Indian Defence Review

It is in this spirit that India has strategic partnerships with a variety of countries. The idea is to develop the basis of long term relationships to mutual advantage, create trust and avoid any policy that hurts the legitimate interests of the other partner.

US has interests spread all over the world by virtue of it being a global power. It cannot expect India to support its policies everywhere. US would want to fit India in the global architecture of its policies. India has no such global architecture in which it wants to fit US. It cannot easily fit US even into the regional architecture of its policies, whether this relates to Pakistan, China’s territorial claims on India, the post Dalai Lama phase in Tibet, Iran etc.

The challenge for India’s foreign policy in the years ahead is to be courted by all and to succumb to no one. Even if India cannot lead, it must not be led.

India has, in fact, shown great resilience, despite its economic and military weakness, to try and stand on its own feet strategically in international affairs. Even big European powers, which have in the past ruled many parts of the world, do not have strategic autonomy today despite the collapse of Soviet Union and communism as an ideology. They willingly subordinate themselves to US.

By choosing strategic self-reliance India has to cope with challenges largely on its own.  This requires that India avoid getting into situations it cannot handle, in the main, on its own. It does not have allies to shore up its positions.

The west has never supported India so far on issues of core concern to it, whether political, military or technological. It has now removed certain technological disabilities on India but far from fully.

The developing countries haven’t supported India either on Pakistan, China or nuclear related issues.

This explains why Indian foreign policy tends to be cautious and reticent in taking partisan positions on highly divisive issues.

There are pressures on India to be more forthright, not sit on the fence, be willing to incur costs in upholding the international order and not be a free-loader. India will have to resist such pressures in the years ahead, because many of these arise from the aggressive, dominating habits that the west has not been able to shed, which drives its efforts to shape the world according to its values which it considers universal.

India’s challenge is not to be simply co-opted into the existing international order that is controlled by the west. It must find its due place in it in its own right and be in a position to change the rules rather than simply adhere to existing ones.

The reform of international institutions is therefore very important and India’s discourse on this is legitimate. India should have a greater say in these institutions. Getting a permanent seat in the Security Council will remain a challenge as resistance to this will not go away soon.

Self-esteem and confidence are reflected in India’s claim to a permanent seat. India is not begging; it is claiming. India should pursue this quest, if only to remind that the existing international institutions that uphold the present world order are no longer representative of the international community.

We have to carefully weigh the China factor in seeking redistribution of power at the global level. The gap between India and China has grown so big that in any re-ordering of the world order China can gain more. With China’s world view, its sense of itself, its historical grievances and its territorially expansionist policies, India, which has serious differences with China, cannot be comfortable with a more powerful China within the international system.

China has become too powerful economically and financially and too integrated with the global economy to be contained in the way the Soviet Union was and the way Russia is  still being pressured by the west. US pivot towards Asia is not intended to actively confront China; it is to caution it against any adventurism.

US-China relationship is much more intensive than the US-India relationship. We should not pay much attention to the democracy rhetoric. China becoming more democratic is no guarantee against a more muscled Chinese foreign policy.

US and its democratic allies have muscled foreign policies too, as they are using force in many parts of the world at great human cost. Political and moral justification for military action can always be found, with globally powerful media helping to rationalize such action.

Democracy is no insurance against the use of military means to achieve national ends.

Nationalism can be a powerful driver in foreign policy. A more democratic but nationalist China will not be any less of a problem for others.

Unfortunately, China has made it clear that it does not intend to solve the border issue with India; it says it wants it to remain dormant and leave it to the next generation to resolve it. But then, as we have seen in the latest maps on Chinese passports, China is establishing its claims in insidious ways. These actions reveal the longer-term strategy China has in mind.

It is clear Tibet is not reconciled to China’s rule. Dalai Lama’s succession can revive tensions between India and China. India has to make sure Bhutan does not yield to China’s blandishments. China’s rising profile in Sri Lanka and Nepal is a cause of concern. The China-Pakistan axis remains a grave problem.

India has to develop its economic and military muscle to counter the China threat. There is no other way. This is a big challenge for us ahead, even as engage China as others do.

India cannot risk a confrontation with China; its strategy should be to dissuade China from taking the risk of confronting India with visible and independent strategic strength.

India has to find the right balance between engaging China and hedging against it.

Some would say that a critical foreign policy challenge confronting India is the maintenance of friendly ties with its neighbours. India, it is claimed, cannot rise to its potential if it is embroiled in conflicts or tensions with its neighbours. India has supposedly failed in this regard.

Having good relations with neighbours is not a unilateral exercise; it is a reciprocal one. If India should have good relations with its neighbours, then it is equally incumbent on the neighbours to have good relations with India. No one can argue that India’s conduct alone is deficient.

India should, of course, try to do its best to win over the neighbours, but if the neighbours see it in their interest to balance a much larger India by drawing in external powers, and prevent their national identities from being overwhelmed by India’s civilisational and cultural pull by emphasing differences with India and stoking anti-Indian national sentiments, there is little India can do. This challenge will not go away.

The argument that India as the bigger country should be more generous with its neighbours is fallacious. Big countries like China and US do not believe in the merits of this approach. Vietnam and Cuba come to mind.

India’s economic growth will be of key importance for tying our neighbours economically to the Indian market. It will be important to give stakes to a cross section of people in our neighbouring countries in various sectors our economy. In this context the strengthening of SAARC should be a priority.

Our improved relations with US has excluded one external factor that in the past complicated our relations with our neighbours. China, hoever, remains a problem in this regard.

Pakistan remains a perennial problem. While some aspects of our relations with that country are improving, as for example, in the trade area, larger questions about the rise of Islamic radicalism there and fears that Pakistan could become a failing state are being debated.

There is little that India can do help Pakistan fight its own internal demons. India is, in fact, the reason why these demons exist in the first place. Unless Pakistan radically changes its attitude to India, ceases to whip up religious sentiments against us that feed the jihadi groups, the problem of radicalism in Pakistan cannot be successfully controlled.

India should continue to encourage more economic and people to people ties with Pakistan, but should also be clear-sighted about the serious obstacles in normalizing relations with that country.

We should shed the belief that concessions will make Pakistan more amenable.

India does not need to re-assure Pakistan about its intentions or make Pakistan trust us. The reverse is needed: it is Pakistan that needs to make the requisite effort to convince India that it has abandoned the use of terrorism as state policy.

Do we have a stake in Pakistan’s survival as a united country, or should we encourage the break-up of the country? So long as Pakistan is adversarial, we have no stakes in Pakistan’s territorial integrity. It would be ironical for India to be supportive of Pakistan’s geographical health when it wants a slice away a part of Indian territory.

We should not, however, actively seek to de-stabilize Pakistan, as managing a fragmented Pakistan would raise its own problems.

On the other hand, a broken up Pakistan loses value for the Chinese. Even a chronically unstable Pakistan loses value. It is unlikely that the Chinese will want to rescue Pakistan with economic largesse. In that context, disarray in Pakistan is not unhelpful to us.

Obversely, we cannot have a viable Central Asia and even Afghan policy if Pakistan remains unstable. If this whole region is to be integrated economically, with energy and trade connectivities, the geo-political key is in Pakistan’s hands.