Indian Defence Review

Reinforced by additional formations mustered for the purpose in the Gujrat area, Pakistan 23 Infantry Division was to secure immediately the Indian area of Chhamb up to the line of the Munawar Tawi river to give the impression of an offensive to capture Akhnur. Pakistan I Corps was to eliminate Indian enclaves north of the Ravi and simulate an offensive in the area so as to draw the Indian strike force, I Corps, into the militarily unproductive area of the Shakargarh bulge.

The Pakistani planners laid great emphasis on this manoeuvre as they hoped to neutralise the Indian offensive potential in the bulge and tie up the Indian forces there so that they would not be able to divert this force to meet the real Pakistan offensive on the southern flank between Ganganagar and Anupgarh in terms of time and space.

In fact, Gen Abdul Hamid was supposed to have stated at the planning stage that he was prepared to allow the Indians to occupy all the area up to the Bumban Wala-Ravi-Bedian (BRB) canal to enhance the chances of success of the Pakistani offensive on the southern flank. Pakistan IV Corps in the Lahore-Kasur-Sulaimanke area was to clear the Indian enclaves in its area of operational responsibility and move close up to the Chugawan drain between the Ravi and Grand Trunk Road, as well as to improve its defensive posture by undertaking local attacks and threatening communications with a view to tying down the Indian reserves in the area.The Pakistani offensive plan was claimed to be good by “any standard of judgment.” Despite the Indians having an overall superiority in numbers, the planners had managed to muster enough reserves to increase its bite. The plan was described as “bold, simple and easy to implement” and having an inherent “tinge of gamble.” Yahya Khan called it “unique.” The planners as well as its executors were “most enthusiastic” and confident that it would succeed if launched “in terms and as a whole.”

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India had no intention of starting the war, and by political necessity had passed the option to Yahya Khan to do so. Since the initiative in starting hostilities in terms of choosing its time and place rested with Pakistan, Candeth could do little except adopt a secure defensive posture against all possible Pakistani actions and maintain adequate reserves suitably positioned to react to the likely Pakistani moves in time.

The Pakistani offensive plan was claimed to be good by “any standard of judgment.” Despite the Indians having an overall superiority in numbers, the planners had managed to muster enough reserves to increase its bite.

As discussed earlier, apart from a holding force in some sectors and a bare covering force in others, most of the Indian reserve formations were located deep in the interior of the country and could be effective in the Western Command only after three to four weeks. These conditions favoured a Pakistan preemptive strike before the middle of October 1971. Candeth was unbalanced in the period between the end of the monsoon and mid-October. Mercifully, Yahya Khan did not preempt.

Candeth’s holding force was in position and fully entrenched to await the start of hostilities by the end of November. Broadly, Ladakh was held by about two brigades. In view of the winter conditions and from the trend of the Chinese activities opposite, the Chief accepted the risk of pulling out the depth brigade of this division to reinforce the southern flank in the Ganganagar sector. The Kargil brigade, facing the Pakistani area of Gilgit, was placed under the command of this formation, as with the coming snows the Ladakh region was likely to be cut off by closure of Zojila.

Since the opposition from the Pakistani side was only from the Frontier Scouts, a paramilitary force with a low war potential, the allocation of resources for the sector was considered adequate. The task allotted to the formation was generally to improve its defensive posture, especially in the Kargil area, where the main logistic artery, the Srinagar-Leh road, ran close to the Pakistan picquet line. The aim was to push this line sufficiently back so that the requisite depth was achieved between the road and the picquet line and the Pakistani capability of disrupting the Indian line of communication was nullified or made less effective.

Its operational task was to protect vulnerable points and areas in the valley against sabotage and take appropriate counter-measures against infiltration both in the rural and urban areas.

Kashmir Valley was held by 19 Infantry Division with the Border Security Force holding the general area of Minimarg and Gurais Valley. Two infantry brigades held the remainder of the picquet line along the ceasefire line in the form of a defensive crust with some depth localities covering the likely routes of ingress. There was one infantry brigade group located deep in the area as a reserve.

To meet the infiltration threat in the valley itself, a separate sector was created under a major general with four to five battalions of BSF and other paramilitary forces. Its operational task was to protect vulnerable points and areas in the valley against sabotage and take appropriate counter-measures against infiltration both in the rural and urban areas. This precaution stemmed from the experience gained in the 1965 conflict. No chance could be taken with the volatile and turbulent politics of Kashmir Valley.

South of the Pir Panjal range, 25 Infantry Division held the picquets along the ceasefire line up to the Manawar Tawi, and 10 Infantry Division from there onward to the Chenab. The impending threat to Poonch was correctly appreciated by the Indian military planners, and despite Candeth’s protest against denuding the Samba sector one infantry brigade was inducted into the Poonch sector on the Chief’s intervention. The wisdom of this decision was to prove itself and was responsible for frustrating the Pakistani offensive launched for the capture of Poonch town and surroundings.

The area north of Pir Panjal was not considered suitable for a Pakistani offensive because it was under snow. The logical conclusion the Indian planners drew was to narrow the likely Pakistani attack in the Poonch sector, and this appreciation eventually proved correct.

A likely Pakistan offensive in Jammu and Kashmir along the ceasefire line could be conveniently divided into two distinct areas, west and east respectively of the Poonch river. Any force committed west of the river could not, because of the layout of the Pakistani communications, be diverted to the plains to meet other contingencies in the context of a short war. Considering that Pakistan had barely enough strike elements in the Gujrat-Kharian complex of cantonments for a counteroffensive in the plains, it was unlikely that it would venture to commit any portion of this element west of the river.

Such a venture would leave Pakistan rather unbalanced inthe plains. But reports of the presence of Pakistan 7 Infantry Division in the Abbottabad area from a very reliable source could not be easily dismissed. In the event, this proved only a ruse successfully contrived by Pakistani intelligence. The supposed presence of this division in the region increased the potential threat to about the infantry division plus two brigades raised from the holding force. The area north of Pir Panjal was not considered suitable for a Pakistani offensive because it was under snow. The logical conclusion the Indian planners drew was to narrow the likely Pakistani attack in the Poonch sector, and this appreciation eventually proved correct.

By virtue of the interior lines of communication east of the Poonch, the Pakistanis could use part of their strike force in the north in an offensive action between the Poonch and the Chenab, and yet in time of need retrieve it to meet contingencies in the area between the Chenab and the Ravi. Pakistan could muster about a division plus two brigades in the hilly region for such an offensive, and about an armoured brigade’s worth in addition if the thrust line was in the plains sector of Chhamb-Jaurian.

Since this sector provided the Pakistanis with an opportunity to exploit their superiority in armour, it was calculated that the main offensive west of the Chenab would come in the Chhamb sector, with a diversionary effort in the Naushera area. This assessment also proved right. To meet the threat, 10 Infantry Division had one infantry brigade and two regiments of armour in reserve.