Indian Defence Review

China’s Space Programme

While the immediate management of the Chinese Space Programme (including commercial aspects) is exercised by the China National Space Administration it is subordinated to the PLA’s Main Directorate of Armament.

The Chinese space programme began to develop at the Shuangchengzi missile range which eventually became a space launch centre is situated in the Gansu province in the Gobi desert. Its official name is Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre but the PLA calls it Base 20. It was built in 1958 for the launch of the Dongfeng (DF) family of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The first Chinese satellite DFH-1 was launched from here on April 23, 1970, and on October 15, 2003, the first manned spacecraft Shenzhou was also launched from this spaceport. The area of this missile range is 19,600 sq kms.

The second spaceport of Wuzhai — also known as the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre or Base 25 — is in the province of Shanxi and is operational since 1967. The Xichang spaceport or Xichang Satellite Launch Centre or Base 27 is located South-Southwest of Chengdu in Sichuan province and is operational since 1970. Due to its proximity to the equator most of the launches have been taking place from this launch centre. Another spaceport is under construction near Wenchang on Hainan Island and is expected to be ready by 2013. Due to it being further South, it will be used to launch heavy spacecraft up to 25 tons. The Chinese Mission Control Centre is at Xian in Shanxi province.

Like other space powers, China also initially developed its carrier rockets from military ballistic missiles. The first carrier missile, the Changzhen-1 (CZ-1) was developed from the Dongfeng-4 (DF-4) ICBM. Later the DF-5 became a predecessor for the CZ-2C/SD carrier rocket with a launch weight of 213 tons. The much more powerful CZ-2E followed with a launch weight of 460 tons and was equipped with four additional first stage boosters with the capability to send a 3.5-ton payload into a geosynchronous orbit. The CZ-2F a modified CZ-2E eventually took the first Chinese manned spacecraft. The CZ-3 derived from CZ-2C used a cryogenic third stage with the CZ-3B becoming the most powerful rocket capable of taking a 12-ton payload into a low orbit. CZ-4 and CZ-5 under development are expected to take much heavier loads 25 tons to a low orbit and up to 15 tons into a geosynchronous orbit.

The PRC has so far launched some 100 satellites into low, medium and geostationary orbits covering all traditional areas such as communication, navigation, weather, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other special use variety. Some 20-30 satellites are currently in orbit. In 2010, China launched the second of the three geosynchronous satellites for the Beidu navigation satellite programme that will eventually have some 22 medium earth orbit satellites and provide GPS Global Navigation System (GLONAS) type of navigation facilities over China and adjoining areas. The manned space flight project was launched in 1992. During 1992-2002, four unmanned launches of the spacecraft Shenzhou weighing 7.5 tons were undertaken. Since October 15, 2003 a total of four such missions have been launched with a spacewalk being performed by a Zhai Zhigang in a Chinese made spacesuit. China plans to establish a space station in the near future.

As with other Chinese military projects, secrecy shrouds her military space programmes but it is evident that China is determined to make full use of space for her strategic purposes. According to a Russian analyst, the Chinese know that American military superiority is based largely on network-centric warfare, the ability to launch PGMs and collect massive amounts of intelligence, all of which are dependent on space-based assets. Without these they are reduced to being mere ‘platforms’. China’s ASAT test of January 2007 should be seen in this light. With China also focusing on cyber warfare as part of ‘informationisation’, her final objective is to develop asymmetric capabilities to match US power without trying to enter an arms race.

The PLAAF Challenge

According to the latest reports (IISS Military Balance, March 2011) the PLAAF has some 1687 combat capable aircraft up from 1653 the previous year. The Chinese aviation industry now has the capacity to manufacture 40-50 modern fighters every year. Such is the pace of progress that the Chinese have of late relied less on Russian technology.

The PLAAF, however, has almost no combat experience nor has it participated in major exercises with other air forces. Yet, the trajectory of PLA modernisation and the focus on cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) and space-based systems such as the GPS/GLONAS reconnaissance satellites shows that the PLAAF is by no means lagging behind other air forces in its understanding of the concepts of air power employment. A majority of the 1687 combat aircraft, however, are of II/III generation with only some 144 J-10 and a few Super-10, 243 Su-27/30, 72 JH-7A while the rest comprise J-7 and J-8 of the older generation.

In addition the PLAN’s aviation wing has some 311 combat capable aircraft with 24 Su-30 Flanker and 84 JH-7 fighter bombers with the remaining comprising J-7 and J-8 variants. Some 15 J-15, a locally manufactured version of the carrier-borne Su-33 are to join the PLAN’s new aircraft carrier the Varyag.

In spite of the PLAAF and PLAN possessing such a large number of third generation or even slightly more advanced fighters, it is not clear if these would be used in their traditional roles. Given the strong influence of Sun Tzu’s philosophy of ‘winning wars without actually fighting’, the hangover of the People’s War dogma, PLA Army’s domination and the relatively limited combat experience of the PLAAF, there is a possibility that the Chinese leadership will rely more on the country’s missile force, especially the conventional SRBM of the M-9 and M-11 variety in preference to combat aircraft.

These weapons are available in large numbers and could well be used in the opening phases of a border conflict to convey Chinese political resolve and to avoid attrition to own fighters. The terrain, large distances to airfields in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces (1,600-1,800 km from Arunachal Pradesh to Chengdu and Kunming) and the limitations imposed by high altitude on fighter operations from Tibetan airfields could also force the Chinese to bank on conventional missiles — SRBMs. It is also debatable if on their way to targets in India the Chinese aircraft would be allowed to overfly Myanmar and/or Bangladesh. For example, as the crow flies, Mandalay which has a very long runway is 805 km from Kolkata, 821 km from Tawang and 1,913 km from Chennai. The Great Coco Island that has only a 1,300 metre long runway is just 284 km from Port Blair.

Given the very large distances to their launch bases in mainland China and the severe payload limitations on fighter operations from the high altitude airfields in Tibet the actual offensive capability of the PLAAF along India’s Northern borders is somewhat limited. The PLAAF fleet of Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) is neither large enough nor sufficiently trained to compensate for this limitation. Besides the airfields in Tibet can be easily targeted by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and hence would remain vulnerable.

In view of the above, the PLAAF may well be the instrument of first choice in a future conflict against Taiwan or in the Yellow/South China Sea but is unlikely to pose a major challenge along the Northern borders of India for some years before China’s FGFA becomes operational.

Capabilities of IAF

The IAF today has a fairly large number of combat aircraft and a small number of conventional missiles of the Prithvi class. In the past, India has shown some reluctance to employ offensive air power in right measure. The combat elements of the IAF were simply not used for fear of escalation during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war which India lost. Thirty-seven years later in the 1999 Kargil conflict, the use of air power was delayed and then severely restricted to the Indian side of the Line of Control again for fear of escalation. It is, therefore, essential that the country’s military and political leadership is prepared to demonstrate India’s resolve without which all the expensive hardware would be utterly useless.

IAF resources would undoubtedly be stretched in the event of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) also mounting an offensive in collusion with the PLAAF. But even in such a situation it would not be easy for them to prevail. Simultaneous and well-coordinated offensive operations by China and Pakistan are a remote possibility but one for which the country must be prepared. For a variety of reasons, at present neither China nor India is likely to engage in an all-out, copy-book and set-piece conventional war. Firstly, India has consistently avoided using force even in the face of serious provocation from Pakistan. Secondly, for China, Taiwan and South China Sea disputes may be of far greater strategic importance given the recently reaffirmed American interest in the region. This is not to suggest that unrest in Tibet and Xinxiang does not pose a threat to China’s national unity. Thirdly, China is no longer the isolated country of the early Cold War era. Today, China is an important economic power with worldwide trading interests and can hardly afford to sully her image as a responsible player. Fourthly, China’s dependence on maritime routes for exports and energy imports especially through the Straits of Malacca would also constrain her strategic options.

The possibility of a local border skirmish, however, cannot be totally ruled out. In such a scenario India must sharply restrict the scope of such a skirmish. Combat elements of the IAF must be used quickly and effectively to demonstrate India’s determination and resolve.

There also exists a possibility of a face off in South China Sea where China has strongly objected to ONGC-Videsh undertaking oil exploration in collaboration with Vietnam. In response, the Indian Prime Minister has stated that this is a purely commercial activity clearly reaffirming India’s determination to assist Vietnam. In the event of a conflict the PLAAF and IAF would have to use flight tankers as this area is at considerable distance from their mainland bases. India has little choice but to station a Su-30 squadron at Car Nicobar airbase in A&N Islands for any possible action in the vicinity of the Malacca Straits.

Conclusion

The Chinese air and space assets are undoubtedly growing at a rapid rate. The PRC’s strategy is essentially aimed at the US. China does not want the US to intervene in a future conflict with Taiwan nor does she want to lose her freedom to bilaterally resolve the South China Sea disputes. China has largely succeeded in strategically encircling India and has also strengthened her relations with India’s neighbours by giving them generous military aid.

China has recently announced the establishment of a refuelling base in Seychelles and has maintained her naval presence around the Horn of Africa for anti-piracy operations. China would fully use and deploy her space based assets in South as well as Southeast Asia for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activity and resort to probing actins along the disputed borders and elsewhere to test India’s resolve and keep her on the back foot. India cannot thus afford to let her guard down.

Two recent statements by Indian political leaders give a fairly good idea of the current state of Sino-Indian relations. On November 30, 2011, Defence Minister AK Antony admitted that the PRC had created some, “situations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that could have been avoided but which were due to different (sic) perception of the border” that remains un-demarcated, but these were resolved through established mechanisms such as hot line, flag meetings, meetings of the commanders of the two sides and that the Sino-Indian border is quiet and tranquility is maintained.

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On December 4, 2011, Mr Omar Abdullah, the J&K Chief Minister expressed concern over Chinese involvement in the Kashmir region and wanted, ‘India to show spine’ while dealing with China. Even the normally mild mannered Dr Man Mohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, has said, “China has been getting more assertive” and that “China wanted to maintain a low-level of equilibrium with India.” This clearly shows that keeping Sino-Indian relations at a comfortable level would remain problematic. India would have to build her economic and military strength to face this challenge. It will be a tight rope walk.