The top brass of Pakistan army regularly congregate at the military’s General Headquarters [GHQ] in Rawalpindi to discuss various defence related issues in a confab referred to as Corps Commanders’ Conferences. On conclusion of these deliberations, the Pakistan army’s media wing, Inter Services Public Relations [ISPR], issues a press release giving out a gist of discussions held during the Conference.

Besides matters military, issues like elections, economy and even political intrigue and incompetence, that don’t fall within the purview of the army, are prominently articulated in ISPR communiqués. However, such mentions aren’t surprising since Corps Commanders’ Conferences also serve as a platform for the army to regularly remind other organs of state and the public that it’s Rawalpindi that calls the shots in Pakistan!

ISPR press releases also act as an effective medium to divert attention from the murkier side of Rawalpindi’s interference in the routine functioning of other state organs as well as protecting its own image as ‘true saviours’ of Pakistan, and the ISPR press release after the March 5 conference is just one such example.

This press statement which reads, “Forum expressed that it strongly believed that democratic consolidation is the way forward for the country,” comes in the wake of Rawalpindi’s brazen manipulation of the judiciary to orchestrate disqualification of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from participating in 2024 elections and politically emaciating his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Party. 

Content of ISPR’s post the conference press releases can be broadly sub-divided into three categories:

• • One, projection of multiple menacing security threats being sponsored by an inimical neighbour [read India] and chest thumping by complimenting the good work being done by the army’s rank and file in thwarting the same.
  • Two, expressing concern on the imagined atrocities being committed by Indian security forces in Kashmir and expressing solidarity with the separatist camp in Kashmir.
  • Three, a stern warning of a befitting response to any misadventure from a neighbouring country [again, read- India].

However, for some time now, mention of “false propaganda” by vested interests aimed at damaging the image of the Pakistan army has become the fourth ingredient of ISPR’s press releases. And its press statement  issued after the Corps Commanders’ Conference held on April 16 mentions that “The forum noted with concern organised misinformation and fake news being spread by certain nefarious elements to sow despondency and divisions within the society…”

While Rawalpindi’s allegations of “nefarious elements” peddling misinformation may be true to some extent, but then, what about the damning revelations made by some very high ranking Generals themselves on the unbecoming conduct of the Pakistan army? A few examples:

• • In 2010, former Pakistan army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf proudly admitted Rawalpindi’s role in promoting fundamentalism in the country by saying, “We poisoned Pakistani civil society for 10 years when we fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was jihad and we brought in militants from all over the world, with the West and Pakistan together in the lead role.” [Emphasis added].
  • Maj Gen Mahmud Ali Durrani who was Pakistan’s National Security Advisor when the Mumbai terrorist attacks took place, revealed in 2017 that “I hate to admit that the 26/11 Mumbai attack carried out by a terror group based in Pakistan on November 26, 2008 is a classic trans-border terrorist event.” [Emphasis added].
  • In November 2017, a video shot by Dawn News TV reporter Shakil Qarar on his mobile phone captured Pakistan army Maj Gen AzharNavid Hayat distributing envelopes containing cash to TLP protesters who had not only blocked movement on the Faizabad interchange for 20 days but also killed a policeman and injured several others. In the video, the two-star Gen can be heard telling a protester, “This is a gift from us to you” and even expressing solidarity with the protesters by saying, “Aren’t we with you too?” [Emphasis added]. Not only this, by giving another protester the assurance that “God willing, we’ll get them [arrested protesters] released,” [Emphasis added], the General demonstrated the power Rawalpindi has over the judiciary.
  • During his last public address before retiring in November 2022, outgoing Pakistan army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa admitted that the Pakistan army was being “criticised from time to time,” and accepted that “The main reason for this is the involvement of the army in politics for the last 70 years, which is unconstitutional.” [Emphasis added].

Rawalpindi doesn’t seem to realise that it is the Pakistan army’s puerile attempts to overlook the highhandedness of its rank and file is one of main reasons for its rapidly deteriorating public image. A classic example is the recent Bahawalnagar incident in Pakistan’s Punjab province in which army personnel stormed a police station, brutally assaulting the police men present and ransacking the premises.

Despite videos of army atrocities showing policemen being brutalised and humiliated by army personnel going viral on social media, the Pakistan army still tried to defend the criminal act of its troops by stating that “unfounded and baseless allegations on law enforcement agencies and security forces have become a fashion and are part of the larger design to drive a wedge between the people and the armed forces of Pakistan.”

Punjab police too tried to play down this serious incident by stating “This matter in Bahawalnagar, which went viral on social media, has been taken out of context and exaggerated,” a clear indication that it was arm-twisted into giving this bizarre statement. With visuals leave no room for any doubts, who in his senses would ever try and suggest that videos showing policemen bruised and bloodied by army personnel were “taken out of context and exaggerated”?

The Bahawalnagar incident is not the first of its type and hence can’t be dismissed as an aberration. In 2020, Sindh Rangers commanded by Pakistan army officers, alongwith military officers of Pakistan army spy agency Inter Services Intelligence [ISI] abducted Sindh police Inspector General [IG] Mushtaq Mahar and forced him to sign an arrest warrant of former Pakistan Prime Minister Nwaz Sharif’s son-in-law Capt Safdar Awan, Retired. 

This illegal act and gross misuse of power and unprecedented humiliation of an IG rank officer didn’t go down well with the Sindh police force and it was the threat of policemen going on mass protest leave that forced the then Pakistan Army Chief Gen Bajwa to intervene. However, rather than accepting that the army officers involved had committed a serious crime, the army’s court of inquiry [CoI] investigating into this incident instead tried to defend the officers’ shameful act of abducting a two-star police officer and even sought to blame the police for precipitating the crisis.

The CoI maintained that the army officers “were under increasing public pressure to ensure prompt action as per law. Assessing the response of police authorities against this developing yet volatile situation to be slow and wanting, in a charged environment, the concerned officers decided to act, rather overzealously.” Rawalpindi failed to explain as to why the Pakistan Rangers [Sindh] and ISI got involved in a police case in the first place!

By attempting to blame tardy police action for the abduction of a high rank police officer, Rawalpindi has itself has clearly sent out the message that even though unconstitutional, the Pakistan army nevertheless reserves the unquestionable right to intervene in any matter whenever it feels that things in the country are not going right. So, acts like abducting police officers or ousting prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan through manipulated judicial and political processes respectively were [in the Pakistan army’s perception] were necessary for the good of the country.

So, while it may cry ‘foul’ and blame the burgeoning anti-Pakistan army sentiments on a ‘grand conspiracy’, the fact of the matter is that Rawalpindi can’t deny is that it is itself responsible for creating a negative image through its scant regard for the country’s constitution and law. And with the “yeh jo dehshatgardi hai, iske peeche wardi hai” [the uniformed (Pakistan) army of is behind terrorism] slogan becoming staple fare for protesters, it’s time for Pakistan army chief Gen Syed Asim Munir to wake up and smell the coffee!

Introduction

Epictetus, the philosopher wrote, we can not choose our external circumstances but we can always choose how we respond to them. It is the role of leaders to ensure our security from external circumstances and inspire people and institutions to preserveour sovereignty. There is a critical linkage of national security with economic power. The economic power of a country is in turn linked substantially with military industry capability. Further, the degree of self-reliance that we have in terms of critical technologies becomesan important parameter for a country in the event of external aggression. China has shown how economic dominance and its position as a prime manufacturing powerhouse globally has helped it to compete with a behemoth like the USA. This paper tries to analyze in the context of India, how its economic ascendency after economic liberalization has helped it to become a global economic power  (b) the fault lines in our human development, (c)  policy evolution in the defense manufacturing sector after 2000  and (d) the way forward.

2. India as a Global Economic Power:

The following table will bring out India’s Gross Domestic Product ( GDP) ranking in nominal US terms since 2000 and India’s Contribution to the World’s GDP growth in real terms from 2000 onwards.

Table 1: GDP ranking in nominal US $ terms

Source: IMF, Jefferies

It would be seen from the above that from the thirteenth rank in 2000 in the global GDP ranking we have moved up to fifth place by 2023 and hope to ascend to the third rank by 2027, given our sustained growth forecast at 7% per year in the next five years.

India’s contribution to the world’s GDP growth (real) is tabulated below

Source: IMF, Jefferies

From 2.7% share in real terms in 2000, we have moved to 5.4% by 2023. One of the significant reasons contributing to India’s sharp economic spurt has been contributed by  the significant boost to capital expenditure as the following figure will show

Figure 2: Capex’s share in total expenditure

Source: Union Budget documents and Emkay research estimates.

As can be seen , the rise in capital expenditure as % to Central government expenditure (CGE) has moved up from 12% in 2013 to about 21% now, Thein flow of Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI) which was around 2.2 billion dollars in 2002, has now gone up to around 80 billion dollars and was least affected even during the pandemic years.

Path-breaking reforms in India over the last decade:

The following flow chart documents the 6 major reformsthat have contributed to higher growth and better financial health of the banking sector:

Figure 3: Reforms that led to Higher growth rate in India

In particular, the Goods & Services Tax (GST) (one nation one tax) with a robust IT network has increased indirect tax collection from less than 1 lakh crore to 1.5 lakh crore. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) has also gone a long way in bringing down the percentage of bad debts from 13% in 2018 to around 3.4% lately. The other most significant move has been India’s UPI and digital payment system which has plucked the subsidy leakage substantially. The (Jan Dhan, Mobile, and Aadhar) JAM trinity has triggered a significant improvement in digitization in the financial sector.

3. The Fault Lines

3.1 Country Power Index

The above trends, however, do not bring out some of the major concerns that India confronts. Ray Dalio, who has developed a country power index 2023, has brought out why India has scored 0.29 (7^th position) out of a score of 1, despite its achievement of 7% growth, over the last decade.

Table 2: Comparative analysis of the status of India in-country power index

Source: Country power index. 2023

It would be seen from the above that the main areas where India needs to catch up are education, innovation technology, and trade whereas China which has a score of 0.77 outscores India, very significantly. Our low HDI (Human Development Index) is largely responsible for our poor rating

3.2 Human development trends

The UNDP brings out the human development indices for different countries which captures not only the per capita Gross National Income (GNI) but also the priority the country accords to quality schooling and healthcare. The following table shows India’s achievement in terms of building human development capability  in terms of health and education

Table 4: Global Trend: Human Development Index

Source: HDR; 2022

The national account data shows that in 2021-22, education and health had a modest size in our economy accounting for 4% and 1.6% respectively of the gross value added. As Prof. Amartya Sen rightly brings out this has to increase significantly to 3% and 6% respectively if we aim to become a developed country. Prof. Nitin Desai formerly chief economic advisor, GOI, in a recent article, has brought out, “Education and Health matter not just for growth but are also an essential part of goals of development which should include the quality of life.”

4. Major policy initiatives for bolstering military industry capabilities

The military manufacturing sector has been the exclusive preserve of the government through the defense PSUs and ordnance factors as per the Industrial Policy resolution of 1956. The 10 major policy initiatives are tabulated below.

Table 5: Major policy initiative for bolstering MIC:

The Kalam committee had assessed India’s Self-reliance Index (SRI) as 30%, which needs to be boosted to 70% in a decade by bolstering indigenous design capability, faster technology absorption, and partnership with design houses and (Original Equipment Manufacturers) OEMs After the disastrous experience in Kargil the government had paid better attention to integration of MoD with the Service Headquarters and coordinated intelligence gathering. A decade later after economic liberalization, the defense sector witnessed full participation of the private sector in defense manufacturing and 25% FDI inflow. This was the first attempt to bust the monopoly presence of the public sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Ordinance factories. The Kelkar committee in 2005 went a step forward by promoting public-private partnerships, the defense procurement policy made India’s procurement system transparent to all suppliers and gave primacy to Make in India which puts a premium on developing indigenous technology that can be converted into production later on. The offset policy in 2006, drawing on the experience of Brazil in developing Embraer aircraft by availing technology from the USA tried to leverage India’s big-ticket acquisition to get critical technology, FDI, and outsourcing orders.

The Dhirendra Singh committee in 2015 made a strong pitch for a strategic partnership between the defense PSUs and the private sector in India. The Chief of Defence Staff which was one of the major recommendations of the Kargil review committee and was put on the back burner for a long time saw the light of the day in 2020 with the appointment of CDS. It has helped the defense services acquirea preeminent position as single-point military advice, thereby deluding civilian control over military advice. Make in India in defense focuses on greater indigenization, protecting domestic manufacturers from imports and bolstering the footprints of SMEs. The latest committee of Vijay Raghavan suggests the creation of a defense technology council helmed by the prime minister with NSA and CDS and the private sector, playing a critical role in improving our record instate-of-the-art technology. The DTC is being registered by the DRDO.

Defence Budget

The following graph will show how defence budget as a % of CGE has moved during the last decade:

Figure 6: Defence budget as % to CGE

Source: Defence Services Estimates

It would be seen from the above that it has plummeted from 13% in 2013-14  to around 9.66% recently. Besides, the defense budget as a % of GDP is also witnessing a reduction from about 3% to about 2.4%.

India as the largest  Importer  of conventional arms

The following table will provide the trends of major exporters and importers globally:

Table 6: Largest exporter and recipient of major arms

Source: SIPRI, 2023

It would be seen from the above that India is the largest importer and the USA the largest seller. Even China has a share of 6% in global arms exports

The reasons for such humungous imports is largely due to our excessive dependence on critical subsystems. The Kalam Committee had identified gaps inthe following areas.

Source: Kalam Committeee

The three major areas are propulsion, weapons, and sensors. The Kaveri which was to power the LCA aircraft has failed the test and is instead powered by a GE 404 engine imported from the USA. The MBT tank is powered by a German MTU engine. The (Active Electronically Scanned Array) AESA radar is sourced from Israel and the air-to-air missile is sourced from France. DRDO’s record in terms of indigenization of these critical systems lacks credibility. There is a huge gap between promise and delivery. DRDO’s ability to develop passive seekers and Focal Plane arrays has come as croppers.

Criticality of R&D Investment

One of the prime reasons for the USA achieving its preeminent position globally is due to its huge investment in R& D. In fact as per Robert Solow, the Nobel laureate in economics, 60% of America’s growth has been contributed by research and innovation and high factor productivity. The following table will bring out the comparative position globally.

Figure 8: R&D as a percentage of GDP

Source: World Bank Data 2020

The poor share of R&D in India’s GDP is also reflected in its low self-reliance index. Besides, in developed countries, the private sector contributes nearly 60% of R&D expenditure, where it is predominantly driven by the government (90%). Israel, which was exporting only $1 million in 1995 to India moved up to $1 billion by 2005, thanks to their amazing attention to R&D and collaboration with the USA.

Concluding thoughts:

It would be seen from the above that while India has made tremendous strides in overall economic prosperity, it also displays significant gaps in human development capability in general and inadequate indigenous capability in designing critical defense subsystems, making it the largest importer of arms. This is further roiled by inadequate exposure to designing defense systems in our IITs, with the solitary exception of IIT Kharagpur in designing naval systems. India also spends less than 1% of its GDP, with the private sector a clear laggard, showing our poor record in innovation & technology as the Country Power Index shows. Make in  India’s successcan not rest on protecting inefficient indigenous industries but on collaborating with OEMs and Global design houses. Kalam showed the way with JV with the Russians for producing Brahmos cruise missiles. He also successfully collaborated with Israel for the design and development of (Medium Range surface to air missiles) MR SAM. These are useful templates to emulate rather than reinventing the wheels. The announcement of the FM in the last budget to create a corpus of 1 lakh crores to catalyze R&D and private sector investment is most welcome. It was Clemenceau who wrote: War is too important to be left to the generals. A coordinated view by a Defence Technology Council helmed by the PM, with NSA, MEA, and CDS in tow and the private sector as equal partners would not only ink a map of long-term security but also build a high level of indigenization in the state of art subsystems based on partnerships.

What to make of a spate of articles in Western media and research papers by think tanks there about democratic ‘backsliding’ in India, just before the general election? While such articles have appeared regularly ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power, what’s striking is how this new flow of articles seeks to draw attention to India becoming increasingly more “authoritarian” and less democratic, and to an apparent gap developing between India and the West on the “values” front. The widely anticipated victory of the BJP in the upcoming elections seems to be the trigger for such commentary.

It is also not just the Western media and think tanks that are talking about the dilution of Indian democracy. Such concerns have been voiced even at the official level in Germany and the US. Both have commented on the arrest of Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, while the US State Department spokesperson also additionally raised questions about the blocking of the Congress’s bank accounts just before the elections. The statements of both countries have cast doubts over the judicial process in India. But New Delhi has firmly rejected these statements as interference in the country’s internal affairs.

Narrative-Building?

Why are such internal matters of any concern to the West? How are Kejriwal and Congress accounts of interest to the US or Germany? After all, these are not the only political figures or parties that have fallen afoul of Indian law, rightly or wrongly. That such comments are being made in support of the political opposition in India with full awareness about the impending general election makes them even more objectionable.

The West has also been very concerned about foreign interference in its own elections and is prepared to sanction countries that allegedly do so. They cite the use of social media and the support of certain local lobbies to influence voters as some of the tools employed by foreign countries to meddle in elections. In that spirit, New Delhi, too, can contend that the constant negative reporting about it in the mainstream Western press, echoing and amplifying what the opposition and sections of the civil society say about the ruling party and its leader, is a similar form of narrative-building aimed at affecting the political process in the country. That the Opposition in India has been citing such endorsements to justify their own charges against the government of undermining democracy, controlling the media, capturing public institutions, curbing the independence of the judiciary, persecuting minorities, rejecting secularism and promoting a Hindu state, shows the synergy between domestic political and social forces and India’s foreign critics.

Old Prejudices Against India

When the West makes critical remarks at an official level about India’s democracy or its human rights record – especially accusations of minority persecution – the media, academia and think tanks see this as legitimising their own broadsides against the country. This interplay leads to suspicions that the ‘deep state’ in these countries has an interest in maintaining pressure points against India through various channels, even when the messaging at official levels may be different, focusing on broader geopolitical and economic interests.

In any case, in liberal societies that allow for freedom of expression and where the government can be and is criticised, the discourse about a foreign country may be both friendly and unfriendly, especially in the case of the US, with which India has had long periods of political alienation. It is a country with lobbies that harbour old prejudices against India. The fact that movement between government positions and think tanks, business and academic worlds is frequent in the US means that such prejudices circulate within the system along with the circulation of individuals.

The Timing Of The Criticism

This campaign-like criticism decrying the anti-democratic trends in India is being pushed when the world is about to witness the largest-ever democratic election, comprising an electorate of 970 million eligible voters, which is more than the total population of the US, Canada, the EU and Britain. Together, these voters are set to elect a government for about 1.4 billion people in total – a sixth of the global population.

The organisation and planning that goes into conducting these elections, which will be spread over six weeks to make sure they are free and fair, is stupendous. No one has ever questioned the fairness of India’s 17 general elections in the past. These are in addition to the assembly elections held at the state level. Their numbers are huge. Some of these states have population sizes that are larger than those of some major European countries.

Instead of celebrating India’s success in preserving its democracy for the last 77 years, against all internal challenges of having diverse religions, languages, cultures, ethnic groups, issues of development and poverty, as well as external security challenges, including claims on Indian territory and terrorism, the West has preferred to focus on what it sees as India’s democratic deficiencies. Of course, India’s democracy, as democracies elsewhere, is not perfect. But no country has managed a democracy of India’s size ever. The West’s approach is judgmental and lacks empathy. There is little intellectual effort to look at the problems their own countries are facing and the erosion of the credibility of their own democracies internally and externally. There is a need to judge Indian democracy more objectively.

Voters Have The Last Word

What’s also interesting is that a large chunk of the negative writing in the West on trends in Indian democracy is either by persons of Indian origin who have settled abroad or people who are writing from India. Those living abroad may be echoing the views of the establishments they work for to secure their future, or they may have actually imbibed Western prejudices enough to make them believe that India is truly becoming “illiberal”. On the other hand, people who are writing from India are often close to opposition circles or are individuals who believe that secularism in India is being abandoned in favour of turning the country more “Hindu” in character.

In any case, the last word on India’s democracy rests with the electorate. How the West looks at it is essentially immaterial. Its ties with communist China are much deeper than those with democratic India despite the growing concerns about Beijing’s aggressive conduct, which makes the West’s democratic posturing look hypocritical.

India is an open society and its people are more exposed to Western ideas, especially through the English language, and thus, how that part of the world looks at India resonates with some sections here. But a more self-confident India will take less notice of such enduring anti-Indian prejudices in Western circles.

Courtesy: https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/the-irony-of-wests-democracy-memos-to-india-5468737

The term “citizenship” is usually used either in academia or news as a synonym of nationality and national affiliation (from the Anglo-Saxon, West European perspective followed by the New World, in fact, as a synonym of state). However, “citizenship” as a concept is essentially a product of and used in political philosophy and jurisprudence.

In practice, the majority of governments in the world concernedwith giving or not giving citizenship to someone follow either the so-called:

•  The French model, based on the “right of soil” (ius soli) or

•  The German model, founded on the principle of “right of blood” (ius sanguinis).

Actually, “citizenship” is not part of the terminology established by sociology and anthropology as in these two academic fields of research the notion of citizenship has come up only recently, basically, with the research of Roger Brubaker, Louis Dumont, or Immanuel Todd. The notion of citizenship is particularly interesting for sociologists and anthropologists as a phenomenon that structures collective representations and social relations among individuals and groups (to have certain rights as well as certain duties).

The status of being a citizen is decided by the law. In the traditions linked to republican political features, qualifications to have or not citizenship have been linked to particular rights and duties of citizens as well as to a commitment to equality between citizens is compatible with considerable exclusivity in the qualifying conditions (Ancient Greece, Rome, and Italian republics excluded women followed by some certain classes of labor men from the concept of citizenship).

During the last decades, basically since the end of the Cold War 1.0 in 1989, there are three crucial reasons for the popularity of dealing with the issue of citizenship:

•  Re-establishment of national states in East-Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe;

•  Re-emerging the problem of the status of historical, ethnic, and territorial minorities;

•  The problem of immigrants’ condition (for instance, in West Europe).

In principle, social science is concerned with the concept of citizenship mainly as an “imagined construction” that is applied in social life. According to a short definition and understanding of citizenship, it is juridical status, granting a sum of rights and duties to members of a specific political entity (state). Concerning the issue of legal rights and duties, one can possess 1) citizenship (participating in state elections for the president and parliament); 2) permanent residence permission (participation in only local elections for the assembly); and 3) temporal resident permission (no electoral rights).

Historically, during the time of feudalism, for instance, full citizenship possessed only aristocracy having political rights followed by certain duties to the state. In modern times, citizenship is understood as a pillar of a modern/contemporary state resembling, in fact, loyalty to the political unity that grants citizenship (it includes above all mandatory military service/conscription to defend the “motherland” – a country of citizenship). Nevertheless, in the past, there was a commonly accepted notion of citizenship that is very similar to the contemporary one (like the polis in ancient Greece, republican Rome, or in Italian medieval comuni/communities).

Today, there are notions of even supranational/transnational citizenship as it was, for instance, in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (double citizenship: of the republic and Yugoslav federation but a single passport) or the EU (double citizenship: of the national state and the EU with a single passport). Nevertheless, there were/are problems of supranational identity and transnational citizenship like in socialist Yugoslavia, USSR, or today in the EU where an overwhelming minority of inhabitants support supranational identity (of being Yugoslav, Soviet, or European) but have transnational citizenship (of Yugoslavia, USSR, or the EU).

What is very important to stress, the notion of (modern) citizenship is unlike the notion of (feudal) subjection. In other words, to possess citizenship means to be a member of a political entity having certain rightsbut to be a subject means being subjected to sovereignty (ruler) without rights having only heavy obligations.The notion of citizenship involves a relation of reciprocal loyalty between an impersonal institution (state) and its members (but not subjects). The notion of subjection, in fact, implies a personalized relation of obedience and submission of subjects to the sovereign. However, since the modern (anti-feudal) times, different types of rights (civil, social, political, minority…etc.) have differentiated citizenship from subjection which was historically founded on privileges (for aristocracy) and obligations (for taxpayers).

What Weberians (followers of Maximilian Karl Emil Weber, 1864−1920) would say is that citizenship is a typical phenomenon of legal-bureaucratic political systems. According to them, subjection belongs to traditional (feudal) and charismatic political systems and social relations. In addition, the concept of citizenship fits to “institutionalized state” while subjection fits to “personalized state”.

Rights of citizenship

The concept of citizenship understands four rights for the citizenship holders:

•  Civil rights concerning individual freedoms (personal freedom, freedom of thought, and freedom of religion) and the right to fair and equal justice for all. They stemmed from the ascent of the middle class in the 18th century;

•  In the 19th century, political rights concerning the exercise and control of political power, to vote, and to create political parties were established;

•  Social rights (rights ensuring a degree of welfare and safety through welfare and education services) were guaranteed in the 20th century;

•  Cultural rights (rights to maintain and hand down to one’s descendant’s cultural identity, ethnic affiliation,and religious background)are introduced in the 1970s.

Dealing with the concept of citizenship, the relations between citizenship, politics of recognition, and multiculturalism is essential. Citizenship is a social process that takes place under specific historical conditions. We have to keep in mind that the concept of citizenship involves both the rights and the duties.

Citizenship as a concept is in the Western world very much founded on the principle of staatsnation(ein sprache, ein nation, ein staat), a Germanterm of French origin. This principle has characterized the old content’s history from the 19th century on. According to the principle of staatsnation = each nation (ethnocultural-linguistic group) must have its state with its territory and each state must comprise one nation.According to common sense and most theoretical representations, a staatsnationis, in fact, kulturnationwhich is a community whose members share the same cultural traits.

The concept of kulturnation corresponds to both:

•  The Herderian idea of “volk”/people (whose main characteristic is a shared language for all its members); and to

•  The original French concept of nation, in which the linguistic criteria is also a major feature.

The original French concept of nation was defined in 1694 by the Académie Française. In essence, the German romanticist model is based on the formula of language-nation-state, while the modern French model after the 1789−1794 Revolution is founded on the opposite formula of state-nation-language (this formula, however, in the practice in many cases results in the assimilation and even ethnic cleansing of the minorities).

The staatsnation principlepostulates the formation of politically sovereign monocultural and/or monoethnic territorial spaces. This principle is based on cultural and/or ethnic purity. From the 19th century on, i.e. since the staatsnation principlewas applied in Europe, there have been repeated efforts to make the single national territories both ethnically and culturally more homogeneous. The politics of ethnocultural re-composition in the nameof staatsnation principleinfluenced both in some cases 1) ethnic cleansing, 2) boundary revisions, 3) forced assimilation, 4) banishments, 5) planned immigration, 6) deportations, etc.

Dealing with the question of citizenship, today has to deal with minority rights and minority protection (regarding in many cases with civic state and society). Globally, human rights were accepted after 1945 while minority rights after 1989. The fact is that the national state has far too often been understood exclusively as a geographic expression.In addition, the national state is a political association of citizens who belong to it even because of their cultural traits are often disregarded.

We and the rest

Not everyone can indiscriminately belong to a specific national state. According to Max Weber, the national state is an association partially open to the outside. In many cases, historically, there were examples of limited opening towards the “others” or the foreigners (like Japan up to 1867). Such a view entails the creation of institutional mechanisms of social selection that regulate affiliation and exclusion. It has to be stressed that both citizenship and nationality represent the fundamental tools that define who has the complete right to belong to a national state and who is excluded from it.

A drastic example of the policy of ethic-based citizenship can be mentioned in the case of Estonia and Latvia (to eliminate the influence on domestic politics of the local Russian minority) immediately after the dismemberment of the USSR but contrary to the case of Lithuania (in Lithuanian case just for the reason that Russian minority was not so numerous compared to Estonian and Latvian cases). In other words, in 1991 Estonia and Latvia introduced a model of citizenship following the staatsnation doctrine that tends to stamp out any form of cultural difference within its national territory. However, neighboring Lithuania after the Soviet time or Malaysia after the end of the British colonial domination in 1956, has given itself a model of multicultural citizenship, whichis based upon differences amongst the country’s various ethnic components.

Specific institutions are established in order to support a strict logic of either inclusion or exclusion from the national state according to the principle of staatsnation. For instance, according to the post-Soviet constitution of Lithuania, in fact, only ethnic Lithuanians can be elected as the president of the country (The 78 paragraph: “Respublikos prezidentu gali būti renkamas lietuvos pilietis pagal kilmę…“ [For the President of the Republic can be elected only Lithuanian citizen according to the origin…]).

Nevertheless, these restrictive institutions are:

•  Naturalization;

•  Assimilation;

•  Entitled nation;

•  Minorities.

Practically, a foreigner can obtain citizenship through naturalization and assimilation. We have, however, to keep in mind that in many countries around the world double citizenship is not allowed (like in Germany or Austria). The acculturation process results in a cultural affiliation change. This is a more or less voluntary process. Usually, the foreigner has to forsake his previous citizenship. However, today, dual citizenship is becoming juridically more widespread as a more democratic option. However, it is still in major cases regarded as dangerous for the preservation of national identities (for instance, controversial debate in Germany).

Practically, in the majority of states exists the problem of the citizenship of the minorities based on the difference between the entitled nation and the rest of the population (minorities) (cases of Slovenia and Croatia). Such attitude implies a structural asymmetry and it conceals a partial exclusion and a demarcation between first and second-class citizenships with their minority rights (example of the Socialist Yugoslavia). In many cases, the citizenship is ethnocentrically oriented whichraises the question of citizenship and cultural plurality. Another connected question is the relationship between citizenship and the right to difference.

To focal questions concerning citizenship:

•  Does citizenship have a unifying and inclusive function?

•  Citizenship as the expression of a harmonious political community?

From the very sociological viewpoint, citizenship must be perceived as an agonistic process with competition, tensions, conflicts, permanent negotiations, and compromises between the groups involved in the struggle for the recognitionof their rights.

Final words

The concept of citizenship is in most cases understood as a research issue within the political science framework. Therefore, the usual definition of citizenship is provided in political terms as referring to the terms of membership of the nation-state which secure certain rights and privileges to those who fulfill particular obligations. Citizenship is a political concept but not developed and academically as such recognized theory. It, nevertheless, is formalizing the conditions for full participation in a certain community (in fact, a nation-state). Originally, the political definition of citizenship stresses the inclusive nature of the term (concept) as it implies that anyone within the territory of a nation-state who meets certain obligations can be included as a citizen, with corresponding rights and privileges.

Qualifications for citizenship, in fact, reflect a conception of the purposes of the political community and a view about which persons are allowed to enjoy the benefits of rights (and duties) of the political unity (state). Shortly, the concept of citizenship applied certain moral and legal rights and obligations to those who possess it. We have all the time to keep in mind that citizenship on the one hand gives certain rights but on the other hand, requires as well as certain obligations. 

The historical background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes back to 1917 (the Balfour Declaration) and the establishment of the British protectorate over Palestine (the Palestine Mandate) after WWI with its provision for a national home for the Jews, although formally not to be at the expense of the local inhabitants – the Palestinians. Nevertheless, it became in practice the focal problem to keep an appropriate balance between these stipulations to be acceptable to both sides – the Jews and the Palestinians.

The people and the land 

Since the time of the Enlightenment followed by Romanticism, in Western Europe emerged a new trend of group identification of the people as ethnic or ethno-cultural nations different from the previous feudal trends from the Middle Ages based on religion, state borders, or social strata belonging.[1] Over time, a new trend of people’s identification as a product of the capitalistic system of production and social order became applied across the globe following the process of capitalistic globalization.[2] As a direct consequence of such development of the group identities, the newly understood nations, especially in the areas under colonial foreign rule, started to demand their national rights but among them, the most important demand was the right to self-rule in a nation-state of their own. In other words, the ethnic or ethnic-confessional groups under foreign oppression demanded the rights of self-determination and political sovereignty.[3]

Since around 1900, both the Jews and the Arab-Palestinians became involved in the process of developing ethno-national consciousness and mobilizing their nations for the sake of achieving national-political goals. However, one of the focal differences between them regarding the creation of a nation-state of their own was that the Jews have been spread out across the world (a diaspora) since the fall of Jerusalem and Judea in the 1^stcentury AD[4] while, in contrast, the Palestinians were concentrated in one place – Palestine. From the very end of the 19^th century, a newly formed Th. Herzl’s Zionist movement had a task to identify land where the Jewish people could immigrate and settle to create their own nation-state. For Th. Herzl (1860‒1904),[5] Palestine was historically logical as an optimal land for the Jewish immigrants as it was the land of the Jewish states in the Antique.[6]

It was, however, an old idea, and Th. Herzl in his book pamphlet which became the Bible of the Zionist movement was the first to analyze the conditions of the Jews in their assumed to be “native” land and call for the establishment of a nation-state of the Jews in order to solve the Jewish Question in Europe or better to say to beat traditional European anti-Semitism and modern tendency of the Jewish assimilation. But the focal problem was to somehow convince the Europeans that the Jews had the right to this land even after 2000 years of emigration in the diaspora.

What was Th. Herzel’s Eretz Yisrael in reality? For all Zionists and the majority of Jews, it was the Promised Land of milk and honey but in reality, the Promised Land was a barren, rocky, and obscure Ottoman province since 1517 settled by the Muslim Arabs as a clear majority population. On this narrow strip of land of East Mediterranean, the Jews, and the Arab Palestinians lived side by side at the time of the First Zionist Congress some 400,000 Arabs and some 50,000 Jews.[7]

Most of those Palestinian Jews have been bigot Orthodox[8] who entirely depended on their existence on charitable offerings of different Jewish societies in Europe which have been distributed to them by the communal organizations set up mainly exactly for that purpose. 

Palestine 

Palestine is a historic land in the Middle East on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea between the River of Jordan and the Mediterranean seacoast. Palestine is called Holy Land by the Jews, Christians, and Muslims because of its spiritual links with Judaism, Christianity as well as Islam.

The land experienced many changes and lordships in history followed by changes of frontiers and its political status. For each of the regional denominations, Palestine contains several sacred places. In the so-called biblical times, on the territory of Palestine, the Kingdoms of Israel and Judea existed until the Roman occupation in the 1^st century CE. The final wave of Jewish expulsion to the diaspora from Palestine started after the abortive uprising of Bar Kochba in 132−135 CE. Up to the emergence of Islam, Palestine historically was controlled by the Ancient Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, the Roman Empire, and finally by the Byzantine Empire (the East Roman Empire) alongside the periods of the independence of the Jewish kingdoms.

The land became occupied by the Muslim Arabians in 634 CE. Since then, Palestine has been populated by a majority of Arabs, although it remained a central reference point to the Jewish people in the diaspora as their “Land of Israel” or Eretz Yisrael. Palestine remained under Muslim rule up to WWI, being part of the Ottoman Empire (1516−1917), when the combined Ottoman and German armies were defeated by the British at Megiddo. The exception being during the time of the West European Crusades from 1098 to 1197.[9] The term Palestine was used as the official political title for the land westward of the Jordan River mandated in the interwar and post-WWII period to the United Kingdom (from 1920 up to 1947).

However, after 1948, the term Palestine continues to be used, but now in order to identify rather a geographical than a political entity. It is used today, particularly in the context of the struggle over the land and political rights of Palestinian Arabs displaced since Israel became established.[10]

The Jewish migrations to Palestine in 1882−1914

As a consequence of renewed pogroms in East Europe in 1881, the first wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine started in 1882 followed by another wave before WWI from 1904 to 1914.[11] The immigration of the Jewish settlers was encouraged by the 1917 Balfour Declaration, and very much intensified since May 1948 when the Zionist State of Israel was proclaimed and established.

There were historically two types of motives for the Jews to come to Eretz Yisrael (In Hebrew, the “Land of Israel”):

• • The traditional motive was prayer and study, followed by death and burial in the holy soil.
  • Later, since the mid-19^th century, a new type of Jew being secular and, in many cases, idealistic began to arrive in Palestine but many of them have been driven from their native lands by anti-Semitic persecution.

In 1882 there was the first organized wave of European Jewish immigration to Palestine. Since the 1897 First World Zionist Congress in Basel, there was an inflow of European Jews into Palestine especially during the British Mandate time followed by the British-allowed policy of land-buying by the Jewish Agency which was, in fact, indirect preparation for the creation of the Jewish nation-state – Israel.[12] In other words, such a policy was designed to alienate land from the Palestinians, stipulating that it could not be in the Arab hands.

Even before the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Th. Herzl tried to recruit prosperous and rich Jews (like the Rothschild family) to finance his plan of the Jewish emigration and colonization of Palestine but finally failed in his attempt. Th. Herzl decided to turn to the little men – hence his decision to convene the 1897 Basel Congress where according to his diary, he founded the Jewish state. After the congress, he did not waste time in turning his political program into reality. Still, at the same time, he strongly disagreed with the idea of peaceful settlement in Palestine, or according to his own words “gradual Jewish infiltration”, which, in fact, had already started even before the meeting of the Zionists in Basel.

At that time, Palestine as an Ottoman province did not constitute a single political-administrative unit. The northern districts have been parts of the province of Beirut, and the district of Jerusalem was under the direct authority of the central Ottoman Government in Istanbul because of the international significance of the city of Jerusalem and the town of Bethlehem as religious centers equally important for Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.[13] A vast majority of the Arabs either Muslims or Christians have been living in several hundred villages in a rural environment. Concerning the town settlers of Arab origin, the two biggest of them were Jaffa and Nablus together with Jerusalem as economically the most prosperous urban settlements.[14]

Until WWI, the biggest number of Palestinian Jews were living in four urban settlements which were of important religious significance to them: Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias. They have been followers of traditional, Orthodox religious practices spending much time studying religious texts and depending on the charity of world Jewry for survival.[15] It has to be noticed that their attachment to Eretz Yisrael was much more of religion than of national character and they were not either involved in or supportive of Th. Herzl’s Zionist movement emerged in Europe and was, in fact, brought to Palestine by the Jewish immigrants after 1897. However, most of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine after 1897 who emigrated from Europe have lived a secular type of life having commitments to the secular goals to create and maintain a modern Jewish nation based on the European standards of the time and to establish an independent Jewish state – modern Israel but not to re-establish a biblical one. During the first year of WWI, the total number of Jews in Palestine reached some 60.000 of whom some 36.000 were settlers since 1897. On the other hand, the total number of the Arab population in Palestine in 1914 was around 683.000.

The second wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine (1904−1914) had many intellectuals and middle-class Jews but the majority of those immigrants have been driven less by a vision of a new state than by the hope of having a new life, free of pogroms and persecutions.

Depiction of three Presidents of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar El-Sadat and Abdel Fatah El-Sisi in Egypt. Photo Credits: Mr. Arunansh B. Goswami.

Recently author of this article was on a tour of a country in North Africa with several millennia old civilisation, namely Egypt. It’s land frontiers border Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, and Israel to the northeast (all it’s neighbours are going through internal or external conflicts), and also borders the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It has the profoundly important Suez Canal that separates the African continent from Asia. 

This canal is the only place that directly connects the waters of Europe with the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the countries of the Asia-Pacific, nationalisation of this canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser (One of the founding fathers of Non Alignment Movement along with Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru) led to the Suez Crisis in 1956, (India supported Egypt during this crisis) he emerged as a victor and a hero for the cause of Arab and Egyptian nationalism after this conflict. 

Travelling through the Nubian desert. Photo Credits. Mr. Arunansh B. Goswami.

From South to the North 

During his travels in the almost entire South-North stretch of the country from Abu Simbel near the Sudan border to Alexandria on the coast of Mediterranean Sea, author interacted with people from different occupations and ethnicities (Upper Egypt was historically part of Nubia with close connections with Sudan and ethnically different from the people of Lower Egypt who have had close connections with the Arabs of Middle East) to learn about what they think about current Egyptian leadership, India and politics of West Asia. 

Author of this article in the Old Catarat Hotel. Image Credits: Mr. D. B. Goswami.

Author even visited as a guest to the Old Cataract Hotel in Aswan, where U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his staff stayed while negotiating the end of the brief Yom Kippur War. On the way from the Cairo International Airport to the city visitors to Egypt can see several posters of President Sisi, who has protected Egypt from forces of religious radicalism (Like Muslim Brotherhood) and was Chief Guest for the 2023 Republic Day parade of India. In this article author will focus on India-Egypt partnership in West Asia and beyond. 

Modi’s Visit In 2023 

Indian Prime Minister Shri. Narendra Modi visited Egypt for the first time since 1997, and Government of Egypt bestowed the highest honor of the land the “Order of the Nile” on him even though under his leadership India’s diplomatic relations with Israel have improved against whom Egypt fought during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and lost. But readers should know that even during the Modi era India has continued to support the “Two-State solution” to Israeli Palestinian conflict. 

Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi in Egypt President Abdel Fattah El-sisi conferred Prime Minister Modi with the highest state honour of Egypt, the ‘Order of Nile.’ Photo Credits: Prime Minister’s Office India.

During his visit to Egypt Modi and Sisi signed a pact that had elevated the bilateral relationship to a “strategic partnership,” which India’s Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra described as “the most important and the landmark development in the history of our relationship.” In January of last year, for the first time, the Special Forces of the Indian and Egyptian armies participated in joint exercises, it is interesting that IAF pilots trained Egyptian pilots from 1960s until 1984 and now as per an article by Rahul Singh for Hindustan Times “India is in talks with Egypt for the possible sale of the indigenously-built Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) to their air forces.”

Israel-Palestine 

India and Egypt have profound convergence of national interests including common threats from rising Neo-Ottomanism in Türkiye, even though India has deepened it’s relations with Israel it is well aware of the sentiments of the Arab world regarding Israel-Palestine conflict. India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ruchira Kamboj has said “Only a Two-State solution, achieved through direct and meaningful negotiations between both sides on final status issues, will deliver an enduring peace. India is committed to support a Two-State solution where the Palestinian people are able to live freely in an independent country within secure borders, with due regard to the security needs of Israel.” 

Al-Hakim Mosque, visited by P.M. Modi during his Egypt tour in 2023. Photo Credits: Mr. Arunansh B. Goswami.

Historical Connections 

During his visit to Egypt P.M. Modi visited the Al-Hakim mosque named after Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (985–1021 AD), the sixth Fatimid caliph. This mosque was restored with the help of the Dawoodi Bohra community that has been politically very close to Shri. Modi since the days when he was Chief Minister of Gujarat. Mr. Modi even visited the Heliopolis War Cemetery, and the Heliopolis (Port Tewfik) Memorial this commemorates nearly 4,000 Indian soldiers who died fighting in Egypt and Palestine in the First World War. Kind of following the footsteps of the Honourable Prime Minister, author visited both the aforementioned places. 

Author of this article at the Heliopolis (Tewfik) Memorial. Image Credits; Mr. D. B. Goswami.

Heliopolis (Port Tewfik) Memorial 

While researching for the Scindia family of Gwalior author found that, 4th Gwalior Infantry Battalion played an important role during the First World War in Egypt. As per Gwalior Today book edited by Michael H. Brown and published by the Publicity Department of the Government of Gwalior, Bombay The Times of India Press 1940, the 4th Gwalior Infantry Battalion, under the command of Lt.-Col. Girdhari Singh, left Gwalior in October 1914 to join the 32nd (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade under Brigadier General H. D. Watson at Deolali, they did service in Egypt to protect Suez Canal from Ottoman Turks. Author went to Heliopolis (Port Tewfik) Memorial to pay his respects to Indian soldiers and other Indian military men whose memory has been commemorated by this memorial. 

Interactions with Locals 

As mentioned before author interacted with several local Egyptians to understand their views on world politics, in Cairo a young engineer told the author that “Sisi is a dictator he made Egypt poor” a taxi driver in Luxor told the author the same, he said “Hosni Mubarak was good, under Sisi our currency became weaker” a tour guide in Cairo told the author “People voted for Sisi they like him, during Nasser’s rule we were the most powerful country in the Middle East, Erdogan is an enemy of the Egyptians and Turks ruled us and took several good Egyptian scholars to Constantinople with them,” and a Christian in Alexandria told the author “Turks did genocide of the Arabs in Egypt.” Sisi is no doubt very popular in Egypt, but it appears his opponents are using economic arguments to reduce his public support. What will happen in Egyptian politics in coming years only God knows, but this is quite evident that Sisi’s leadership is in India’s national interest. 

Conclusion 

India and Egypt are two civilisational states that have important geopolitical status in Asia and Africa respectively. India has over the years during the Modi era developed strong partnerships with Arab states in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and has built on the strong relations India had with Egypt since the day of Nasser and Nehru. India is emerging as a strong defence equipment’s manufacturer, strong relations with countries like Egypt and Armenia will be advantageous to the growth of this capacity of our nation. Let’s hope under the leadership of Modi and Sisi, Egypt and India strengthen our “strategic partnership” even more.

Summary

The Project 75(I) will provide an opportunity for local manufacture of the state-of-the-art submarines which will enable the Indian Navy to dominate the undersea domain in our area of interest whilst providing the Indian industry an opportunity for long-term partnership in not only submarine construction but also maintenance, logistics and maintenance support.

Introduction

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued an Expression of Interest (EoI) in June 2019 for shortlisting of Indian Strategic Partners (SP) in collaboration with foreign original equipment manufacturers (FOEMs) for construction of six conventional submarines under Project-75(I) of the Indian Navy. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) had earlier approved progressing the project under the Strategic Partnership Model (SPM) in January 2019. The Brief places in perspective developments relating to the procurement of the P-75(I) submarines, specifically in the context of the defence procurement/acquisition procedure that sought to build indigenous capacity in the domestic private defence industry through the SPM.

The P-75(I) Saga

While the most recent DAC approval for the Project 75(I) was in January 2019,1 the project was envisaged in the year 1999 when the Government of India contemplated indigenous construction of conventional submarines at two Indian shipyards. The project was formally initiated in November 2007 with the granting of the Acceptance of Necessity (AoN). The plan was to induct 12 conventional submarines by 2012 and another 12 by 2030.

To bridge capability gaps in India’s submarine force comprising of just four German HDW and 10 Russian Kilo-class submarines, the contract for six Scorpene submarines (Kalvari-class) worth Rs 18,706 crores was signed in 2005, which later escalated to about Rs 23,000 crore. The first of the Scorpene submarines built at Mazagaon Docks Limited (MDL) was inducted in 2017 and the sixth submarine is set to be inducted this year. The DAC gave approval for three additional Scorpenes in July 2023.

The EoI issued by the MoD for the P-75 (I) in June 2019 noted that while Indian companies would be shortlisted ‘based on their capability for integration of system of systems, expertise in shipbuilding domain and the financial strength’, FOEMs would be shortlisted based on their ‘submarine design meeting the Indian Navy’s Qualitative Requirements and qualifying the Transfer of Technology and Indigenous Content (IC) criteria’.2

The DAC in January 2020 shortlisted MDL and private sector ship builder Larsen and Toubro (L&T) to tie up with any of the five foreign submarine builders as strategic partners. These five included Rubin Design Bureau (Russia), Naval Group-DCNS (France), Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) (Germany), Navantia (Spain) and Daewoo (South Korea).3 The Request for Proposal (RfP) for the nearly Rs 43,000 crore project was issued in July 2021 to the shortlisted two Indian strategic partners, MDL and L&T. The MoD noted that the Project 75(I) envisaged ‘indigenous construction of six modern conventional submarines (including associated shore support, Engineering Support Package, training and spares package) with contemporary equipment, weapons & sensors including sea proven Fuel-Cell based AIP (Air Independent Propulsion Plant), advanced torpedoes, modern missiles (indigenous) and state of the art countermeasure systems’.4  

The French Naval Group in May 2022 announced that it will not be able to participate in the project, given that the RfP includes a sea proven operational AIP system, which it did not possess.5 Russian officials in August 2022 also noted that the terms of the project were “unrealistic” and that they preferred a government-to-government agreement for the project.6 Reports noted that the timeline for submitting bids was extended as a result of the apprehensions expressed by the FOEMs, mainly relating to liability clauses.7 Hanwha Ocean (which took over Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering in May 2023) initially maintained interest in Project 75(I) in collaboration with L&T. It also held talks with MDL. CMD, MDL was however cited as stating in August 2023 that the South Korean company had withdrawn from the tender process.8

TKMS and Navantia remain in the race to bag the prestigious contract along with the Indian partner. Despite initial apprehensions, TKMS signed a teaming agreement with MDL in June 2023 during the visit of German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius to India comprising non-binding and non-financial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). TKMS agreed to contribute to submarine engineering and design as well as provide consultancy support while MDL would be responsible for constructing and delivering the respective submarines.9 TKMS was offering the HDW Class 214 submarines to meet the Indian Navy’s requirements.10

On the occasion of the signing of the MoU with MDL, TKMS noted that the four HDW Class 209 submarines built in the 1980s were a successful example of Indo-German cooperation which continue to be frontline assets of the Indian Navy. Two were built in Kiel while the last two were built at MDL. TKMS and MDL also signed an agreement for the repair and overhaul of the second of the HDW submarines, INS Shankush in July 2023, worth over US$ 300 million, to be completed by 2026. The Medium Refit Cum Life Certification (MRLC) of the first submarine INS Shishumar was signed in 2018, which extended the service life of sub by another ten years.11

German Ambassador to India Philip Ackermann in March 2024 stated that there was clear political will on the part of the German leadership for enhanced defence cooperation with India. He flagged the “huge paradigm shift” in German strategic thinking to “boost cooperation with our strategic partners outside the NATO area” in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s expansionist behavior in the Indo-Pacific in violation of the rules-based international order.12 Ackermann noted that while the selection process for Project 75(I) was ongoing, there is a “clear willingness and preparedness from the German side to support this Indian project”.13 He further added that a group of Indian naval officers will be visiting Germany in March 2024 to evaluate the submarines.

Spain’s Navantia, meanwhile, signed a teaming agreement with L&T in July 2023 for submission of techno-commercial bids for the submarine project, a month after the TKMS, MDL MoU. Navantia and L&T had signed a MoU in April 2023. Reports note that the company will be offering its S80 class of submarines.14 Spanish Secretary of State for Defence Maria-Amparo Valcarce Garcia visited New Delhi on 8 March 2024. During her meeting with Defence Secretary Giridhar Aramane, a number of bilateral defence cooperation issues were discussed, with focus on industrial collaboration.15 Earlier in February 2024, Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Teresa Ribera visited India. She asserted that Navantia was developing the most modern submarines though she added that “we need to be quite respectful about decisions being made by each country on how to [meet] defence requirements”.16  

The SPM Policy at Crossroads

The Strategic Partnership Model (SPM) as a capital acquisition policy is, therefore, at a significant crossroads. The procedure was first promulgated in May 2017, following its inclusion as Chapter VII of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016. This followed the December 2015 report of a task force headed by V.K. Aatre, former scientific adviser to the defence minister, which laid down criteria for selecting Strategic Partners (SPs) from the private defence industry for executing high-value, defence projects.17

The SPM eventually envisaged developing domestic capabilities in the four segments of fighter aircraft, submarines, helicopters and armoured fighting vehicles/main battle tanks. The SPM is part of the MoD’s efforts relating to defence procurement to develop long-term indigenous defence industrial capabilities. Other categories of capital acquisition as listed in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 include ‘Buy’, ‘Buy and Make’, ‘Leasing’, ‘Design and Development’. Under the ‘Buy’ scheme, procurements are categorised in order of priority based on their relative importance towards indigenisation as ‘Buy (Indian – Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured)’, ‘Buy (Indian)’, and ‘Buy (Global)’. Under the ‘Buy and Make’ scheme, the procurements are categorised in order of priority as ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ and Buy (Global – Manufacture in India).

It is pertinent to note that the Indigenous Content (IC) requirements for most ‘Buy’ categories of capital procurement are more than 50 per cent. The IC requirements for SPM projects are lower than for those under the ‘Buy’ category of capital procurement. The Project 75(I) EoI stipulates IC as a minimum of 45 per cent on cost as per commercial bid basis with 60 per cent to be achieved for the last submarine with incentives for achieving higher IC content. Such provisions were included to ensure greater willingness on the part of the FOEM to partner with Indian SPs to execute high-value defence projects. It is pertinent to highlight that a higher IC content is envisaged for Project-75 (I) given that majority of weapons on the submarine are likely to be indigenous.

Despite such provisions, however, the policy has not seen success so far. Some of the issues highlighted by analysts as regards the SPM policy included the restrictions on FDI limits. This was especially so in the aftermath of the government allowing FDI limit in defence to 74 per cent in May 2020, from the earlier limit of 49 per cent.18 The DAP 2020 notes that the strategic partner of the FOEM has to be an Indian company ‘owned and controlled by resident Indian citizens’ and the maximum permitted foreign direct investment (FDI) shall be 49 per cent.19 Officials of the Swedish defence company SAAB were cited as seeking clarification if the SPM policy also allowed for 74 per cent FDI, after the government raised the limit.20 As regards the Project 75(I) specifically, previous sections highlighted apprehensions of Russian and French defence majors as regards ToT and liability clauses, among others.

The Project-75(I) was the second project to be pursued under the SPM policy of defence procurement. The first project under the SPM policy related to the procurement of naval utility helicopters (NUH) worth more than Rs 21,000 crore, an EoI for which was issued in February 2019 after the DAC approved the project in August 2018. Sixteen NUH were planned to be bought in a flyaway condition from a foreign military contractor, while the remaining 95 were to be built in the country in partnership with an Indian firm. Three foreign firms, Airbus, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (part of Lockheed Martin) and Kamov (Russian firm) submitted technical bids while Indian firms that were in the reckoning as SPs were Tata Aerospace and Defence, Mahindra Defence, Reliance Defence, Adani Defence, HAL, Bharat Forge and Lakshmi Machine Works.

This project, however, did not fructify as planned due to a plethora of reasons, including interest shown by the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the project, which was opposed by the domestic private defence industry on the grounds that the SPM policy was specifically promulgated to build capacities in the private defence industry.21 There were also changes in specifications relating to maximum take-off weight. The NUH was eventually placed on the positive indigenisation list (PIL) which was issued in April 2022, barring the import of such platforms.22

Way Ahead

On the occasion of the DAC granting approval for the Project 75(I) in January 2019, the Ministry of Defence noted that it will ‘provide a major boost to the existing submarine design and manufacturing ecosystem in India through transfer of design and equipment technology as well as necessary skill sets’.23 The delivery of the first sub is expected not later than eight years after the signing of the contract. Given the reality of extant Indian submarine strength, the acquisition by Pakistan of eight 039 Yuan class submarines from China with AIP capability by 2028 and the increasing forays of Chines submarines in the waters of the Indian Ocean, it is essential that there is faster forward movement on the Project 75(I) with early contract conclusion for a submarine with proven combat capabilities which will provide the Indian Navy a true combat edge.

The success of the strategic partnership model policy therefore is essential to convince FOEMs to be partners with the Indian domestic defence industry in taking forward the vision of building capacities in niche technological platforms like submarines. Moreover, given that the SP will not only need to commit to a plan for indigenisation in terms of value of production but also formulate a research and development roadmap to achieve self-reliance, the SPM policy will only aid in enhancing domestic capacities in the Indian defence industry.

The Project 75(I) will provide an opportunity for local manufacture of the state-of-the-art submarines which will enable the Indian Navy to dominate the undersea domain in our area of interest whilst parallelly providing the Indian industry an opportunity for long-term partnership in not only submarine construction but also maintenance, logistics and maintenance support. This project will form the basis for development of fully indigenous next generation submarine design and technology for use by the Indian Navy with potential for export to interested partner nations. The Project 75(I) will be the acid test for atmanirbharta in India in the true sense through the SPM Model which will help realise the vision of the Government of India in the defence manufacturing space and should, therefore, be taken to its natural conclusion.

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1. “DAC Approval for Indigenous Construction of Six Project 75(I) Submarines Under Strategic Partnership Model”,Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 31 January 2019.
2. “Expression of Interest For Six P 75(i) Submarines for Indian Navy”,Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 20 June 2019.
3. “Defence Acquisition Council, Chaired by Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh, Approves Several Procurement Proposals to Boost ‘Make in India’”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 21 January 2020; See also Rajat Pandit, “Centre Shortlists Two Firms for Rs 50,000 crore Stealth Sub Contract”,The Times of India, 22 January 2020.
4. “MoD Issues RFP for Construction of Six P-75(I) Submarines for Indian Navy”,Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 20 July 2021.
5. “France’s Naval Group Pulls Out of India’s P-75I Submarine Project Ahead of PM Modi’s Visit”,The Hindu, 4 May 2022.
6. Dinakar Peri, “Terms of Indian Navy’s Mega Submarine Deal Unrealistic: Russian Official”,The Hindu, 15 August 2022.
7. Mayank Singh, “Delays Dog Indian Navy’s High-tech Submarine Plan”,The New Indian Express, 18 December 2022; Manu Pubby, “Indian Navy’s P75I Submarine Programme in Troubled Waters”, The Times of India, 2 December 2022.
8. Raunak Kunde, “South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean Withdraws from India’s Project 75(I) Submarine Tender”,Indian Defence Research Wing (IDRW), 14 August 2023; Manish Kumar Jha, “After Hanwha’s K-9 Vajra, Submarines are the Potential Area to Collaborate with India, Says Kim Dae-Young, EVP”, Financial Express, 28 June 2023.
9. “thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited Express their Intention to Build Submarines for and in India”,thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, 7 June 2023.
10. Ritu Sharma, “Germany Offers ‘Bigger’ 214 Version of HDW-Class Submarines to Indian Navy to Counter Pakistan, China”,The Eurasian Times, 19 November 2023.
11. “thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited Sign Contract for Overhaul and Modernization of Indian Submarine INS Shankush”, thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, 27 July 2023.
12. Rajat Pandit, “Clear Political Will in Berlin Now to Boost Defence Ties with India: German Envoy”,The Times of India, 4 March 2024.
13. Ibid.
14. Ajai Shukla, “L&T, Navantia Sign Teaming Deal for Project 75(I) Submarines at Rs 43K cr”,Business Standard, 10 July 2023.
15. “Defence Secretary & Spanish Secretary of State for Defence Meet in New Delhi; Focus on Defence Industrial Cooperation”,Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 8 March 2024.
16. Rezaul H. Laskar, “India a Very Relevant Player for Indo-Pacific Security: Spain’s Teresa Ribera”,Hindustan Times, 8 February 2024.
17. “Report of the Task Force on Selecting Strategic Partners”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, December 2015.
18. Prasanna Karthik, “India’s Strategic Partnership Policy is Counter-productive in its Current Form”,Observer Research Foundation, 8 June 2020.
19. “Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, p. 481.
20. Dinakar Peri, “SAAB Seeks Clarity on Strategic Partnership Model”,The Hindu, 23 September 2020.
21. Manu Pubby, “Keep Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd Out of Naval Helicopter Plan, Private Companies Tell Govt”,The Economic Times, 14 July 2020.
22. Snehesh Alex Philip, “Naval Utility Chopper, Light Tanks on 3rd List of Items India Will Stop Importing”,The Print, 7 April 2022.
23. “DAC Approval for Indigenous Construction of Six Project 75(I) Submarines Under Strategic Partnership model”,no. 1.

Courtesy: https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/P75-1-Submarines-and-Strategic-Partnership-Model-sksingh-sscrajiv-280324

India can easily retort by showing the mirror to the US, Germany and others about the problems these countries face at home. But there is nothing to be gained by resorting to polemics with countries we consider as friends and partners

Western countries have dominated the rest of the world for centuries. This has ingrained in them some pernicious habits of lecturing the non-Western world, assuming superior moral positions, imposing their own ways of thinking on them, expecting them to accept their political, economic and social models, and so on.

The West still dominates global institutions established after World War II. The Western countries are the richest, the most advanced in technology, the strongest militarily, and they control the international media. This gives them the tools to exert power over the non-Western world, intervene militarily to oust governments or even change the maps of countries, employ the tools of sanctions to coerce others to fall in line with their policies, intervene in the internal affairs of other countries on grounds of promotion of human rights, democracy and protection of minorities.

The dominant Western powers have lost the capacity to introspect about the deficiencies in their own polities and societies, the glaring double standards that animate their external policies and the willingness to discard their “values based” foreign policies if they clash with their parochial national interests.

Lately, of course, the challenge to the power of the West has grown. The biggest challenge has come from China, a country that Western capital built up on the assumption it could be co-opted in the West-dominated international system. China’s huge store of cheap labour and its massive market drove the West’s investment in China, trade with it and use of the country as an export base. Its authoritarian government provided the assurance that they could do business and invest without having to worry about trade unions, rights of workers, strikes, questioning by local interests, and the like.

It was a win-win formula which the Chinese now repeat on every occasion to promote cooperation with the West in the face of moves by Western governments to reduce over dependence on China. China’s mercantilist policies, its unfair trade practices, forced technology transfers, the systematic control over critical raw materials and technologies that China has acquired through state controlled industrial policies has created a backlash. More than that, it is China’s open challenge to the dominating power of the US in the international system that has led to the West seeking to “re-shore” manufacturing, pursue “de-risking strategies”, questioning globalisation and imposing restrictions on technology transfer to China, and so on.

Relations between the West and Russia have collapsed over the Ukraine conflict, although it was clear for some time that treating Russia as a security threat, seeking democratisation of Russia before it could be considered a worthy partner of the West, accusing it of human rights violations, promoting colour revolutions in Russia’s periphery to instigate a similar revolution in Russia, portended a break-down of the West’s ties with Moscow.

Unlike in the case of China, the West, led by the US has intervened in Russia’s internal affairs, promoting select opposition leaders, as in the case of Navalny, to put pressure on President Putin internally.

The West’s international agenda of promoting democracy, protecting minorities, highlighting human rights violations, and markets, and so on, has not been limited to what it calls “authoritarian” regimes. It is extended to even friendly democracies like India.

Ever since Prime Minister Modi has come to power, even as the West has engaged India and built productive ties, it has not been able to shed its ingrained patronising habits of lecturing India, accusing it of violating human rights, democratic backsliding, persecution of minorities, and so on. This is largely done by the mainstream press, the think tanks and their associated journals, academics, NGOs, etc. At the official level, the US State Department in its annual report on human rights at the global level highlights violations of human rights in India. Other than this, quite often the State Department comments on sporadic incidents in India of communal tensions, rioting, and legislation seen as anti-minority such as the CAA, etc.

The latest provocation comes from Germany which gratuitously commented on the arrest of Kejriwal by the ED, patronisingly asking for the standards relating to independence of judiciary and basic democratic principles to be applied to his case, and for him to get a fair and impartial trial and make use of all available legal avenues without restriction as well. This implies that all this may not be available in the normal course. This is a presumptuous statement that calls into question India’s political and legal system. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) summoned the German Deputy Chief of Mission to lodge a strong protest which was made public.

The US State Department then jumped into the fray by also patronisingly “encouraging” a fair and transparent trial of Kejriwal by India. This was in response to an emailed question, which suggested that the US was keen to quickly back its ally Germany, ignoring that India had already made public its strong displeasure to Germany for interfering in our judicial process etc. The State Department showed scant regard for India’s legitimate annoyance at Germany’s unwarranted interference in our internal affairs.

If India had ignored the offensive remark by the US, it would have meant that we had one standard for Germany and another for the US, which is why for the same provocation a senior US diplomat was called in by the MEA for a protest. Surprisingly, the US State Department instead of backing off as Germany has done, doubled down on its earlier intrusive comment by not only calling for a fair and transparent trial of Kejriwal but also added the issue of hampering electioneering by the Congress party by the closure of its bank accounts.

The State Department was fully aware that by its comments it was supporting the opposition parties in the run up to the elections, which made its interference openly politically partisan. It is now widely accepted that Modi and the BJP will come back to power in the coming elections. Normally any country would not like to create a misunderstanding with a leadership likely to come to power by showing support for the opposition. This is standard book diplomacy. Yet, the State Department has not hesitated to show that they have special interest in Kejriwal and the Congress party.

A concerted campaign against India has been set in motion by foreign lobbies in connivance with lobbies in India after the Kejriwal arrest. The Economist and Le Monde Diplomatique of France have questioned in their latest issues the direction the Indian democracy is taking. India can easily retort by showing the mirror to the US, Germany and others about the problems these countries face at home with regard to treatment of minorities, rise of right wing forces, media restrictions (access to Russian media is banned), and general recourse to double standards in their external policies. The judiciary in the US is highly politicised. The efforts being made to legally hound Trump and prevent him from fighting the presidential election is there to see. The US is very watchful and intolerant about foreign interference in its election process.

But there is nothing to be gained by resorting to polemics with countries we consider as friends and partners. The need is to build trust, not undermine it. We respect their democracies and leave their leadership to deal with internal problems. We have no desire to give lessons to them. We expect them to also follow this sensible and friendly course, especially as India is managing, without any historical parallel, the most populous democracy in the world with its incomparable diversity and centuries of external exploitation.

Courtesy: https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/uncle-sam-fellow-democracies-should-be-respected-and-not-scorned-13754313.html

During the annual ‘Two Meetings’ in Beijing, it was announced that China’s defence budget for 2024 would be $231.36 billion, an increase of 7.2 per cent from the previous year (about thrice the size of the Indian defence budget); it is a large increase, especially when one knows that official figures are only a fraction of the actual spending by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Li Jie, a Beijing-based naval expert, told the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece The Global Times: “By 2027, the Chinese military will have the ability to effectively deal with threats brought by hegemonism and power politics in the western Pacific region, including issues relating to the Taiwan question and the South China Sea, as well as border tensions between China and India.”

It is clear that the increase in the Chinese budget is targeting not only Taiwan, the ‘rebel island’, but also India.

In these circumstances, it is necessary for Delhi to think ‘out of the box’.

One of the many alternatives is to supplement military preparedness with ‘Historical Warfare’; this would not cost much to the exchequer and would help refocus and motivate the defence forces on the border.

It would also put the boundary question in its proper historical perspective; for millennia, Northern India has been contiguous to Tibet, an independent nation till the end of the 1950s, not to China; the same is true for Eastern Turkestan (now called Xinjiang).

In this context, I recently became acquainted with the fascinating life of Mahapandita Rahul Sankrityayan, one of the greatest Indian scholars who wrote some 130 books.

He was a great wandering scholar, spending 45 years of his life away from home on Asian and Western roads.

Rahul Ji, as he was known by his followers, was born Kedarnath Pandey to an Orthodox Hindu Brahmin family in Pandha village of Azamgarh district in Uttar Pradesh on April 9, 1893. He was the eldest child of six siblings. Though he only received a formal education up to grade eight (in Urdu language in his village), Sankrityayan later mastered some 34 languages.

His maternal grandfather, Ram Sharan Pathak, an ex-soldier, with his innumerable tales of valour and adventure, planted the seed of love for travelling in him; already at the age of 9, he ran away from home ‘to see the world’ and only after having visited Calcutta and Varanasi did he return to complete his middle school.

One of his biographers wrote: “Sankrityayan’s life, work, and ideas were steeped in and spread through many cultures, disciplines, and geographies. Born in a Sanatani Brahmin family, he lived variously the life of a Vaishnava sadhu, an Arya Samaji polemicist, a Buddhist monk, an antiquarian and scholar of Buddhism, a political activist jailed for anti-colonial speeches (1920 and 1923–1925) and beaten up by the henchmen of landlords in a peasant movement in Bihar (1939), a self-professed communist, a progressive writer, a novelist, a historian, a biographer, a language activist, a linguist, lexicographer, and so forth.”

Sankrityayan indeed lived multiple lives in one, always ready to change his worldview while remaining profoundly human.

From 1914 till 1930, he lived as a Vaishnava sannyasi; in 1939, Rahul Ji converted to Buddhism; this did not stop him from participating in the freedom movement, and between the years 1936 and 1944, he was actively involved in the peasant movement. During this period, he spent 29 months in jail (1940–42) for being a member of the Communist Party of India.

When free, he extensively travelled to Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, the Far East, Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Western Europe.

Sankrityayan’s four visits to Tibet are fascinating as they are a vibrant proof of the century-old linkages between India and Tibet (a fact denied by Communist China today) and a proof that Tibet is truly a child of Indian civilisation (as the Dalai Lama likes to put it).

It is important in the present tense context of Sino-Indian relations to not forget this.

During his trips to Tibet, this polymath managed to bring back to their land of origin some 1,619 valuable manuscripts and thankha paintings; he employed 16 mules to bring the precious loads to Bihar, where they are today kept in a special section of the Patna Museum.

In Tibet, Rahul Ji met his Tibetan ‘counterpart’, probably the greatest Tibetan scholar of the first part of the 20th century, Gendun Choepel. Rahul Ji called him ‘Geshe’ (‘Kalyanamitra’ in Sanskrit) or ‘Brother in the Dharma’. In Tibet, Geshe denoted a high degree of knowledge and was equivalent to a PhD in Buddhist studies.

The Mahapandita recounted: “My first meeting with Geshe took place in Lhasa. He was a disciple of Geshe Sherab, the most learned pandit of Drepung, the largest monastery in Tibet. Geshe Sherab was an authority on philosophy; thus, his disciple would also be a student of the same subject.”

However, Gedun was not only a student of philosophy; he was also a poet and had mastered traditional and modern Tibetan painting: “As a talented artist, he could live a comfortable life in Lhasa. However, Geshe never aspired to a comfortable life.”

Like Rahul Ji, Gedun was a wanderer, an adventurer, with an insatiable thirst for knowledge, always wanting to acquire more knowledge.

Sankrityayan recalled: “[In 1934> I realised that his depth of classical learning combined with his artistic background would be invaluable to me in the search for ancient MSS [manuscripts>… On his part, he wanted to accompany me to India and see and learn more. We became friends from that time onwards.”

Thus started the search for the lost manuscripts of Nalanda and the other great viharas of Northern India; the two pandits wanted to rediscover the centuries-old linkage between India and Tibet.

They first visited the ancient monasteries north of Lhasa, then they went to Reting monastery, established in the 11th century: “Tibet has a scanty rainfall, and at the time of our arrival, richly painted thangkas had been hung out for an airing. Geshe’s heart leapt at the sight. They were of Indian workmanship, and it is also possible that they had been brought from India.” They copied them.

In his memoirs, Rahul Ji noted: “My Tibetan journeys were a combination of bitter-sweet experiences—the bitterness as extreme as the sweet. Sometimes, animals to carry us and our goods were as readily provided as a householder’s hospitality. Sometimes, though we ourselves were willing to walk, we could not hire porters, and it was difficult to get a yard of space to rest ourselves.”

His following visit to Tibet was a great success: “I saw many dozens of ancient Sanskrit MMS. I was able to photograph many of them and copy down many by hand.”

The day of May 25, 1936, was memorable: “We were informed by Dolma Phodrang [one of the temples in Sakya monastery that they had received the key to Chakpe Lhakhang… I had very little expectation that I would find a Sanskrit manuscript there. After arriving, I turned to the left and found the first stockroom. The door and doorframe seemed centuries old. Who knows how many years of dust must have been collected? On one occasion, dust spread so profusely that the whole stockroom was blanketed as if in smoke.”

The Mahapandita continued his exploration: “We waited a little and then moved in. There was also enough dust on the floor to make footprints. We found hundreds of scriptures there, some wrapped in cloth, while others had been left uncovered. Among them, we found scriptures as old as seven and eight hundred years. These were the texts that had been written and read by great ancient Tibetan masters and scholars. They were precious jewels of Tibetan literature and history.” They had found the lost manuscripts.

Rahul Ji continued to explore the room: “I was searching for palm leaf manuscripts in Sanskrit. After browsing here and there, I found one which was not wrapped in cloth. One, two, three, four… I found twenty manuscripts in all. I opened one and began to look at it. I was overjoyed.”

This discovery symbolises the age-old relationship between Tibet and India.

Today, it is important to remember these ancient linkages (there are many others), which bear testimony to the deep connections between the people of India and Tibet.

If these connections could be revived in any way, it could completely change the perspective of the conflict with China and Beijing’s erroneous narrative for the border ‘dispute’. In the meantime, Beijing should be reminded that Tibet has been (and is still geographically) India’s northern neighbour.

And real heroes like Mahapandita or Geshe should not be forgotten; on the contrary, they should be honoured, and a young generation of historians should be encouraged to boldly follow in the footsteps of the wandering scholars.

Courtesy: https://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2024/03/rahul-sankrityayans-tibet-connect.html