Indian Defence Review

Large posters of Prabhakaran and Mahatlya appeared along the Marina Beach, starting from right In front of the Legislative Assembly building. LTTE posters and their cadres’ participation in the Tamil Nadu election campaign were a factor in the 1988 Assembly Elections. Madras had a certain disdain for and gave an uncomfortable feellng of the IPKF soldiers. Jawans therefore would ask us: ‘Saheb, have we done something wrong?’ Be that as it may, the Internal fibres of morale held firm and sustained soldiers, their units – and the Army – in Op PAWAN despite the unhelpful, harmful external features.

What we at the ground level acutely felt was the lack of response or necessary promptness at all higher levels to our problems of discipline, welfare and morale. Customs clearance and application of baggage rules, as mentioned earlier, had to wait for nearly two years to be resolved, that too when we at the lower end repeatedly made a noise, even taunted and used harsh words at our superior HQs. This problem could have been easily visualised and resolved; there were precedents of Gaza, Congo, Lebanon and Korea.

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Even after we projected our difficulty, there was that typical ‘babu’s’ response – put up a statement of case. Then there were the rear area functions like transit camps at Madras, despatch and receipt of personnel, rations and stores across the sea to and from the Island, arranging shipping, trains, aircraft and so on. Although there were small units or detachments nominated to undertake these functions, at Madras the major contribution of manpower and some command responsibilities still devolved on field formations fully stretched in active operations in Sri Lanka. No amount of our entreating with the higher HQ at Pune and Delhi helped us persuade them for benevolence. Formations had to look backwards across the sea’ for logistic support organisation in the rear area.

What we at the ground level acutely felt was the lack of response or necessary promptness at all higher levels to our problems of discipline, welfare and morale.

HQ IPKF was given no resources or financial powers to help the field formations in this respect; it rested with the Command HQ. These arrangements violated the basic principles of administration.

Another instance related to the status of Madras being peace station or field area for the specifically raised organisation of HQ IPKF. Since nothing was spelt out, those posted to HQ IPKF moved as for peace station, brought families, applied for government accommodation, hired houses and claimed reimbursement. JCOs and jawans did the same and claimed enhanced allowances for a class ‘A’ city that Madras is.’ Some were given accommodation, many others were not. Some were permitted rent reimbursement, others were not. Representations against this unfair dispensation were not even replied to.

Even statutory complaints remained unanswered for over a year. The Government, the bureaucracy and the system can be terribly callous. In the meanwhile, after more than a year of the raising of HQ IPKF, its status was declared as field area with retrospective effect. That made things worse for most of those who were already affected. When we cried ourselves hoarse, again the same posturing from higher HQ was forthcoming – forward a statement of case. It took nearly a year thereafter to resolve this very simple case, which was well within Command HQ powers to resolve. The tardiness, an almost open punch below the belt, was indeed very hurtful to honest, simple, disciplined, devoted officers, JCOs and jawans.

It must go to the credit of the higher HQ that they were not as tardy and ‘peace-timely’, if one can so use the word, in obtaining extention of leave concessions, death and disability benefits, etc. That was all fine, but what about the benefits to and welfare of the 90 per cent who could not die? Why this callousness in helping them with their discipline and morale? Don’t the higher and the highest HQ have a responsibility towards contributing to the discipline, morale and welfare of troops?

It must go to the credit of the higher HQ that they were not as tardy and “˜peace-timely, if one can so use the word, in obtaining extention of leave concessions, death and disability benefits, etc.

Operations are ordered, discipline is demanded, morale is measured every time, but welfare is only accorded lip service, grudgingly attended to! The Army and its system have a strange comprehension of welfare of troops. The soldiers were shoved into operations overnight, build-up for battle was achieved within days, organisational structures of sorts were contrived within weeks, but measures for helping the soldier maintain his discipline and morale and to care for his welfare took not merely months, but years.

Leadership at JCOs and NCOs levels showed improvement and in several units reached remarkably high standards. But it took a long time and hard knocks to achieve it. Wherever unit and formation commanders specifically devoted their energy, time and attention to nurturing excellence in their subordinates, things improved rapidly. It is a painstaking affair, a hobby-horse if you will, because the Infantry takes longer to prepare, particularly since our training and control systems have smothered individual thinking and acting. The rank and file interminably await orders and guidance at each and every step.

‘Initiative’ is a word used only in lectures, talks and harangues, seldom seen executed or encouraged, because of the peace-time attitude in war and the petrifying malaise of a ‘no mistake’ syndrome which has affected the very vitals of the Army. In war the only rescuing factor is to do, to act, to take the first step (initiative). Action and initiative may prove wrong on occasions, but their chances of success and maintaining cohesion too are far brighter than inaction, awaiting orders or delay in doing a right thing.

Young officers were fairly prompt in doing, acting and doing things right. They did not wait for doing right things; and therefore largely succeeded. What the young subaltern lacked in knowledge and experience he more than made up in his enthusiasm, keenness, guts and getting into the act promptly. God bless him. He proved to be the cutting edge, while steadiness, ballast and momentum were provided by his enduring, stolid, phlegmatic, gritty follower, the jawan. Many unit and formation commanders waited for doing right things and were bypassed by events and opponents.

One of the first things I did was to declare and demand that my subordinates and their subordinates in turn, should be two steps ahead of their superiors in their (subordinates’) spheres. Section and platoon commanders must be experts in sitting and employing their weapons and be the last word in minor tactics. How dare a Brigade or Divisional Commander point out faults in these fields? It would be sacrilege if it were to happen. That, we in 54 Infantry Division said, should be the spirit and practice as well.