Indian Defence Review

The Army and Counter-Terrorism

Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan is rife with inherent contradictions, caught between an inclination to fight militant forces and yet having to partner with some to strengthen its bargaining position. While this is no doubt a truism, it is also correct to state that its global strategy on the war on terror is dictated by the ISI and therefore, contradictions abound.20

“¦military is the only weapon in the armoury of the state to fight terror, particularly of the jihadi kind in Pakistans North West frontier. But more than the military option, it is the exercise of political will that is most important.

In the present context, there are plenty of problems because of the conflicting priorities. But General Kayani opined in 2008 that one of the challenges faced by the Pakistan army in its anti-terrorism strategy is the “centuries’ old traditions and enmities” prevalent in many areas in Pakistan. This, in his opinion, made it difficult to secure the confidence and support of local communities. Hence, Kayani felt, that only a “pure military solution” would not yield results but it needed to be supplemented with civic and economic assistance that would bring basic services to remote areas.21

It may be argued that the military is the only weapon in the armoury of the state to fight terror, particularly of the jihadi kind in Pakistan’s North West frontier. But more than the military option, it is the exercise of political will that is most important. The developmental strategies allied to engaging the tribal genius in this war is going to be all important. This is where the army has to concentrate.

Intensifying military operations has the danger of collateral damage. One option is to use the special forces route, as the US did in Abbottabad, to take out the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. The military has to reinvent its counter-insurgency strategy and make it clear that it is fighting terrorism, period. That is the challenge before General Kayani today.

So where does the military stand today in this regard? The press release of the ISPR of the 139th Corps Commanders Conference states that Kayani told his colleagues that that the Army was following a “well thought out campaign plan” and was under no pressure to carry out operations at a particular time. The army chief also noted that “future operations, as and when undertaken, will be with political consensus.”22

“¦the growing clout of the militants in Pakistan and their penetration of institutions indicates that a terrorist strike on a nuclear facility is not an improbability.

The hearts and minds strategy is the common strategy followed by militaries the world over to curb and contain insurgencies. General Kayani has taken this a step further and makes a political statement when he calls upon the ”brave people” of North Wazaristan Agency [NWA] to “evict all foreigners” from their soil and “take charge of their land and destiny once again.” He emphasized that it was wrong, in principle, to allow others to use our land for fighting their battles. So Kayani informs his Corps Commanders that the Army in NWA is “committed to supporting the people of NWA in this effort.”23 Seen one way this means that the military has left it to the people to fight terror. Are we seeing withdrawal symptoms? Or is Kayani planning a new offensive that is premised on the hearts and minds strategy?

The Army and Nuclear Weapons

The assault on PNS Mehran and the Abbottabad raid by the US had two important implications. First, it sent out a signal that a country with nuclear weapons is not necessarily immune to specific and targeted strikes. Second, the growing clout of the militants in Pakistan and their penetration of institutions indicates that a terrorist strike on a nuclear facility is not an improbability.

In the first instance, if the Abbottabad operation was conducted by the US without the tacit consent of the Pakistani establishment then it means that Americans were not too bothered about that threat. Secrecy and surprise being the key elements the US calculated that Islamabad would not get a chance to respond.

It is Beijing that should be most worried about the safety and security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. China has had a close link to the development of the nuclear programme since the 1970s.

On the other hand, the Mehran base attack and killing of the journalist Shahzad shows the impact of jihadi elements within Pakistan and the risks involved of their coming into possession of nuclear weapons. In the worst case scenario, these terrorists will use the nuclear weapons, not in Pakistan or Kashmir as is commonly believed, but in Europe and America.24 That is the reason why it must be impressed on the military and government in Islamabad that the security of the nuclear facilities, both physical and manpower, must be of the highest order.

It is Beijing that should be most worried about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. China has had a close link to the development of the nuclear programme since the 1970s. Beijing has not only provided Islamabad with nuclear bombs, uranium, and plants (all three Pakistani nuclear plants—Kahuta, Khushab, and Chasma—have been built with Chinese assistance) but also their delivery systems: ready to-launch M-9 (Ghaznavi/Hatf), M-11 (Shaheen), and a number of Dong Feng 21 (Ghauri) ballistic missiles.25

And in the aftermath of the 9/11 strikes on the twin towers there were unconfirmed reports that nuclear warheads had been moved from Pakistan to China for safekeeping. If this were true then Beijing may well decide again that this is best in keeping with their national interest.26

The Army and Politics in Pakistan

That the army has always controlled the strings of power in Pakistan is a fact of history. Only in the initial stages of its existence was there an effort to democratize the nation. From the 1950s onwards, the military began to indirectly exercise its role in the functioning of government and by Ayub Khan’s time it was direct military rule. The idea that an institution of the state could exercise both direct and indirect control over the state and the political establishment is apparent from the Bhutto years when the army decided to stay in the barracks and yet ‘guided’ democracy by laying down conditions on the manner in which the government could function.

It would be recalled that Benazir Bhutto was not administered the oath of office of Prime Minister till such time that an informal agreement was reached between her and the Army on foreign policy and nuclear issues. After the restoration of democracy, the military retained its leverage by permitting the President, constitutionally to dismiss the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. At the same time, the army tacitly retained its pre-eminence in the sphere of foreign and defence policy matters. In fact, some observers claim that the Bhutto years were also an example of controlled democracy, where the Army, along with the intelligence agencies, played an important role in the running of government.27

“¦the incapability of the present civilian government in tackling a range of national security issues, it has been possible for the army to assert itself “¦

More recently, the Musharraf era coincided with direct military rule and institutionalization of the role of the army in every part of government. Army officers, both serving and retired were appointed in each and every government department. This trend was reversed by General Kayani. But that does not take away from the military-industrial complex constructed within the country by the Pakistani army to keep its control over the instruments of state. More importantly, because of weak democratic institutions, barring the media, and the incapability of the present civilian government in tackling a range of national security issues, it has been possible for the army to assert itself in any eventuality, be in a natural calamity, such as the floods in 2009, or be it the US led war on terror in the North West Frontier Province.

So where does the army go from here? According to the ISPR press release of the 139th Corps Commanders Conference held at the GHQ, Rawalpindi on 9 June 2011, the Corps Commanders “noted with regret that despite briefing the Joint Session of the Parliament and deferring the ultimate findings to the Commission appointed by the Government, some quarters, because of their perceptual biases, were trying to deliberately run down the Armed Forces and Army in particular. This is an effort to drive a wedge between the Army, different organs of the State and more seriously, the people of Pakistan whose support the Army has always considered vital for its operations against terrorists. The participants agreed that all of us should take cognizance of this unfortunate trend and put an end to it.28

It is interesting that the armed forces are being forced by circumstances to defend their pre-eminent position, which is being questioned today from within and by civil society, raising fears that the army will find difficult to retain its credibility. The route it has chosen immediately is to ensure maintenance of primacy by ‘involving’ the people by seeking their support in the war on terror.

The implications of the present situation are fluidity and uncertainty. For the Pakistan army both conditions apply. This is so because without strong leadership from General Kayani and quick action on terror there is likely to be a continuation of the present state of threat.

Little wonder then that the Corps Commanders “recommended to the Government that the US funds meant for military assistance to Army, be diverted towards economic aid to Pakistan which can be used for reducing the burden on the common man.” So while the army continues to pay tribute to the “resilience and sacrifices of valiant people of Pakistan”, it assured the nation that it will do its utmost and continue to sacrifice for the security and well being of the people.29 For the time being one should read this as an attempt to ensure that too many volcano’s do not erupt within Pakistan, one of which could upset the apple cart and lead to an erosion in the army’s position.

Therefore, the recognition that “Pakistan’s internal situation is the most important factor and it cannot be relegated in priority” is a welcome sign. But how can it be eased? The answer to that according to Kayani is to “continue supporting the democratic system without any preference to any particular political party.” At the same time, the army will continue to lead the fight on terror in partnership with other law enforcement agencies and in line with the Constitution. Does this mean that the army wants to remain in the barracks and not take over the reins of government? It already has the reins of power therefore it stands to reason that it continues to rebuild its image and focus on the task of containing terrorism.

So what happens to the third leg of the Pakistani state, “America” the other two commonly being described as “Allah” and “Army?” In the light of the US Abbottabad operation Pakistan went on the defensive, making the right noises about minimizing the presence of American troops on Pak soil. Obviously, military to military relations with the US have to be viewed within the larger ambit of bilateral relations between the two countries as the press release of the 139th Corps Commanders Conference notes.30

The military in Pakistan will have to come up with new innovations in terms of global best practice on counter-insurgency if it is to maintain its supremacy in the pegging order of the state.

The participants were also informed about the extent of intelligence cooperation with the US. It has been decided to share intelligence strictly on the basis of reciprocity and complete transparency. It has been clearly put across to US intelligence officials that no intelligence agency can be allowed to carry out independent operation on our soil.

The implications of the present situation are fluidity and uncertainty. For the Pakistan army both conditions apply. This is so because without strong leadership from General Kayani and quick action on terror there is likely to be a continuation of the present state of threat. In addition, the army has to rebuild its image carefully and this will call for decisive action against militant elements both within the forces and outside. Without this, the forces will find it difficult to maintain credibility.

The army has long been involved in the fortunes of Pakistan. Therefore, to expect it to completely delink itself is also a pipe dream. The present level of involvement suggests that as long as the civilian government is weak, the military will continue to dictate terms. Given General Kayani’s personal predilections and support of his Corps Commanders it is likely that the US will back him till such time they can find another Benazir Bhutto. With no such leader on the horizon it is clear that Kayani is here for some time to come.

Conclusion

The above analysis makes it clear that Pakistan has a long way to go especially in the strengthening of the sinews of power and in terms of capability to tackle the internal security challenge. It is perhaps for the first time, that we are seeing an articulation of the importance of the internal security matrix in the Pakistan military. Recent statements emanating from GHQ Rawalpindi make it clear that the military is now seriously considering its own role within this matrix. In fact, it is a catch 22 situation wherein a move in any direction could lead to erosion of power and status. Maintaining status quo and yet moving towards a goal is going to the main challenge before the army in Pakistan.

Uncertainty and internal strife have the hallmark of Pakistan in the last decade. These two conditions have always made India wary of its neighbour, both in terms of the threats that it poses and in terms of the diplomatic challenges it throws up. In a sense, the recent events in Pakistan have shown that New Delhi’s articulation about Pakistan having become the global epicenter of terrorism is now recognized by even the United States. And yet linked as it is intricately to Afghanistan, it is important for India to view any long term solution for Pakistan as being interlinked with the developments in Kabul. In policy terms, the challenge is to cooperate with Islamabad while ensuring that fundamentals on terrorism are not compromised. At the same time, the American presence in Afghanistan should be contextualized in terms of our own interests and move ahead on the same path as presently pursued.

The military in Pakistan will have to come up with new innovations in terms of global best practice on counter-insurgency if it is to maintain its supremacy in the pegging order of the state. This can only happen if there is some new thinking and that is the challenge for General Kayani. Tomorrow will never come for Pakistan if its nuclear weapons get into the hands of jihadi’s!

Notes and References :

1. Khalid Qayum, ” Pakistan’s Army Chief Kayani Pledges to Stay Out of Politics” Bloomberg L.P., 6 March 2008.
2. Ibrahim Sajid Malick, ‘Pakistan to keep, a bit longer, current Army Chief’, Posted on 17 May 2010 at http://ibrahimsajidmalick.com/pakistan-to-keep-a-bit-longer-current-army-chief/1410/
3. Ibid.
4. Wilson John, Osama’s death: The Key Question, 03 May 2011 http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=22929&mmacmaid=22930
5. Reza Jan, Continuity in a Time of Flux: Pakistan Army Chief’s Term Extended, August 9, 2010 AEI Critical Threats http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/continuity-time-flux-pakistan-army-chief%E2%80%99s-term-extended-august-09-2010
6. R Banerji, Kayani and his Generals, Article No.: 1711, Date: 29/12/2010. Centre for Land Warfare Studies. http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=712&u_id=36
7. Micheal Krepon, Osama and U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Analysis, May 02, 2011. http://www.stimson.org/summaries/osama-and-us-pakistan-relations/
8. Smarting, Pak Army chief warns US, India, Indian Express, Friday, May 6, 2011, 02:10 hrs, Islamabad. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/smarting-pak-army-chief-warns-us-india/786640/0
9. Ibid.
10. If sovereignty is breached, US ties will be reviewed: Kayani Thursday, 5 May 2011 | http://www.nerve.in/news:253500391449 | Channel: Asia
11. Micheal Krepon, Pakistan May 05, 2011, Pakistan, Testimony Of Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, The Stimson Center Before The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011. http://www.stimson.org/summaries/pakistan-1/
12. Karin Brulliard, Anger simmers in Pakistani army over bin Laden raid, Published: Washington Post, May 19, 2011 | Updated: Saturday, May 21, 3:08 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-pakistans-army-anger-simmers/2011/05/18/AFU8yB7G_story.html
13. Senator Kerry meets Pakistan Army chief, Monday, 16 May 2011 | http://www.nerve.in/news:253500393723 | channel: Asia
14. Graeme Smith, Republic Of Fables: Pakistan’s reaction to Osama’s killing shows it’s a country of contradictions, The Globe and the Mail, May 15, 2011. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pakistans-reaction-to-osamas-killing-shows-its-a-country-of-contradictions/article2021970/singlepage/
15. PNS Mehran attack, Editorial, The Dawn, June 9, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/24/pns-mehran-attack.html
16. Pakistan raid raises nuclear fears, Dawn.com May 15, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/25/pakistan-raid-raises-nuclear-fears.html
17. Bob Dietz, Rising anger amid accusations about who killed Shahzad, CPJ Blog, June 2, 2011. http://cpj.org/blog/2011/06/rising-anger-amid-accusations-about-who-killed-sha.php#more
18. A Journalist is Silenced, Editorial, The Hindu, June 2, 2011. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2071554.ece 
19. Suhasini Haidar, The story that killed Saleem Shahzad, June 2, 2011 The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2071460.ece Also see, Anita Joshua, ISI takes flak for Shahzad’s killing, The Hindu, ISLAMABAD, June 1, 2011 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2068550.ece
20. Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2011, 34:1 pp. 149_162, http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Siddiqa.pdf
21. Kayani: ‘It is unjust to criticize Pakistan’ for not locating Osama, The Hindu, Chennai, May 3, 2011 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1988673.ece
22. 139th Corps Commanders Conference, Press Release No. PR/134- 2011-ISPR, Rawalpindi, June 9, 2011. http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1763
23. Ibid.
24. Narayanan Komerath, Has Pakistan Lost Its Nuclear Weapons?, Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Volume 5(1) July-August 2002. http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-1/narayanan.html
25. Mohan Malik, The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict, Parameters, Spring 2003, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/03spring/malik.pdf
26. Ibid. fn. 51.
27. Olivier Immig & Jan Van Heugten A Taste Of Power: The Uneasy Reign Of Benazir Bhutto 1988-1990. The Netherlands 1992, http://www.immigvanheugten.nl/downloads/A%20taste%20of%20power%20-%20the%20uneasy%20reign%20of%20Benazir%20Bhutto%201988-1990%20(MERA%20April%201992).pdf
28. See Fn. 22 above.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.