Homeland Security

From Kashmir to Mumbai : Terror Comes Full Circle
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Issue Vol 24.1 Jan-Mar2009 | Date : 20 Aug , 2010

Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Mesopotamia, Saudi Arabia, South East Asia, Causacus, USA, Great Britain and Israel have remained largely unscathed since 9/11. One can debate the reasons for the Mumbai carnage endlessly and actually never come to the real reason for its enactment. However, what is irrefutable is that the militants in Kashmir have been rendered a delibitating and crippling blow. Is this frustration in Kashmir responsible for such reprehensible acts outside J&K?

Turning The Tide In Kashmir

The terrorist infrastructure in PoK has remained intact, albeit scaled down from 52 camps in 2006 to 37 in 2008 with Kotli and Muzzaffarabad being the epicentres of terrorist training. The launch pads remaining the same i.e, 48, Pakistan has increased the number of ingress points along the entire LoC/IB so as to increase the access rate of infiltration.

Pakistan calibrated the level of infiltration and violence as per internal and international situation, so as to maintain deniability, while endeavouring to keep the number of militants at an optimum level. As per Multi Agency Centre(MAC) it is estimated that close to 6000-8000 terrorists are presently available in Pakistan of which 1500-2000 are concentrated at various training and staging camps. The number of terrorists present inside J&K has now gone down to a little under 1000 with the  foreign content being 66 percent.

Levels Of Infiltration And Violence

In the year 2005, out of a total of 597 infiltration attempts, 335 were successful, the year 2006 saw 343 successful attempts out of 573, and the year 2007 saw 311 successful attempts against 535 attempted. Compare this to the period upto 2004, where infiltration attempts were in the range of 2000 or so, and infiltration had been much more than the rate of attrition of militants (ranging between 550 and 2020 in any one year). In the year 2008 the number of infiltration attempts further declined and most of these attempts were foiled.

Latest reports pertaining to training of women couriers and suicide bombers, parachute and snow-warfare training to select LeT terrorists in Kalighati and Kel in PoK can only be ignored at Indias peril.

All parameters of violence have shown a steady decline. In 2008 the number of terrorism related incidents dropped by 40 percent from the period 2006-2007.174 civilians and security force personnel lost their lives in the year 2008, a sharp decline from the year 2004 when 859 civilians and SF personnel had died in terror related violence in the state. Around 380 militants, including a large number of terrorist leaders were eliminated in the year 2008, figures for the years 2007 and 2006 being 478 and 589 respectively. Consequently the terrorists avoided direct contact with the Army preferring low risk, high gain acts of violence. Recent trends show election of soft targets like tourists, migrant labour and security force informers.

The tide has turned slowly and irrevocably against the militants. The reasons are many.

The Anti-infiltration Obstacle System (aios)

First, prior to enforcement of the ceasefire in November 2003, the Pakistan Army provided artillery, mortar and small arms covering fire to infiltrating and exfiltrating militant groups. Although numerous terrorists were killed in the process, the numbers infiltrating and exfiltrating only doubled year after year.

Checking infiltration all along the LoC became an operational imperative that was practically impossible to execute as the terrain ideally suited infiltration. It was against this backdrop that the Indian Army conceived the idea of undertaking the a project for fencing the loc. This onerous task of erecting the 12 feet high multi-layered barbed wire fence along most of  the 750 Km stretch of LoC, covering areas of almost two corps zones was completed in a record time of one year in 2004.

Second, the efficacy of the fence was augmented with a series of surveillance devices, and apart from the multi-layer barbed wire, concertina coils with high-tech surveillance and detection devices were co-opted in the design.

The infantry battalions deployed along the LoC were provided with devices like LORROS (long range reconnaissance observation system), hand-held thermal imagers, intrusion detection devices, passive infra red sensors, ground sensors and battle field surveillance radars.

Also the concept of a multi-layered counter-infiltration(CI) grid was introduced. In the CI grid the Indian Army was deployed along the length of the LoC in a linear fashion constituting the first tier.

The second, tier, too, was occupied by the Army, along the length of the fence or the AIOS, just behind the first tier or the LoC. The third tier in the hinterland comprises the Rashtriya Rifles(RR), Border Security Force(BSF) in some areas, the fourth tier in towns by the Central Reserve Police Force(CRPF), Special Operations Group(SOG) of the J&K Police and the Village Defence Committees(VDCs), established in 1994 in the areas of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda.

Due to the above measures, the strength of the militants in J&K has been drastically reduced, and  with increased pressure on them in the hinterland, their capability to strike has been rendered ineffective to a great extent. The elimination of a large number of militant commanders, possible due to the effective human and signals intelligence gathered by the Special Operations Group(SOG) of the police, and greater synergy in operations between them and the RR and CRPF, has resulted in the uprooting of the militants from their traditional hubs.

The recently concluded state elections in J&K with incredibly high voter turnout and absence of violence is testimony to the success story scripted by the security forces in J&K.

Combating Terror Outside J&K

Notwithstanding the major revamp measures being undertaken like setting up of a National Investigation Agency(NIA), strengthening anti-terror laws, bringing  various intelligence agencies under one command for efficient interpretation and dissemination of data, decentarlising NSG deployment, it is  only effective border management, along the IB or the coastal areas that holds the key to making India relatively safer and immune from terror attacks.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Rohit Singh

Rohit Singh is a Research Assistant at the Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

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