- Negotiations with the parties of the Northern Alliance and the different elements of the Pashtuns, which appear to be underway, would have to be completed.
- Simultaneously, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) would have to be redeployed to meet the new imperatives. Specific bases to meet the entire gamut of military contingencies would have to be earmarked and provided appropriate staying power and the wherewithal to carry out punitive action when deemed necessary.
- Pakistan will react violently. Though Pakistan is not a failed state, it is a “failed economy.” The economic straits it’s in makes it highly dependent on Western beneficence to avoid a total economic collapse. Nevertheless, it will fight to maintain its territorial integrity.
- Therefore, the U.S. will have to launch an immediate counter-proliferation operation and defang the limited nuclear strategic capabilities in Pakistan even before launching its Balkanisation strategy. The problem will be to neutralise the nuclear warheads and allied strategic support systems located in Baltitistan and protected by the Chinese military.
The primary focus of the U.S. coalition would have to shift from military operations to creating a meaningful economy and infrastructure in both the northern and southern portions of Afghanistan.
- Air bases in the central Asian republics, and even India, would have to be acquired to replace the primary and secondary airbases in Pakistan.
- Similarly, a Naval base on the west coast of India would become an imperative to replace the assets of Karachi port. Depending on how the Washington–Tehran equation plays out, the ideal alternative would be the Indian-built Iranian port of Chahbhar, which also links to Afghanistan by an Indian-built land route.
- The negotiated arrangements with Russia and the central Asian republics will have to be bolstered to ensure that the additional logistics load created compensates for the loss of a secure landline of communications through Pakistan.
- The U.S. and its coalition allies must simultaneously start negotiating with other regional and global powers for the political recognition of Pashtunistan and the northern areas. For the success of this strategy, the U.S. and NATO will necessarily have to make some compromises with at least Russia to grant recognition to the newly created states. While possible doable options are discernible, it would not be right to try and second-guess the concerned powers.
- For India, the problems are less complex. The Northern Alliance is a traditional ally, whereas there is a requirement to assess the ways and means of securing India’s assets in Pashtunistan. Special attention will have to be paid to the inroads India has made with the Taliban in Afghanistan to ensure continued or even enhanced presence in the newly delineated Pashtunistan. This will require some quick-footed diplomacy to grant recognition to that state. The same would be applicable to the state created for the Northern Alliance.
- For this strategy to succeed, the U.S. coalition will need to guarantee the territorial integrity of both states it creates. That will require advance military planning, and deployment largely dependent on massive air support would be a prerequisite.
- The primary focus of the U.S. coalition would have to shift from military operations to creating a meaningful economy and infrastructure in both the northern and southern portions of Afghanistan.
Finally, one cannot but be concerned with the opium economy from which the Western alliance benefits and the concerns of Beijing that can be expected to strongly defend the economic inroads into the economic benefits it has acquired in Afghanistan. That is a matter for analysis by those in the government who have full access to both these occurrences in Afghanistan.
A Hypothetical Methodology to Operationalise Contingency
- Design the ongoing negotiations with the various Taliban-predominated Pashtun tribes to give warlords control of their traditional fiefdom and offer material assistance to each for local development in preparation to withdrawing combat troops.
“¦one cannot but be concerned with the opium economy from which the Western alliance benefits and the concerns of Beijing that can be expected to strongly defend the economic inroads into the economic benefits it has acquired in Afghanistan.
- Set up a two-tier network of garrisons capable of withstanding attacks and launching punitive action if required, along the line dividing northern Afghanistan from the Pashtun-dominated south.
- Discontinue ground combat operations in southern Afghanistan and dominate by air a la September–December 2001.
- Redeploy units of the ANA comprising non-Pashtun tribesmen to the north.
- Establish autonomous diplomatic structures and systems in Kabul and Kandhar for northern and southern Afghanistan, respectively. Centralise Pashtun political headquarters in Kandhar.
- Launch counter-proliferation operations into Pakistan to coincide with ground and air operations in FATA and NWFP.
- Offer Pashtuns an autonomous homeland along the line dividing the northern part of Afghanistan from the southwestern part, in keeping with traditional post-partition claims.
- Under the aegis of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, provide socio-economic and infrastructural support once the situation stabilises.
- Simultaneously, boost military, political, socio-economic and infrastructure reconstruction to the northern areas.
- Use air power and armed drones extensively in punitive mode where elements of Pashtunistan ingress into the north.
How the U.S. deals with the Balochis is any one’s guess as this involves reconfiguring the Afghan–Pakistan–Iran triangle. It is safe to assume that they would be excluded from Pashtunistan in the long run.
Conclusion
The U.S. is on the cusp of the run-up to the presidential elections due in 2012. That generates unusual political pressures that constrain the decision-making process of the incumbent in Washington. The rough edges affecting domestic and economic policies gain precedence over ongoing foreign policy schemes.
Washington would be forced to downsize its arrangements with Pakistan, which is hosting the American nemesis””al-Qaeda””and using massive air power to secure the southern parts of the negotiated Pashtunistan.
The United States’ “War against Terror” is at precarious crossroads. The exit strategy in Iraq is wavering; the war in Afghanistan has reached a no-win situation, and public opinion at home is steadily growing in favour of disengagement of military forces; instead, Obama, against the advice of the Pentagon, has committed his overstretched military to yet another war in Libya; the U.S. economy is faltering, and unemployment is at an all-time high, at near 12 per cent; the “reset” button with Russia is under fire; the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has taken an unprecedented toll, threatening a debilitating economy and environment even further; Somalian terrorists have expanded their war to Uganda, drawing the U.S. with it; Israel is nixing U.S. attempts to broker a Middle East peace plan and is dragging Washington into exercising the military option to eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme; North Korea has successfully frustrated the Obama administration’s nonproliferation initiatives; the U.S.–Japan military pact for basing facilities is under strain; the enormity of the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, has given rise to unforeseen consequences for the U.S. security strategy in support of its allies along the Pacific Rim; and China is a major economic and strategic headache. Something has to give to reduce the pressure on Washington’s capability to manage its strategic policies.
The flailing war in Afghanistan is unpopular at home; the outlay is disproportionately excessive, imposing a prohibitive penalty on the economy; and last but not the least, the loss of American lives carries unsustainable political consequences, more so with Obama’s unfulfilled election promise to bring the troops home.
The U.S. administration has already spelt out the objective of the ongoing war in Afghanistan through a white paper, affirming that the “core goal of the US must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan”¦
The Afghan War could be the much-needed pressure-release valve, provided Washington can come up with a face-saving “exit strategy,” for the besieged administration.
An abrupt end to the unfinished war can only be brought about by a major change in course. The only option is to design the ongoing negotiations with the disparate Pashtun entities to recognise a separate homeland for them in the form of Pashtunistan, an independent state for the Northern Alliance, and meaningful corrections to the distortions in the overall U.S. strategy to shift the centre of gravity of its strategic imperatives and focus of its military policies from Europe to Asia. The sanctity and viability of these two states would have to be guaranteed, for which both would have to guarantee base facilities for U.S. and residual NATO military forces.
Please wait...
