future, India has to understand the geographical needs.

At the same time, our vast seaboard has to be protected by guaranteeing ‘stand-off’ capability using dominant air power which is a more flexible asset, and by the use of effective ‘sea denial’ assets. Our cyber warfare capabilities and foreign language skills also have to be greatly enhanced if we have to stay relevant. This task may be handed over to the Air Force as they are a technology intensive service and they presently have the largest numbers of surplus manpower vis-a-vis the numbers of operationally ready squadrons. A War Doctrine also needs to incorporate serious Psy War aspects and the need to genuinely win ‘Hearts and Minds’.

The absence of a proper War Doctrine for India has pitted her more often into the trap of waging ‘Limited Wars’ much to the advantage of her adversaries. Sixty years ago, the redoubtable General Douglas MacArthur was bang on target when he advocated the bombing of the Yalu bridges to cut off logistics supplies of the Chinese Army in Korea, and quickly use overwhelming force to liberate the North Korean region so that no strategic impasse would cause trouble in the future.

Another telling example was the brief and bloody engagement between the Red Army of USSR and the Imperial Japanese Army, in the steppes of Mongolia in August 1939. On June 01, 1939, when Georgii Zhukov received his summons to report to Moscow, his first reaction was to write a farewell letter to his wife, thinking that his turn for being ‘purged’ had come long after the massacres of 1937. Instead, Zhukov was put in a special aircraft and sent to Outer Mongolia to take command of the 57 Special Corps. Zhukov immediately demanded and got reinforcements from the Trans Baikal Military District. The area of Khalkin-Gol River/ Nomonhan village was 650 kms from the nearest railhead and was a five-day round trip for logistics convoys over a dirt road. The Japanese had deployed a Corps for taking offensive actions. By adopting maskirovka (great field deception) tactics, Zhukov created an impression that they were on the defensive whereas actually he had assembled sufficient stockpile to launch an offensive with a force of 58,000 men that included nearly 500 tanks and 250 aircraft.

After stalling two Japanese offensives, Zhukov revealed the presence of his three Armoured brigades which he had till then kept hidden and uncommitted, in a smashing encirclement move on August 20, along with a Mongolian cavalry division. His T-26 tanks had armour piercing ammunition and some were even modified as flame throwers. Zhukov pressed on, unmindful of casualties and disregarding the advice of the Trans Baikal Military District Chief to pause. By August 31, the Japanese Corps of nearly 61,000 troops was annihilated. This momentous victory enabled Stalin to wrest the Non Aggression Pact from Hitler on favourable terms; the civilian government in Japan led by Prince Konoe Fumimaro was forced to resign, and more importantly, the Germany–Japan Anti Comintern Pact of November 1936 became redundant and forgotten.

Events progressed to the extent that Stalin was able to negotiate a Non-Aggression Pact with Tokyo by April 1941, to the utter dismay of Hitler who was planning to unleash ‘Operation Barbarossa’ on Russia a few weeks later! Thus Russia was saved from fighting a two-front war which would have certainly ended up in its capitulation before the winter of 1941.

The ‘Strike South’ faction led by the Imperial Navy gained ascendancy in Japan, leading it to its ultimate doom in the Pacific War with the United States. These events clearly show that it was Stalin who had a clear mastery of national War Doctrine under such perilous circumstances. He saved Russia from its sworn enemies by encouraging them to first get entangled in unwinnable wars against other mighty powers. Clausewitz had said, “War is a very serious business and what marks great nations is that first they try and avoid it; but when driven to war, there is no stopping them until ultimate victory.”

Lessons for India

To have an effective War Doctrine, India should lay great emphasis in building up its political and military intelligence strength and capabilities. Most of the time, India is engaged in fighting a covert war with any one of its adversaries. In this game of unprincipled one-upmanship involving indirect targeting under the cloak of plausible deniability aimed to cause deep psychological hurt, a strong proactive and stinging intelligence mechanism with reach in hostile territory is the need of the hour. The Armed Forces’ intelligence organs have to function on a war footing even during peacetime. Only then can we escape getting ‘Kargilled’, as our enemies take advantage of every opportunity of our perceived weaknesses. To overcome our present day lacunae, the intelligence branch of a Divisional HQ should get headed by a full Colonel who should be Higher Command Course qualified and this same branch should be headed by an NDC-qualified Brigadier at the Corps HQ. Only this measure will improve the quality of analysis of our foes’ intentions, and no commander can afford to disregard such experienced and high quality advice and remedial options.

Our country’s strong intelligence apparatus should be complemented by sustained diplomatic offensives aimed to show India as a dependable partner and a friendly and quickly responsive country to deal with. This proactive approach should be specially directed at our neighbouring countries. It is worth considering appointing mature political appointees as ambassadors to these countries who have direct approach to the Prime Minister’s Office. This experiment should be continued if found successful. An Indian ambassador to these countries should be more of a high level political negotiator with direct access to the highest rungs of the political and military leadership of these countries. India’s clearly demonstrated image projection activities abroad should get an urgent fill-up in deeds and less in words. A case to ponder is why did we not send a medical ‘division’ set-up consisting of nine field hospitals augmented with civilian expert doctors and protection elements to fight the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the African continent?

In the Nehruvian era, the image of Indians in Africa was ten feet tall and their leaders felt free to approach Indian leaders because of the sincere faith that had been built up. Today we find the Chinese building bridges in Africa better than any other country, and converting these into economic opportunities. A tale that is often told is that of an African minister who requested the Indian Ambassador for 20 PC systems which were urgently required for his Ministry. A lot of sweet talk emanated from the Ambassador, but there was no movement on the ground. The exasperated minister then requested the Chinese Ambassador. All twenty PCs were installed free of cost within seven days, and the Chinese Ambassador thereafter also extended a line of credit to install 1,000 computers in the ministry’s departments within two months! Today, unfortunately, India’s diplomats are short-selling India abroad because of their bureaucratic tendencies and laissez faire approach to emerging situations. The political leadership needs to support our missions abroad.

India must invest heavily in neighbouring countries where there is peace as well as law and order. Just as the Chinese companies are doing, the Government of India (GoI) should task business houses in India to invest in particular types of visible infrastructure and these commercial ventures need to be quietly subsidized. The Indian system of higher secondary education is highly acclaimed the world over and needs to be popularised abroad using private partners and franchisees, who should be financially supported and closely monitored to ensure sustained high quality. Similarly, with the GoI’s support, fully residential engineering and technology colleges, management institutions, medical colleges and professional training colleges should be set up by reputed private corporate bodies of India in locations abroad. At least 80 per cent of the students should be offered liberal scholarships by the GoI. This will create a climate of goodwill towards India amidst the emerging generations in these countries.

Indian industries should set up manufacturing bases abroad with the active policy support of the GoI and Indian Bank consortiums, so that we quietly change the image of our country in the eyes of other nationals and also imbibe the best management practices prevalent globally. This would require the strong political support of a new ‘Cabinet Committee for Global Investments’ which should meet every quarter. A case in point is the need to establish a rail link from India to Kathmandu before the Chinese extend theirs from Xigatse to the Nepalese capital.

Over the next decade, India must follow a well-crafted policy of ambiguity and refuse to get drawn into any larger conflict, when she is not fully prepared for the eventualities. This will mainly involve exercising restraint in the face of severe provocations caused by our hostile neighbour(s), retaliating to situations only in situ by imposing disproportionate damages on errant opponents or by using strictly covert means. The lessons of Op Parakram deployment for a wasteful and prolonged period should be properly taken heed of. For example, the moment we start laying defensive minefields, our opponents can correctly read that we are hesitant to go for offensive actions. We should threaten to use force only when we have developed a ‘knock-out punch’ capability. Until then we should exercise utmost caution so that we do not get taken lightly, when we mean otherwise. Capability building on a steady basis should not get interrupted till we actually become overwhelmingly strong. The need of the hour is to identify and use the services and dedication of dynamic personalities a la Albert Speer, who was Hitler’s Minister for War Production, who ensured that Nazi Germany completed its rearmament in a mere seven years and was capable of giving strong resistance till the very end, when the tide of war changed and Ferdinand Porsche, who led the design team which mass produced the PzKw Mark IV Leopard tank series, which ensured the successful unveiling of blitzkrieg tactics and initial German victories over all its adversaries in WWII.

The biggest stumbling block to the emergence of a proper War Doctrine for India is the pathetic state of indigenous R&D effort in developing weapon systems and the poor manufacturing and innovation prowess of our defence production set up. We need demanding and hard driving leaders to get the required results. The armed forces, who are the users, instead of sitting back after giving the GSQR and proposals to the Defence Ministry should now get into the act themselves and start developing the desired products up to the Prototype and Pilot Manufacturing Plant stage.

Bureaucrats in the MoD easily escape responsibility by raising ‘observations’ and the DRDO passes the blame to the users for ‘changing’ the GSQR specifications but all this delay only helps our enemies, costs the lives of brave and patriotic soldiers in the event of war and impedes the attainment of victory. All those who are involved in this circus appear to the public as if they have no national pride and they are on the payroll of our country’s enemies. Self-serving gerontocracies rule the roost in MoD and DRDO circles, and it would be naïve to expect any change unless most Joint Secretary-level officers in the MoD and DRDO are replaced by officers from the armed forces.

The whole talk of ‘Transfer of Technology’ under the garb of ‘Buy and Make’ is a facade for perpetuating lack of accountability in cost escalation, cover up of slippages in delivery schedules and making fertile grounds for permanent sources of kickbacks to all those who are involved in processing the proposals, monitoring the schedules and ensuring quality assurances. It would be far more economical to outright buy the complete lot of equipment which we cannot manufacture and set up only the required MRO facilities within the country. No seller parts with the actual technology otherwise he will be out of business. So he will, therefore, part with only the ‘monkey version’ of the technology and give the necessary bribes, when nobody is looking. The right path would be to independently develop the required technology and weapons platform using all inputs, as China is presently doing and it is succeeding in manufacturing working prototypes within three years of purchase of any equipment from abroad. There is no scope for having wishful thinking and mistakes which have been going on for decades cannot afford to be repeated.

Conclusion

In the natural progression of a country to take its rightful place in the world hierarchy by the middle of the next decade, India has no alternative but to make its processes simple, productive, modern and cost effective. Having a robust National War Doctrine will be the fitting measure to eradicate systemic inadequacies and the pitfalls of short term and tenure based thinking of retiring senior executives in the government. A Military Doctrine is only a component to achieve the aims of the country’s all encompassing and multi-dimensional War Doctrine. A good War Doctrine helps to prevent War whereas a good Military Doctrine will help to achieve victory in the event of a war. Making economic progress of high order and promotion of social equity under the democratic framework demands that India pays serious attention to this little understood aspect of power play.