Indian Defence Review

The Western Command

The territorial jurisdiction of Western Military Command embraced the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Haryana, the Union territories of Chandigarh and Delhi, and a few districts of Rajasthan. It covered a vast area from the Western Himalayas to the plains of Punjab and the sandy tracts of the Rajasthan Desert. Geopolitically, it faced two hostile neighbours—Pakistan and China. These countries were inimical to India but friendly to each other. Their mutual cooperation in politics and military affairs were indicative of their likely coalition in the event of a military confrontation on the sub continent.

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Lieut Gen K P Candeth, PVSM, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Command, was operationally responsible for defending the region against external aggression and generally aiding the state governments in maintaining law and order, if required. Candeth’s task, both in peace and war, was onerous. He had not only to contend with political turbulence in the controversial state of Jammu and Kashmir but also to ensure the security of an undemarcated line of control on the Indo-Tibetan border against the Chinese in Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh, to hold the uneasy ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir, and police the well-demarcated international border in Jammu, Punjab and Rajasthan against Pakistan.

 It divided the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in two, with Pakistan illegally occupying about one-third of the territory.

Candeth was a grandson of the late Sir Shankaran Nair and a product of RIMC and the Indian Military Academy. Kept in the background under British rule, he suddenly flowered after independence. Seniority found him Artillery Adviser to Gen Thimayya at the time of Pakistani aggression in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, when he came to notice. His subsequent rise in the Army may be attributed to his being noncontroversial and perhaps more pliable than more deserving contemporaries who fell by the wayside, unfortunate victims of our promotion system. What paid him most however was his friendship with Gen PP Kumaramangalam. As Kumaramangalam rose, he took Candeth up with him in preference to those with greater merit but not of his coterie.

In the Kaul-Menon era, Candeth was lucky to command the invasion force in the unopposed march to annex the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu in 1961. On completion of this operation, he was appointed Military Governor of the territories and became a national figure in that capacity. Apart from that operation, he had very little war experience and displayed a slow, deliberate and rather cautious approach to military problems. He had served mostly in North India and knew the terrain as well as the day-to-day problems of the no peace-no war military posture of the time. But he did not appear to be made for the role history was soon to bestow on him as the commander of the largest army to be launched in battle under the Indian flag since times immemorial.

For offensive and counteroffensive operations, Pakistan had two armoured divisions, three infantry divisions and an independent infantry brigade group in reserve apart from what could be mustered from the holding force at the point of thrust.

The demarcated international border, policed by the paramilitary forces of both countries, divided India and Pakistan in Rajasthan and Punjab, and up to the river Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir. From there, the ceasefire line ran north and northeast to Keran, near the Kishenganga, and then at right angles through Minimarg in Gurais Valley and ended in the snows of the Karakoram ranges. It divided the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in two, with Pakistan illegally occupying about one-third of the territory. The Chinese occupied the northeastern area of the state roughly east of the line joining Chushul with the Karakoram Pass. The old Indo-Tibetan boundary from opposite Shipkila in Himachal Pradesh to Chushul in Ladakh prevailed.

The Chinese had about a division holding the Indo-Tibetan border against Candeth. In the event of active coalition with Pakistan they could wield about two divisions to develop a worthwhile thrust towards Leh in Ladakh and no more. The long and tenuous lines of communication from their bases in Sinkiang and the inhospitable high altitudes and rugged terrain of operations, with the attendant difficulties of sustenance, forbade a bigger buildup in the region.

Matters were however different with Pakistan. Pakistan had about two armoured divisions, ten infantry divisions, two independent armoured and two independent infantry brigades, and a collection of paramilitary forces numbering about 90,000. Out of this impressive order of battle, seven infantry divisions and one independent infantry brigade were locked in a holding role along the ceasefire line and the international border, two divisions were in Jammu and Kashmir up to the River Chenab, two more held the Shakargarh bulge, and still two others the Punjab border from Ranian to the infantry brigade group was statitioned in the general area of Bahawalnagar-Mandi Sadiq Gunj, and one infantry division in the Rajasthan Desert and the Rann of Kutch.

The entire force was committed to static defence along the ceasefire line and to covering the routes of ingress to sensitive areas, particularly in the Jammu sector.

For offensive and counteroffensive operations, Pakistan had two armoured divisions, three infantry divisions and an independent infantry brigade group in reserve apart from what could be mustered from the holding force at the point of thrust. To build up its army in East Pakistan for the impending battle, Pakistan had considerably denuded its western wing to the extent that two old formations, 9 and 16 Infantry Divisions, had been transferred to the east wing.

To compensate for the imbalance thus created Pakistan had raised two new infantry divisions, 17 and 33, but these were in the early stages of training and were known to consist of only two brigades each. Their war potential was therefore doubtful. There was however a third division, 7 Infantry, an old formation which had trained for operations in the mountains but could be allotted to the. strike force to bolster the offensive thrust line wherever required.

Pakistan had never found itself so weakened in reserves so far as maintaining parity with India in quality and quantity was concerned, and could not fill this void in the time frame of the coming war. The potential of the Pakistani strike force was reduced to the extent that it could not penetrate more than 20 to 30 miles deep at the chosen point of thrust.

The Shakargarh bulge, especially from Samba to Dera Baba Nanak, was rather thinly held by one infantry division and presented the weakest gap in the event of a preemptive Pakistani attack.

Candeth calculated that Pakistan’s military planners would follow the old pattern of stirring up insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, especially in Kashmir Valley, followed by the infiltration of guerillas to inflame the whole state with largescale sabotage and disruption, and would then carry the war across the ceasefire line. He went wrong in this assessment, as no enemy, leave aside Pakistan, could afford to repeat its earlier performance.

Candeth had three corps against Pakistan and China. XV Corps looked after Jammu and Kashmir with five divisions and one armoured brigade. One division looked after India’s borders with China and Pakistan, another the valley, a third the hilly sector south of the Pir Panjal range, while two others looked after the approaches to Akhnur, Jammu and Samba. The entire force was committed to static defence along the ceasefire line and to covering the routes of ingress to sensitive areas, particularly in the Jammu sector.

The reserves in each sector were meagre, about one infantry brigade in the valley, and an infantry brigade group and one armoured brigade in the Jammu area. Punjab was held by three divisions or their equivalent, the broad distribution being two divisions between the Ravi and the Beas, and one division plus east of the Sutlej. Between them, they had a reserve of about one independent armoured brigade and one infantry brigade. The Shakargarh bulge, especially from Samba to Dera Baba Nanak, was rather thinly held by one infantry division and presented the weakest gap in the event of a preemptive Pakistani attack.

Pakistan managed to position a balance of reserve armour, artillery and infantry north and south of the Ravi.

I Corps, each comprising two infantry divisions, armoured brigades and independent artillery brigades, was located in the hinterland, and within the time frame of rail and road movement would take three weeks to concentrate. This corps was to take the divisions holding the Shakargarh bulge under its command and assume responsibility for defending the peri-pheral area around the bulge on arrival in the sector. Army Headquarters reserves, consisting of one armoured division and one infantry division, were to be suitably located to afford indirect security to Punjab and the prosperous area of Ganganagar, in Rajasthan, in the defensive phase, and carry out such offensive contingency tasks as considered feasible, depending upon the opportunities offered by the vicissitudes of war.

Pakistan also tied up its formations in a holding role, broadly with a wing of Frontier Scouts in the Ladakh and Kargil sector, one division between the Keran and Poonch rivers and one between the Poonch and the Chenab. Between them, they had about 11 brigades, nine of which were committed to a holding role on the ceasefire line, and one brigade in each sector was available as reserve. In the Shakargarh bulge Pakistan had I Corps, consisting of three infantry divisions, an armoured division, an armoured brigade and an artillery brigade. Two of these divisions were committed in a holding role, with one infantry brigade as reserve between them.

The remainder of the Pakistani Army in the west was to keep the Indian Army in fixed positions all along the western front to disrupt its offensive potential. To enhance the offensive capability of their thrust, the Pakistanis adopted additional measures to induce the Indians to divert their forces

From Ranian to Sulaimanke, Pakistan had IV Corps, consisting of two infantry divisions, mostly employed in a holding role, with one armoured brigade and an infantry brigade held as reserve. There was an infantry brigade group from Sulaimanke to Bahawalpur. Pakistan II Corps, consisting of one armoured division and an infantry division, was located in the general area Montgomery-Okara under Gen Tikka Khan as a strike force for offensive tasks in Indian territory. 7 Infantry Division, which had earlier trained in mountain warfare, could normally have been employed in the Jammu and Kashmir theatre, but in view of the paucity of infantry in the Pakistani strike forces north and south it was imperative that this formation should be available for use wherever the enemy chose to attack.

Since some intelligence reports had indicated the presence of Pakistan 7 Infantry Division in the general area of Abbotabad, some precautionary measures were adopted to meet its potential threat in the Poonch sector, but in the event these fears proved unfounded. Woefully short of infantry, Pakistan could ill afford to employ its only proven reserve division in mountain operations which consumed time and troops. Pakistan’s initial poise had a strike force in the Shakargarh bulge to the north and another force to the south in the general area of Montgomery-Okara. Each force comprised an armoured division and an infantry division, and each force could be boosted with an infantry division wherever required. Thus Pakistan managed to position a balance of reserve armour, artillery and infantry north and south of the Ravi.

Fazal Muqeem tells us that the task of the Pakistan Army in the western wing was to seize the initiative at the start of hostilities and launch an offensive to capture as much Indian territory of strategic, economic and political significance as possible while denying similar Pakistani territory to India. To this end, the Pakistani planners produced “a very good plan indeed,” according to Muqeem.

It appears that the plan revolved around launching a corps of one armoured and two infantry divisions in a counteroffensive initially, and later reinforcing the thrust with additional armour and infantry by regrouping the holding force. The remainder of the Pakistani Army in the west was to keep the Indian Army in fixed positions all along the western front to disrupt its offensive potential. To enhance the offensive capability of their thrust, the Pakistanis adopted additional measures to induce the Indians to divert their forces, particularly the reserves, from the general areas of the selected objectives of their offensive. According to Muqeem, one measure was to execute a number of local attacks in addition to improving the defensive posture of the holding forces all along the front. Another was to practice deception under an overall cover plan designed to give the impression that the strike forces were assembled for a task different from that intended.

The Pakistani planners laid great emphasis on this manoeuvre as they hoped to neutralise the Indian offensive potential in the bulge and tie up the Indian forces there so that they would not be able to divert this force to meet the real Pakistan offensive on the southern flank”¦

There were two schools of thought regarding the timing of the intended offensive. One was for starting an all-out offensive by the strike corps at the very outset, while the other maintained that the holding formations should first carry out preliminary operations to fix the enemy and divert its attention to local engagements in order to facilitate offensive thrusts. The second school, which stood for preliminary operations followed by a counter-offensive, ultimately prevailed. It was felt that if the Indians revealed their hand in the preliminary operations the choice of Pakistani thrust lines, with objectives farther from the Indian reserves, would be facilitated.

The Pakistani military planners therefore broadly allotted the preliminary operational tasks as follows. Pakistan 12 Infantry Division, deployed opposite Kashmir Valley up to the Poonch river, was to capture Poonch town and simulate such a limited offensive in the area as to tie up the Indian reserves in the sector to the extent that they would be prevented from moving south of the Chenab to be effective against the planned offensive there.

Reinforced by additional formations mustered for the purpose in the Gujrat area, Pakistan 23 Infantry Division was to secure immediately the Indian area of Chhamb up to the line of the Munawar Tawi river to give the impression of an offensive to capture Akhnur. Pakistan I Corps was to eliminate Indian enclaves north of the Ravi and simulate an offensive in the area so as to draw the Indian strike force, I Corps, into the militarily unproductive area of the Shakargarh bulge.

The Pakistani planners laid great emphasis on this manoeuvre as they hoped to neutralise the Indian offensive potential in the bulge and tie up the Indian forces there so that they would not be able to divert this force to meet the real Pakistan offensive on the southern flank between Ganganagar and Anupgarh in terms of time and space.

In fact, Gen Abdul Hamid was supposed to have stated at the planning stage that he was prepared to allow the Indians to occupy all the area up to the Bumban Wala-Ravi-Bedian (BRB) canal to enhance the chances of success of the Pakistani offensive on the southern flank. Pakistan IV Corps in the Lahore-Kasur-Sulaimanke area was to clear the Indian enclaves in its area of operational responsibility and move close up to the Chugawan drain between the Ravi and Grand Trunk Road, as well as to improve its defensive posture by undertaking local attacks and threatening communications with a view to tying down the Indian reserves in the area.The Pakistani offensive plan was claimed to be good by “any standard of judgment.” Despite the Indians having an overall superiority in numbers, the planners had managed to muster enough reserves to increase its bite. The plan was described as “bold, simple and easy to implement” and having an inherent “tinge of gamble.” Yahya Khan called it “unique.” The planners as well as its executors were “most enthusiastic” and confident that it would succeed if launched “in terms and as a whole.”

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India had no intention of starting the war, and by political necessity had passed the option to Yahya Khan to do so. Since the initiative in starting hostilities in terms of choosing its time and place rested with Pakistan, Candeth could do little except adopt a secure defensive posture against all possible Pakistani actions and maintain adequate reserves suitably positioned to react to the likely Pakistani moves in time.

The Pakistani offensive plan was claimed to be good by “any standard of judgment.” Despite the Indians having an overall superiority in numbers, the planners had managed to muster enough reserves to increase its bite.

As discussed earlier, apart from a holding force in some sectors and a bare covering force in others, most of the Indian reserve formations were located deep in the interior of the country and could be effective in the Western Command only after three to four weeks. These conditions favoured a Pakistan preemptive strike before the middle of October 1971. Candeth was unbalanced in the period between the end of the monsoon and mid-October. Mercifully, Yahya Khan did not preempt.

Candeth’s holding force was in position and fully entrenched to await the start of hostilities by the end of November. Broadly, Ladakh was held by about two brigades. In view of the winter conditions and from the trend of the Chinese activities opposite, the Chief accepted the risk of pulling out the depth brigade of this division to reinforce the southern flank in the Ganganagar sector. The Kargil brigade, facing the Pakistani area of Gilgit, was placed under the command of this formation, as with the coming snows the Ladakh region was likely to be cut off by closure of Zojila.

Since the opposition from the Pakistani side was only from the Frontier Scouts, a paramilitary force with a low war potential, the allocation of resources for the sector was considered adequate. The task allotted to the formation was generally to improve its defensive posture, especially in the Kargil area, where the main logistic artery, the Srinagar-Leh road, ran close to the Pakistan picquet line. The aim was to push this line sufficiently back so that the requisite depth was achieved between the road and the picquet line and the Pakistani capability of disrupting the Indian line of communication was nullified or made less effective.

Its operational task was to protect vulnerable points and areas in the valley against sabotage and take appropriate counter-measures against infiltration both in the rural and urban areas.

Kashmir Valley was held by 19 Infantry Division with the Border Security Force holding the general area of Minimarg and Gurais Valley. Two infantry brigades held the remainder of the picquet line along the ceasefire line in the form of a defensive crust with some depth localities covering the likely routes of ingress. There was one infantry brigade group located deep in the area as a reserve.

To meet the infiltration threat in the valley itself, a separate sector was created under a major general with four to five battalions of BSF and other paramilitary forces. Its operational task was to protect vulnerable points and areas in the valley against sabotage and take appropriate counter-measures against infiltration both in the rural and urban areas. This precaution stemmed from the experience gained in the 1965 conflict. No chance could be taken with the volatile and turbulent politics of Kashmir Valley.

South of the Pir Panjal range, 25 Infantry Division held the picquets along the ceasefire line up to the Manawar Tawi, and 10 Infantry Division from there onward to the Chenab. The impending threat to Poonch was correctly appreciated by the Indian military planners, and despite Candeth’s protest against denuding the Samba sector one infantry brigade was inducted into the Poonch sector on the Chief’s intervention. The wisdom of this decision was to prove itself and was responsible for frustrating the Pakistani offensive launched for the capture of Poonch town and surroundings.

The area north of Pir Panjal was not considered suitable for a Pakistani offensive because it was under snow. The logical conclusion the Indian planners drew was to narrow the likely Pakistani attack in the Poonch sector, and this appreciation eventually proved correct.

A likely Pakistan offensive in Jammu and Kashmir along the ceasefire line could be conveniently divided into two distinct areas, west and east respectively of the Poonch river. Any force committed west of the river could not, because of the layout of the Pakistani communications, be diverted to the plains to meet other contingencies in the context of a short war. Considering that Pakistan had barely enough strike elements in the Gujrat-Kharian complex of cantonments for a counteroffensive in the plains, it was unlikely that it would venture to commit any portion of this element west of the river.

Such a venture would leave Pakistan rather unbalanced inthe plains. But reports of the presence of Pakistan 7 Infantry Division in the Abbottabad area from a very reliable source could not be easily dismissed. In the event, this proved only a ruse successfully contrived by Pakistani intelligence. The supposed presence of this division in the region increased the potential threat to about the infantry division plus two brigades raised from the holding force. The area north of Pir Panjal was not considered suitable for a Pakistani offensive because it was under snow. The logical conclusion the Indian planners drew was to narrow the likely Pakistani attack in the Poonch sector, and this appreciation eventually proved correct.

By virtue of the interior lines of communication east of the Poonch, the Pakistanis could use part of their strike force in the north in an offensive action between the Poonch and the Chenab, and yet in time of need retrieve it to meet contingencies in the area between the Chenab and the Ravi. Pakistan could muster about a division plus two brigades in the hilly region for such an offensive, and about an armoured brigade’s worth in addition if the thrust line was in the plains sector of Chhamb-Jaurian.

Since this sector provided the Pakistanis with an opportunity to exploit their superiority in armour, it was calculated that the main offensive west of the Chenab would come in the Chhamb sector, with a diversionary effort in the Naushera area. This assessment also proved right. To meet the threat, 10 Infantry Division had one infantry brigade and two regiments of armour in reserve.

The Indian planners correctly calculated that to maintain the military balance on the northern and southern flanks, Pakistan would attempt a limited offensive in both sectors, as indicated by the reported location of its strike forces

With a total strike element of two armoured and three infantry divisions, Pakistan had several options, especially when the initiative for starting the war lay in its hands. There were three Indian areas broadly open for an offensive, one of them between the Chenab and the Ravi where Pakistan could threaten the sensitive areas of Jammu, Samba and the Madhopur headworks, thereby extending its hold on the plain sector up to the Shivalik range if fully successful. Otherwise, it could at least disrupt Indian rail and road communications between Pathankot and Jammu.

The second option was to secure the area between the Ravi and the Beas either by developing two thrusts from the north from the area of Dera Baba Nanak-Gil ferry and from the south from Kasur-Khemkaran towards the Beas, or to break through from a central bridgehead along GT Road and then divide it into two thrusts northward and southward to envelop the Indian defences from the rear. This option, if successfully pursued, could be very profitable as it would include in its sweep the city of Amritsar, the industrial town of Batala, the headworks at Madhopur and Harike, the military base at Pathankot, and the rich agricultural belt of the Bari Doab.

The third option was to develop a thrust east of the Sutlej either between Hussainiwala-Sulaimanke in the general area of Mamdot-Jalalabad to secure the territory up to the Twin Rajasthan Canal to include the towns of Ferozepur, Faridkot and Malout. This would have given the Pakistanis access to the “white gold” cotton tract or enabled them to develop a thrust towards Bhatinda from the extreme south.

Although the northern complex of Gujrat-Kharian is well connected by a lateral road and rail communications running to the international border drep in Pakistani territory between the Chenab and the Ravi, the time frame of building up a force consisting of one armoured and one infantry division would have taken about a week to ten days to be effective at either end. In the context of a short war, it was feasible to take a risk and employ the entire strike force, depending on the room for deployment together in the north or south, subject to the overall priority of objectives.

To frustrate the choice of these options individually or in combination, the Indian planners devised a multipronged offensive into Pakistani territory north of the Ravi”¦

This course was unlikely to be acceptable to Pakistan as it could not run the risk of leaving either of its flanks exposed. The extensive network of obstacles along the central approach in considerable depth also forbade the adoption of this course. The Indian planners correctly calculated that to maintain the military balance on the northern and southern flanks, Pakistan would attempt a limited offensive in both sectors, as indicated by the reported location of its strike forces. This suited India as dividing the strike force would proportionately diminish the potential and scope of their offensive thrusts.

India accordingly matched the positioning of the Pakistani reserves by placing I Corps in the general area of Samba-Gurdaspur, one armoured brigade and one to two infantry brigades in the general area of Ajnala, and one armoured and one infantry division near Muktsar-Kotkapura. Although Candeth had dissipated the reserve infantry division by detaching two of its brigades under the operational command of two holding divisions, similar efforts at distributing the armoured division into penny packets were strongly resisted by its GOC, and it remained intact.

To frustrate the choice of these options individually or in combination, the Indian planners devised a multipronged offensive into Pakistani territory north of the Ravi, simultaneously or staggered in timing in accordance with the opportunity offered, after the Pakistanis revealed their hand. The plan envisaged the movement on either side of the Chenab of 10 Infantry Division towards Tanda and Gujrat as far as Alexander Bridge, and 26 Infantry Division up to the Marala-Ravi link canal, thereby threatening Sialkot, as one prong of the offensive.

The second prong was an advance by I Corps in the Shakargarb bulge east of the fortress line of Zafarwal-Dhamtal Narowal. This sizable thrust was expected to draw the Pakistani strike force, or the major portion of it, into the bulge so as to ease the progress of other thrust lines. The third prong was meant to be developed towards Qila Sobha Singh from the direction of Gil Ferry. The prongs along the Chenab as well as the ferry prong were aimed at dividing the Pakistani strike force in the north, thus reducing the opposition to the main I Corps thrust and indirectly helping its piecemeal destruction.

The Indian planners however failed to visualise how, when and where their commanders were to launch an offensive if the Pakistanis failed to launch theirs.

If this multipronged offensive achieved its objective, it was calculated that this might induce the Pakistani higher command to divert the whole or a portion of its strike force in the south to meet the developing threat to the sensitive areas in and around the Shakargarh bulge. In that event, Indian 1 Armoured Division, supported by one infantry division and whatever other troops could be mustered from the holding force at the point of thrust, was to be launched across the Sutlej to secure the sensitive Pakistani areas of Luliani-Raja Jang-Raiwind up to the Upper Bari Doab Canal.

Thus the basis of Indian planning was broadly to await in a defensive posture the start of war by Pakistan. On the commen-cement of hostilities, an all-out effort was to be made by the holding force to improve its defensive posture by capturing objectives which would further strengthen the initial posture, and also to release the troops containing the Pakistani enclaves on the Indian side of the river and the canal obstacles. The tactical balance in relation to the Pakistani strike force was to be maintained by the correct positioning of our reserves to ensure that they would not be allowed to get embroiled in the defensive battle. After Pakistan had launched its offensive with one or both of its strike forces and thus revealed its hand, a multipronged Indian offensive would be launched in the Shakargarh bulge and, depending on the Pakistani reaction on the northern and southern flanks, launch its offensive across the Sutlej at a suitable opportunity.

A limited offensive in the Rajasthan Desert was also planned by the Southern Command to tie up Pakistan 18 Infantry Division. In the process, as part of the defensive and also offensive battles, an effort was to be made to capture as much Pakistani territory as possible, especially what was of political and economic value to Pakistan. The Indian planners however failed to visualise how, when and where their commanders were to launch an offensive if the Pakistanis failed to launch theirs. In the context of a short war time was at a premium and could not be wasted in fruitless waiting. As it happened, Yahya Khan and his Chief of Army Staff, Gen Abdul Hamid, failed to launch their II Corps offensive under Tikka Khan up to the declaration of the unilateral ceasefire because of some vacillation in decisionmaking.

The plan was conceived, studied in depth and brought to its final shape by Maj Gen K.K. Singh, Director of Military Operations, under the direction and guidance of the Chief. The plan was subjected to detailed scrutiny in war games at various levels by the executors and its shortcomings, if any, were removed before the conflict began. The plan was by no means original, bold or ambitious, but it was certainly workable provided the resources for its execution were not dissipated earlier or some unforeseen factors did not intrude. Candeth had no worthwhile experience of serious warfare and was known to be rather “cautious.” This plan, once set in motion, left very little room for him to influence the tide of battle.

To be continued…