The Mumbai Carnage, wherein a dozen terrorists, held an entire country to ransom for three days, is unprecedented and unusual, not only for India but for the entire world community. For close to three days the terrorists held centrestage against the might of the Indian state, resorting to cold, calculated, calibrated and prolonged mayhem, the like of which has no parallel in terms of the longevity and brutality of terror.
The subcontinental norm has been a series of explosions undertaken simultaneously by radical Islamic terrorist organsisations reared by Pakistan’s notorious ‘ISI’ often referred to as ‘a state within a state’, aiming to kill masses of people, in line with the doctrine of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’. But, this was an all-out offensive, with clear military hallmarks. The NSG and Marine Commandos who battled the terrorists have affirmed that ‘it was like fighting regular soldiers whose training was not unlike their own’.
US intelligence agencies rate the Mumbai attack as being more sophisticated and logistically complex than even 9/11.
So, what were the objectives behind 26/11 and what led the ‘masterminds’ of the attack to so rapidly raise the bar and the stakes in this so called ‘Jihad’, knowing fully well that the response to an attack of this magnitude would be entirely different from the ones elicited by the periodic ‘serial blasts’ that punctuate the country in a routine manner. The planners knew only too well that it will invite the wrath of the complete world community as never before.
Two immediate answers provided in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage has been that the Taliban and its affiliate militant groups wanted to take the ‘focus’ away from Afghanistan-Pakistan, the epicentre of US led Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) and earn a reprieve for itself in order to regroup before a surge in American troop levels by early spring of 2009, when President Obama prepares to adopt a more aggressive policy towards the militant sanctuaries in the tribal areas of North-West Pakistan. The aim, therefore was to raise tensions between India and Pakistan so that the Pakistan Army re-deploys its nearly one lakh troops back to the eastern border, hence enabling them to strengthen themselves in the North-West and also southern Afghanistan. And, of course, Pakistan was increasingly getting wary of India’s expanding influence in Afghanistan and with the Indo-US nuclear deal, perceived a consort of nations including India and the United States ‘encircling’ it and eventually breaking the country by dividing NWFP and FATA.
But, the second and the obvious aim was to bring back focus on the Kashmir issue, as was evident by Pakistan and even China’s assertions at the UN Security Council meet (called to approve the ban on the Jammat-ud-Dawa) on the need to address the ‘root cause’ of the problem, i.e. ‘insurgency in Kashmir.’
Pakistan’s Frontier Problems And Mumbai
The reasons for the outbreak of insurgency in the historically restive North West Frontier and the tribal agency, and Pakistan itself becoming ‘a victim of terrorism’ is too well known to be dwelt upon here. That the CIA and Pakistan created the Taliban which has now turned upon its own masters is also well known.
Pakistan calibrated the level of infiltration and violence as per internal and international situation, so as to maintain deniability, while endeavouring to keep the number of militants at an optimum level.
But in the present context it seems that more than the Tehreek-e-Taliban, it is the Pakistan Army which is eager to get out of the imbroglio in NWFP and FATA where it has received a ‘bloody nose’ in its ‘war against terror’, with more than a thousand of its soldiers dying there in the year 2008, itself.
This was perhaps for the first time that the Pakistan Army which had perfected the art of ‘proxy war’ got a taste of its own patented medicine.
So, was 26/11 a clever orchestration of the ‘larger than the state institution’ that is, the Pakistan Army to find for itself a saving grace to get out of the western borders by riding a wave of nationalism and jingoism against traditional rival India with the ultimate aim of ridding itself of all its domestic travails?
The post attack war hysteria in Pakistan has indeed united not only the people of Pakistan who have reposed faith in its fledgling state machinery and retrieved the battered image of the Pakistan Army, but has also found the support of the Pakistani Taliban, responsible for innumerable suicide bombings across Pakistan, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the Marriot Hotel attack. The Tehreek-e-Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsood had declared that his ‘suicide bombers’ are ready to defend the only Islamic nation with known nuclear capabilities from a ‘common enemy’.
So, were the GPS, satellite-phone and other materials with Pakistani markings deliberately left behind on the fishing trawler Kuber? Could the well trained terrorists who found their way around in South Mumbai by just looking at the satellite images commit such a basic mistake? And could the LeT handlers continue giving instructions during the siege over mobile and satellite phones knowing fully well that the source of the calls would be ultimately traced back, notwithstanding the sophisticated routers they used by linking the calls via Europe, UAE and USA?Nevertheless, all this and the trove of other electronic, signals intercepts and other evidence provided by the lone terrorist to be captured alive — Ajmal Amir Kasab have well established the link with what India’s External affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee calls ‘para-state actors’ in Pakistan.
Or, are these signs of desperation? Is the Jihadi war machinery showing signs of decay, failure and inability?
Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Mesopotamia, Saudi Arabia, South East Asia, Causacus, USA, Great Britain and Israel have remained largely unscathed since 9/11. One can debate the reasons for the Mumbai carnage endlessly and actually never come to the real reason for its enactment. However, what is irrefutable is that the militants in Kashmir have been rendered a delibitating and crippling blow. Is this frustration in Kashmir responsible for such reprehensible acts outside J&K?
Turning The Tide In Kashmir
The terrorist infrastructure in PoK has remained intact, albeit scaled down from 52 camps in 2006 to 37 in 2008 with Kotli and Muzzaffarabad being the epicentres of terrorist training. The launch pads remaining the same i.e, 48, Pakistan has increased the number of ingress points along the entire LoC/IB so as to increase the access rate of infiltration.
Pakistan calibrated the level of infiltration and violence as per internal and international situation, so as to maintain deniability, while endeavouring to keep the number of militants at an optimum level. As per Multi Agency Centre(MAC) it is estimated that close to 6000-8000 terrorists are presently available in Pakistan of which 1500-2000 are concentrated at various training and staging camps. The number of terrorists present inside J&K has now gone down to a little under 1000 with the foreign content being 66 percent.
Levels Of Infiltration And Violence
In the year 2005, out of a total of 597 infiltration attempts, 335 were successful, the year 2006 saw 343 successful attempts out of 573, and the year 2007 saw 311 successful attempts against 535 attempted. Compare this to the period upto 2004, where infiltration attempts were in the range of 2000 or so, and infiltration had been much more than the rate of attrition of militants (ranging between 550 and 2020 in any one year). In the year 2008 the number of infiltration attempts further declined and most of these attempts were foiled.
Latest reports pertaining to training of women couriers and suicide bombers, parachute and snow-warfare training to select LeT terrorists in Kalighati and Kel in PoK can only be ignored at Indias peril.
All parameters of violence have shown a steady decline. In 2008 the number of terrorism related incidents dropped by 40 percent from the period 2006-2007.174 civilians and security force personnel lost their lives in the year 2008, a sharp decline from the year 2004 when 859 civilians and SF personnel had died in terror related violence in the state. Around 380 militants, including a large number of terrorist leaders were eliminated in the year 2008, figures for the years 2007 and 2006 being 478 and 589 respectively. Consequently the terrorists avoided direct contact with the Army preferring low risk, high gain acts of violence. Recent trends show election of soft targets like tourists, migrant labour and security force informers.
The tide has turned slowly and irrevocably against the militants. The reasons are many.
The Anti-infiltration Obstacle System (aios)
First, prior to enforcement of the ceasefire in November 2003, the Pakistan Army provided artillery, mortar and small arms covering fire to infiltrating and exfiltrating militant groups. Although numerous terrorists were killed in the process, the numbers infiltrating and exfiltrating only doubled year after year.
Checking infiltration all along the LoC became an operational imperative that was practically impossible to execute as the terrain ideally suited infiltration. It was against this backdrop that the Indian Army conceived the idea of undertaking the a project for fencing the loc. This onerous task of erecting the 12 feet high multi-layered barbed wire fence along most of the 750 Km stretch of LoC, covering areas of almost two corps zones was completed in a record time of one year in 2004.
Second, the efficacy of the fence was augmented with a series of surveillance devices, and apart from the multi-layer barbed wire, concertina coils with high-tech surveillance and detection devices were co-opted in the design.
The infantry battalions deployed along the LoC were provided with devices like LORROS (long range reconnaissance observation system), hand-held thermal imagers, intrusion detection devices, passive infra red sensors, ground sensors and battle field surveillance radars.
Also the concept of a multi-layered counter-infiltration(CI) grid was introduced. In the CI grid the Indian Army was deployed along the length of the LoC in a linear fashion constituting the first tier.
The second, tier, too, was occupied by the Army, along the length of the fence or the AIOS, just behind the first tier or the LoC. The third tier in the hinterland comprises the Rashtriya Rifles(RR), Border Security Force(BSF) in some areas, the fourth tier in towns by the Central Reserve Police Force(CRPF), Special Operations Group(SOG) of the J&K Police and the Village Defence Committees(VDCs), established in 1994 in the areas of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda.
Due to the above measures, the strength of the militants in J&K has been drastically reduced, and with increased pressure on them in the hinterland, their capability to strike has been rendered ineffective to a great extent. The elimination of a large number of militant commanders, possible due to the effective human and signals intelligence gathered by the Special Operations Group(SOG) of the police, and greater synergy in operations between them and the RR and CRPF, has resulted in the uprooting of the militants from their traditional hubs.
The recently concluded state elections in J&K with incredibly high voter turnout and absence of violence is testimony to the success story scripted by the security forces in J&K.
Combating Terror Outside J&K
Notwithstanding the major revamp measures being undertaken like setting up of a National Investigation Agency(NIA), strengthening anti-terror laws, bringing various intelligence agencies under one command for efficient interpretation and dissemination of data, decentarlising NSG deployment, it is only effective border management, along the IB or the coastal areas that holds the key to making India relatively safer and immune from terror attacks.
In this design, a leaf may be taken from the counter-terror mechanism in J&K. The process of erecting a fence along the Bangladesh border should be hastened and the concept of ‘one border one force’ for effective border management implemented, whereby the BSF and Assam Rifles are given charge of specific state sectors in the North-East.
If the sea-borne assault on Mumbai was novel and unexpected, already there are inputs of terrorists trying to use the aerial route in the next attack.
The concept of the SOG and STF in J&K could be introduced in the coastal belts of the country where in the Coastal Police should incorporate local residents and fishermen into a dedicated task force for effective surveillance and information on suspected activities and movement of terrorists, smugglers and the likes. It will also facilitate employment generation, and an incentive to the jobless youth to provide information and check illegal activities.
It needs to be underscored that it was largely due to the efforts of the SOG in J&K which comprised former militants that ‘actionable’ human intelligence on top terrorist leaders could be gathered. This can only happen when the local population has faith and trust in the police and are prepared to share information with them, hence the SOG model (by recruiting locals) can cement police-public relations. The inhabitants of isolated islands in Lakshadweep and Andamans could be incorporated in special units for enhancing the intelligence and security mechanisms in these vulnerable zones. Illegal immigration by Bangladeshi labourers in Andaman Islands needs to be checked.
Also, there is an urgent need to de-criminalize policing in the country and go after organized mafia, drug and gun runners, etc with a vigorous zeal as often it is these criminals who provide local support and logistics to foreign terrorists, who would otherwise find it difficult to strike in another country.
The beat policing system should be strengthened and the beat constables given the wherewithal to personally know each and every inhabitant of his beat and fix accountability.
Police personnel in all districts of the country should be sent to nearby Army units for short duration training capsules so that they can effectively deal with urban terrorism.
Lastly, VDCs need to be empowered and cash grants and rewards should be instituted for information on criminals, terrorists, seizure of weapons, etc.
The armed forces should be kept in the loop, if not at the helm of all counter-terror planning, intelligence sharing, and pro-active counter terrorism strategy.
The New Terror
After finding it diffcult to strike in J&K, the Pakistani mentors in frustration have increased strikes in the rest of the country, taking advantage of the weak defence mechanism along the coastal areas and land borders with Nepal and Bangladesh. Some have even come via the ‘peace bus’ from Lahore and the Samjhauta express on valid documents and passports.
In fact, in discarding the traditional methods of infiltration through the LoC, militants are now being sent via a long route to Jammu and Kashmir by first entering India by sea from the Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts, or by land from Nepal and Bangladesh after completing their training in PoK. Weapons and ammunition are made available once they reach their respective bases in Kashmir. Weapons are also being manufactured on a small scale with one such facility being discovered in the Sopore belt of North Kashmir. Also, the recent discovery of Lashkar cadres from Kerala fighting in J&K points to a new trend in expansion of the recruitment base of Pakistan based terror outfits.
These developments and the attack on Mumbai are testimony to the sinister designs of these terror organisations, i.e. to strike in mainland India to de-stabilize our economic growth and create a sense of helplessness and fear among the populace, and question the ability of the government in protecting them.
One needs to be more vigilant and better prepared in the coming days and years as the enemies of the nation will continue to resort to new methods and modes to target India and attempt to regain lost ground in Kashmir.
If the sea-borne assault on Mumbai was novel and unexpected, already there are inputs of terrorists trying to use the aerial route in the next attack.
Intelligence agencies have known for a while that Pakistan Army and Navy have been providing marine training to select groups of terrorists in Mangla Dam and Karachi Port with durations ranging from six to eighteen months. It involves underwater operations, use of high speed boats, demolition of vital assets such as merchant and naval vessels and off-shore nuclear and oil installations.
Similarly, latest reports pertaining to training of women couriers and suicide bombers, parachute and snow-warfare training to select LeT terrorists in Kalighati and Kel in PoK can only be ignored at India’s peril.
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