Indian Defence Review

And in the aftermath of the 9/11 strikes on the twin towers there were unconfirmed reports that nuclear warheads had been moved from Pakistan to China for safekeeping. If this were true then Beijing may well decide again that this is best in keeping with their national interest.26

The Army and Politics in Pakistan

That the army has always controlled the strings of power in Pakistan is a fact of history. Only in the initial stages of its existence was there an effort to democratize the nation. From the 1950s onwards, the military began to indirectly exercise its role in the functioning of government and by Ayub Khan’s time it was direct military rule. The idea that an institution of the state could exercise both direct and indirect control over the state and the political establishment is apparent from the Bhutto years when the army decided to stay in the barracks and yet ‘guided’ democracy by laying down conditions on the manner in which the government could function.

It would be recalled that Benazir Bhutto was not administered the oath of office of Prime Minister till such time that an informal agreement was reached between her and the Army on foreign policy and nuclear issues. After the restoration of democracy, the military retained its leverage by permitting the President, constitutionally to dismiss the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. At the same time, the army tacitly retained its pre-eminence in the sphere of foreign and defence policy matters. In fact, some observers claim that the Bhutto years were also an example of controlled democracy, where the Army, along with the intelligence agencies, played an important role in the running of government.27

“¦the incapability of the present civilian government in tackling a range of national security issues, it has been possible for the army to assert itself “¦

More recently, the Musharraf era coincided with direct military rule and institutionalization of the role of the army in every part of government. Army officers, both serving and retired were appointed in each and every government department. This trend was reversed by General Kayani. But that does not take away from the military-industrial complex constructed within the country by the Pakistani army to keep its control over the instruments of state. More importantly, because of weak democratic institutions, barring the media, and the incapability of the present civilian government in tackling a range of national security issues, it has been possible for the army to assert itself in any eventuality, be in a natural calamity, such as the floods in 2009, or be it the US led war on terror in the North West Frontier Province.

So where does the army go from here? According to the ISPR press release of the 139th Corps Commanders Conference held at the GHQ, Rawalpindi on 9 June 2011, the Corps Commanders “noted with regret that despite briefing the Joint Session of the Parliament and deferring the ultimate findings to the Commission appointed by the Government, some quarters, because of their perceptual biases, were trying to deliberately run down the Armed Forces and Army in particular. This is an effort to drive a wedge between the Army, different organs of the State and more seriously, the people of Pakistan whose support the Army has always considered vital for its operations against terrorists. The participants agreed that all of us should take cognizance of this unfortunate trend and put an end to it.28

It is interesting that the armed forces are being forced by circumstances to defend their pre-eminent position, which is being questioned today from within and by civil society, raising fears that the army will find difficult to retain its credibility. The route it has chosen immediately is to ensure maintenance of primacy by ‘involving’ the people by seeking their support in the war on terror.

The implications of the present situation are fluidity and uncertainty. For the Pakistan army both conditions apply. This is so because without strong leadership from General Kayani and quick action on terror there is likely to be a continuation of the present state of threat.

Little wonder then that the Corps Commanders “recommended to the Government that the US funds meant for military assistance to Army, be diverted towards economic aid to Pakistan which can be used for reducing the burden on the common man.” So while the army continues to pay tribute to the “resilience and sacrifices of valiant people of Pakistan”, it assured the nation that it will do its utmost and continue to sacrifice for the security and well being of the people.29 For the time being one should read this as an attempt to ensure that too many volcano’s do not erupt within Pakistan, one of which could upset the apple cart and lead to an erosion in the army’s position.

Therefore, the recognition that “Pakistan’s internal situation is the most important factor and it cannot be relegated in priority” is a welcome sign. But how can it be eased? The answer to that according to Kayani is to “continue supporting the democratic system without any preference to any particular political party.” At the same time, the army will continue to lead the fight on terror in partnership with other law enforcement agencies and in line with the Constitution. Does this mean that the army wants to remain in the barracks and not take over the reins of government? It already has the reins of power therefore it stands to reason that it continues to rebuild its image and focus on the task of containing terrorism.

So what happens to the third leg of the Pakistani state, “America” the other two commonly being described as “Allah” and “Army?” In the light of the US Abbottabad operation Pakistan went on the defensive, making the right noises about minimizing the presence of American troops on Pak soil. Obviously, military to military relations with the US have to be viewed within the larger ambit of bilateral relations between the two countries as the press release of the 139th Corps Commanders Conference notes.30

The military in Pakistan will have to come up with new innovations in terms of global best practice on counter-insurgency if it is to maintain its supremacy in the pegging order of the state.

The participants were also informed about the extent of intelligence cooperation with the US. It has been decided to share intelligence strictly on the basis of reciprocity and complete transparency. It has been clearly put across to US intelligence officials that no intelligence agency can be allowed to carry out independent operation on our soil.

The implications of the present situation are fluidity and uncertainty. For the Pakistan army both conditions apply. This is so because without strong leadership from General Kayani and quick action on terror there is likely to be a continuation of the present state of threat. In addition, the army has to rebuild its image carefully and this will call for decisive action against militant elements both within the forces and outside. Without this, the forces will find it difficult to maintain credibility.

The army has long been involved in the fortunes of Pakistan. Therefore, to expect it to completely delink itself is also a pipe dream. The present level of involvement suggests that as long as the civilian government is weak, the military will continue to dictate terms. Given General Kayani’s personal predilections and support of his Corps Commanders it is likely that the US will back him till such time they can find another Benazir Bhutto. With no such leader on the horizon it is clear that Kayani is here for some time to come.