Indian Defence Review

Command and Control Structure

We had a very peculiar, off-beat command and control structure, which had intimate concerns, cooperation and interaction with the sister Services – the Navy and Air Force – Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Information and Broadcasting and Home, Intelligence agencies, the Indian High Commission In Colombo, the Press, a few State Government agencies of Tamil Nadu, the Indian Red Cross and others. The IPKF, with its HQ at Madras and the operations had to be very closely orchestrated and handled directly from Delhi, where a core group of relevant representatives oversaw and controlled the whole show.

The Directing HQ was the Army HQ, where all planning and coordination were done. The Force HQ at Madras, though conventionally placed under HQ Southern Command, had to deal directly on most of the operational and intelligence matters with the Army HQ. Southern Command was responsible for providing logistic support, dealing with discipline and welfare matters and writing confidential reports. Technically, the Southern Army Commander was the Overall Force Commander COFC) but the policy, planning and execution were dealt with by GOC IPKF, Lt Gen Kalkat (who was also Deputy OFC) directly in accordance with the directions of Army HQ.

This was the repository of all dissonance in the command structure. As it is, there is always a certain amount of animus between subordinate and superior HQ, which in this case was exacerbated by this peculiar arrangement. Personality clashes not only hampered optimisation of effort and result but also indirectly affected welfare of troops adversely, despite varying efforts by all senior actors to ‘make the system work.’

Command personality clashes leave little scope for the staff and subordinates to effect smoothness in functioning and maximisation of efficiency. Tension rules the roost. One has to donate a good deal of blood for internal combustion. HQ OFC wanted to push HQ IPKF out into Sri Lanka whenever things hotted up, so that the former could control more effectively from Madras. For HQ IPKF, there was no magic wand which could be waved to make it move in and out at the drop of a hat. In fact its attempts, in the initial months, to locate itself in Jaffna or Trincomalee had been turned down by the Army HQ.

One can only hope that a future recasting of such an organisation and its command and control structure will be less conducive to personality friction and dissonance.

Splitting the IPKF HQ between Madras and the Island frequently and for indefinite periods was unacceptable to GOC IPKF, because the staff authorised in the HQ was at a low scale. There were problems of communications, staff processing, examination of problems, coordination with the Air Force and the Navy Nevertheless the sword always hung on our heads.

More often than not we in the HQ IPKF let it hang! There was nothing we could do. The Command HQ staff thought HQ IPKF had no time for it. HQ IPKF thought that the Command HQ was interfering unduly. The next door ATNK & K Area HQ thought that HQ IPKF was bullying them or making excessive demands. We thought the Area HQ was not responding adequately. The Navy had its own plans, pattern and conception. The Air Force usually saw things faster and more clearly and responded quicker, but occasionally put their foot down even on minor matters. The OFC and Deputy OFC had their own views and conceptions. The former wanted to be heard, counted, listened to, but he did not assert himself. The latter had the direct responsibility and often asserted himself with a certain amount of brusqueness. Thus, it was left to the staff and subordinates to muck their way through to make things work.

Could this friction have been avoided or minimised by a proper ordering of a command and control structure? An assertive OFC-cum-Army Commander and a GOC IPKF sans bouts of siege mentality, both under the aegis of a clearly perceived hierarchical directive-cum-executive channel at the Army HQ could have done better. Even then, they would have required considerable patience, skill, tact and will to make the system work. The job of the IPKF was not a routine one like any other HO of a Corps. Its functioning had to be fine-tuned with political-diplomatic developments on a daily basis. Even so, under the circumstances and with scarce resources the system somehow worked; it might have creaked, tottered and dawdled, but it worked, and delivered. One can only hope that a future recasting of such an organisation and its command and control structure will be less conducive to personality friction and dissonance.

Discipline and Morale

In the Initial stages of the war,  October-December ’87, there were complaints and reports of rape, looting and wanton destruction indulged in by the IPKF. When a soldier is pushed and led into a blind alley-like the situation in Jaffna, where it suddenly changed from the so well tom-tommed peace-keeping and bonhomie into a full fledged battlefield – he feels terribly insecure and starts seeing an enemy all over. In an insurgency sparked and sustained by an opponent who is dressed in civilian clothes but shoots and blows him up unseen, suspicion alone takes a vicious turn.

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When he sees his comrades being killed by innocent looking civilians, blending again into the civilian population, he gets into a rage and anger against the uncertainty, the unseen. At that point his pent-up tension, welling feeling of helplessness and burning desire to explode into a release of Counter-violence are in frantic search of a tangible object he can master – an object which is weak and helpless itself? What better object than a frightened, weak, cowering woman; an unguarded, wide open shop; an unresisting, defenceless house and its feeble occupants whose shelter the unseen deceitful opponent had obtained (by whatever means)? It is madness, the animal in him, that rules momentarily. He is wild – but just for a brief spell.

In an insurgency sparked and sustained by an opponent who is dressed in civilian clothes but shoots and blows him up unseen, suspicion alone takes a vicious turn.

If he can get hold of himself, or if somebody controls him in that moment of crisis of cathartic explosion, he might in all probability get over his baser instincts. Where this does not happen then the explosion manifests in counter-assault, rape, loot, wanton destruction; seeking release from tension, fear, rage. Education, motivation, communication and company are good antidotes. Most culprits realise their bestiality within minutes of the act and repent, weeping like children. I saw a JCO with 27 years service breaking down like this.

It was under these circumstances of total uncertainty, initial disorientation, sudden violence, inability to communicate (language and surroundings were totally different) and lack of effective control, company and education that excesses were committed by a few. But the command and leadership chain rapidly gathered their brood once again within the warmth of their moral influence and disciplinary binding. Enquiries were instituted and disciplinary action taken against the defaulters. Warped minds had to be weeded out. But there were not very many. After February-March ’88, the incidence rates dropped almost to zero.

We had a few desertions in the Island. In Jaffna they could be counted on one palm. In one case a boy fell in love with a girl and decided to abscond, little realising that he had a herculean task escaping, unless of course the LTTE absorbed him. The LTTE found this first class material for their propaganda mill. The boy had no chance, as the people brought him back. In another case, an interpreter was influenced by one of the detents who was an important Jaffna leader. The boy, apart from interpreting was also tasked to be on guard duty on the prisoner at night. This went on for many days.