A battle is the testing ground for a soldier. All the training that he receives from the day he enlists is for this supreme test, when he stakes his dearest possession — his life — against the enemy. Men do not stake their lives to earn medals. Men die for higher things, things they cherish most: their country, their religion, their family or clan. In the Army, the love of the clan is synonymous with love for the battalion or regiment. And there is no scale by which bravery can be measured. It has to be remembered that true bravery is not a ‘heedless and impassioned courage’ of the moment. True valour is measured courage inspired by the sight of the foe which takes ‘command in the midst of danger’. Among the rank and file, the men who deliberately risk their own lives to save their comrades’ certainly deserve a place of honour.
Click to buy: Indian Army After Independence
One such man who gave his life that day was Sepoy Dewan Singh. He was in charge of a light machine gun. The enemy having reached close to the position held by his platoon, there was danger of being overrun and orders to withdraw had been issued. But it was impossible for the men to get away unless the enemy could be held. Quickly realizing that his platoon faced destruction, Dewan Singh stood up and began to blaze away from the hip at the onrushing tribesmen. Several of the enemy fell. This stopped the onrush long enough to enable his platoon to withdraw. But an enemy bullet found its mark and Dewan Singh was hit in the shoulder. In spite of this he did not leave his position and kept engaging the enemy till a machine-gun burst killed him outright. This Kumaoni’s valour saved his platoon; it was recognized with a posthumous award of the MVC. Besides Sharma and Dewan Singh, the company suffered 46 casualties – 20 killed and 26 wounded. Enemy casualties were estimated by some sources at several hundred.
The enemy having reached close to the position held by his platoon, there was danger of being overrun and orders to withdraw had been issued. But it was impossible for the men to get away unless the enemy could be held.
The battle at Badgam caused a great deal of concern in Delhi and on 4 November Sardar Patel paid a visit to Srinagar to study the situation. He made it quite clear to Sen that Srinagar must be defended, and promised to send more troops. Sen was told later that day that by the evening of 7 November, he would be getting substantial reinforcements.13 His immediate task, therefore, was the close defence of Srinagar, for which he needed more troops. Sen decided to pull out the Sikhs from Pattan. Even otherwise, this battalion was in danger of being cut off. After withdrawal from Pattan, the battalion was deployed on the approaches to Srinagar, the main body being placed at milestone 4 on the Bararnula road. A sizeable tribal force followed up and attacked 1 Sikh on the night of 5/6 November. The battalion repulsed the attack, but the pressure against it kept increasing.
An aerial reconnaissance on the morning of 7 November revealed a large concentration of tribesmen between Shalateng and Zainakut, villages West of the Sikhs’ position. They were preparing defences, and a fleet of lorries that had brought them from Bararnula was parked beside the road. Sen now had two options. He could hold the lashkar till the arrival of reinforcements, or take it on that very day. What prompted Sen to attack straightaway was the certainty that once the enemy had had time to dig in, it would be much more difficult to drive him out. The decision resulted in the enemy’s rout.
Besides Sharma and Dewan Singh, the company suffered 46 casualties ““ 20 killed and 26 wounded. Enemy casualties were estimated by some sources at several hundred.
Sen’s plan was simple. He ordered 1 Sikh to keep the lashkar engaged lightly from their position at milestone 4. 1 (Para) Kumaon was at the time deployed near the Rifle Ranges. He ordered it to work its way forward and form up on a canal bank, South-West of the Sikhs, for an attack. 4 Kumaon was now up to strength and he ordered one company from it to secure the forming-up place for 1 (Para) Kumaon; the rest of the battalion was to guard the air-strip.
To Sen’s good luck, a troop of armoured cars of 7 Light Cavalry had reached Srinagar two days earlier by road, crossing the Banihal Pass from Jammu. He had sent two of the armoured cars with a rifle troop that morning on a patrol to Bandipura, North-West of Srinagar. He now ordered the patrol over the radio to forget about the mission to Bandipura and instead make at once for a spot in the rear of the lashkar concentrated at Shalateng. The road from Sumbal would enable the patrol to do this; it met the Srinagar-Baramula road near Shalateng. The Patrol Commander was to keep in touch through radio with Headquarters and inform it as soon as he had reached the allotted position. The assault by 1 (Para) Kumaon was to go in as soon as the armoured cars were ready. Simultaneously, the Sikhs were to attack from the East and the armoured cars from the rear of the enemy.
The effectiveness of the victory was proved by the fact that the enemy made no further serious attempt to get into the Srinagar Valley.
The plan succeeded beyond all expectations. The action commenced around noon and, by 1700 hours, the battle was over. Not used to fighting in the open, the lashkar behaved like a mob. ‘Shot up from three sides, the tribesmen ran pell-mell’. Even the best of troops lose their nerve if attacked from the rear unexpectedly, and the share of this small armoured force in the victory was far beyond its size. To the tribesmen’s bad luck, most of the area over which the action took place had been freshly ploughed and they fell easy victims to the steady fire that poured from three sides. The Air Force too put in its bit, strafing the enemy caught in the open. The day was won with very light Indian casualties although the enemy suffered a crushing defeat, deaths on their side running into hundreds. The survivors ran as fast as their legs could carry them, leaving their lorries standing by the roadside. The effectiveness of the victory was proved by the fact that the enemy made no further serious attempt to get into the Srinagar Valley.
It is interesting to recall that Sen got into hot water for withdrawing the Sikhs from Pattan. When Kalwant Singh visited Sen on 5 November he berated the Brigade Commander for his action. According to Sen (Slender was the Thread), the Kashmiris got so alarmed by the pull-out of the Sikhs, that they sent an urgent appeal to Nehru to remove him from the command of 161 Brigade. Success changed all that: he was now the saviour of Srinagar.
There was no trace of the enemy or the locals when 1 (Para) Kumaon entered the town. But there were plenty of signs of carnage and plunder: unburied bodies, burnt-out shells of houses, and the all-pervading smell of death. The houses were deserted and not a soul stirred.
The Sikhs were entrusted with the pursuit of the fleeing enemy and by 2000 hours they had reoccupied Pattan. Shortage of petrol and the poor condition of the civilian lorries forced a short halt, and the advance was resumed shortly after midnight. Baramula was taken without opposition on the morning of 8 November. There was no trace of the enemy or the locals when 1 (Para) Kumaon entered the town. But there were plenty of signs of carnage and plunder: unburied bodies, burnt-out shells of houses, and the all-pervading smell of death. The houses were deserted and not a soul stirred.
However, after some time, men were seen coming down from the hills surrounding Baramula. They came in ones and twos, but soon their number increased. As they came nearer, they shouted ‘Maharaja Sahib zindabad’. They were under the impression that the state’s forces had retaken Baramula. Soon the crowd spotted Brigadier Sen, who had by then come up and the shouting changed to ‘Sarkar Britannia zindabad’14 – they had taken Sen for a British officer! Someone must have put them wise, for the chant soon changed to ‘Pandit Nehru zindabad’. These simple people had run away from their homes to escape the savagery of the tribesmen. Sudden deliverance left them dazed and confused. But they were happy.
While 161 Brigade was consolidating at Baramula on 9 November, the Air Force flew sorties from Amritsar to attack the enemy line of communication right up to Muzaffarabad. The advance was resumed the next morning with Uri being the next objective. Progress was, however, slow. A short distance from Baramula the road entered the lofty Pir Panjal range, and picquets had to be posted all along the route to guard against ambush. Blown bridges and enemy rear guards also imposed delay. However, the brigade column reached Mahura in time to save the powerhouse there.
The troops in Kashmir were greatly heartened when Prime Minister Nehru paid a visit to the valley on 11 November. He travelled to Baramula in an armoured car of 7 Light Cavalry and saw for himself the shambles there. The townspeople greeted him warmly, and told him of the happenings of 26 October.
| Editor’s Pick |
Uri was taken on 13 November. With its capture, the Srinagar Valley was free from the invader. Domel was Sen’s next objective, but certain developments forced a change of plans. While his brigade was on its way to Uri, he had been ordered to return 1 (Para) Punjab to Srinagar. It was flown from there to Jammu to join 50 Parachute Brigade, its parent formation. While the Infantry Brigade group was driving the invader from the Kashmir Valley, much had happened elsewhere in the state.
As the reader is aware, the J&K state forces got dispersed in penny-packets while dealing with the initial hit-and-run raids. These later grew into set-piece attacks, with machine guns and mortars in support. Pakistani propaganda had been very successful in the border areas of Punch and Mirpur. As a result, the Muslim population in these places rose in revolt against the Maharaja and set up a rebel organization, which called itself the Azad Kashmir Government. The Muslims in the state forces in these areas deserted to the enemy and the so-called Azad Kashmir Force came into existence, led by Pakistani officers and equipped with Pakistani weapons and equipment with the state forces in disarray, a good deal of territory was lost. Several garrisons on the Southern and Western borders of the state were under siege in the later half of October. The only assistance that India could give even after 27 October was air support which ‘amounted to no more than occasional strafing of enemy concentrations and some supply drops’. One by one, the besieged garrisons fell. By 3 November, Bhimbar and Mendhar were in enemy hands. On 9 November, Bagh fell and its garrison withdrew together with non-Muslim refugees to Punch. Rajauri and Rawalkot followed suit; the troops from the latter brought large numbers of refugees with them to Punch. The tribesmen had struck terror in the whole border region and some 30,000 non-Muslims were reported to have been killed, wounded or abducted.15
Politically, the situation was most extraordinary. After the state’s accession to India, the whole of Jammu & Kashmir had become Indian territory, and the attacks from bases in Pakistan were clearly an invasion of one Dominion by another. Pakistan had denied her hand in the happenings in Jammu & Kashmir but independent observers were convinced of her complicity. Many years later, those who had planned and conducted the campaign were to boast of their exploits. In India, it was known early enough that Major General Akbar Khan, who was at the time Director of Weapons and Equipment at Pakistan’s Army Headquarters, had organized the invasion. He conducted the operations under an assumed name, ‘General Tariq’. 16The planners of the invasion had not expected India to react as quickly as she did. The swift airlift upset Jinnah’s apple cart. When the invasion began, he was at Abbotabad and expected to ride in triumph into Kashmir. On hearing of the landing of Indian troops at Srinagar he was furious. General Sir Douglas Gracey was at the time acting as Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief in the temporary absence of General Messervy. Jinnah at once ordered Gracey to send regular troops into Kashmir. This order was sent to him on the night of 27 October through the Military Secretary to the Governor of West Punjab, with whom Jinnah was at the time staying. Gracey replied that he was not prepared to issue such instructions without the approval of the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck.
At Gracey’s request, Auchinleck flew into Lahore the next day and explained to Jinnah the military issues involved. He told him that on account of the state’s accession to India, the latter’s Government had a perfect right to send in troops in response to the Maharaja’s request. He further explained that any intervention by Pakistani troops would amount to an invasion and ‘would involve automatically and immediately the withdrawal of every British officer serving with the newly formed Pakistan Army’. The Pakistan Army at this time was relying more heavily on British officers than the Indian Army. The advice, therefore, had its effect on Jinnah and he cancelled his orders. Thus, a confrontation between the regular forces of India and Pakistan was averted for the time being.17
Thimayya called its Commander, Brigadier (later Major General) Y.S. Paranjpe, and told him to go on a quick reconnaissance to Jammu as he foresaw a role for the brigade in the situation that was developing.
That the tribal invasion was directed and controlled by Pakistan became clear enough when Mountbatten and Nehru met Jinnah in Lahore on 1 November to discuss the Kashmir crisis. The meeting was in response to the latter’s invitation, extended at Auchinleck’s suggestion. At the meeting, Jinnah proposed that both sides should at once withdraw from Kashmir simultaneously. Mountbatten thereupon asked as to how the tribesmen could be forced to pull out. ‘If you do this,’ Jinnah is reported to have replied, ‘I will call the whole thing off’.18
Did the British know of Pakistan’s plans to invade Kashmir? Historian Russell Brines has answered this question in his book The Indo-Pakistani Conflict. “The first movement of the Mahsuds [a frontier tribe] was secret,” he says, “even from British military and civilian advisers, whom the Pakistanis regarded as neutral or hostile to their desire to gain Kashmir”. However, General Sinha, in his book Operation Rescue, says: “We had reliable reports about a British officer, recently transferred to Pakistan, having organized the necessary “base facilities” for the invading tribesmen”. Whether individual British officers in Pakistan’s employ had a hand in organizing the invasion does not have as much significance as the admission by that country’s Governor-General that he controlled it. But the British Government must have had an inkling of Pakistan’s involvement, for instructions were received from London debarring British officers of either Dominion from entry into Jammu & Kashmir.
The logical course was to go for Domel and then push on to Muzaffarabad. This would have secured the main ingress route into Kashmir from Pakistan.
General Lockhart had been Governor of the North-West Frontier Province before his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. It is said that some time before the tribal invasion, General Gracey had told him over the telephone of the preparations for mounting it. Lockhart, somehow, failed to apprise the Indian Government of this development, or to take measures for meeting it. When this fact came to the notice of Prime Minister Nehru, he sent for him and asked to put in his papers. Lockhart was succeeded by General Sir Roy Bucher on 1 January 1948. Even more astonishing is the experience of Major (later Major General) O.S. Kalkat who actually saw the plans of Operation ‘Gulmarg’ at the Pakistani Army Headquarters in early October. After a narrow escape, he managed to reach Delhi by 19 October. His debrief was dismissed by Indian authorities. On 22 October he was vindicated.
The efficiency of the airlift and the speed with which the Indian Army drove the invader from the Srinagar Valley prompted the Pakistanis to make the charge that India had prepared for the operation in advance. The charge is frivolous. No pre-emptive action was taken by India. The only man to think ahead and act was Major General Thimayya. As General Officer Commanding the East Punjab Area, he had been watching with concern the situation in Jammu & Kashmir. 50 (Para) Brigade was at the time at Gurdaspur, employed on internal security duties. Thimayya called its Commander, Brigadier (later Major General) Y.S. Paranjpe, and told him to go on a quick reconnaissance to Jammu as he foresaw a role for the brigade in the situation that was developing. Paranjpe set off with a small party in a couple of jeeps. There was no bridge at the time on the Ravi at Madhopur, and the road beyond was a dirt track. Crossing the river by ferry, this small party pushed on to Jammu. The arrival of paratroopers in their red berets created quite a stir in the town. People came out and surrounded the two jeeps. The Maharaja had just come out of Srinagar and he met Paranjpe in Jammu. Soon after Paranjpe got back to Headquarters, his brigade was ordered to move to Jammu.
The arrival of paratroopers in their red berets created quite a stir in the town. People came out and surrounded the two jeeps.
After the enemy had been temporarily cleared from the Srinagar Valley, the Indian High Command had to decide on the next move. The logical course was to go for Domel and then push on to Muzaffarabad. This would have secured the main ingress route into Kashmir from Pakistan. With the enemy in disarray, the task was not too difficult. But unfortunately, the situation in the Jammu province was fast deteriorating. The beleaguered garrisons of Mirpur, Kotli and Punch were clamouring for relief. Thousands of refugees had taken shelter in these towns; Punch alone was reported to have about 40,000 of them. General Kalwant Singh, who had by then moved JAK force Headquarters to Jammu, was in favour of going to the aid of the besieged garrisons so that the refugees could be evacuated. He accordingly prepared a plan and submitted it to Russell.
Kalwant Singh’s plan envisaged the move of two columns: one from Uri and the other from Jammu (see Fig. 3.3). The Jammu column, consisting of 50 (Para) Brigade Group, would move to Kotli and then to Mirpur by way of Akhnur, Beri Pattan, Naoshera and Jhangar, clearing the area of hostiles en route. He fixed 20 November as the deadline for the relief of Mirpur. The Uri column would comprise two battalions from 161 Brigade and some ancillaries. It would advance from Uri on 18 November, reach Punch the same day, and then push a small body further South to link up with 50 (Para) Brigade at Kotli. After reinforcing the garrison at Punch with one battalion, the rest of the column was to return to Uri. By this time, 268 Infantry Brigade had arrived in Jammu with two infantry battalions: 1 Madras and 1 Patiala. This brigade was to relieve 50 (Para) Brigade of its commitments on the line of communication.
The tribesmen ambushed it on the morning of 21 November, near milestone 7 out of Uri. 24 lorries, carrying the columns rations, ammunition and equipment were looted and thereafter burnt. Of the two platoons that formed the rearguard, 16 men were killed and 14 wounded.
Punch was the capital of a feudatory raja of the Kashmir Durbar. The town lay in a triangular valley at the confluence of the Betar Nulla and the Punch River. It was 48 kilometres from Uri and was connected to it by a fair weather road. About halfway from Uri, the road crossed the Pir Panjal range at the Haji Pir Pass (2,636 metres). This pass held the key to Punch from the North.
Kalwant Singh had forbidden any reconnaissance of the Uri-Punch road so as not to give away the surprise element for the link-up operation. Unfortunately, the road was in bad shape and the Uri column, starting two days behind schedule on 20 November, had to proceed at a very slow pace. Its rearguard was badly mauled. The tribesmen ambushed it on the morning of 21 November, near milestone 7 out of Uri. 24 lorries, carrying the column’s rations, ammunition and equipment were looted and thereafter burnt. Of the two platoons that formed the rearguard, 16 men were killed and 14 wounded.
An ironical misfortune awaited the main body of the column too. The state force garrison in Punch did not know of the column’s despatch from Uri. A detachment of the garrison was holding a wooden bridge on the Betar Nulla,16 kilometres North of the town, on the Uri road. On the night of 20 November, when the vanguard of the Uri column descended from the Haji Pir Pass, with vehicle lights on, the troops took it for a Pakistani force, destroyed the bridge and made for Punch. Brigadier Sen was in command of the column. With the bridge gone, all he could do was to send 1 (Para) Kumaon on foot into Punch with a few jeeps, which were lowered to the dry nulla bed with the help of winches.
| Editor’s Pick |
Sen knew that no link-up was now possible. He placed Lieutenant Colonel Pritam Singh, Commanding Officer of the Kumaonis as the Punch Garrison Commander. The State Forces Commander was senior to Pritam Singh, but he accepted this arrangement without complaint. Either way this command anomaly was solved by granting Pritam Singh the local rank of Brigadier. Pritam Singh and his garrison held out against all odds for exactly one year. Sen now hurried back to Uri to sort out the situation created by the ambush.
The Jammu column set out on 16 November. Reaching Beri Pattan that afternoon, it found its path blocked. The enemy had burnt the ferry there, and it took 24 hours to build a temporary causeway. When the advance was resumed, another obstacle on the far bank barred the way: a road-block with a large civilian lorry, full of dead Hindus and Sikhs. They had been butchered and their belongings looted.
There was a pause in the operations after Kotli was abandoned. Till then ad hoc missions had been undertaken as and when the situation demanded.
No serious opposition was encountered up to Jhangar, though progress was slow owing to numerous road-blocks with felled trees, boulders and demolished culverts. At Jhangar, two companies of 3/1 Punjab19 joined the brigade. The road to Kotli now passed through mountainous country, where it was easy for a few men to hold up the whole column. Three kilometres North of Dungi, the brigade was held up for two days while armoured cars and field guns pounded enemy positions. There was also a sharp encounter on the Ban River, at the outskirts of Kotli, where the enemy had partly destroyed the bridge and placed a 3-inch mortar and automatics to cover the rest of it.
Kotli had been under siege for some weeks, and there was great jubilation among its people when Brigadier Paranjpe entered the town on 26 November. But the joy was short-lived for by evening came the news that Mirpur had fallen. With Mirpur in enemy hands, Kotli could no longer be held and the town was abandoned two days after its relief. 15,000 refugees had taken shelter in Kotli before the siege began. Taking them along, the brigade column made its way back to Jhangar, and the rest of the brigade returned to Naoshera. The link-up, a controversial military decision to begin with, failed in its entirety.
| Also read: |
There was a pause in the operations after Kotli was abandoned. Till then ad hoc missions had been undertaken as and when the situation demanded. Now, a stock-taking was ordered with a view to planning for the future. In an appreciation made about this time, Russell stated that the enemy, estimated at about 20,000 men and led by ex-officers, could move in motor transport along roads leading from the tribal territory and West Punjab right into the state’s territory. Russell thought that the enemy would not again try conventional Army tactics and would move along roads and valleys en masse, thus providing a good target to Indian forces. Large-scale attacks against established garrisons were considered unlikely and it was thought that the enemy would take revenge by striking against places in the Punch, Mirpur and Uri areas, where the terrain suited irregular tactics.
According to him, there were two alternatives for India: station sufficient troops to keep the raiders out or abandon Punch so as to cut down commitments. Induction of more troops would create maintenance difficulties especially in the isolated Kashmir Valley in winter. At the same time, it was realized that abandonment of Punch would give the enemy a base from which it could launch attacks against the Uri sector as well as Jammu. Russell’s recommendation was to restrict the tasks in Jammu & Kashmir to those already laid down by the Government. The Joint Planning staff also endorsed these views. It recommended that the district of Jammu and Kashmir Valley should be strongly held, and from these bases self-contained fighting groups should exploit any opportunities that came along. Military action West and South of Uri and North of Naoshera was to be confined to vigorous patrolling and commando missions.
Please wait...
