Indian Defence Review

IDR think-tank war-gamed and published in July 1989 the anticipated course of action by Pakistan in Kashmir under the title OP TOPAC.. This came true in the subsequent years!. We reproduce this war gaming done by IDR , in original that was published in the issue of July 89 to show that New Delhi despite the warning by IDR Team,did not take counter measures and allowed the situation to deteriorate. – Editor

Operation Topac was named after Amru. an Inca Prince who fought an unconventional war against Spanish rule in eighteenth-century Uruguay.

Intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of militant Kashmiri youth had sneaked back into the valley after receiving training in guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities in POK.

The aim of ‘OP TOPAC’ is to draw attention of the free-thinker, policy-maker and the defence planner to the dangerous potential of the current developments in Jammu & Kashmir. Part fact, part fiction, the scenarios visualized have been based on the trends, which have become manifest in the subcontinent in the last few years.

Situation in Jammu & Kashmir in 1988-89

In the higher reaches of Jammu & Kashmir heavy snows generally commence in October and the falls carry on till May. However, thaw sets in on lower heights in April. This prolonged winter season results in disruption of surface communications and closure of passes for a period of almost six months. During this period the valley of Kashmir wears a thick mantle of white and remains largely isolated from the rest of the country. Air services also become irregular due to thick clouds over the valley and frequent heavy falls. The only winter route via National Highway lA which enters the valley through Jawahar Tunnel is also frequently disrupted during the period due to heavy accumulation of snow in the areas of Batot-Patni Top, Banihal Tunnel and Qazigund. Numerous landslides on lower heights along the river valleys cause further problems by blocking the road and hurtling down small bridges and culverts into deep ravine beds. Traditionally, mainly due to these conditions, the Jammu & Kashmir Government moves to Jammu for winter every year. This year winter was several over Northern India and snowfall was heavy in the Himalaya so in Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. The snows started melting as usual in April on the southern face of the Pir panjal Range but within the valley neither the Pir Panjal, Kazinag, Shamsabari, or the high ranges connecting Pir Panjal to the Greater Himalayan Range, showed any signs of early thaw. It was apparent that the ‘gallies’ and passes across Pir Panjal and Shamsabari Range would not open till the end of May. The troops located across various passes. whether in Kayian Bowl. Tangdhar, or Gurez Sectors, would be short of supplies and other necessities long after the Pakistani troops opposite them on lower heights would be receiving regular supplies. In fact in April itself long convoys could be seen carrying winter stocks northwards on Neelam Valley highway and other subsidiary roads.

A powerful explosive device was found and defused in the Jawahar Tunnel itself. These activities were followed by prolonged hartals in major towns on one pretext or the other.

Zojila (pass), leading into Ladakh, remains closed for almost six months; but this year even Khardungla (pass) closed for over a month during April. This upset the road movement and stocking schedules of Shyok and Siachen garrisons. Paucity of air effort due to air-lift commitments in Sri Lanka. combined with days of bad weather, had created a large backlog of stocks and transients awaiting air-lift at various airfields/transit camps all along the line of communication to Ladakh/Kashmir Valley.

In this situation a series of bomb blasts ripped through the valley and on the national highways on both sides of the Jawahar Tunnel; random blasts near Srinagar Club, central telegraph office and transport yards were merely precursors. A powerful explosive device was found and defused in the Jawahar Tunnel itself. These activities were followed by prolonged hartals in major towns on one pretext or the other. In one incident unidentified gunmen on motor cycles opened fire at the sentry post outside the residence of the Sessions Judge who had passed the death sentence on Maqbool Butt. Later, fIring was also reported near the office of the Inspector General Kashmir Ranges. In the encounter one Ajiz Ahmed of MUF was reported killed. All this created panic in the valley but no one was clear as to the identity of the people responsible for these attacks. In another incident a car was blown up in La! Chowk and bombs were lobbed at a police piquet at Zaldagar bridge in downtown Srinagar. Yet in another incident at Srinagar, two extremists fired at a CRPF post located in the High Court premises. Several bomb blasts were reported in various tourist complexes in the valley and some groups of tourists from Gujarat and Maharashtra had a narrow escape. A few days later, extremists lobbed a hand grenade on the roof of the Doordarshan Kendra and made an attempt to blow up Badshah bridge in which a part of the parapet was damaged.

It was also reported that the setting up and running of these camps has been entrusted to the President of POK and the ISI as the Pakistani Government wanted no direct involvement.

Intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of militant Kashmiri youth had sneaked back into the valley after receiving training in guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities in POK. Some persons arrested at Kupwara revealed that large quantities of automatic weapons with huge quantities of ammunition, hand grenades and plastic explosives had entered the valley through ‘Northern Gallies’ and had been dumped in the jungles around Kupwara and Handwara. It was believed that Amanulah Khan, a top leader of the KLF, had addressed several meetings in various mosques in Srinagar and Anant Nag and Kupwara urged the Kashmiri youth to be ready for Jehad.

There was persistent bazaar gossip in all big towns of the valley about training camps in several places on both sides of the Line of Control (LC), some of which were manned by experienced Mghan Mujahids where every Kashmiri youth was made welcome and received gifts, provided he was ready to undergo guerrilla-warfare training. A newly formed outfit called ‘Ansar-ul-Islam’ supported by the Muslim Liberation Front was also reported to be enlisting and training youth in guerrilla tactics. This organization was reported to be in touch with Abdul Hamid and Dr Haider, two well-known leaders of a fundamentalist organization in POK. Intelligence reports suggested that the POK Government could be imparting training for subversive activities in J&K to about 500 Kashmiri youth in POK. It was also reported that the setting up and running of these camps has been entrusted to the President of POK, Sardar Abdul Qayum and the ISI as the Pakistani Government wanted no direct involvement. Sardar Qayum was reported to be taking a personal interest in the distribution of arms to the trainees. He frequently called upon businessmen in POK to donate liberally for the cause.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government, the police and the paramilitary forces were getting more and more tied down in putting down mob violence, rioting, vandalism and violent demonstrations. The urban population was steadily becoming defiant and aggressive and the rural folk were sulking. Mob violence erupted on the slightest pretext in which Government property and offices, transport and business establishments of certain communities became the main targets, Frequent incidents of violence, attack on public figures and police officials had succeeded in creating a fear psychosis in Government circles. This added to the existing threat from Sikh militants, creating a virtual state of siege in Jammu & Kashmir. With the aid of tip-offs from informers some arms and ammunition, along with subversive literature with a call from KLF for the liberation of Kashmir, were unearthed from Kupwara, Tangdhar and Keran areas. A leaflet simultaneously distributed at certain mosques at Srinagar contained the following message in Urdu:

The Union Home Ministry at this stage expressed its grave concern over the increased terrorist activities and asked the Jammu & Kashmir Government to take stern measures to curb them. In their assessment not only had there been an increase in terrorist activities but there was a qualitative change in the situation. They said they had received information to suggest that some Sikh extremists’ organizations operating abroad and groups of Kashmiri extremists had joined forces. The Union Home Ministry advised the State Government to strengthen vigilance on the border, improve intelligence collection and take steps to isolate the elements trying to whip up anti-Indian feelings. As the violence continued unabated and even spread to Jammu in winter, the Union Home Ministry once again issued a statement that it had no doubt that the secessionist movement was being escalated in a planned manner for which preparations had gone on for a long time.In subsequent months, more incriminating documents signed in the name of KLF and Muslim Liberation Front were distributed at some mosques and religious gatherings. The existence of special groups called ‘AI Harnzah’ and ‘Ansari-ul-Islam’ was confirmed.

The Union Home Ministry and other central agencies perhaps considered this kind of advice quite adequate to meet the situation. It seemed that the Centre still viewed the growing unrest in Kashmir as purely a state law and order problem of Jammu & Kashmir. No meaningful dialogue between State and Central agencies nor a joint assessment to tackle the situation seemed to emerge.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government on their part seemed content with heaping the blame on the MUF, Awami Action League and those forces which were anti-NC-Congress(I) alliance. A myriad of intelligence agencies operating in the valley without an overall coordinating authority added further confusion to the situation by working at cross purposes and sending conflicting signals to their bosses in Delhi. Editorial comment in influential Urdu dailies of Srinagar indicated that the Kashmiris held the State and Central Governments responsible for the chaotic conditions prevailing in the valley and very few people believed that Pakistan was out to create disturbances in the valley. One paper which is particularly popular amongst the middle-class Muslims of the valley suggested that like the AI-Fateh, which was supposed to have emerged in 1970, AI-Harnzah and Ansar-ul-Islam were also only a figment of the Government’s imagination. These, they said, were ploys to let loose a reign of terror on the peace-loving but independent-minded Kashmiris.

The sudden demise of General Zia in August 1988 created a kind of political paralysis in Pakistan for a while but this seemed to have little effect on the continued Pakistani collusion in subversive activities in Punjab or the Kashmir Valley; ISI, General Zia’s chosen instrument to handle covert operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Punjab, seemed even more powerfully independent and active.

The layout and substance of most intelligence reports emanating from Corps HQ were nothing more than summaries of police, civil intelligence and newspaper reports.

The LC even at Siachen had been unusually quiet this year, except for more than the usual reconnaissance helicopter flights opposite Kargil sector and the usual sporadic firing in Rajauri-Punch areas. Forward brigades and units in most sectors in the valley reported an inexplicable but marked degree of bonhomie on the part of Pakistani troops all along the LC. Even messages of good wishes were sent’ across at Holi and Diwali festivals. Headquarters located at Kupwara and Chowkibal, however, seemed alarmed at the sudden mushrooming of madras-as (with multiple green flags fluttering over them) in their areas. This was not somehow considered very significant at higher levels. In fact the Divisional Commander and lower Formation Commanders had little or no opportunity to present their views on the overall security environment in the valley, in spite of various hartals and acts of violence in their areas of responsibility. It was the officers at the grassroots level, however; who had the most accurate information about their areas and were in the best position to judge the mood of the local population, as compared to the clinical intelligence summaries Composed at higher HQ. The intelligence summaries collated by 15 and 16 Corps really contained nothing more than what was publicly known. The layout and substance of most intelligence reports emanating from Corps HQ were nothing more than summaries of police, civil intelligence and newspaper reports. There was no in depth analysis of the situation, nor were any meaningful conclusions drawn.

In North-Eastern Ladakh, across Sasar La, except for small patrols coming to ‘Three Pimples’ area for observation over -Daulat Beg Oldi and ‘Track Junction’, the Chinese remained rather inactive. Even the so-called ‘forward posture’ adopted by the Indian Army in some areas did not seem to bother them.

In the Jammu-Pathankot belt there was a sudden increase in subversive and terrorist activities. Violence flared up in Jammu city on the eve of Gur-Purab and quickly spread to other parts of Jammu region. The Army had to be called out in several towns.

In these circumstances, the Army leadership visualized no special problem except for the normal logistics problems of forward troops due to late opening of passes. The news of violent demonstrations and riots which stretched the state police resources to the limit did not come in for much comment and discussion in Army circles, as there was not even a hint of any hostility in the valley towards the Army. However, during a war game organized by 15 Corps, certain issues were raised by the local Sub Area Commander on paucity of paramilitary resources for internal security duties, under the prevailing circumstances. This was not disputed by the senior officers present but at the summing up it was made clear that the shortage of paramilitary forces at his disposal was fully appreciated but it was to be seen in the light of the overall requirement of such forces in the Punjab and elsewhere. No alternatives were offered, so the Sub Area was expected to make do with what it had. It was evident that the Army hierarchy foresaw no special problems in the valley as far as they were concerned. The attention of most senior commanders remained riveted on Siachen which had become a prestige issue since the last Pakistani attack on ‘Bana’ post. A firm conviction prevailed that nothing much could happen in the valley barring a stalemate even if Pakistan were to start full-scale hostilities. Anti terrorist operations were not the ‘Army’s baby’. In any case it could not affect the overall defensive posture,’ it was said.

The situation on the other side of Pir Panjal Range, especially after widespread violence in Jammu region, was somewhat different. The borders were active off and on and the Pakistani troops were seen carrying out various training exercises fairly close to the border, which indicated aggressive designs.

The line of communication to the Kashmir Valley through Udhampur-Ramban-Banihal this year had somehow become more prone to big landslides resulting in prolonged suspension of traffic. A new bridge at Khuninala had to be built as the old one was damaged by frequent landslides. Several smaller landslides kept blocking the road between Ramban-Ramsu and Banihal frequently. People of Doda, Kishtwar and Bhadarwa areas were on the war-path against the Jammu & Kashmir Government. As such there was a perpetual shortage of local labour to work on the roads.

In the Jammu-Pathankot belt there was a sudden increase in subversive and terrorist activities. Violence flared up in Jammu city on the eve of Gur-Purab and quickly spread to other parts of Jammu region. The Army had to be called out in several towns.

A little later violence recurred in the valley during a bandh which was observed in Srinagar, Baramulla, Anant Nag and Sopore to mark the anniversary of the hanging of Maqbool Butt. Violence broke out again after a short interval when rampaging mobs came out in the streets, ostensibly to protest against Salman Rushdie’s controversial book Satanic Verses. This agitation soon spread to all major towns in the valley and continued unabated for almost a week.

It was quite apparent by now that there was an overall method in this madness. Most national newspapers in their editorials spoke of the dangers from within in Kashmir and the Pakistani connection. The Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir was however reported to have said in a statement to the press that he had definite information that Pakistan was winding up camps where terrorists were being trained, after the recent meeting of our Prime Minister and Ms Benazir Bhutto.
The Jammu & Kashmir Government continued to make bold declarations that they would come down on the trouble-makers with a heavy hand”¦Reacting to various statements issued by the Union Home Ministry indicating that a serious view of the situation in Jammu & Kashmir had been taken by the Centre, the Chief Minister said that both the State and Central Governments had responsibilities in this respect, and although the Prime Minister had once told him that there was the possibility of Pakistan creating disturbance in the valley, he blamed internal politics for the prevailing conditions.

The deteriorating law and order situation in the valley was generally attributed by the Centre and the national press to the ineffectual leadership in Jammu & Kashmir; but many prominent leaders of Jammu & Kashmir held that a constant drift in the Centre’s policies was largely responsible for the situation. At this juncture the attention of the Centre was mainly focused on Punjab and perhaps because of this no viable joint strategy for Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir was evolved. Creation of special forces or a joint intelligence network to tackle terrorism and anti-national forces in these states were not apparently formulated even at this stage. Evidently, it was not perceived that the escalation in the Punjab situation was correlated to the main objective of certain forces, of destabilizing and subverting the legitimate authority in Kashmir.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government continued to make bold declarations that they would come down on the trouble-makers with a heavy hand and that they would fight the extremists with full determination. They also often repeated that the use of sophisticated arms by the extremists showed a foreign hand. However, no one seemed to be any the wiser as to who was the master-mind behind these operations.

Pakistan’s Aims and Plans – I

A top-level meeting had been called in the President’s residential office by General Zia in April 1988. This was attended by selected Corps Commanders and top ISI bosses. Some other names mentioned in this connection were those of a prominent Afhan Mujahid leader and two Kashmir Liberation Front leaders. Whether they actually attended this meeting was not confirmed. The main contents from the President’s address which were leaked out, probably through a mole from a Third World country and became available to India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents some time in September-October 1988, were as follows:

…as no Government can survive in Occupied Kashmir unless it has the tacit approval of Delhi, it would be unrealistic to believe that the MUF or any such organization can seize power through democratic or other means.

“Gentlemen, I have spoken on this subject at length before, therefore, I will leave out the details. As you know due to our pre-occupation in Afghanistan, in the service of Islam, I have not been able to put these plans before you earlier. Let there be no mistake, however, that our aim remains quite clear and firm-the liberation of the Kashmir Valley-our Muslim Kashmiri brothers cannot be allowed to stay with India for any length of time, now. In the past we had opted for hamhanded military options and therefore, failed. So, as I have mentioned before, we will now keep our military option for the last moment as a coup de grace, if and when necessary. Our Kashmiri brethren in the valley, though with us in their hearts and minds, are simple-minded folk and do not easily take to the type of warfare to which, say, a Punjabi or an Afghan takes to naturally, against foreign domination. The Kashmiris however have a few qualities which we can exploit. First, his shrewdness and intelligence; second, his power to persevere under pressure; and the third, if I may so say, he is a master of political intrigue. If we provide him means through which he can best utilize these qualities – he will deliver the goods. Sheer brute force is in any case not needed in every type of warfare, especially so in the situation obtaining in the Kashmir Valley, as I have explained earlier.

Here we must adopt those methods of combat which the Kashmiri mind can grasp and cope with-in other words, a coordinated use of moral and physical means, other than military operations, which will destroy the will of the enemy, damage his political capacity and expose him to the world as an oppressor. This aim, Gentlemen, shall be achieved in the initial phases.

In the first phase, which may, if necessary, last a couple of years we will assist our Kashmiri brethren in getting hold of the power apparatus of the State by political subversion and intrigue. I would like to mention here that as no Government can survive in Occupied Kashmir unless it has the tacit approval of Delhi, it would be unrealistic to believe that the MUF or any such organization can seize power through democratic or other means. In view of this,’ power must “apparently” remain with those whom New Delhi favours. We must therefore ensure that certain “favoured politicians” from the ruling elite be selected who would corporate with us in subverting all effective organs of the State. In brief, our plan for Kashmir, which will be codenamed as “Op Topac” will be as follows:

Phase 1

A low-level insurgency against the regime, so that it is under siege, but does not collapse as we would not yet want central rule imposed by Delhi.

We must therefore ensure that certain “favoured politicians” from the ruling elite be selected who would corporate with us in subverting all effective organs of the State.

We plant our chosen men in all the key positions; they will subvert the police forces, financial institutions, the communication network and other important organizations.

We whip up anti-Indian feelings amongst ” the students and peasants, preferably on some religious issues, so that we can enlist their active support for rioting and anti-Government demonstrations.

Organize and train subversive elements’ and armed groups with capabilities, initially, to deal with paramilitary forces located in the valley.

Adopt and develop means to cut off lines of communication between Jammu & Kashmir and within Kashmir and Ladakh by stealth, without recourse to force. The road over Zojila upto Kargil and the road over Khardungla should receive our special attention.

In collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and terror in Jammu to divert attention from the valley at a critical juncture and discredit the regime even in the Hindu mind.

Establish virtual control in those parts of the Kashmir Valley where the Indian Army is not located or deployed. The Southern Kashmir Valley may be one such region.

Phase 2

Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen. Kargil and Rajauri-Punch sectors to force the Indian Army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir Valley.

Some Afghan Mujahideen, by then settled in Azad Kashmir, will then infiltrate in selected pockets with a view to extending areas of our influence.

Attack and destroy base depots and HQ located at Srinagar, Pattan, Kupwara. Baramulla. Bandipur and Chowkiwala by covert action at a given time.

Some Afghan Mujahideen, by then settled in Azad Kashmir, will then infiltrate in selected pockets with a view to extending areas of our influence. This aspect will require detailed and ingenious planning. The fiasco of Op Gibraltar (1965) holds many lessons for us here.

Finally a Special Force under selected retired officers belonging to Azad Kashmir, with the hard core consisting of Afghans, will be ready to attack and destroy airfields, radio stations, block Banihal Tunnel and Kargil-Leh Highway.

At a certain stage of the operations Punjab and adjacent areas of Jammu & Kashmir will be put under maximum pressure internally by our offensive posture.

Phase 3

Detailed plans for the liberation of Kashmir Valley and establishment of an independentIslamic State in the third phase will follow.

We must, therefore, be careful and maintain a low military profile so that the Indians do not find an excuse to pre-empt us, by attacking at a time and at a point of their own choosing…

We do not have much time. Maximum pressure must be exerted before the general elections in India and before Indian Army reserves which are still bogged down in Sri Lanka become available. By the Grace of God, we have managed to accumulate large stocks of modern arms and ammunition from US consignments intended for Afghan Mujahideen. This will help our Kashmiri brethren achieve their goals. Even if we create a kind of “Azad Kashmir” in some remote parts of Occupied Kashmir as a beginning, the next step may not be as difficult as it appears today. On the other hand, it should also be noted that a part of the Indian Army, particularly the Infantry, will be well trained by now for such a situation due to their experience in the North-Eastern Region and more recently in Sri Lanka. But the situation in Kashmir will be somewhat different; more like the “Infetada” of Palestinians in towns, and on the pattern of the Mujahideen in the countryside to attack hard targets. A. period of chaos in the State is essential in the circumstances.

And what of our Chinese friends? They can do no more than ensure that Indian forces deployed against them are not moved. out; but this may be required only at the last or the third stage of our operations. Of course, if we are in serious trouble, the Chinese and our other powerful friends shall come to our rescue one way or the other. They will ensure if we do not win -at least we don’t lose.
Pakistan Paindabad.”Finally, I wish to caution you once more that it will be disastrous to believe that we can take on India in a straight contest. We must, therefore, be careful and maintain a low military profile so that the Indians do not find an excuse to pre-empt us, by attacking at a time and at a point of their own choosing, at least before Phase 1 and 2 of the Operation are over. We must pause and assess the course of operations after each phase, as our strategy and plans may require drastic changes in certain circumstances. I need not emphasize any further that a deliberate and objective assessment of the situation must be ensured at each stage, otherwise a stalemate will follow with no good for Pakistan.

General Situation in March 1989

The initial phase of Op Topac was apparently put into action in the latter half of 1988 as was evident from the course of events from July 1988 to March 1989. The death of General Zia in August 1988 in a PAF accident, and the new dispensation under Ms Benazir Bhutto appeared to make very little difference till March 1989. ISI has been rightly described as a ‘State within a State’. It has been said that soon after Ms Bhutto took over, at a stormy meeting, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yakub Khan urged that Afghan policy no longer be handled by ISI but even he was turned down and the attempt to curb the power of ISI did not succeed.

It seemed that although the ISI would go ahead with its plan of action in Kashmir, the time- frame will be dictated by the course of events in Afghanistan and of course Indias reaction.

Significantly, Pakistani COAS, General Mirza Aslam Beg, in his first visit to Siachen, was reported to have said that the Pakistani armed forces would not rest till an amicable solution of the Siachen dispute was found. This statement seemed to be a precursor of Ms Benazir Bhutto’s views expressed a bit later.

The emergence of Ms Benazir Bhutto as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan and the restoration of democracy could queer the pitch of ISI but Kashmir figures high on her priorities too as was evident from her statement that ‘Kashmir is a major dispute between India and Pakistan. It has led to three wars between our countries, to a never-ending arms race and to endless tensions. It is a problem we have to solve.’

‘Right now we have another serious matter, between us and that is the Siachen Glacier issue – but India and Pakistan are holding talks and we hope that we will be able to make progress on that particular issue,’ she had added.

It seemed that although the ISI would go ahead with its plan of action in Kashmir, the time- frame will be dictated by the course of events in Afghanistan and of course India’s reaction. Only if Pakistan is able to oust Najib-PDPA, establish a friendly Islamic regime in Afghanistan and ensure the return of Afghan refugees, will it be able to focus attention on Kashmir. ISI which runs the show in Afghanistan is well organized and trained, however, to launch effective covert operations in Jammu & Kashmir. General Zia had constituted it to be a combination of CIA, GSG9, SAS and Spetznaz. Spectacular initial success in Afghanistan showed its effectiveness and efficacy. It is well on the cards that this organization will continue to carryon Zia’s chosen line of action in Kashmir, notwithstanding the constraints which the precepts of the new regime may impose on it.

Continued…: OP TOPAC: The Kashmir Imbroglio – II