In 2004, the Government of Dr Manmohan Singh created two posts of National Security Advisers — one for external security, which was held by the late JN Dixit, and the other for internal security, which was held by MK Narayanan. After the death of Dixit in January 2005, the Government reverted to the previous practice of having a single NSA to deal with internal and external security. This post is now held by Narayanan. A reversion to the 2004 practice of having an NSA exclusively for internal security is necessary for improving our counter-terrorism management.
Another important step should be the reorganization of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India. Counter-terrorism is one of its many responsibilities. While the trend in other countries has been towards having a single Ministry or Department to deal exclusively with counter-terrorism, our MHA has resisted this trend. In any unified command and control for counter-terrorism, the Ministry responsible for counter-terrorism has to play a pivotal role.
The importance of having a single leader for dealing exclusively with internal security, without being burdened with other responsibilities was realized by Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao.
The importance of having a single leader for dealing exclusively with internal security, without being burdened with other responsibilities was realized by Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao. Instead of bifurcating the MHA, Rajiv Gandhi created a post of Minister of State for Internal Security in the MHA to handle all operational matters including waging a joint campaign against terrorism by the Centre and the States. This continued under Narasimha Rao. The time has come to create an independent Ministry of Internal Security.
Inadequacies in our intelligence agencies have remained unidentified and unaddressed. Every successful terrorist strike speaks of an intelligence failure. There is a lack of co-ordination not only among the agencies at the Centre, but also between the central agencies and those of the state police. How to improve the quantity and the quality of the intelligence flow? How to ensure better co-ordination at the Centre and with the States? Important questions such as these were addressed by the Special Task Force for Revamping the Intelligence Apparatus headed by Shri GC Saxena, former head of the R&AW, appointed by the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government in 2000.
The implementation of its recommendations has not had the desired impact on the ground situation. Why? What further measures are needed? These issues have to be urgently addressed by a dedicated task force on terrorism-related intelligence capabilities.
The time has come to create an independent Ministry of Internal Security.
Preventive physical security is the responsibility of central police forces and the police of different States. While the capability at the centre has improved, it has improved in certain States and declined in certain others. A strong physical security capability can thwart a terrorist strike even in the absence of intelligence. A weak capability may not be able to prevent it even if intelligence is available. Identification of weaknesses in our physical security set-up and action to remove them must receive priority.
Successful investigation and prosecution deter future terrorist strikes. Poor investigation and prosecution encourage terrorism. India has a poor record in successful prosecutions. Effective co-ordination of the police in all the States, the creation of a national data base to which the police of different States can have direct access and the quick sharing of the results of the enquiries and investigations through this data base could improve our record in investigation and prosecution.
Preventive physical security is the responsibility of central police forces and the police of different States.
How can attacks on soft targets be prevented? This has been a dilemma for all States. Israel, which sees many attacks on soft targets by Palestinian suicide bombers, follows a policy of reprisal attacks by the State on the leaders of the suspected organizations after every attack on a soft target, in order to demonstrate to the terrorists that their attacks on soft targets will not be cost free. It is able to do it because the targets chosen by the State agencies for reprisal attacks are located in the areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority. It does not indulge in reprisal attacks in its own territory.
Despite such reprisal attacks by the State agencies, Israel has not been able to stop attacks on soft targets. There is no short-term solution to attacks on soft targets except improvement in the capability of our intelligence agencies to collect timely preventive intelligence. Gradual attrition of organizations indulging in such attacks through arrests and neutralization of their leaders could be a medium and long-term solution. That too would require precise intelligence, which is not always available.
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Suicide terrorism is a lethal strategic weapon, to which no State has been able to find an effective response. While suicide terrorism against hard, heavily protected targets can be prevented through strict access control, suicide terrorism against soft targets is difficult to prevent unless the suicide terrorist is accidentally detected or the explosive device fails to function.
Gradual attrition of organizations indulging in such attacks through arrests and neutralization of their leaders could be a medium and long-term solution.
About 80 per cent of the acts of suicide terrorism are carried out with explosives. Strict explosives control in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists can make the problem of suicide terrorism more manageable, but the increasing use of commonly available materials such as nitrogenous fertilizers, cosmetics used by women, etc by the terrorists for fabricating explosives has added to the difficulties of the counter-terrorism agencies in preventing explosive substances from falling into the hands of terrorists.
Yet, how to tighten up controls over the purchase, sale and acquisition of explosives and substances capable of being converted into explosives is a question, which needs serious attention. While considerable attention has been paid to devising measures to prevent the proliferation of small arms and ammunition, similar attention has not been paid to explosive substances.
Strategic threat analysis has undergone a significant change since 9/11. Before 9/11, analysis and assessment of threat perceptions were based on actual intelligence or information available with the intelligence and security agencies. 9/11 has brought home to policy-makers the difficulties faced by intelligence agencies, however well-endowed they might be, in penetrating terrorist organizations to find out details of their thinking and planning.
We have not succeeded where the threat was pan-Indian in nature with the network extending its presence to many States in the north and the south.
This realization has underlined the importance of analysts serving policy-makers constantly identifying national security vulnerabilities, which might attract the attention of terrorists, and suggesting options and actions to deny opportunities for attacks to the terrorists. Vulnerability analysis has become as important as threat analysis.
Strategic analysts can no longer confine themselves to an analysis and assessment of strategic developments of a conventional nature arising from State actors, but should pay equal attention to the strategic impact of non-State actors, such as international or trans-national terrorists, crime mafia groups and nuclear proliferators on global security in general and our own national security in particular..
India’s record in dealing with terrorism and insurgency is not as negative as it is often projected to be. We have had a successful record in Punjab, Nagaland (partial), Mizoram, Tripura and in Tamil Nadu in dealing with terrorism of Al Umma. Even in Jammu & Kashmir, the ground situation is showing signs of definite improvement.
A determined political leader, who has the national interests in mind, can use a whip and make the agencies and the police co-operate.
However, there are two kinds of terrorism/insurgency where our record has been poor till now — the jihadi kind, which is essentially an urban phenomenon outside J&K, and the Maoist (Naxalite) kind, which is essentially a rural phenomenon. We have succeeded where the terrorism or insurgency was a regional phenomenon and was confined to a narrow area. We have not succeeded where the threat was pan-Indian in nature with the network extending its presence to many States in the north and the south.
A pan-Indian threat requires a co-ordinated pan-Indian response at the political and professional levels. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of political parties, the era of coalition and the tendency in our country to over-politicize terrorism come in the way of a pan-Indian political response. The tendency of the intelligence agencies and the police of different States to keep each other in the dark about what they know and not to admit to each other as to what they do not know comes in the way of a pan-Indian professional response. There has been a plethora of reports and recommendations on the need for better sharing and co-ordination, but without any effect on our agencies and the police.
The agencies and the Police are largely responsible for the absence of a co-ordinated professional response, but the political leadership at the Centre and in different States cannot escape their share of responsibility. A determined political leader, who has the national interests in mind, can use a whip and make the agencies and the police co-operate. A political leader whose policies and actions are motivated by partisan and not national interests will come in the way of professional co-operation.
Any cure to the problem of jihadi and Maoist terrorism has to start at the political level. A political leader has to play a dual role. He has to help professionals in taking firm action against the terrorists — whatever be their community and ideology. He has to give them whatever tools they need.
At the same time, he has to identify the circumstances and perceptions which drive young Muslims to take to jihadi terrorism and young tribals to take to Maoist terrorism. Anger is one of the common root causes of all terrorism. Unless this anger is addressed, professional handling of the threat alone, however effective, cannot bring about an enduring end to this threat.
Unsatisfactory political handling of the Muslim youth by all political parties is an aggravating cause of the threat from jihadi terrorism.
An effective political handling has to start with a detailed analysis of the causes of anger and action to deal with them. Our young Muslims, who are taking to jihadi terrorism, are not bothered by issues such as lack of education and unemployment, reservation for Muslims, etc. They are angry at what they consider to be the unfairness to Muslims, which, according to them, is widely prevalent in India. Unsatisfactory political handling of the Muslim youth by all political parties is an aggravating cause of the threat from jihadi terrorism.
Similarly, it is the absence of meaningful land reforms and perceptions of suppression of the tribals by the non-tribals and the administration, which is an important cause of the tribal anger in Central India. It is the responsibility of the political class and the society as a whole to address this. They do not do so and keep nursing an illusion that more and more money, men and equipment for the agencies and the police will end this problem. It won’t.
Any cure to the problem of jihadi and Maoist terrorism has to start at the political level. A political leader has to play a dual role.
The way we kick around the problem of terrorism like a football blaming everybody else except ourselves can be seen in TV debates and media columns. The same arguments are repeated without worrying over their validity.
Flow of human intelligence about jihadi terrorism is weak because of the post-9/11 phenomenon of global Islamic solidarity and the adversarial relationship between the agencies and the police on the one side and the Muslim community on the other. Feelings of Islamic solidarity prevent even law-abiding Muslims from volunteering to the agencies and the police information about their co-religionists, who have taken to terrorism and from assisting the police in their investigation. The adversarial relationship has resulted in mutual demonization.
How to come out of this syndrome is a matter for serious consideration not only by the police and the agencies, but also by the political class and the civil society, including the media.
“¦keep nursing an illusion that more and more money, men and equipment for the agencies and the police will end this problem. It wont.
Once we allow terrorism and insurgencies of different kinds to make their appearance in our society it takes a long time to deal with them. We took 19 years to deal with the Naga insurgency, another 19 years to deal with the Mizo insurgency, 14 years to deal with Khalistani terrorism and about 10 years to deal with Al Umma. The French took 19 years to deal with the terrorism of Carlos and his group. Even after 41 years of vigorous implementation of a no-holds-barred counter-terrorism strategy, Israel is still grappling with the terrorism of the Palestinians and the Hezbollah. The British took over 20 years to bring the Irish Republican Army under control.
The attitude of our political class to terrorism is ambivalent. On the one hand, it is worried — rightly — over this growing threat. On the other, it continues to view this as a vote-catcher. Every political party has been firm in demanding action against terrorism when it is out of power. It becomes soft when it comes to power. That is the bane of our counter-terrorism. Only voter pressure can force the political class to stop exploiting terrorism as an electoral weapon and to start dealing with it as a major threat to national security, which should unite the political class and the civil society.
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The jihadi terrorism in our territory has been able to thrive because of the support from the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our anxiety for improved relations with them has been coming in the way of any deterrence to their continued use of terrorism against India. The deterrence has to be in the form of an effective covert action capability, which we should be prepared to use against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani and Bangladeshi territory, if left with no other option. The covert action capability, which was reportedly wound up in 1997 out of a misplaced sense of generosity to Pakistan, has to be revived.
The jihadi terrorism in our territory has been able to thrive because of the support from the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh.
In our preoccupation with what is happening and what could happen in Pakistan, we should not overlook the urgent need for having a relook at our physical security architecture in sensitive establishments such as the nuclear establishments, oil refineries, gas production infrastructure, road, rail and air transport, critical information infrastructure, etc. I never tire of repeating that physical security is the most important component of counter-terrorism. In both India and Pakistan, we have a weak culture of physical security. The main reason why the US has been able thus far to prevent a repeat of 9/11 is the strengthening of the physical security apparatus by the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
What happened at Mumbai — namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terrorists wielding lethal hand-held weapons — could happen again in India. There is an urgent need for two actions. Firstly, an audit of the physical security measures at all sensitive establishments — whether run by the Government or the private sector — in order to determine whether any physical security enhancements are called for.
The covert action capability, which was reportedly wound up in 1997 out of a misplaced sense of generosity to Pakistan, has to be revived.
There is a need for dividing all sensitive establishments into two categories — those where a single-layer of physical security would be enough and those where a double or multiple-layer of physical security would be necessary. The idea of a double or multiple-layer of physical security is that even if the terrorists manage to beat the outside gate or perimeter security, they will not have a free run of the establishment due to a second or more layers of armed physical security. To counter determined terrorists such as those one saw at Mumbai, a single-layer of physical security may not be sufficient in sensitive establishments.
The second action required is to have a relook at our consequence management capabilities to deal with a situation should, despite revamped physical security, the terrorists manage to have access to sensitive establishments. The consequence management drill should take into account various issues such as control over media coverage, prevention of panic, minimization of damage and lethality, etc. It is important to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would act as the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequence management community of the Government of India.
What happened at Mumbai “” namely, commando-style surprise attacks by small groups of well-trained terrorists wielding lethal hand-held weapons “” could happen again in India.
Situated as we are in the sub-continental region where terrorism will continue to be a fact of life at least for another 10 years or more and keeping in view our ambition of emerging as a major economic power, we just cannot afford to take up the stand that the physical security of the private sector is its responsibility and that the Government’s role will be limited to issuing periodic advisories regarding likely threats.
The Government has to play a more proactive role in encouraging and helping at least establishments of a strategic nature such as those associated with the tourism industry, the information technology companies, etc in improving their physical security. They already have some capability for checks for explosives, but the methods used by them are primitive and do not take into account dangers from suicide bombers and vehicle-borne suicide terrorists.
Their weakest capability — which is almost non-existent — is in facing a commando-style surprise attack by small groups of terrorists with modern hand-held weapons. The only way of thwarting them is by having well-armed and well-trained guards. Do the present laws allow the employment of such guards? If not, should the laws be modified to permit them to employ such well-armed guards? Who is going to supervise their training and keep them under control to prevent the arms issued to them from finding their way into the hands of terrorists? These are questions, which need urgent attention.
From the point of view of the physical security architecture, the distinction between the public and the private sector is disappearing. Many private companies are already in the fields of oil refining and gas exploration, production and transport. An increasing number of airports are now privately managed. We intend allowing private companies into the field of nuclear power production. The Government cannot evade the responsibility for ensuring that such private establishments have a high level of physical security.
There is a need for a joint task force consisting of the representatives of the intelligence and security agencies and professional organizations of private industries such as the FICCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries), the CII (the Confederation of Indian Industries), etc as well as representatives of foreign business organizations to go into the question of physical security enhancements for private establishments of strategic significance.
Practically all major private establishments — Indian as well as foreign — have their own physical security set-up. It is important for senior intelligence and security officials at the State and Central levels to regularly interact with them to exchange threat and vulnerability perceptions and ideas as to how to strengthen physical security.
In an important article titled “The Coming Swarm” in the New York Times of February 15, 2009, which should be required reading for all our physical security experts, John Acquilla, who teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey in California, wrote as follows: “It seems that a new ‘Mumbai model’ of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging.”
It is important to associate the consequence management set-ups of the States with this exercise because it is ultimately they who would act as the protector of first resort through their consequence management capabilities till there is intervention by the consequence management community of the Government of India.
“The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counter-terrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai. The Indian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time. While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years…How are swarms to be countered?”
“The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential. … For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counter-terrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing…At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely.”
“Cities, states and Washington should work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in a counter-terrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more units able to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen all responded to Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved.”
At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely.
As already stated, jihadi terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir is essentially an urban phenomenon. We cannot use against it the techniques learnt by us in dealing with the insurgency in the North-East and with Maoist terrorism in Central India. We need a different system of response, which is comprehensive enough to cover all likely targets of strategic significance — whether in the Government or private sector. Even if we do not create an independent Ministry of Internal Security, we should create a separate Department of Physical Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is, inter alia, responsible for counter-terrorism, to act as the nodal agency for all physical security measures on the pattern of the Department of Homeland Security of the US. This newly-created department should interact continuously with its US counterpart to pick its brains and profit from its expertise and experience.
The Government is already reported to have taken some steps for toning up the intelligence collection capability by strengthening the Multi-Agency Centre. Chidambaram, the Home Minister, is reported to have taken action to address the staff and resource constraints faced by the MAC. Even before the Mumbai attack, the National Security Adviser (NSA) had set up a new Task Force headed by Dr SD Pradhan, former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), to have a fresh look at measures required for further strengthening intelligence collection and co-ordination in the light of developments since 2000.
Such strategic thinking has to be based on the assumption that any significant improvement in our bilateral relations with Pakistan is unlikely in the near future and that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism would continue to be the most serious internal security threat.
Inter alia, this Task Force is also expected to address the resource and manpower shortages faced by the intelligence agencies and to remove red tapes in the processing of their proposals in this regard. While these measures would result in short-term improvements in the functioning of the intelligence community, there is a need to think strategically of medium and long-term measures. Such strategic thinking has to be based on the assumption that any significant improvement in our bilateral relations with Pakistan is unlikely in the near future and that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism would continue to be the most serious internal security threat.
Such strategic thinking should also take into consideration a scenario where the developing strategic relations between India and the US makes India a target of global terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda. To provide a strategic framework for improving our capability for prevention through intelligence, it is necessary to set up a Special Task Force exclusively dedicated to intelligence-driven counter-terrorism to come out with a set of recommendations for this purpose.
The piecemeal measures initiated by the Government since the Kargil conflict for improving co-ordination among intelligence agencies have not completely removed all the deficiencies which led to our being taken by surprise by the clandestine occupation of the Kargil heights by the Pakistan Army. Presently, the responsibility for intelligence coordination is with the NSA as recommended by the Saxena Task Force. The time has come to create a post of National Intelligence Coordinator to handle the task of co-ordination on a full-time basis. Like the NSA, he could work under the Prime Minister.
These attacks have, inter alia, the purpose of shaking the confidence of our people as well as foreign investors and businessmen in the capabilities of our counter-terrorism machinery.
Outside Jammu & Kashmir, the externally-sponsored jihadi terrorists have been focusing mainly on metro cities such as Mumbai (three mass-casualty attacks in March, 1993, July, 2006 and November, 2008), Delhi (two attacks in October, 2005 and September, 2008 plus the unsuccessful attack on the Parliament in December, 2001), Hyderabad (two attacks since 2006) and Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Bangalore (one attack each in 2008). Only Chennai and Kolkata have so far escaped mass casualty attacks. These attacks have, inter alia, the purpose of shaking the confidence of our people as well as foreign investors and businessmen in the capabilities of our counter-terrorism machinery.
Future attacks are also likely to be directed at such metro cities, which are the economic nerve-centers. In addition to a national plan for strengthening counter-terrorism, we should have separate tailor-made plans for Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur and Ahmedabad. These plans should focus on capacity-building through improved manpower and resource availability and better training.
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