During a discussion of these recommendations by the Defence Committee, Prime Minister Nehru urged that the occupation of Domel was important and told the Army Chief to consider sending a force to at least destroy the bridge there. Before committing himself, the Army Chief wanted to consult Russell. The latter was all for an advance towards Domel but in the report that he submitted he laid down a pre-requisite for such a move. The pre-requisite was pulling out troops from Punch. According to him; the Indian Army could regain the initiative by these means, and then tackle the enemy at Uri. After driving him from there, Indian troops could follow up with a dash to Domel before he had had the time to recover.
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The essence of Russell’s plan was the evacuation of Punch. The fall of Mirpur, however, brought about a drastic change in the situation. The state forces troops holding the town had managed to withdraw with a large number of refugees. The latter brought reports of non-Muslim girls having been raped and of others having been sold in the market like slaves. This brought public opinion in India to boiling point; and Nehru was considerably upset. He did not want Punch to suffer the fate of Mirpur and ordered that it must be held at all costs. At the same time, reinforcements were ordered to Jammu. This political decision was to have far-reaching effects in the future.
The biggest nuisance to the garrison and the townspeople was the frequent mortaring they were subjected to. Only heavy mortars or howitzers could silence the enemy mortars.
Brigadier Pritam Singh,20 who had marched into Punch at the head of 1 (Para) Kumaon on 21 November, showed what a determined commander can do even under very adverse conditions. In 1942, after the fall of Singapore, he had escaped from Japanese custody and trekked through enemy-occupied Malaya, Thailand and Burma to reach India. This needed a good deal of courage, grit and resourcefulness. These qualities, the mark of a good leader, won him the Military Cross. Now, as Commander Punch Garrison, he brought into play the same qualities. In Punch about 3,000 of the hostiles were holding the heights around the town. Soon after Sen’s return to Uri, the tribesmen had occupied the Haji Pir Pass, cutting off Punch from the North. The Southern exit was already blocked. Thus, the garrison, the townspeople, and the refugees depended entirely on air-drops for their food and other supplies. The only other troops in Punch besides 1 (Para) Kumaon were a few hundred state forces troops belonging to 1 and 8 J&K Infantry. The town was swarming with refugees.
As a first step, Pritam Singh set up his own picquets on the Northern and Southern approaches to the town. To augment his strength, he began to train a local militia. The biggest nuisance to the garrison and the townspeople was the frequent mortaring they were subjected to. Only heavy mortars or howitzers could silence the enemy mortars. Using refugee labour, Pritam Singh built an air-strip and, on 13 December, the Air Force landed a section of 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery (3.7-inch howitzers). With the arrival of the howitzers, the enemy was forced to pull its mortars out of their range. They also enabled Pritam Singh to drive the enemy from some of its strongholds. The air-strip assured supplies to the garrison, and on their return journey the aircraft took back refugees.
The enemy made several attempts to retake Chhamb but was repulsed every time.
Another bright spot on the horizon was the capture of Chhamb by 1 Patiala on 10 December. It was taken after a bold attack, supported by 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, a troop of armoured cars of 7 Light Cavalry, a troop of 11 Field Regiment and a platoon of machine-gunners from 1 Mahar. Two days later, this battalion came under 80 Infantry Brigade, a newly inducted formation which took over the Akhnur-Chhamb sector. Besides 1 Patiala, the new brigade had 4 Rajput, 3 (Royal) Garhwal and 1/9 Gorkha Rilles. The enemy made several attempts to retake Chhamb but was repulsed every time.
The picture in the 50 (Para) Brigade sector was different. Here enemy pressure was much heavier and his immediate objectives were Jhangar and Naoshera both important communication centres. Soon after his return from Kotli, Paranjpe had been evacuated due to an earlier injury sustained while the brigade was at Gurdaspur. His place was taken by Brigadier Mohammed Usman,21 a man of great energy and devotion to duty. Within days of taking over, he mounted an operation to drive the enemy from the strongpoints held North of Naoshera. He also sent out a column to capture Chingas, a village on the road to Rajauri. But the strength at his disposal was inadequate for these tasks, and not much was achieved. The Jhangar garrison comprised 1 (Para) Punjab a platoon of Mahar machine-gunners and four armoured cars from 7 Light Cavalry. besides some ancillaries. The positions that it took up on the approaches to Jhangar could not support each other and the garrison had neither wire nor mines basic requirements in defence.
Jhangar was lost due to unpreparedness and the refusal of those in authority to face the fact that it was Pakistan they were fighting and not the tribals from the Frontier.
The enemy began its probes against Jhangar early in December, and kept the garrison under intermittent fire from mortars and machine guns. By the third week of December, it had established strong positions overlooking the Naoshera-Jhangar road. Even the Naoshera-Akhnur road was not free from interference. Requests for reinforcements brought no results. In fact. there were no reserves in the theatre.
The Indian Emergency Committee was against committing any more troops in Jammu & Kashmir. It had to think of other possibilities. There was the 1,700-kilometre border with West Pakistan. If the Frontier tribesmen and ‘volunteers’ from West Punjab could swarm into Jammu & Kashmir in thousands, they could also descend into the plains of East Punjab or debouch further South into Rajasthan and Gujarat. The state of Hyderabad had refused to accede to India and a paramilitary communal organization, called Razakars, was causing trouble in the state and along its borders. Any action to bring normalcy in the region would also need troops.
Jhangar was attacked at dawn on 24 December. The enemy had taken care to cut the Jhangar-Naoshera road the previous day at two places, and last-minute attempts by Usman to reinforce Jhangar proved abortive. Wave after wave of yelling tribesmen charged the defences despite the hail of fire that greeted them. The Mahar machine-gunners covered themselves with glory that day. They kept mowing down the enemy till they were overwhelmed and cut to pieces by the infuriated tribesmen.
That some of the commanders had not yet taken full stock of the enemys capabilities was apparent when the newly arrived Marathas were sent on a mission a day after their last company had arrived.
The battle was over by 0800 hours and the survivors made for Naoshera in small parties. Four armoured cars had gone out to escort convoys from and to Jhangar. The enemy ambushed these convoys at the road-blocks. Besides the armoured cars, 79 other vehicles were lost to the enemy. The weapons lost included 17 mortars (2- and 3-inch), 19 machine guns (light and medium) and 70 rifles. The casualties totalled 158, including 5 officers and 2 JCOs. Due to bad weather, the Air Force could not intervene in the battle.
Jhangar was lost due to unpreparedness and the refusal of those in authority to face the fact that it was Pakistan they were fighting and not the tribals from the Frontier. There could be no other explanation for not providing artillery support or basic defence stores, like mines and wire to the Jhangar garrison.
Poor intelligence was another problem faced by the Indian Army—there was hardly any intelligence organization within the theatre. Even Prime Minister Nehru was constrained to remark to the Army Chief that commanders in Kashmir had an amazing lack of information. He suggested co-operation with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s men22 in this regard. With the realization of its shortcomings, the Indian Army now adopted certain measures. Among these was the establishment of an intelligence bureau under the Delhi and East Punjab Command. Another measure was the setting up of administrative Headquarters at Pathankot and Srinagar. Till then only ad hoc arrangements existed for the day-to-day administration. These decisions and their implementation took time. The enemy was not going to wait. In fact, the victory at Jhangar spurred it to greater effort. Russell’s forecast that the enemy was not likely to make large-scale attacks against established garrisons had proved wrong: in the attack on Jhangar, the enemy had used 3,000 men. Russell was to be proved wrong again at Naoshera.
Cariappa was the seniormost Indian officer in the Army. His arrival immediately saw more purpose-oriented decisions being taken at least in the Jammu district.
The enemy reached Naoshera on the evening of 25 December and besieged the garrison. Then, bypassing the town, a number of the enemy went towards Beri Pattan to cut off Naoshera from Jammu. After bringing Naoshera under mortar fire, two attempts were made that night to infiltrate its defences. When these were repulsed, the enemy broke off the engagement and occupied positions commanding the approaches to the town. Its strength between Naoshera and Jhangar was estimated at 5,000; another 2,000-3,000 were reported to be investing the Naoshera-Beri Pattan route.
Towards the end of December, 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry23 joined 50 (Para) Brigade. To enable the brigade to devote itself entirely to the task of driving the enemy from the vicinity of Naoshera, 80 Brigade was also inducted into this sector. The latter would guard the lines of communication. That some of the commanders had not yet taken full stock of the enemy’s capabilities was apparent when the newly arrived Marathas were sent on a mission a day after their last company had arrived. It was risky to send out a newly inducted unit without giving it a chance to shake down. As if this was not enough, the battalion was not provided any artillery support. The mission failed, and the battalion lost seven men, including the commanding officer, who was wounded and evacuated. This reverse emboldened the enemy, and that very day (4 January) it descended upon Naoshera, though only to be chased back with artillery and mortar fire. Two days later, he came again, in much larger numbers. 5,000 men were thrown against Naoshera that day and all the resources of the garrison had to be brought into play to repel the attack.
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Around this time, an important change took place in the command set-up. Due to the ban on the entry of British officers into Kashmir, Russell had been under a severe handicap ever since he took charge of the operations in Jammu & Kashmir. For over two months, he had been directing the operations without being able to visit his forward troops. Such a restriction would be unacceptable to any commander. Russell now suggested to the Government that either an Indian should take over his assignment or the restriction on him should be removed. The ban having been imposed by London, the Indian Government chose to bring Lieutenant General Cariappa from Eastern command to relieve Russell.24 The change-over took place on 20 January.
Nature had been generous to the man who was destined to be the Armys first Indian Commander-in-Chief. Six-feet tall, muscular but slim, he had a remarkable uprightness of bearing that singled him out from others.
A new commander can make a lot of difference to a theatre of operations. Besides the freedom to visit any place in his command, Cariappa enjoyed other advantages over Russell. The latter was a seasoned general and an earnest commander but, as an Indian, Cariappa could identify himself more intimately than Russell could ever do with the cause for which Indian officers and men were shedding their blood in Jammu & Kashmir. Cariappa was the seniormost Indian officer in the Army. His arrival immediately saw more purpose-oriented decisions being taken at least in the Jammu district. There was nothing that he could do for 161 Infantry Brigade group isolated then in the Kashmir Valley, snowbound in deep winter.
Nature had been generous to the man who was destined to be the Army’s first Indian Commander-in-Chief. Six-feet tall, muscular but slim, he had a remarkable uprightness of bearing that singled him out from others. Field Marshal Manekshaw, reminiscing about the period when both were in Delhi – Cariappa as Chief and Manekshaw as Director of Military Operations – told the author: “Wherever he went, there was no doubt that he was the Jangi Lat. . . . When he walked down the corridor, the whole world knew that there was the Army Chief walking down. When he visited any state, any country, they could make out that that was the Army Chief. He gave all of us dignity by the way he carried himself”. The ability to impress those around him is a great asset to any commander.
Within days of assuming command, he began a tour of the forward areas, using an Auster Light Observation Aircraft. One of the first places to claim his attention was Naoshera. With his experienced eye, he at once saw the importance of a feature called Kot. Lying about 8 kilometres North-East of Naoshera, it overlooked the Naoshera Tawi Valley. Cariappa ordered Usman to capture it with all possible speed.Mounted after due preparation, the operation to seize Kot—appropriately codenamed ‘Kipper’25 —was a complete success. Kot and its adjacent positions were held by about 500 of the enemy deserters from the state forces and personnel from the Pakistan Army. Surprise was the keynote of Usman’s plan and about 150 of the enemy were killed. When his men reached the objective, they came upon an officers’ mess with a sumptuous breakfast, laid out but untouched.
The success at Kot, after the Jhangar debacle raised the morale of the Indian troops. But the enemy was chagrined at the loss of this important position. An attack on Naoshera was the only way out. This attack came at dawn on 6 February. The action that followed has been called the biggest battle of the Jammu & Kashmir campaign. The enemy threw in all he had and Usman had to use every weapon and every man to push him back. Estimates of enemy strength used in the assault range between 11,000 and 15,000. Whatever the actual number, it was a well-planned attempt to take the town by sheer weight of numbers. Usman had five battalions at Naoshera (3 [Para] Maratha LI, 1 Rajput, 3 [Para] Rajput, 2/2 Punjab, 1 Patiala)26, one squadron of armoured cars from 7 Light Cavalry and a battery each of field and mountain guns.
The enemy threw in all he had and Usman had to use every weapon and every man to push him back.
Though Usman had received reports that a major attack was in the offing, the enemy was able to achieve complete surprise. During the night of 5/6 February, large numbers of the enemy crawled up vital points unobserved and at first light, four of Naoshera’s picquets were attacked simultaneously. The attacks were well-co-ordinated and were supported by mortar and machine-gun fire. Among the places attacked were Kot and two localities South of Naoshera. The full fury of the attack, however, fell upto Tain Dhar, a feature to the North of Naoshera, held by a company of 1 Rajput. Usman could not reinforce the threatened locality as 3 (Para) Maratha LI, the only reserve with him, had been sent out early that morning on routine road-opening operations. A radio signal was flashed to recall the battalion, but till its return the situation was critical.
Tain Dhar was the vital ground of the defences, being the highest feature in the area. With first light, the Rajputs observed a seething mass of humanity creeping up the ridge. A barrage of fire began. But, in spite of heavy casualties, wave after wave of the enemy kept surging against the defences. At one of No. 2 picquet’s posts, three waves of the enemy were stopped on the barbed wire. Some of the attackers however managed to get through, and reaching the ‘sangar’ grabbed the Bren gun on the picquet. By then, of the 27 men on the picquet, 24 were dead or wounded. Of the three survivors, two fell soon after in hand-to-hand fighting. However, the last man did not throw up his hands and kept fighting. Fortunately, a company from 3 (Para) Rajput now reached Tain Dhar and the enemy was thrown back.
Naik Jadunath Singh, won undying fame that morning. He was in command of a section. During the first moments of the assault, he had been hit in the thigh. But when he saw a group of the enemy charging his post, he jumped out of his trench with his light machine gun”¦
Lieutenant Kishen Singh Rathore, who led this company, later received the MVC. A junior leader in Rathore’s company, Naik Jadunath Singh, won undying fame that morning. He was in command of a section. During the first moments of the assault, he had been hit in the thigh. But when he saw a group of the enemy charging his post, he jumped out of his trench with his light machine gun and began to blaze away at the yelling tribesmen, then only 15 yards away. In the face of murderous fire, the enemy retreated in confusion. The battle claimed Jadunath’s life and it was later seen that his body bore eight wounds. The Government acknowledged this non-commissioned officer’s valour with a posthumous award of the PVC.
Another instance of bravery at Tain Dhar must be recorded here. That the act was performed by a non-combatant makes it all the more remarkable. Seeing the peril from the horde of Pathans attacking the picquet, a sweeper picked up the rifle of one of his wounded comrades and fired away at the enemy for all he was worth. When his ammunition gave out, he snatched a sword from the hand of a dying tribal and killed three of the enemy.
The other picquets were also subjected to attack by masses of yelling hostiles. Artillery, mortars and machine guns had a field day engaging them as they came up in an endless stream. The valley was cleared by 1500 hours though fighting continued at Kot throughout the day and the night of 6/7 February. The enemy paid heavily for its senseless attacks. Close upon a thousand dead were counted. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured, though only three prisoners were taken.27 Indian casualties were 33 killed and 102 wounded. Artillery played a dominant role in the defence of Naoshera that day, the 25-pounders and the 3.7-inch howitzers scattering most of the attacks. The Air Force also provided support during the battle, its Dakotas flying three sorties from Jammu.
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Pakistan had dubbed the attacks on Indian territory in Jammu & Kashmir a holy war, a Jehad by Muslims against the infidels. That an Indian Muslim led the defenders of Naoshera was thus a matter of significance. It not only gave the lie to the two-nation theory of Jinnah and his followers, but also turned Usman into a hero overnight.
It is said that after the loss of Jhangar, Usman vowed that he would not sleep on a cot until he had retaken it. In fact, the defeat there rankled in every Indian heart, and preparations now began for retaking it. Operation ‘Vijay’ was the code name given to the plan that Kalwant Singh formulated for the purpose. The enemy was known to have one brigade in the Naoshera-Jhangar area. The defences of Naoshera would also have to be manned while the task force advanced to Jhangar, 26 kilometres away. More troops were thus needed for Operation ‘Vijay’ and the second week of February saw 19 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Yadunath Singh (later Major General Singh mvc), move into Naoshera.20 This formation consisted of 2 Rajputana Rifles, 4 Dogra, 1 Kumaon Rifles, 28 and 37 Assault Field Company. To direct the operation from close quarters, Kalwant Singh moved his tactical Headquarters to Naoshera and Cariappa came over to Jammu with a few of his staff officers.
Pakistan had dubbed the attacks on Indian territory in Jammu & Kashmir a holy war, a Jehad by Muslims against the infidels. That an Indian Muslim led the defenders of Naoshera was thus a matter of significance.
The enemy held strong positions North and South of the route to Jhangar. It also had several hideouts within the valley. Kalwant Singh began by clearing the valley; thereafter, the two brigades attacked and captured enemy strongholds on the approaches to Jhangar. The enemy fought stubbornly before giving up some of these and Indian casualties were considerable, though the enemy suffered more heavily on most occasions. By 8 March, the enemy had been cleared from the environs of Naoshera and the two brigades were ready for the thrust against Jhangar.
Kalwant Singh’s final plan for Operation ‘Vijay’ was that both brigades should advance simultaneously on parallel axes —19 Brigade along the hills on the right of the Naoshera-Jhangar road, and 50 (Para) Brigade on the left of that road ( see Fig. 3.4). At this time, infantry battalions were not allotted to brigades permanently and were regrouped, as required, from one formation to another. Thus, for this operation,50 (Para) Brigade was to consist of 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry, 3 (Para) Rajput, 1 Patiala and one company of 3/1 Punjab; 19 Brigade was to have 1 Rajput (less a company), 4 Dogra and 1 Kumaon. While the two brigades advanced along the hills on both sides of the Naoshera-Jhangar road, an armoured column, consisting of 7 Light Cavalry (less a squadron), a squadron from the Central India Horse and a company from 1 Rajput, was to advance along the road. Artillery support for the operation consisted of two mountain batteries (5 and 7), 30 Field Battery, a troop of 45 Field Battery and a troop of 37 Anti-Tank Battery. About a platoon of Mahar machinegunners was also given to each brigade.
The recapture of Jhangar was of special significance to Usman and 50 (Para) Brigade. In a special order of the day, he made a stirring appeal to the men under his command to ‘retrieve the honour of our arms’. But, when all was ready, rain intervened and unseasonal downpours made the road to Jammu unusable and the track to Jhangar a quagmire.
Indian troops entered Rajauri on the evening of 12 April. The sight that greeted them in and around the town was so gruesome that it killed all jubilation. The enemy had carried out a massacre of non-Muslims and put a torch to all that could be burnt down before making his getaway.
The weather cleared by 14 March and, although the Jhangar track was still slushy and unfit for vehicular traffic, Kalwant Singh ordered the advance to commence. Field artillery could not move and, on the second day out, 50 (Para) Brigade was held up at the Pir Thil Nakka feature after its leading battalion (3 [Para] Maratha LI) had suffered 18 casualties, induding two officers killed. The feature could be taken only on 17 March after field guns had been brought up and, together with the Air Force, they softened up the position. After taking this feature, the brigade reached Susiloti Dhar that day without further opposition.
On the right, 1 Kumaon took Point 3327 and 1 Rajput captured Tangni Dhar on the first day. The next day the Rajputs, with assistance from the Dogras took Darhal Fort. A double thrust by the Dogras and the Kumaonis cleared the Gaikot forest on 17 March. On the following day, the two brigades made a pincer move against Jhangar. But the enemy had meanwhile pulled out, and the commanding heights around Jhangar were taken without opposition. The village itself was entered by the armour and a company of 1 Rajput at 1400 hours.
Leaving Jhangar in the care of 50 (Para) Brigade, 19 Brigade returned to Naoshera after a few days. Cariappa soon had another mission for it—the liberation of Rajauri. Non-Muslims escaping from there had brought reports of inhuman atrocities.
The town of Rajauri lay 48 kilometres North of Naoshera on the old Mughal route to Kashmir. The fair weather road linking the two followed the Tawi River and passed through thickly wooded hills. Many of the hilltops had well-defended ‘sangars’. Halfway to Rajauri was Chingas, an enemy base from which it had been launching its operations against Naoshera.
On the first day of the advance, an enemy mortar bomb had landed in the midst of a sapper platoon. Among the casualties was Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane. Though bleeding heavily he refused to be evacuated.
Kalwant Singh’s plan for the attack on Rajauri provided for diversionary operations by 50 (Para) Brigade and 80 Brigade. While 19 Brigade advanced to Rajauri, these two formations would keep the enemy engaged with limited offensives of their own. The opening move of 19 Brigade was made on 8 April with an attack on the Barwali Ridge by 4 Dogra. This hill, 11 kilometres from Naoshera, was held by enemy troops in uniform, who were equipped with automatics and 3-inch mortars. The Dogras’ attack was supported by artillery and tanks of the Central India Horse, and their flanks were secured by 2 Jat and 2 Rajputana Rifles. The enemy made a spirited stand and it was only after a hard-fought action that Barwali was taken. Thereafter, the advance was conducted on a broad front, the infantry moving along the line of hills on either side of the road, while armour moved along the road. The Kumaonis entered Chingas on the morning of 11 April after taking a feature that overlooked the village.
It had been expected that the enemy would fight hard for Chingas. That it was taken without much trouble was largely due to the dedication shown by the Engineers of 37 Assault Field Company. To enable the tanks to advance, they worked under enemy fire for long hours to clear the road-blocks and mines from their path. On the first day of the advance, an enemy mortar bomb had landed in the midst of a sapper platoon. Among the casualties was Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane. Though bleeding heavily he refused to be evacuated. On 10 April, this officer ‘achieved an almost impossible task when he cleared, single-handed, a formiable road-block of five big pine trees surrounded by mines and covered by machine-gun fire’. For his ‘grim determination and tireless diligence’ in the face of the enemy, Rane received the PVC.
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Indian troops entered Rajauri on the evening of 12 April. The sight that greeted them in and around the town was so gruesome that it killed all jubilation. The enemy had carried out a massacre of non-Muslims and put a torch to all that could be burnt down before making his getaway. Three gaping pits full of corpses were found near the town. The enemy reacted to the success at Rajauri with attacks on Jhangar and Naoshera. Even at Rajauri, 19 Brigade had to mount several small missions to reduce enemy strongholds in the countryside. At Thanna Mandi, North of Rajauri, a local chief, Ali Bahadur by name, proved particularly troublesome and a column with armour had to be sent out to clear the place.
These operations in the South-West liberated hundreds of square kilometres of Indian territory. In the North, too much had been happening. At Uri, the enemy became very aggressive after the successful ambush of Sen’s column on the morning of 21 November 1947. When he hurried back to his Headquarters, he found that large numbers of Pathan tribesmen were collecting in the vicinity of Uri. The enemy was preparing to retake this wayside town where three roads met – the road to Punch, the one to Srinagar, and the road to Domel. Between 22 November and 9 December, the enemy put in no less than 16 attacks on Uri. It speaks well of the garrison that each one of these attacks was repulsed.
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