COULD LAWRENCE REES EXPLAIN THE FUNDAMENTAL PRECONDITIONS OF THE HOLOCAUST?

British historian and scholar Lawrence Reese in his latest book published in May 2024 explains in the following words “The fundamental precondition for the Holocaust happening was Adolf Hitler,” he explains from his home in London. “Even as far back as 1921, Hitler said that solving the Jewish question was a central question for National Socialism. And you can only solve it by using brute force.” Hitler had no blueprint for the Holocaust at that point, says Rees. But he did have a pathological problem with Jews. “Hitler believed that something needed to be done,” Rees explains, “and that evolved and changed according to circumstances and political opportunism.” An intriguing part of Rees’s book is his determination to figure out when the collective set of initiatives we now call the ‘Final Solution’ became official Nazi policy. It’s a question that doesn’t come with a straightforward answer, Rees maintains. What is clear, though, is that in the summer of 1940 there was still no concrete plan in place for the extermination of Jews. Furthermore, up until that point, Rees argues, the Nazis were still clinging to the belief that in the long term, the way to solve what they called “the Jewish question” was by expulsion and hard labor. At that point, mass murder was still not the preferred option. By the summer of 1942, however, a sea change had taken place. By that time, the Holocaust was in full swing.

Therefore, within the previous two-year period, Rees points out, there were several milestones on the road towards mass extermination. But trying to pinpoint an exact moment where the decision was taken to commit to mass killing is very difficult, says Rees — especially since much of the planning was done in secret without written records. Hitherto, many historians, filmmakers, and writers have pointed to a single meeting where plans for the Holocaust were finally decided upon in the power structures of Nazi officialdom. This was known as the Wannsee Conference. It was held in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee in January of 1942 and involved several mid-ranking Nazi officials devising a plot to murder Jews over a shorter timescale and in more efficient ways. But even then, Rees says, no final plans were resolved at the infamous conference. He also points out that key figures from the upper tiers of the Nazi hierarchy — Himmler, Goebbels, and Hitler himself — were not present. “I cannot see how there can have been a decision in 1941,” says Rees. “By that stage, you can say a decision to implement what we would now call the Holocaust had been. The moment of no return for the Holocaust,” says the historian, “was in the spring and early summer of 1942 when a decision was taken to kill all of the Jews in the General Government in Poland — a German-occupied zone established by Hitler after the joint invasion by the Germans and Soviets in 1939.By that stage, you can say a decision to implement what we would now call the Holocaust had been made,” said Rees with convincing authority.

BENITO MUSSOLINI NEVER BELIEVED IN RACIAL SUPERIORITY

Though Adolf Hitler had great admiration for Mussolini the latter had no belief in the concept. One has to remember that Mussolini’s girlfriendwas a Jew and exercised considerable influence in Mussolini’s propaganda machine. Surprisingly this had not affected Hitler’s adoration for Mussolini. One can assume that till that time at Potsdam Hitler had not reached his conclusion of a final solution for the Jews. One wonders what led Hitler to his “conclusion” thesis.

DONALD TRUMP’S NEW ADOLPH HITLER

No less surprising was President Donald Trump’s admiration for Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban whose central guiding philosophy and preferred method of governing are similar to Trump’s, and could provide insight as to what a second Trump presidency would look like. Like Trump, Orbán is hostile toward immigrants and notably built a massive border fence in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis to keep asylum-seekers out of Hungary. His political party, Fidesz, has cracked down on press freedom and has sought to revise textbooks to exclude mentions of the LGBTQ+ community. And most revealingly, Orbán has made changes to Hungary’s government that allow him to stay in power for an extended period. While addressing a crowd at Mar-a-Lago, Trump extolled his leadership style publicly, saying “There’s nobody better, smarter or a better leader than Viktor Orbán, he’s fantastic… He says, ‘This is the way it’s going to be,’ and that’s the end of it. He’s the boss.”  The vile reason Hungary’s Viktor Orban is manipulating US politics Trump’s comments caused significant alarm on social media, with journalists, commentators, and elected officials urging voters to pay attention to the former president’s praise of an “autocrat.” “How many different ways does Trump need to tell you he’s going to rule as a dictator before you believe him?” Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Will Bunch Former federal prosecutor Richard Signorelli wrote that Orbán was “Trump’s Mussolini,” suggesting the former president and the Hungarian leader could be the “new Axis powers’ alliance.”

CONCLUSION

“Journalist and lawyer Daniel Miller called on the New York Times in particular to publish a “massive headline about Trump wanting to be a dictator” every day until the election. And Sarah Longwell, who is the publisher of the anti-Trump conservative website – The Bulwark–urged news outlets to not hold back in calling out Trump’s affinity for far-right dictators. “Just because it’s old news that Donald Trump loves autocrats doesn’t mean it doesn’t deserve wall-to-wall coverage when he does things like this,” she wrote, “Because it’s insane.” Columnist and podcaster Charles Adler tweeted about his firsthand experience with Orbán’s brand of governing, writing that he “destroyed democracy in Hungary – the land of my birth.“Hungarians of my generation fled to the US and Canada to get the hell away from authoritarianism,” Adler said.

India has now begun to engage more uninhibitedly with the Taliban leadership in Kabul, as was demonstrated by a March 7 visit of a delegation of the Ministry of External Affairs to the Afghan capital and the subsequent press coverage it received. The Taliban’s control of Afghanistan is now a hard reality, with which India has begun to reconcile for a variety of pragmatic reasons.

The question is how far and how quickly should India move forward with the Taliban in practical ways. Is the Indian public opinion ready for this, given the fundamentalist Islamic character of the Taliban, their brutal use of terror to gain power in Afghanistan, and the lack of confidence in the relative moderation they are projecting currently? Is this posture simply tactical because they have to gain the world’s acceptance and deliver governance to Afghanistan in very difficult conditions, or, have they become more experienced and learnt lessons from the past, and want to avoid repeating their mistakes?

Sour Experience With Taliban

In India, the antipathy for the Taliban cannot be ignored. They have been seen as creatures of Pakistan; their past role in the IC 814 hijacking has not been forgotten, as also the fact that they allowed terrorist attacks against India from their soil. Their medieval Islamist ideology is viewed as a regional threat.

They have gained power in Afghanistan for the second time with full Pakistani backing. The ISI chief played a role in the government formation in Kabul, making Sirajuddin Haqqani, a designated terrorist, the Interior Minister.

India has noted, however, that after assuming power, the Taliban have avoided negative statements about India. They have assured India that they will not allow Afghan soil to be used against the country. So far, this seems to be the case. They complain apparently that despite this, India’s narrative about them has not changed.

Taliban-Pakistan Relations Are Rough

More importantly, their relations with Pakistan have soured. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has carried out operations inside the country. The Taliban have refused to act against the TTP as requested by Pakistan, and have advised the latter to sort out their differences with the TTP, for which they have offered help. Pakistan carried out attacks against the TTP in Afghanistan once again on March 18, eliciting strong protests from the Taliban government.

Pakistan’s hopes of “strategic depth’ against India in Afghanistan have been belied. The state of their bilateral relations has deteriorated further with Pakistan’s expulsion of nearly 500,000 Afghan refugees who had settled there years ago. The Taliban refused to recognise the Durand Line when they first came to power in Kabul with Pakistan’s backing. They are doing so again. Pakistan’s fencing of the border during the Ghani presidency to affirm the Durand Line on the ground has not progressed, and in parts, the fencing has been ruptured.

The Taliban are asserting their independence. Pakistan, in turn, has stepped up economic pressure on the Taliban government by exploiting land-locked Afghanistan’s dependence on imports from Pakistan as well as the transit of goods through it. The country has been blocking traffic at Torkham, among other places. This is critical because customs duties on such goods are a vital source of revenue — making up almost 50- 60% of the total—for the Taliban government.

Why The Taliban Need India

This explains why the Taliban minister concerned visited Chabahar to activate this alternative route for Afghanistan’s trade traffic. India had been promoting this route to gain access to Afghanistan, which Pakistan has long denied to India. There is now a shared interest between India and the Taliban government to loosen Pakistan’s transit grip on Afghanistan, which is why the subject of transit was mentioned in the release issued by the Taliban in its Foreign Minister’s meeting with the visiting MEA Joint Secretary. It might be time to give Afghanistan more options.

India’s projects in Afghanistan during the Karzai/Ghani regimes were spread all over the country, including in areas under Taliban control. These projects were very well received by the locals, and the Taliban, therefore, did not disturb them. India has invested almost $3 billion in assistance projects in Afghanistan, earning the people’s goodwill. The Taliban want India to continue this form of assistance. An Indian technical delegation recently went to Afghanistan to inspect the Selma dam constructed by India. The security situation seems to be under control.

India’s Assistance Projects

The reality is that India and Afghanistan have historical ties. These have essentially been with the Pashtuns, though the relationship later extended to the Tajiks, the Hazaras and the Uzbeks when India supported the Northern Alliance against the first Taliban government. The fact that the Taliban are Pashtuns does not necessarily mean that we distance ourselves from the Pashtuns at a people’s level. It is argued that if we want to continue our humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan, which includes the Pashtuns, a pragmatic modus vivendi with the Taliban authorities in Kabul would be required. The Taliban appreciate the projects India has backed in Afghanistan and want them to be expanded.

At the international level, India has to remain in line with the overall consensus against recognising the interim Taliban government unless it becomes inclusive, gives rights to women, respects human rights, guarantees that its soil will not be used to commit acts of terrorism, among other concerns. The Central Asian states are concerned about the spillover of Islamic radicalism from Afghanistan into their polities. Elements affiliated with al Qaeda and the Islamic State seem to be present in Afghanistan, though lately, no major incident involving them has been reported. It appears that the Taliban government is desperate to obtain formal recognition, and hence its moderate stance. Individually, some Taliban leaders may even want to give women some basic rights, including the right to education, but they have to defer to the Emir in Kandahar, whose thinking remains very regressive.

India has thus not accorded formal recognition to the Taliban government. Its “technical” mission in Kabul is manned by middle-level officials, whereas countries like China, Russia, Turkey, the European Union and the Central Asian states have ambassadors in place.

The Other Afghanistan

India faces another challenge. A host of Afghan leaders who have quit the country still owe allegiance to the overthrown Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and fly its flag, not that of the Taliban. India, therefore, has to deal with two Afghanistans, one inside the country and one outside, and find some sort of balance between the two.

In sum, India cannot withdraw from Afghanistan as it did during the first Taliban regime in the country. The country is an important geopolitical piece not only in the larger geography of the Indian subcontinent, but also that of Central Asia. China, which is already present strategically in Pakistan and is dominating Central Asia economically, is extending its sway there. It has strengthened its presence in Afghanistan’s neighbour Iran, too. India thus must not vacate its bilateral and geopolitical stakes in Kabul, and for that, the doors to the Taliban would need to be kept open.

Courtesy: https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/hard-realities-is-india-ready-for-a-real-taliban-outreach-5267698

The flags of the European Union, Germany and Turkey are pictured before the arrival of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan to deliver a speech at the ISS arena in Duesseldorf February 27, 2011. REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay (GERMANY – Tags: POLITICS) – RTR2J6VT

Introduction

Up to now, not once expressed by Turkey’s President R. T. Erdoğan a possibility to organize a national referendum on Turkish membership to the European Union (the EU) opened many questions of different nature followed by old and new problems.

A current European political concern is reflected in many controversial issues and one of those the most important is facing the EU about whether or not to accept Turkey as a full member state (being a candidate state since 1999). Turkey is, on one hand, governed as a secular democracy by moderate Islamic political leaders, seeking to play a role of the bridge between the Middle East and Europe. However, Turkey is, on other hands, almost 100% Muslim country with a rising tide of Islamic radicalism (especially since the 2023 Israeli aggression on Gaza and ethnic cleansing of the Gazan Palestinians), surrounded with the neighbors with a similar problem.

There are two fundamental arguments by all of those who are opposing Turkish admission to the EU: 1) Muslim Turkish citizens (70 million) will never be properly integrated into the European environment that is predominantly Christian; and 2) In the case of Turkish accession, historical clashes between the (Ottoman) Turks and European Christians are going to be revived. Here we will refer only to one statement against Turkish accession: it “would mean the end of Europe” (former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) – a statement which clearly reflects the opinion by 80% of Europeans polled in 2009 that Turkey’s admission to the EU would not be a good thing. At the same time, there are only 32% of Turkish citizens who had a favorable opinion of the EU and, therefore, the admission process, for which formal and strict negotiations began already in 2005, is very likely to be finally abortive.

Islamic fundamentalism and Turkey’s admission to the EU

The question of Turkish admission to the EU is by the majority of Europeans seen through the glass of Islamic fundamentalism as one of the most serious challenges to the European stability and above all identity that is primarily based on the Christian values and tradition. Islamic fundamentalism is understood as an attempt to undermine existing state practices for the very reason that militant Muslims (like ISIS/ISIL/DAESH) are fighting to re–establish the medieval Islamic Caliphate and the establishment of theocratic authority over the global Islamic community – the Umma. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism first came to the attention of the Western part of the international community in 1979 when a pro-American absolute monarchy was changed with a Shia (Shiia) Muslim anti-American semi-theocracy in Iran. In other words, Iranian Shia Muslim clerics, who were all the time the spiritual leaders of the Iranians, became now their political leaders too. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 prompted possibilities of similar uprisings in other Muslim societies followed by pre-emptive actions against them by other governments.  

What can be the most dangerous scenario for Turkey from the European perspective if the accession negotiations failed is, probably, Turkish turn towards the Muslim world followed by rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism which can be properly controlled by the EU if Turkey would become a member state of the club? That is, probably, the most important “security” factor to note regarding the EU-Turkish relations and accession negotiations. Namely, following the 9/11 terror attacks (on Washington and New York), it was becoming more and more clear that it was better to have (Islamic) Turkey inside the EU rather than as a part of an anti-Western bloc of Muslim states.

In general, for the Western governments and especially for the US and Israeli administrations, Shia Muslims became seen after the 1979 Iranian Islamic (Shia) revolution as the most potential Islamic fundamentalists and the religious terrorists.Therefore, the oppression of Shia minorities by the Sunni majorities in several Muslim countries are deliberately not recorded and criticized by the Western governments. The case of Alevi people in Turkey is one of the best examples of such policy. However, at the same time, the EU administration is paying a full attention to the Kurdish question in Turkey even requiring the recognition of the Kurds by the Turkish government as an ethnocultural minority (as different from the ethnic Turks). Why the Alevi people are in this respect discriminated by the EU’s minority policy in Turkey? The answer is because the Kurds are Sunni Muslims but Alevis are considered as a Turkish faction of (militant) Shia Muslim community within the Islamic world.

In the next paragraphs, I would like to put more lights on the question who are Alevi people and what is Alevism as a religious identity taking into account the fact that religion, undoubtedly, has become increasingly important in both the studies and practice of both international relations and global politics. We have to keep also in our minds that religious identity was predominant in comparison to national or ethnic identities for several centuries being the crucial cause of political conflicts in many cases.            

What is Alevism?

​The Alevi people are those Muslims who believe in Alevismthat is, in fact, a sect or form of Islam. Especially in Turkey, Alevism is a second common sect of Islam. The number of Alevi people is between 10−15 million. A name of the sect comes from the term Alevi what means “the follower of Ali”. Some experts in Islamic studies claim that Alevism is a branch of Shi’ism (Shia Islam), but, as a matter of fact, the Alevi Umma is not homogeneous and Alevism cannot be understoodwithout another Islamic sect – Bektashism. Nevertheless, Alevi culture produced many poets and folk songs alongside with the fact that Alevi people are experiencing many every-day life problems to live according to their belief in Islam.

The Alevis (Turkish: Aleviler or Alevilik; Kurdish: Elewî) are a religious, sub-ethnic, and cultural community in Turkey representing at the same time the biggest sect of Islam in Turkey. Alevism is a way of Islamic mysticism or Sufism that is believing in one God by accepting Muhammad as a Prophet, and the Holy Qur’ān. Alevi people loves Ehlibeyt – the family of Prophet Muhammad-, unifying prayer and supplication, prayer in their language, to prefer free person instead of Umma (Muslim community), to prefer to love God instead of God’s fear, to overcome Sharia reaching to real world, believing to Holy Qur’ān’s genuine instead of shave. Alevism has found its cure in human love; they believe that people are immortal because a person is manifested by God. Women and men are praying together, in their language, with their music that is played via bağlama, with semah. Alevism is an entirety of beliefs that depends on Islam’s rules which based on the Holy Qur’ān, according to Muhammad’s commands; by interpreting Islam with universal dimension, it opens new doors to earth people. The Alevi system of belief is Islamic with a triplet composed by Allah, Muhammad, and Ali.

There are many strong arguments about the relationship between Alevism and Shi’ism. Some researchers say that Alevism is a form of Shi’ism but some of them say that Alevism is sectarian. We have to keep in mind that Shi’ism is a second common type of Islam in the world after Sunnism. This is a branch of Islam which is called as the Party of Ali for the reason that it recognizes Ali’s claim to succeed his cousin and father-in-law, the Prophet Muhammad, as the spiritual leader of Islam during the first civil war in the Islamic world (656−661). In most of the Islamic countries the Sunnis are in majority, but the Shi’ites comprise some 80 million believers, or, in other words, around 13% out of all world’s Muslims. The Shi’ites are predominant in three countries: Iran, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. However, Alevism cannot be understood as identical to Sufism that is the mystical aspect of Islam which arose as a reaction to strict religious orthodoxy. Sufis seek personal union with God and their Christian Orthodox counterparts in the Middle Ages were the Bogumils.  

Undoubtedly, Alevism has some similar issues with Shi’ism but, at the same time, there are a lot of differences concerning a general practicing of Islam. However, in some Western literature, Alevism is presented as a branch of Shi’ism, ormore specifically, as a Turk or Ottoman way of Shi’ism.

Split within Muslims

We have to keep in mind on this place that the Islamic expansion in the 7th and 8th centuries was accompanied by political conflicts which followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and the question of who is entitled to succeed him is splitting up the Muslim world up today. In other words, when the Prophet died, a caliph (successor) was chosen to rule all Muslims. However, as the caliph lacked prophetic authority, he enjoyed secular power but not an authority in religious doctrine. The first caliph was Abu Bakr who is considered together with his three successors as the “rightly guided” (or orthodox) caliphs. They ruled according to the Quran and the practices of the Prophet, but, thereafter, Islam became split up into two antagonistic branches: Sunni and Shia.

The Sunni-Shia division basically started when Ali ibn AbiTalib (599−661), Muhammad’s son-in-law and heir, assumed the Caliphate after the murder of his predecessor, Uthman (574−656). The Civil war was ended with the defeat of Ali with the victory of Uthman’s cousin and governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya Ummayad (602−680) after the Battle of Suffin. However, those Muslims (like the Alevi people, for instance) who claimed that Ali was the rightful calif took the name of Shiat Ali – the “Partisans of Ali”. They believe that Ali was the last legitimate caliph and, therefore, the Caliphate should pass down only to those who are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and Ali, her husband. Ali’s son, Hussein (626−680), claimed the Caliphate, but the Ummayads killed him together with his followers at the Battle of Karbala in 680. This city, today in contemporary Iraq, is the holiest of all sites for Shia Muslims (Shi’ism). Regardless to the fact that the Prophet’s Muhammad’s family line was ended in 873, the Shia Muslims believe that the last Muhammad’s descendant did not die as he is rather “hidden” and will return. Those basic Shia interpretations of the history of Islam are followed by the Alevi people and, therefore, many researchers are simply considering Alevism as a faction of the Shi’ism.        

The dominant branch of Islam is Sunni. The Sunni Muslims, differently to their Shia opponents, are not demanding that the caliph has to be of a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. They are also accepting the Arabic tribal customs in government. According to their point of view, a political leadership is in the hands of the Muslim community as such. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the religious and politicalpower in Islam was never again united into a political community after the death of the fourth caliph.

Alevism in Islam

Alevi people believe in one God, Allah, and, therefore, Alevism, as a form of Islam, is a monotheistic religion. Likeall other Muslims, the Alevis understand that God is in everything around in nature. It is important to notice that there are those Alevis who believe in good and bad spirits (and kind of angels), and, therefore, they often practice superstition in order to benefit from good ones and to avoid harm from bad ones. For that reason, for many Muslims, Alevism is not a real Islam as it is more a form of paganism imbued with Christianity. However, a majority of Alevis do not believe in these supernatural beings saying that it is an expression of Satanism.

The essence of Alevism is in the fact that Alevis believe that according to the original text of the Quran, Ali, Muhammad’s cousin, and son-in-law, was to be the Prophet’s successor as God’s vice-regent on earth or caliph. However, they claim that the parts of the original Quran related to Ali were taken out by his rivals. According to Alevis, the Quran, as a fundamental holy book for all Muslims, should be interpreted esoterically. For them, there are much deeper spiritual truths in the Quran than the strict rules and regulations that appear on the lateral surface. However, most Alevi writers will quote individual Quranic verses as an appeal for authority to support their view on a given topic, or to justify a certain Alevi religious tradition. The Alevis generally promote the reading of the Quran rather in the Turkish language than in Arabic, stressing that it is of the fundamental importance for a person to understand exactly what he or she is reading what is not possible if the Quran is read in the Arabic. However, many Alevis do not read the Quran or other holy books, nor base their daily beliefs and practices on them as they consider these ancient books to be irrelevant today.

The Alevis are reading three different books. If according to their opinion, there is not a proper information in the Quran, as the Sunnis corrupted the authentic words of Muhammad, it is necessary to reveal original Prophet’s messages by alternative readings. Therefore, Alevi believers are looking to (1.) the Nahjul Balagha, the traditions and sayings of Ali; (2.) the Buyruks, the collections of doctrine and practices of several of the 12 imams, especially Cafer; and (3.) the Vilayetnameler or the Menakıbnameler, books that describe events in the lives of great Alevis such as Haji Bektash.Except for these basic books, there are some special sources to participate in the creation of Alevi theology like poet-musicians Yunus Emre (13−14th century), Kaygusuz Abdal (15th century), and Pir Sultan Abdal (16th century).

The foundation of Alevism is in the love to Prophet and Ehlibeyt. Twelve Imams are godlike glorified by the Alevis. Waiting for the last Imam’s (Muslim religious leader) reappearance, the Shia Muslims established a special council composed of 12 religious scholars (Ulema) that elect a supreme Imam. For instance, Ayatollah (“Holy Man”) Ruhollah Khomeini (1900−1989) enjoyed that status in Iran. Most Alevis believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammed Mehdi, grew up in secret to be saved from those who wanted to exterminate the family of Ali. Many Alevis believe Mehdi is still alive and/or he will come back to earth one day.According to Alevis, Ali was Muhammed’s intended successor, and therefore the first caliph, but competitors stole this right from him. Muhammed intended for the leadership of all Muslims to perpetually stem from his family line (Ehli Beyt) by beginning with Ali, Fatima, and their two sons, Hasan and Hüseyin. Ali, Hasan, and Hüseyin are considered the first three Imams, and the other nine of the 12 Imams came from Hüseyin’s line. Just to remind ourselves, the names and approximate dates of the birth and death of the 12 Imams are:

• • İmam Ali (599-661)
  • İmam Hasan (624-670)
  • İmam Hüseyin (625-680)
  • İmam Zeynel Abidin (659-713)
  • İmam Muhammed Bakır (676-734)
  • İmam Cafer-i Sadık (699-766)
  • İmam Musa Kâzım (745-799)
  • İmam Ali Rıza (765-818)
  • İmam Muhammed Taki (810-835)
  • İmam Ali Naki (827-868)
  • İmam Hasan Askeri (846-874)
  • İmam Muhammed Mehdi (869-941).

For the Alevis, to be a really good person is an inalienable part of their life philosophy. It is important to notice that the Alevis are not turned to the Black Stone (Kaaba) which is in Meccain the Sunni Saudi Arabia, and, as it is known, the Muslim community’s member is supposed to visit it for Hajj at least once in the life. Alevis’ first fasting is not in Ramadan, it is in Muharram and it takes 12 days not, 30 days. The second fasting for them is after the Feast of Sacrifice for 20 days and another one is the Hizir fast. In Islam, there is a rule, if a person has enough money, he/she should give to a poor person a specific amount but the Alevis prefer to donate money to Alevi organizations but not to the individuals. As they don’t go to Mecca for Hajj, they visit some mausoleums, like of Haji Bektaş, (in Kırşehir), Abdal Musa (in Tekke Village, Elmalı, Antalya), Şahkulu Sultan (in Merdivenköy, İstanbul), Karacaahmet Sultan (in Üsküdar, İstanbul) or Seyit Gazi (in Eskişehir).  

Bektashism

Haji Bektash (Bektaş) Wali was a Turkmen who was born in Iran. After graduated, he had moved to Anatolia. He educated a lot of students and he and his students had served a lot of religious, economic, social, and martial services in Ahi Teşkilatı. Haji Bektash started gradually to be popular among the Ottoman elite military detachment – the Janissaries. Nevertheless, he was not of the Alevi origin but he adopted the rules of the Alevi believers into his personal life. That sect, or a form of Islam, was founded in the name of Haji Bektash Wali whose members depend on the love of Ali and twelve imams. Bektashism was popular in Anatolia and the Balkans(especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania) and it is still alive today.

Over the course of time, Bektashism became improved by taking some features of old beliefs of Anatolia and Turkish culture. However, Bektashism is the most important part of Alevism as many rules of Bektashism are incorporated in Alevism. For the Alevi believers, the mausoleum of Haji Bektash Wali in Nevşehir in Anatolia is an important point of the pilgrimage. Finally, in Turkey, Bektashism and Alevism, in fact, cannot be treated as different concepts of the Islamic theology.

Problems and difficulties of Alevis in the Ottoman history and Turkey

When the Ottoman state was established at the end of the 13thcentury and at the beginning of the 14th century, it did not have sectarian frictions within Islam. At that time, Alevis occupied a lot of chairs in state institutions. The Janissaries (originally Sultan’s bodyguard) were members of Bektashism what means that even Sultan tolerated in full such way of the interpretation of the Quran and the early history of Islam. However, how the Ottoman state was involved in the process of imperialistic transformation by the annexing surrounding provinces and states, Sunnism was getting more and more important because the Sunni Muslims were becoming a clear majority of the Ottoman Sultanate and, therefore, Sunnismwas much more useful for the state administration and the system of governing. The Ottoman state became on the East involved into the chain of conflicts with the Safavid Empire (Persia, today Iran, 1502−1722) – a country with a clear majority of those Muslims who expressed Shi’ism that is a form of Islam very similar to Alevism. The Alevi group, who complained to go being more Sunni in the Ottoman Sultanate, became sympathizing Safavid Shah İsmail I (1501−1524) and his state as it was based on Alevism. The animosity between the Ottoman Alevis and Ottoman authorities became more obvious in 1514 when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1512−1520) executed some 40.000 Alevis together with the Kurdish people while going to have a decisive Battle of Chaldiran (August 23rd) in Iran against Shah Ismail I. Till the end of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1923, Alevis have been oppressed by the authorities as the sectarian believers who were not fitting to the official Sunni theology of Islam.    

​After the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Alevis were glad in the first years of the new Republic of Turkey which declaratively proclaimed a segregation of the religion from the state what practically meant that there was no any official state religion in the country. The Alevi population of Turkey supported most of the reforms with a great hope that their social status is going to be improved. However, after the first years of the new state, they started to experience some difficulties as, de facto, a religious minority. The 1960s were very important for the Turkish society for at least three reasons: (1.) The immigration had started from the rural area to the urban area following a new process of industrialization; (2.) The immigration abroad mostly to West Germanyaccording to the German-Turkish the so-called Gastarbeiter Agreement; and (3.) A further democratization of political life. As a consequence, in 1966, Alevis had established their own political party – Birlik Partisi (Unity Party). In 1969, Alevis as a minority group sent eight members to the Parliamentaccording to the results of the parliamentary elections. However, in 1973, the party had sent just one member to the Parliament, and finally, in 1977, the party had lost itsefficiency. In 1978, in Maraş and in 1980, in Çorum, hundreds of Alevis were killed as a consequence of the conflict with the majority Sunni population but the most notorious Alevi massacre happened in 1993 on July 2nd in Sivas when 35 Alevi intellectuals were killed in Madimak Hotel by a group of religious fundamentalists.

Undoubtedly, the Alevi believers still are facing manyproblems in Turkey today in connection with a freedom of religious expression and the recognition as a separate cultural group. For example, the religious curriculum does not have any information about Alevism but rather only on Sunnismwhat means that Alevism is not studied on the regular basis in Turkey. Alevism is deeply ignored by Turkey’s administration, for instance, by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (est. 1924) that is an institution dealing with the religious questions and problems but in practice, it is workingaccording to the rules of a Sunni Islam. However, on the other hand, there are and some improvements of Alevi cultural life as, for instance, many foundations and other civic public intuitions are opened to support it. Nevertheless, Alevis, like Kurds, are not recognized as a separate ethnocultural or religious group in Turkey due to the Turkish understanding of a nation (millet) that is inherited from the Ottoman Sultanate according to which, all Muslims in Turkey are treated as ethnolinguistic Turks. The situation can be changed as Turkey is seeking the EU’s membership and, therefore, certain EU’s requirements have to be accepted among others and granting minority rights for Alevis and Kurds.

Conclusions

Alevism is a sect of Islam, and it shows many common points with Shi’ism. However, we can not say that it is a part of Shi’ism as a whole. Alevi culture has a rich heritage in poems and musicians because of their worship style. In Anatolia, Bektashism is usually connected with Alevism.

The Alevi people were living in the Ottoman Sultanate and its successor the Republic of Turkey usually with the troubles as they with their religion did not fit to the official (Sunni) expression of Islam.

Today, Alevis in Turkey are fighting to be respected as a separate religious-cultural group who can freely demonstrate their peculiar way of life. As a matter of fact, the Alevi people could not express freely themselves for the centuries including and present-day Turkey which should learn to practice both minority rights and democracy.

Finally, if Turkey wants to join the EU, surely, it has to provide a maximum of required standards of protection of all kind of minorities including and religious-cultural ones. That can be a chance for the Alevi people in Turkey to improve their status within the society.

Ethnic Uighurs look on as Chinese security forces stand by the entrance to the Uighurs neighborhood in Urumqi in China’s Xinjiang autonomous region (Photo © www.voanews.com)

‘Sinicising’ Islam

Owned by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Global Times is an English tabloid that faithfully articulates China’s nationalistic perspective on international issues.  On January 5, 2019, it reported that Chinese representatives had held a meeting with members of eight Islamic associations in China and based on mutual approval, Beijing had decided to undertake a five-year work plan to ‘sinicise’ Islam.

No details regarding the identity of Islamic associations that had participated in this meeting were furnished and neither was any road map of the “five year work plan” shared by Global Times. The only clarification it provided was that the two sides had “agreed to guide Islam to be compatible with socialism and implement measures to sinicise the religion.” [Emphasis added]. While this statement seems to say nothing much, it certainly does convey a lot.

Defaming Islam

While Beijing has made the sweeping statement that Islam isn’t compatible with socialism, it hasn’t cared to substantiate this skewed assessment with specifics. Islam regards social responsibility as part of one’s service to God and that’s why Zakat or almsgiving is considered the third [amongst five] pillars of Islam. Zakat is obligatory and prescribes payment of fixed proportions of a Muslim’s possessions for the welfare of the entire community, and in particular for its neediest members.

This is why Beijing’s claim of Islam being incompatible with socialism lacks substance and it’s a pity that Islamic nations haven’t taken umbrage to this utterly malicious observation. In fact Beijing’s factually deficient discourse lends credence to the widely accepted view that instead of accepting that its institutionalised persecution in the Xinjiang region is to blame for widespread public resentment, Beijing is trying to accuse Muslims Uyghurs for the same.

Xinjiang’s Communist Party chief Ma Xingrui has validated this apprehension by reportedly telling reporters on the sidelines of China’s annual parliamentary sessions in Beijing last week that “three forces [a reference to ethnic separatism, religious extremism and violent terrorist forces] are still active now.” From this barefaced accusation it’s absolutely clear that Beijing continues to link separatism, extremism and terrorism in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region with religion.

Sinification

In simple terms, ‘sinification’ is the process of integrating cultural, ideological and ethnic norms of non-Chinese societies so that they conform to Chinese culture. With Beijing making no adjustments whatsoever in this process, minority groups have no choice but to accept additions, alterations and even termination of certain age old religious and cultural practices 

So, by declaring that “Everyone knows that Islam in Xinjiang needs to be ‘sinicised’, this is an inevitable trend,” Xingrui has left no room for any doubt that Beijing is determined to achieve ‘sinification’ of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims, even if it is tantamount to riding roughshod over their religious beliefs and cultural sentiments.

Brutalising Uyghurs

The list of atrocities being inflicted on Uyghurs is terrifying. Human Rights Watch [HRW] has confirmed that “the Chinese authorities impose on Turkic Muslims a pervasive system of mass surveillance, controls on movement, arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance, cultural and religious erasure, and family separation.”

The HRW report also mentions that “… UN special procedures-special rapporteurs, working groups, and other human rights experts-issued a searing indictment of China’s human rights record, including the Chinese government’s “collective repression” of religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang…”

While indoctrination and forced labour in internment camps under garb of “re-education and vocational training” is used to alter their political outlook, forcing Uyghurs to consume alcohol and pork as well as discouraging fasting during Ramadan is meant to destroy their religious beliefs. Mass sterilization and intrauterine contraceptive device implantation programs are aimed at systematically reducing the Uyghur population to an insignificant minority.

Even innocuous things like wearing veils, growing beards or even having too many children can have very serious consequences for Uyghurs.

The Ummah’s Silence

In Islam, ummah denotes the entire Muslim community worldwide being bound together by ties of religion, and this makes it incumbent on them to univocally express solidarity with and assist their brethren who are in trouble. Unfortunately, despite being physically and mentally traumatised by the Chinese authorities, the ummah doesn’t appear to be worried at all about their persecuted Uyghur brothers and sisters.

In 2017, China’s religious affairs official MaisumujiangMaimuer went as far as inciting the Chinese people against Uyghurs by his post on a Xinhua Weibo page that read, “Break their [Uyghurs] lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins. Completely shovel up the roots of “two-faced people,” dig them out, and vow to fight these two-faced people until the end.” Unfortunately, even this patently rabid anti-Uyghur tirade failed to stir the ummah’scollective conscience.

However, it would be factually incorrect to say that the persecution of Uyghurs and other Muslim communities in Xinjiang Autonomous Region was never contested by any Islamic nation. In 2019, while Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Imran Khan tried to feign ignorance regarding persecution of Uyghurs, it was heartening to note that Türkiye was more forthcoming on this issue.

Ankara outrightly condemned religious China’s ‘sinification’ policy calling it “another step towards the goal of eliminating the ethnic, religious and cultural identities of the Uighur Turks and other Muslim communities in the region,” and called on the international community and UN Secretary General to “take effective measures in order to bring to an end this human tragedy in Xinjiang.”

However, just a year later, without offering any explanation, Türkiye suddenly changed track and maintained a stoic silence on the ongoing persecution of Uyghurs and hence its show of solidarity was just a flash in the pan. And it doesn’t require rocket science to deduce that it’s Beijing’s financial clout and the commercial interests of Islamic nations that has led to the Uyghurs being abandoned for good.

Tailpiece: In 2003, an Indian politician was caught on camera while accepting illegal gratification during a ‘sting operation’ and commenting that “Paisa Khuda to nahin, par Khuda ki kasam, Khuda se kam bhi nahi.” [Money isn’t God, but God-promise; it’s no less than God]. Though undoubtedly a crude utterance that possibly borders on the sacrilegious, it nevertheless aptly explains why the ummah has completely forsaken the hapless Uyghurs of Xinjiang! 

It’s for the benefit of all and APTC officers in particular that, I wish to recall from memory the thought, which went behind giving endurance training its due importance to further develop the aerobic and anaerobic energy pathways that, exclusively contribute to improving cardio respiratory endurance and include it in the construct of the Battle Physical Training Tables (BPTT) for trained soldiers.

In 1986/87 this was a path breaking change, which was undertaken by the Study Group to, by and large, turn on its head the existing BPTT, with the intent to give primacy to this critical component of fitness, which very substantially comprises a well-balanced physical training programme. With the knowledge that was available to us during the pre-Google, user friendly Internet applications or ChatGPT, but was reached by in depth study of the subject from books and research papers drawn from sports sciences libraries, we understood the nuances of exercise physiology and applied these to design and arrange the several training modalities in a progressive manner and incorporated it in our regimen. We were all through, conscious of the fact that our training was meant for en masse application for the Army and hence it should not at any point of time be overbearing and overwhelming for an average person who is of normal physical abilities.

The Tables were to cater for all and hence we had to keep the weakest in mind so as to ensure that, those for whom physical exercise was most needed were not ignored by disregarding the principle of training overload, which if not addressed mindfully, inevitably leads to demotivation and acute or chronic physical injury. Therefore, we were guided by our prudence and mindfulness to ensure that we didn’t plagiarise training schedules from others, but instead designed and calibrated our Tables in a manner, which conformed to our genetic characteristics,inclinations and climatic conditions/variations. This was done by first hypothesisising on our theoretical conclusions, in comparison to the extant design and structure of the Tables, preparing a progressive three months (24 days × 3) training programme. Based upon that, experimenting on it by physical trials on the target population, tabulating pre and post training performance results on existing and revised battery of physical tests by the two groups. Thereafter, comparing the performance results between the Control and Experimental Groups, plotting the entire results on a X and Y axes graph and then finally determining the value dispersion to arrive at grades/ standards with reference to where lay the maximum bunch of the tested population.  

As all this was being done in an uncontrolled manner, wherein the trainees were not kept in a state of active isolation from other forms of physical and sports activity and were participating in these as part of their routine training / duties. Also the PTIs conducting the Experimental Programme were continuing on their method of imparting physical training as then in vogue – the results which we got was not statistically significant to support the postulate arrived at by our theoretical conclusions.

There was something amiss in this because it didn’t lend itself to improvements in the specific fitness components, which the Experimental Programme ought to have brought about. Disappointed at this outcome, the Presiding Officer of the Study Group displayed the expected professional integrity by not falsifying the findings of our initial trials and placed the facts in front of the Director General Military Training (DGMT), with reasons for the unexpected findings, in complete contrast to our expectations. Allowing us the room for not being able to place our Final Report in accordance with our proclaimed timeline, the Presiding Officer requested for more time and which was allowed. We, thereafter did as best we could to minimise the dilutions in the manner in which training should be imparted by the PTIs, but didn’t have the luxury to isolate the trainees from any other form of physical activity that had the possibility to interfere in our trials. This was a Hobson’s choice for us and we couldn’t help but carry on with it. We had learnt the necessary lessons from our first trial, which went wrong owing to the excessively controlled and strict execution of training, that belied the more informal, relaxed and breezy manner required in the Experimental Programme and therefore were more careful and ensured greater supervision to monitor and oversee training and preclude any slip ups. On conclusion of our second trials, we got statically significant results in favour of the Experimental Programme of training as also the revised tests, which were specific to test the fitness components and motor abilities and related to the training that was imparted to develop these. It was the finding of the Study Group that, the existing BPTT didn’t stimulate the training effect, which was the need of the soldier and for which training over and above what was imparted in the daily programme of exercises, was required to be done. The most striking failing in this was the development and improvement of the cardiovascular endurance component that was substantially marginalised. The existing training and testing were loaded more in favour of anaerobic adaptations and evaluation, and therefore didn’t subscribe to an effective and efficient physical training regimen, which is designed around an essential pivot of aerobic capacity and constitutes a major portion of it.

The Experimental Programme and the newly designed assessment tests correlated to each other and we had arrived at our conclusions, which was validated and confirmed by on ground trials and established by statistical records and results. It is after that, the then de novo design of the BPTT has given exclusive attention to developing and improving aerobics power and capacity by separate Table Cards of Interval , Repetition, Fartlek and Long Distance Slow Continuous running training. These are briefly explained below -: 

1. Interval Training:

• Description: Interval training involves alternating periods of high intensity exercise with periods of lower intensity or rest.
• Physiological Adaptations: It improves cardiovascular fitness, increases aerobic capacity, and enhances the body’s ability to recover quickly between bursts of intense effort.

2. Repetition Training:

• • Description: Repetition training, also known as high-intensity interval training (HIIT), focuses on short bursts of intense exercise followed by longer periods of rest or lower-intensity activity.
  • Physiological Adaptations: Similar to interval training, repetition training improves aerobic capacity and helps the body adapt to higher intensity efforts, promoting cardiovascular endurance and speed. It develops tolerance to lactic acid .

3. Fartlek Training:

• • Description: Fartlek, meaning “speed play” in Swedish, is a less structured form of training. It involves varying your speed and intensity throughout a workout, often including both fast and slow-paced segments.
  • Physiological Adaptations: Fartlek training promotes a combination of aerobic and anaerobic adaptations. It helps improve both cardiovascular endurance and speed endurance by incorporating different intensities and durations.

4. Long Distance Slow Continuous Running. 

Long-distance slow continuous running is beneficial for developing cardiovascular endurance (CR endurance) as it enhances your heart and lung function, improves oxygen delivery to muscles, and increases your overall stamina. This type of exercise also helps build a strong aerobic base, promoting better endurance and efficiency in utilizing oxygen during prolonged activities.

Engaging in long-distance slow continuous running prompts various physiological adaptations in the body:

Physiological Adaptations : Cardiovascular System: The heart becomes more efficient, pumping blood more strongly per beat. Stroke volume increases, leading to a higher cardiac output. Blood vessels may also adapt, becoming more elastic and improving blood flow.

Respiratory System: Lung capacity tends to increase, enhancing oxygen intake. Improved efficiency of breathing muscles and increased diffusion capacity in the lungs contribute to better oxygen transport to muscles.

Muscular System: Muscle fibers may undergo changes to favor endurance, with an increase in the number of mitochondria (responsible for energy production). Enhanced capillarization ensures better blood supply to muscles.

Metabolic Adaptations: The body becomes better at utilizing fat as an energy source, sparing glycogen stores. This can contribute to improved endurance over longer durations.

Temperature Regulation: Increased sweat production and improved heat dissipation mechanisms help in maintaining a stable body temperature during prolonged exercise.

Mental Toughness: Long-distance running often requires mental endurance. Regular practice can lead to improved mental resilience, focus, and coping strategies during extended physical efforts.

These adaptations collectively contribute to increased endurance, allowing individuals to sustain physical activity for more extended periods without experiencing fatigue as quickly.

Significant Differences:

• • Interval Training vs. Repetition Training: While both involve high intensity efforts followed by rest or lower intensity, repetition training often focuses on shorter, more intense bursts with longer rest periods compared to interval training.
  • Fartlek Training vs. Structured Intervals (Interval & Repetition) : Fartlek is more unstructured, allowing for spontaneous variations in intensity, whereas structured interval training follows a predetermined pattern of work and rest.

Physiological Adaptations:

• • Cardiorespiratory Endurance: All three methods enhance cardiovascular endurance by increasing the efficiency of the heart and lungs, improving oxygen delivery to working muscles.
  • Speed Endurance: Repetition training specifically targets speed endurance by improving the muscles’ ability to generate force quickly and efficiently during short bursts of high intensity exercise.

Summary:

In summary, these training methods share commonalities in promoting cardiovascular and speed endurance but differ in their structures and the specific physiological adaptations they emphasize. Incorporating a variety of these methods into a training regimen can provide a well-rounded approach to developing overall endurance.

Recommendations : As the Study Group was constituted in 1986 and the new design of PT and Evaluation/ Assessment Tests introduced into the Army in 1991/1992, it has been over 30 years since. There is far and muchmore that has changed in exercise physiology and sports sciences and is readily available at the click of a mouse/ button, to be read and understood for incorporating the latest developments and improvements which can help improve our training system and make it more time cost effective. It is therefore critical that those who are mandated with the responsibility to conceptualise and curate our physical training doctrine in the Army, are abreast with the changes that have subsumed the overarching subject of fitness and manifest the mental agility and resolute will to adopt CHANGE in its training playbook – its Doctrine. 

For the past three decades, the people of Afghanistan have been facing the ordeal of war and instability. Taliban came to power by the power of the gun in 2021, replacing the elected Government. Since then, the Afghan people including women and children have been forced to live under the shadows of fear and violence.

The present generation of Afghans see themselves at a critical crossroads. Handicapped as a result of a lack of formal education or skills, with very little opportunity for growth their future is dark and deary. The country lacks infrastructure, adequate healthcare facilities and educational opportunities for the young. To top it up, the girls have been barred from pursuing formal education thus rendering them voiceless to live a life of slaves in a male-dominated society.  

The question is, why does the situation in Afghanistan, continue to remain unchanged with very little chance for any forward movement despite international dialogues, peace talks and forums? Yet the world failed to change course or implement corrective measures preferring the beaten bath. Why is the Taliban not fulfilling its obligations to the people? Going by Taliban’s past record of keeping up its promises, or its willingness to correct itself, does anyone think attempting to persuade the Taliban to reform its ways will yield results?  Where lies the problem and what are the solutions for a way forward?

Afghanistan till today– What is the Reality?

The facts and reality in Afghanistan are clear, Afghans have shed enough blood in this war of power games starting from the Soviet invasion followed by the Taliban rule. Subsequently, after the 9/11, the US ousted the Taliban from power and fought them for two decades, only to hand over the country which was then being ruled by an elected government, back to the very same terror outfit in August 2021, that they had set out to change.  This left the people of Afghanistan with no option but to endure the threats, fear and hardships being perpetrated by the gun totting Taliban rule. A rule under early 10th Century Sharia laws in the 21st century?

Being in total control of Afghanistan with a large military, the least that the Americans could have done was to conduct an election and install a democratically elected government before they departed. That would have been a more honourable exit for the overpowered military that was looking for an exit strategy. US has now left the world to deal with a country which is ruled by a terror outfit that is in power, posing a threat to regional states and the world.

Failing to secure international recognition, Taliban has not felt obliged to its people in the face of a deepening humanitarian crisis. Under the present Taliban dispensation, Afghanistan’s economy shrank by 25 per cent in the last two years affecting livelihoods.

This plight has further been aggravated by the Taliban’s restrictive policies on women’s employment in addition to the ban on their education and resultant growth. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), women’s participation in the labour force in Afghanistan has dropped by 25% between August 2021 and March 2023, despite humanitarian needs increasing at a steady pace and reaching worrying levels. By imposing 50 decrees aiming to erase women from public life and education, the Taliban miserably failed to understand that peace, prosperity, dignity and opportunity in a country for all, depends on equality. 15.3 million people are living in conditions of acute food scarcityin Afghanistan in 2023, representing 35 per cent of the population. Afghanistan is marked as a hotspot of highest concern for food insecurity in the FAO-WFP outlook report on hunger hotspots for June to November 2023.

Terror Affiliations

Taliban’s continued linkages with various militant groups in Afghanistan are well documented and cannot be ignored. More significantly, the presence of Al Qaeda Chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul and his killing by US drone attack in 2022, speak volumes for Taliban’s connections with the terror outfit which goes against the assurances and guarantees Taliban has been feeding the world with.  According to the report by a United Nations Security Committee (UNSC), there are indications that Al-Qaeda is rebuilding its operational capability. Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban. As per credible sources, the Taliban is also providing space to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan-based terrorists. Andrei Serdyukov, Chief of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) Joint Staff, stated on Feb 14, 2022 that the presence of ISIS and TTP fighters has increased near Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. According to the National Resistance Front (NRF) report released in September 2022, the Taliban has transferred 16 high-ranking members of foreign terrorist groups from different parts of the world to Kabul and then to Baghlan, Kunduz and Badakhshan provinces of Afghanistan.

Regional Threat

Taliban’s supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada on July 06, 2022 in an address to a gathering of clerics in Kabul asserted that Afghan soil would not be used to launch attacks against other countries. “We assure our neighbours, the region and the world, that we will not allow anyone to use our territory to threaten the security of other countries,” Only a day earlier Uzbekistan had claimed that five rockets fired from Afghanistan had landed in Termez, the capital of the southern province close to its border with Afghanistan. These attacks were suspected to be the handiwork of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Was Akhundzada trying to plead innocence and ignorance?

On April 18, 2022, ISKP fired ten Katyusha rockets at a military base in Termez. Claiming responsibility for the attack, the jihadi group said that the missiles were launched from near the town of Hairatan in Afghanistan’s Balkh province. Though the ISKP’s claim was rejected by the Uzbek Government, Taliban’s Deputy Spokesman Inamulla Samangani subsequently admitted to Uzbekistan’s Gazeta news website that ISKP militants had fired a barrage of rockets at Uzbekistan but claimed that these rockets “did not reach the border of Uzbekistan.” On May 07, 2022, the ISKP again claimed that its fighters fired seven rockets from Khawaja Ghar district of Afghanistan’s Takhar Province toward unspecified military targets in Tajikistan.

The attacks were carried out from Balkh and Takhar provinces in northern Afghanistan, which border Central Asian countries, signalling the jihadi group’s expanding presence in Afghanistan. Given the deep alienation among Afghans of Uzbek and Tajik ethnic origin with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, the ISKP could strike a chord with these alienated ethnic groups and their ethnic neighbours in countries across the border.

The point is, Taliban’s unwillingness to carry the other ethnic groups along, in preference to the Sunni Pashtun elements forecloses any preference of the people of Afghanistan for Taliban rule in the country. Legitimacy to a group seeking to rule a country is provided by the people and not by self-proclaimed leaders. How can Taliban then represent the people of Afghanistan as their legitimate government?  

The other disturbing news is about the formation of Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan (TTT), the Movement of the Taliban of Tajikistan which was formed in the northern Afghanistan to unite people from Tajikistan under the Taliban brand to overthrow the Government in Dushanbe.

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul, the terror threat to Central Asia has risen manyfold. Looks like terror groups including ISKP, some aligned to major powers are using Afghan territory as a springboard for operating in the region and beyond. The larger aim of the terror groups to launch ‘global jihad’ beyond Afghan borders is a very appropriate narrative for the major powers aiming to contain and destabilise countries in the region. China and Moscow are concerned that the Afghan territory might become a logistic hub and a ‘safe heaven’ for several terrorist organisations and that the Central Asia may be destabilised with a view to spread terror to their countries.

Terrorism has become a severe threat in Tajikistan. The Prosecutor General of the Republic of Tajikistan stated that the number of terrorists and extremists in the country has increased over the past six months. Tajik security forces registered in the first half of 2022, seven hundred and twenty crimes related to extremism and terrorism.

Taliban’s International Engagements

With vested interest, various countries have been engaging with the Taliban in an uncoordinated manner each working towards their own geopolitical interests. The question is, on what basics is the world engaging with the Taliban, a terror group that had seized power by force and whose cabinet is filled with designated terrorists claiming itself to be the Government of Afghanistan? The international community ought to have first put in place a mechanism to solve the legitimacy issue before entering into any dialogue or discussion. Do the UNSC and the countries of the world consider the present ruling dispensation, the legitimate representatives of the people?

No details of the discussions at various meetings of countries with the Taliban have been put out in the public domain excepting stating that Taliban has been impressed upon to establish an inclusive government and allow education for the girl child. Neither of these have yet been fulfilled by the Taliban giving a clear indication that Taliban is in no mood to change. The question is why then are countries continuing these futile talks? What have they achieved till now and what do they expect to gain by reinforcing failure?

India’s engagement with the Taliban was first established in June 2022, when it had sent a ‘Technical team’ to Kabul. India has not recognised the Taliban led Afghan Government and has no Ambassador or Charge de Affaires (CDA) positioned in Kabul to represent the country.

India has de facto permitted the Taliban to induct its representatives into the Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi over a period, unethically removing Ambassador Farid Mamundzay and the diplomats of the Embassy appointed by the Ghani Government unannounced by November 2023. First it started with Taliban nominated Qadir Shah’s coup within the Afghan Embassy in April last year and subsequently, by installing Taliban loyalists Ms Zakia Wardak, Consul General Mumbai and Mr. Sayed Mohammad Ibrahimkhil Acting Consul General Hyderabad, in the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi. No official announcement was made by the Indian Government regarding the induction of Taliban representatives inside the embassy. However, Taliban’s Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai declared in an interview with Afghanistan’s state broadcaster RTA that “the embassy of Afghanistan in India will soon start operations.”

On the occasion of India’s 75th Republic Day, India invited Badruddin Haqqani, the Charge d’Affaires at the Taliban-run Afghan embassy in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to attend a ceremonial reception in the Indian Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Badruddin Haqqani, had an association spanning close to three decades with the Haqqani Network, which was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the United States of America in 2012. Worldwide intelligence conclusions point to the Haqqani Network as having been primarily responsible for a 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in which 58 people were killed. Close on the heels of this outreach, on January 29, India was officially represented at a regional conference in Kabul, convened by the Taliban administration’s foreign minister.

Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan was also present at the meeting. A day later, on January 30, 2024, China’s President Xi Jinping accepted the credentials of Asadullah Karimi, the Taliban-appointed Afghan ambassador in Beijing, for whatever it may mean, without announcing the recognition of the Taliban led Afghan Government.  For the first time since the Taliban takeover in 2021, probably on September 2023, China has appointed Zhao Sheng as its ambassador to Kabul. “This is the normal rotation of China’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, and is intended to continue advancing dialogue and cooperation between China and Afghanistan,” China’s foreign ministry said in a statement. China probably has kept its options open by leaving things vague.  

Interaction by the United Nations

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres convened an initial conference of the world’s special envoys to Afghanistan in May 2023 in Doha to address the issues relating to the potentially destabilizing conditions in Afghanistan, including a failing economy and increasingly restrictive Taliban policies on women’s rights.  

That was followed by a two-day meeting in Doha on February 18-19, with the participation of member states, special envoys and civil society members. The Taliban however did not attend the meeting. According to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the Taliban had set unacceptable conditions for attending a UN sponsored meeting on Afghanistan. The Taliban demands included the exclusion of Afghan civil society members from the talks in Doha, Qatar, and a treatment that amounted to official recognition of the Taliban as the country’s legitimate rulers. Another point of contention was the appointment of a UN special envoy in the country, which the Taliban opposes.

An unimaginative Afghan Strategy

The world community is missing the point. Taliban has snatched Afghanistan by the power of the gun and has not established its rule, duly sanctified by the will of the people. Taliban as of today, it must be realised, has nothing to take from the people. Why should then the Taliban consider the needs and the well-being of the people?

Consequently, the people have no option but to accept the dictates of the ‘Terror group’ and its terrorist cabinet appointed by its lead religious leaders. They do not recognise any constitution or law and what the terror group and its religious leaders think are the laws of the land and they are applied on the people without any consideration for the period in which we are living, Taliban’s methods of flogging, executions etc in public has created fear in the minds of the people.

Why is this happening? Why this, arrogance of the ruling elite and security forces towards the people? To whom the country legitimately belong? The problem is with the world community which instead of realising the importance of Taliban seeking legitimacy from the people, seems satisfied with Taliban forming an inclusive Government and allowing the girl child to go to the school or Taliban removing some of the restrictions imposed on the women. Pray let these expert diplomats tell the world, as to what happens if the Taliban re-imposes these restrictions once it is recognised?

Such recognition, including providing the UN seat to the Taliban led Afghanistan, would mean legitimisation of the group and its harsh interpretation of Sharia Law, which has resulted in the despicable treatment of women and minority groups.

Do the people of the country have any means to force the Taliban to adhere to its promises? Do the people of Afghanistan have the powers to force the Government to do what is in their best interests or remove them from power if they fail to act?

Taliban’s record of implementing agreements till date has been abysmal to say the least. Will the world body or the major powers be able to force Taliban to implement the agreements? Probably not, excepting by going to war with Taliban led Afghanistan, which will again place the people to face bloodshed, destruction and economic woes that directly affect them, which the world is trying to avoid.  

The world needs to realise that recognition of Afghanistan and its induction into the world body are the only leverages that the world has, to correct the situation in Afghanistan. If that influence is given away, the Taliban led Afghanistan will become a liability to the world for ever.

The Way Forward    

In the first place, recognition of Taliban should as a matter of rule, be handled solely by the world body with the advice of major powers and regional countries and not by individual players seeking petty geopolitical gains. Individual dealing directly with the Taliban only legitimises the terror outfit and enhances its importance.  

Inclusive Govt, respect and education to women etc as is being demanded by the world community and the major powers are merely side issues. The problem that needs recognition is that Taliban is interested in following Sharia Law teaching without caring for the sentiments of the people. As a result, the gun wielding Taliban cadre, do not respect people and is only too eager to implement the Sharia laws-based rules evolved by Taliban, like the need for a woman to be accompanied by a male member of the family. Consequently, the people are not free and are scared when confronted by a Taliban militant with a gun.

The strategy for recognition of Afghanistan must demand that political entities and others seeking to rule Afghanistan need to get their legitimacy endorsed by the people of the country through elections or by any other means available and considered appropriate. This will automatically open up the options for dispensations other than Taliban to contest for ruling the country. This may however induce clashes amongst contestants for ruling the country with attendant bloodshed which must be accepted.

The strategy will willy-nilly force the entity to interact with the people, seek their support and adopt rules that are fair to all sections of the society. The law enforcement cadres will be controlled to remain respectful to the people. The women will be respected and will be given their dues in the society.  

The country needs to have a constitution to be considered eligible for recognition. If the constitution doesn’t exist, the selected entity needs to create one within six months of its recognition duly endorsed by the people. The constitution needs to be designed to give power to the people including for the removal of a renegade establishment from ruling the country.

If this option fails, it may be necessary to create a government in exile, support them politically and economically and get the Government recognised by the countries of the world and the UN. The head of the government in exile could be identified with the help of former Ambassadors of Afghanistan and members of the civil society with a caveat that they will have to create a constitution and hold elections to have a permanent government say within two years of establishment of the proxy government.  

Will the UN Secretary General and the major powers at least now change course?

The eastern portion of Europe and the end of WWI

The end of WWI resulted in significant changes concerning the political boundaries of Central, East, and South-East Europe. For the reason of the extent of these changes and the newly born regional wars over the land distribution that erupted in several mini-regions in the eastern portion of Europe, it was to take around five to six years before new borders between the states were finally established and stabilized at least up to 1938.

The political transformation of the eastern portion of Europe after 1918 was a direct result of the collapse of both the German Second Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the last months of 1918, as well as due to unsettled western borders of the former Russian Empire (overthrown by the Russian Revolution in 1917) which still was involved into the revolution and civil war. Most of the boundary changes in this half of Europe after WWI were direct result of decisions reached by the Entente powers (Allied and Associated Powers during WWI) at the Paris Peace Conference that began in early 1919 resulting in five peace treaties, named after the castles outside Paris where they have been finally signed. Each of these peace treaties was dealing in part, but in some cases entirely, with states in Central Europe that was the case, for instance, with Poland which was in the post-WWI military-political conflict with the West Ukrainian nationalists over the land of East Galicia.

The state borders of post-WWI Poland were decided by the Paris Peace Conference by three means: 1) Through decisions of the Council of Ambassadors; 2) Plebiscites held under Entente direction; and 3) By the result of the war with West Ukraine and Bolshevik Russia. Concerning Poland, the final settlement of its eastern borders became the most complex. In fact, the first boundary problem became Galicia or more precisely East Galicia where Poles went to open war with Ukrainians. On November 1st, 1918, when the rule of Austria-Hungary finally collapsed in the region, local Ukrainian nationalistic leaders proclaimed the independence of the West Ukrainian National (People’s) Republic. This new state claimed the whole of East Galicia (eastward from the San River with Lwów) to be Ukrainian followed by North Bukowina and Carpathian Rus’. However, these territorial claims became immediately challenged by local Poles who fought all over Galicia to be united with the post-WWI Poland. Consequently, the result was a Polish-Ukrainian War that lasted from November 1918 until the summer of 1919, when the Galician-West Ukrainian military detachments were expelled from East Galicia which finally became a part of the interwar Poland.

East Galicia and Central Powers

The land of East Galicia was, before WWI, included in Austria-Hungary (Austrian part) having mixed ethnic composition (as a majority of the provinces of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy at the time). East Galician population before WWI was almost 5 million: a majority of it was“Ukrainians” (3.1 million), Poles (1.1 million), and Jews (620,000) followed by several other small ethnolinguistic communities. The Ukrainians (whatever this ethnic term meant at that time) had population domination in the countryside (villages), but the towns and cities were inhabited by the Polish and Jewish majorities.

It was, in general, a tolerant policy by Vienna toward national minorities which resulted in Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish political and national organizations existing side by side in peace.

Ukrainian national organizations have been struggling to defend their own ethnic-regional autonomy and to strengthen Ukrainian national identity among the local Slavic people.However, the reality on the ground was not so favourable for Ukrainian national propaganda for the very reason that regardless that the intelligentsia which was accepting Ukrainian ethnolinguistic identity had been quickly progressing but on other hand, an overwhelming number of the peasantry (majority of the population of East Galicia) was not affected with Ukrainian national identity’s propaganda. Another fact was that both ethnic Poles and Jews had clear domination over the areas of education, culture, regional economy, and civil administration. The Poles regarded the city of Lwów/Lvov/Lemberg/L’viv (which was the crucially important settlement in East Galicia) as one of the most important cities of Polish culture and nation following Cracow, Warsaw, and Wilno/Vilnius.

During WWI (1914−1918), the Central Powers, especially Germany, stubbornly supported Ukrainian national identity, nationalism, and national goals – all of them directed against Russia and Russian national interests. On February 9th, 1918 in Brest–Litovsk it was signed the peace treaty between one hand the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (the UPR) – Brotfrieden in German (“Bread Peace”). The peace treaty ended the war in East Galicia and recognized the sovereignty of the UPR. One of the most important points of this peace treaty was that the victorious Central Powers promised Ukraine some territories which included the Kholm region (populated by the Polish-speaking majority) as well as. It was also a secret initiative to transform both provinces of Bukovina and East Galicia into a crownland of Austria-Hungary (Austrian part) but the plan soon became an extremely problematic issue for the reason that the Poles opposed it insisting on the indivisibility of the whole of Galicia in which they would have a dominance. In other words, for the Poles, the pro-Ukrainian policy of the Central Powers during WWI and especially in 1918 was not only anti-Russian but even more anti-Polish. Therefore, due to the policy of Berlin regarding the Ukrainian Question in 1918 the interethnic conflict between Poles and Ukrainians became, in fact, unavoidable.

The conflict

In the autumn of 1918 during the collapse of the Danube Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), national workers of several ethnic groups within the monarchy had been preparing plans for the creation or re-establishment of their own (united) national states after the war. That was the case as well as with the Polish politicians in Galicia who wanted to include the whole region of Galicia (Western and Eastern) into the united national state of the Polish people. However, the Ukrainian political workers from West Galicia opposed such a Polish idea and on the night of November 1st, 1918, organized a coup. As a result, helped by Ukrainian national units, they succeeded in occupying Lvov and other cities in East Galicia. At the same time, they proclaimed the West Ukrainian People’s Republic as an independent Ukrainian state. The Poles of Lvov (being a majority of the city) were taken by surprise but organized a military defense (including schoolchildren) and soon expelled Ukrainian forces from the biggest part of the city. Nevertheless, in other cities of East Galicia, the Ukrainians had the greatest success, except in the city of Przemyśl/Peremyshl. Polish troops made advances in other cities in the western portions of East Galicia but on the other hand, Poland failed in several attempts to resolve this Polish-Ukrainian conflict by arbitration. In other words, before Poland proclaimed its own independence on November 11th, 1918, the war between Polish and Ukrainian forces already was going on over East Galicia and its most important city – Lvov.

The Polish armed forces expelled the Ukrainian military from Lvov on November 22nd, 1918. However, Lvov was under siege including constant firing by the Ukrainian military until April 1919 (five months). Nonetheless, immediately after the Ukrainian forces were driven away from Lvov, the pogroms against the Jews began in which up to 80 people died. The issue was that the local Poles accused the Jews of supporting the Ukrainian side regarding the destiny of Lvov. Especially, the Jewish paramilitary units being armed by the Ukrainian side have been accused by the Poles of anti-Polish policy in the city.

During the war between the Polish and Ukrainian forces over East Galicia in 1918−1919, the Polish side was gradually winning over the enemy. For the Ukrainian side in the conflict, the crucial problem was that the West Ukrainian political-military leaders did not succeed in mobilizing the biggest part of the Ukrainian peasantry for their course as the peasants have been much more involved in their economic than the political interests of existence. Another problem/question is how much they have felt themselves as “Ukrainians” at all in order to fight against the Poles. In such a political situation, in order to attract the peasants for the Ukrainian course, the Ukrainian nationalists tried to make use of some social-economic slogans and, therefore, promised the peasantry an agricultural reform after the war –distribution of land (the same have been propagating the Russian Bolsheviksat the same time). Nevertheless, the Ukrainian nationalists used all means of force for the reason to mobilize the peasants of West Ukraine for the Ukrainian military to fight Poles in East Galicia.

The mediation by Entente

After the Great War, in 1919 the Entente powers attempted to mediate in this Polish-Ukrainian war with the final purpose to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible taking into account the post-war peace conference in Paris and around castles. In fact, what they preferred was a priority of the fight against Russian Bolshevism and, therefore, the Polish-Ukrainian War was simply weakening the European forces against the potentially aggressive policy of the Bolsheviks who at that time supported all kinds of the left revolutions in Central Europe. In other words, this war occurring on the borders with the Bolshevik Russia was preventing the creation of a united anti-Bolshevik Polish-Ukrainian front which could block eventual aggression of Europe by Lenin’s Red Army.The first practical move by the Entente forces concerning the making of peace between Ukrainian and Polish military forces occurred in February 1919 when a special French-led military commission negotiated both a truce and a demarcation line between Poland and Ukraine. According to this proposal, the city of Lvov and the oil region to the south around Boryslav had to go to Poland. In other words, some 2/3 of East Galicia would be included in West Ukraine.

The Entente’s commission also decided that the West Ukrainian People’s Republic was a failed state – not a viable one. The real reason for such a conclusion was the fact that the East Galician movement of independence was based only on an extremely tiny stratum of intelligentsia without massive support by the people especially in the countryside. The Ukrainian nationalists and politicians in order to attract the local peasants of East Galizia promised them alongside the agrarian reform as well as houses and castles of Lvov. However, it happened that the West Ukrainian national fighters lost control over the peasant movement they had themselves inspired.

As a matter of fact, the Polish leaders involved in the conflict accepted (half-heartedly) the set of peace-meal conditions required by the Entente commission. However, the same conditions Ukrainian leaders rejected and, automatically, ended the previously agreed Polish-Ukrainian truce. As a consequence, the Ukrainian armed forces on March 10th, 1919 started a new offensive to occupy the city of Lvov which soon collapsed just after the following ten days. In essence, that became a real turning point in the 1918−1919 Polish-Ukrainian War over East Galicia and the making of a final border between newly re-established Poland and newly to-be-formed Ukraine. Nevertheless, from mid-March 1919, that was Poles who took the military and political initiatives over the Ukrainians. Basically, it became obvious that the Ukrainian side would lose the war against Poland concerning East Galicia and the city of Lvov. During the night between April 14/15th, 1919, the Poles launched a fruitful attack resulting in Lvov not anymore at the distance of firing the city by Ukrainian artillery fire. The Polish offensive was so successful that in May 1919 Poles took several other East Galician cities (Stanislawów in Polish or Ivano-Frankivsk in Ukrainian) – that was at that time the headquarters of the Ukrainian political and military authorities.

At the very beginning of June 1919, West Ukrainian military detachments were in control of only several areas of East Ukraine. What happened, was pressure by the Entente commission on the Polish side to stop further offensive, and the bilateral truce negotiations between Poland and Ukraine were renewed. Nevertheless, West Ukrainian leaders did not respect the truce agreement and suddenly started an offensive on June 7th, 1919 with the result of recapturing some areas of East Galicia from the Polish side. Therefore, Poles blamed Ukrainians for the prolongation of the military conflict in and over East Galicia to such an extent that Entente states were compelled to send a commission to the city of Lvov for the sake to do investigation regarding serious complaints about crimes against the civil population in the city committed, in fact, by both sides. The commission finally did not find relevant evidence of Polish war crimes but, oppositely, a lot of cases of war crimes were done by the Ukrainian side. What is of probably crucial importance to emphasize here is the fact that the commission found a very enthusiastic reception of the Polish troops by the city dwellers as liberators against the terror of the “Ukrainian bands”.

The commission composed of the representatives of the Entente powers in order to finally solve the problem of East Galicia proposed that the whole territory of this region be occupied by the Polish troops and, in fact, consequently, included in the post-WWI Polish national state. For that reason, the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on June 25th, 1919 gave open permission to the Polish government in Warsaw to launch a new military offensive in East Galicia for the final purpose of expelling all West Ukrainian military detachments from the region and occupy the same completely. It was agreed that the Haller Army (armed in France) to be sent to Poland and deployed in the struggle against the communist units. For Eastern Galicia, autonomy had to be given within Poland, and the final decision on the status of East Galicia would be decided by referendum (but organized by the Polish authorities).

Finally, the Polish army led by Piłsudski himself, on July 2nd, 1919 started its decisive military attack against West Ukrainian military troops and succeeded in expelling them from the complete territory of East Galicia. Up to July 18th, 1919, the forces of West Ukraine composed of some 20,000 soldiers crossed the Zbruch River and entered the territory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Therefore, the destiny of East Galicia was decided in favour of Poland up to WWII.

Final remarks

The war between Poland and West Ukraine was going on from November 1918 to July 1919. According to different scholars, the war took around 25.000 lives of the soldiers from both sides: around 10.000 Polish and 15.000 Ukrainian. However, due to the lack of sources, we can very hardly estimate the number of losses among the civilian population. Nevertheless, it was less than the overall number of soldiers lost combined from both sides. Another feature of this war was the fact that atrocities committed against both the civilian population and prisoners of war have been not on a large scale compared with some other cases during WWI, for instance, Serbia which lost around 25% of its population.

This war between the Polish and Ukrainian sides, nevertheless, poisoned Polish-Ukrainian relations for decades and became clear during WWII when Ukrainians committed a large-scale genocide on the Poles (and Jews) in Galicia.

The Polish-Ukrainian dispute was over the land:

1. For the Polish side, the problems concerning the belongings of East Galicia did not end with the military defeat of West Ukrainian armed forces in July 1919. However, the problem continues to be as such for the next two decades playing the focal influence in both inner and foreign affairs of Warsaw.
2. For the Ukrainian side, the problem was solved by J. V. Stalin at the end of WWII as according to his decision, East Galicia became annexed by Soviet Ukraine. The local Poles have been forced to live outside their motherland – Poland – up to the present day while Ukrainians succeeded in creating within the USSR a Greater Ukraine by the annexation of the land from all neighbors.
3. The Entente powers, nevertheless, being concerned with the direct threat of the export of the Bolshevik revolution from Russia to Europe, granted East Galicia (temporarily) to Poland having in mind to create at such a way a stronger defense corridor against Bolshevik Russia. However, the Treaty of Saint Germain signed in September 1919 gave only West Galicia (westward from the San River to Poland), leaving, therefore, the final resolution of the belonging of East Galicia as a problematic issue to be solved in the future.
4. In December 1919, the British statesman Lord Curzon proposed two possible boundary lines throughout Galicia: 1) One of which would serve as the southern extension of what he proposed should be the eastern borders of Poland. That was officially accepted to be named as Curzon Line. The 2) variant, which was further east and included Lwów, would serve as Poland’s border. In reality, none of these proposed solutions was accepted by Warsaw, whose annexation of all of East Galicia was, in March 1923, recognized by the Entente Council of Ambassadors.

Western Tibet has a rich historical background, particularly in proximity to Mount Kailash, near the trijunction between India, Nepal and Tibet.

It is the case of Purang/Taklakot and a place called Toyo, located a few kilometres away, which have gone down in history for the epic battle between the Dogras of Gen. Zorawar Singh and the Tibetans troops.

In December 1841, the Dogra troops, who had just conquered Western Tibet (known as Ngari), were defeated by the Tibetans — and also by the winter.

The great Tibetan historian, Tsepon Shakabpa, thus described the battle of Taklakot/Toyo: “The Tibetan government quickly dispatched Ü Dapön [Gen.] Shedra Wangchuk Gyelpo and the Ü Tsang [Central Tibet] militia under the leadership of Cabinet minister Pellhün; when they arrived in Ngari, one regiment of the foreign army [the Dogras] was stationed at Rutok [near Pangong-tso], another was at Trashigang [near Demchok on the Ladakh border], and a third was at Rupshö [in Ladakh]. Secret preparations were made for the Tibetan troops to confront each [Dogra] unit. Zorawar Singh and the most seasoned [Dogra] troops, who were stationed at Taklakhar [Taklakot] Castle [in fact in Toyo] were confronted… In the eleventh month [December 1841], during the coldest weather of the year, the Tibetan troops attacked from all directions simultaneously.”

The fate of Zorawar Singh and his troops were sealed, according to Shakabpa:

“Three days after the fighting began, heavy snow fell. Thus, the Sikh troops who were at Taklakot became frozen solid. Trembling under their difficulties, the Sikhs were attacked by the Tibetans in terrible hand-to-hand fighting… While Zorawar Singh was riding his horse, rushing back and forth, he was recognized by a Yasor called Mikmar. He threw a spear and Zorawar Singh fell from his horse. Leaping off of his own horse, Mikmar cut Singh’s head off and carried it into the middle of the Tibetan camp. This was seen by the Sikh [Dogra] soldiers, and they fled in whatever way they could.”

A few months later, Maharaja Gulab Singh smashed the Tibetan forces trying to invade Ladakh. Dapön Zurkhang and Dapön Pelzhi were captured and taken to Leh, where a peace treaty was signed between the Dogras and the Tibetans, confirming once more the traditional border between Ladakh and Tibet. The tomb of Zorawar Singh still exists in Toyo, which has recently come in the news, but for different reasons.

An article in the Chinese media mentions a newly-built village in Toyo:

“China continues to promote the improvement of the rural living environment, paying close attention to greening [the area], beautification and [water] purification; the changes in Toyo are a concrete manifestation of the Ngari region’s efforts to build a beautiful and livable countryside.”

During the past three years, in Western Tibet alone, a total of 31 projects have been implemented to build liveable, “industrial” and beautiful villages, a local Communist Party cadre explains; in his jargon that it will be: “in accordance with the principles of beautiful leisure villages, happy and liveable villages, clean and tidy villages.”

But why a new village in Toyo?

Says Newsweek:

“China appears to have completed the construction of a new dam in the country’s southwestern border regions, a project that could have far-reaching strategic implications for its southern neighbours India and Nepal.”

Built on the Mapcha Tsangpo (or Peacock river, also known as Ghaghara or Saryu in India and Karnali in Nepal), it is a perennial source of fresh water water supply to the downstream populations.

What is strange is that the existence of this hydropower plant, located close to the Indian border, has not appeared in any published Chinese plan earlier.

Though satellite imagery only shows a medium river-of-the-river dam, without a large reservoir, India downstream should be concerned.

But there is more.

A new airport is coming up a couple of kilometres north of the hydropower plant and the “model” village. In June 2018, the Civil Aviation Administration of China had announced that Tibet would soon have three new airports. The Chinese-language press had given some information about the location of these three airports: one was to be located in Lhuntse, north of Arunachal Pradesh, the second was north of a border post with Nepal and the last in Purang.

Chinese website seetao.com explained:

“These three airports can be used for civilian use in peacetime, military aircraft training on the plateau; direct military use in wartime, holding military operations, will be able to play a very important role.”

Though many in India had forgotten about this announcement, the airport is now functional; on November 10, 2023, videos of the newly-built airfield appeared on the Chinese social media.

These three developments (model village, hydropower station and airport) should be seen as one, undoubtedly all are for dual (civil and military) use.

A separate occurrence needs to be noticed: the closure of the Kailash Yatra to Indian pilgrims. The 6,638-metre-tall diamond-shaped mountain is considered to be the abode of Lord Shiva and also one of the most sacred places in the Jain, Buddhist and Bon religions.

For centuries, pilgrims from India have visited the holy site; since the 1990s, they could cross into Tibet via Lipulekh Pass in Pittoragarh district and later enter Tibet via Nathu-la in Sikkim.

After the Doklam incident in 2017, the Indian yatris were not allowed to use these routes anymore.

As Beijing ignored Kathmandu’s request to permit the aerial sightseeing of Mount Kailash, Nepali tour operators decided to offer the yatris an alternative and a large number of devotees started using the Nepal route from Simikot to Purang by chartered helicopters; unfortunately, the scheme was subsequently closed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

After the scheme reopened for Nepalis in 2022, the Chinese authorities did not allow Indian visitors to fly to Purang, though last year alone, Nepali tour operators received over 50,000 bookings from Indian pilgrims for the sacred pilgrimage.

According to the Kathmandu Post, a new alternative has been found: a flight could remain in Nepalese territory and have a “remote” darshan of the sacred mountain: “Shree Airlines operated a first-of-its-kind aerial pilgrimage tour of the holy places, making the pilgrims’ dream come true without a Chinese visa” — explained a communiqué last week.

It is clear that China does not want Indians to have a real darshan of the holy mountain, or even come close to the place where Zorawar Singh is buried; and these latest developments in the area explain why.

Courtesy: https://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2024/02/claude-arpi-china-playing-new-border.html?m=1