Indian Defence Review

Enduring Problems

Target Identification. Despite major advances in air launched weapons and attendant target designation and aiming/homing systems the problem of target identification continues to be a severe constraint on strike missions especially in sub-conventional warfare when the risk of collateral damage is high. Fighter aircraft and attack helicopters face such situations on almost daily basis when operating against terrorists, guerrillas and insurgents. Non-state actors have often used innocent civilians as human shields while launching attacks on government forces. Not a day goes by without some report of a civilian target being mistakenly destroyed in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Air operations in urban areas are even more difficult even though some very accurate attacks were indeed launched on targets in Baghdad during the Second Gulf War.

Click to buy: Asia 2030: The Unfolding Future

In today’s world of 24-hour TV news channels and the increasing role of NGOs keeping an eagle eye on all government operations, nation states find it increasingly difficult to explain and justify these mistakes. A recent such attack in North Afghanistan on an oil tanker that was thought to be surrounded by Taliban fighters but which actually turned out to be civilians collecting fuel resulted in the tragic death of some 90 innocents.1 Afghan marriage parties where participants often fire weapons in celebration have been mistakenly targeted bringing opprobrium on air power operators. The arms manufacturers would have to work to improve the present target identification methods if indiscriminate use of fire power is to be avoided.

Developing own military aviation industry is, therefore, inescapable if dependence on foreign suppliers is to be avoided. It is likely that the next two decades will see efforts in reducing the types and vendors of the aircraft and equipment used by the air forces in the Asian region.

Air Superiority. “With it anything is possible; without it everything is at risk,” said Major General (Retd) Charles Link of the USAF.2 It is a truism that no major armour activity can be undertaken without air superiority. One of the most important tenets of air power employment, the concept of air superiority has often been mistakenly associated with air forces fighting their ‘own battles’ against enemy air forces and failing to come to the support of own ground forces when most needed. Nothing could be farther from the truth. No air force can mount air operations before it first effectively neutralises or at the very least reduces the ability of the opposing air force to interfere with own operations. There are many ways to achieve this basic objective; offensive counter air, airfield strike and deep interdiction including strikes on enemy’s leadership are some of them. Admittedly, air superiority is not automatically achieved but has to be hard fought and sometimes may take time.

The US and its allies have not fought a single war since Vietnam without first neutralising enemy air. SEAD or Suppression of Enemy Air Defence operations are, therefore, vital and have to be undertaken at the very initial stage of a conflict. The ground forces often overlook this fact and bitterly complain that the air force does not provide them ‘Close or Offensive Air Support’ (CAS/OAS) to first soften up the enemy before they can launch an offensive. Col. John Warden who formulated the air strategy for the 1991 Gulf War and many others are of the view that ‘something has already gone drastically wrong, if the army demands immediate air support meaning thereby that joint planning should already have taken into account the needs of the surface forces. Problems of target identification, friendly fire incidents and collateral damage will in all likelihood continue to plague the modern air forces for the foreseeable future.

Missiles. As seen above, many Asian countries are rapidly building their capacity to indigenously produce short-range ballistic, anti-ship, cruise and other missiles apparently to make up for deficiencies in manned combat aircraft. The PRC has over the last two decades built up a stock of some 1500 SRBMs and a whole host of cruise and other missiles and has also exported them to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Syria giving these countries to deter some extent, future threats. Given the changing nature of warfare in which sub-conventional and irregular conflicts appear to predominate, building of indigenous military/defence capabilities naturally becomes inescapable.

Also read: The Teenage Maoists: a challenge unprecedended

The rapidly rising prices and increasing difficulties in accessing state-of-the-art technologies together place serious strains on a country’s economy. This perhaps makes the relatively cheaper and easy-to-produce missile a weapon of choice. It must be noted that missile technology has rapidly proliferated with some 40 countries pursuing some missile programmes of their own.3 As these technologies become more diffuse and widespread with increasingly affordable missiles with high accuracy and bigger conventional warheads, it is possible that these will play a bigger role in both deterrence and Warfighting.

Conclusion

The foregoing has shown that technology has continuously shaped and sharpened the effectiveness of air power as a decisive element in conventional warfare. Air power has also been successful as a deterrent to conventional wars. It has, however, not been as effective against insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas and those indulging in ethnic cleansing activities. Other limitations such as very high unit costs of aircraft and weapons and the inability to produce these locally place developing countries in a difficult situation when planning their force structure upgrades. Developing own military aviation industry is, therefore, inescapable if dependence on foreign suppliers is to be avoided. It is likely that the next two decades will see efforts in reducing the types and vendors of the aircraft and equipment used by the air forces in the Asian region.

China, and with its help Pakistan, may become more independent in this field. Both the PLAAF and PAF are likely to consolidate their inventories greatly relying on indigenously manufactured products. India’s GDP has been growing at a steady 6-7 per cent for some time and if this pace is maintained, adequate funding would be available for the IAF to also become a truly balanced and capable air arm despite its current problems of dwindling assets. Its leadership would have to focus on fewer types such as the Su-30, Mirage-2000, MiG-29 and the Tejas while simultaneously developing its capabilities to upgrade them as the need arises. India cannot, however, be counted among modern developed nations if it does not soon build a robust aviation industry. Modern air power undoubtedly will play a decisive role in national security but it cannot be viewed as a panacea for all problems. Its effectiveness would continue to depend on the freedom it gets from the political and military leadership of the country.