The beginning of December brought the first snowfall to Uri. About this time, enemy troops in uniform appeared for the first time in this sector. On 11 December, all traffic to Uri stopped suddenly around 1000 hours when the enemy brought the entrance to the Uri bowl under machine-gun fire. It had occupied a ridge overlooking the road near Bhatgiran, South of Uri. A fighting patrol from 4 Kumaon discovered that an enemy battalion was in position on the ridge; Sen ordered 1 Sikh to clear it.
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Bhatgiran Ridge was held by a battalion of Pakistan’s Frontier Scouts. Its positions were so well concealed that when the Sikhs approached the hill on 13 December, no enemy was to be seen. The leading company commander, however, sensed that the enemy was there and advised the battalion commander that an attack should be launched. The latter chose to ignore this advice and ordered the battalion to return to camp. Even the withdrawal was not carried out as a tactical operation. The men were told to scramble down the side of a hill that ran down to the Uri-Haji Pir Pass road. The enemy which lay in wait held its fire till the leading company had gone into a re-entrant and then poured down murderous fire. Before the situation could be retrieved, the battalion had suffered 120 casualties – 61 killed and 59 wounded. Among the killed was Jemadar Nand Singh. In Arakan, during the Second World War, this brave man had taken three Japanese foxholes single-handed with only his bayonet and won the Victoria Cross. Here too, it was Nand Singh who saved the situation: he ordered his platoon to fix bayonets on their rifles and then charged headlong into the enemy. A posthumous MVC was later awarded to Nand Singh.
No consideration was given to Pakistans stake in Kashmir. The result was the loss of another opportunity to take Domel.
Many of the wounded who survived owed their lives to 3 Light Field Ambulance. Thirty-six of the seriously injured were operated upon in 27 hours at Uri, with the doctors and other staff resting only when the last patient was off the operation table.
The enemy vacated Bhatgiran on his own after some days. This first winter in Kashmir was particularly hard for Indian troops. For many of them it was their first taste of snow and of mountain warfare. Except for the sentries, who were issued ‘poshteens’ and Gilgit boots, purchased locally, the rest of the troops were in ordinary winter uniform. Snow-clothing had yet to make its appearance in the Army! Many of the localities were under several feet of snow, and there were frequent blizzards and avalanches. Both the Uri and Srinagar garrisons were completely cut off from the rest of India by 20 December 1947.
In January, the so-called Azad Kashmir troops began to arrive in the Mahura area in large numbers. Their objective was the powerhouse there since it supplied electricity to the valley. A company of 2 Dogra was already at Mahura, but Sen decided to clear the hills overlooking the powerhouse, and moved 4 Kumaon from Uri. The battalion marched to Mahura while a blizzard was blowing and its timely arrival fores- talled the enemy which, thereafter, was systematically chased from the surrounding villages.
“¦gave useful information about the Azad Kashmir battalion to which he belonged. According to him, it was organized on normal infantry lines, had a strength of about 800 men, and was commanded by a regular officer of the Pakistan Army.
A notable action of this period was the clearing of the Limber Nulla, a stream that joins the Jhelum East of Rampur. The enemy commander, who called himself ‘Khalil’, had for some time been collecting a force in the area. He had been doing this very quickly, his intention being to make a surprise crossing of the Jhelum and then seize the heights South of the river. Sen prepared his Brigade to give ‘Khalil’ a befitting welcome, but it was difficult for him to guess the exact timing of the enemy’s attack. Luckily, ‘Khalil’ himself helped Sen in this when, on the afternoon of 10 April, he spoke to his superior over the radio in Urdu and said: “Tomorrow night I shall change the map”.29
Sen put his own plan into action immediately. Features overlooking the Limber Nulla were captured in swift moves by 3 (Royal) Garhwal30 and 4 Kumaon. The enemy was thereafter treated to a plastering by field guns and mortars. ‘Khalil’ withdrew in great confusion to the hills in the North after suffering heavy losses. Sen exploited his success by attacking enemy positions to the West and North-West of Mahura where two Azad Kashmir battalions and some tribesmen were deployed.
Earlier in February, the enemy had made an attempt to infiltrate towards Srinagar by way of Tithwal and Handwara. Fortunately, its advance elements were detected in good time at Handwara, and swift action by 1 Sikh and 7 Cavalry foiled the venture. The battalion captured 15 prisoners, including an officer. The latter gave useful information about the Azad Kashmir battalion to which he belonged. According to him, it was organized on normal infantry lines, had a strength of about 800 men, and was commanded by a regular officer of the Pakistan Army.
In the first week of May, Indian forces in Jammu & Kashmir were reorganized. An offensive was in the offing and more troops were moving in. For better control of the ensuing operations, two divisional Headquarters were formed: one at Srinagar and the other at Jammu. The former, initially known as Sri Division and later as 19 Infantry Division, was under Major General Thimayya; the latter, at first named JA Division and later 26 Infantry Division, was under Major General Atma Singh. The crest of the Pir Panjal Range was made the boundary between the two, but Punch was retained for some time under Sri Division, although it lay South of the range. JAK Force Headquarters was abolished and Kalwant Singh left the scene to take over as Chief of the General Staff at Army Headquarters. Earlier, Delhi and East Punjab Command had been reorganized as Western Command.
The enemy was expected to make a stand on the pass, but the field guns could not move beyond Chowkibal, and the distance between the two places was just outside the range of the 25-pounders.
The operations that began in the 19 Division sector in the third week of May have come to be called the spring offensive. Thimayya had three brigades under him. The reader is familiar with Sen’s 161 Brigade, deployed in the Uri-Mahura area. Another infantry brigade, the 163rd 31, was raised at Srinagar from units already there and one or two that arrived after the Banihal Pass reopened. The third brigade, 77 Para, arrived in the first week of May.
The task given to Thimayya was to capture Domel, about 72 kilometres from Uri. The mission was too ambitious for one division. The Uri-Domel road ran parallel to the Jhelum Gorge and passed through high mountain ranges, where every advantage lay with the defender. Yet, Thimayya might have taken Domel had his hands not been fettered with extraneous responsibilities. It is axiomatic that a formation launched into battle should have no administrative or static tasks. In this case, Thimayya’s orders required him to continue to hold Uri, Baramula, Handwara, Skardu, Leh and Kargil, and at the same time, to secure the communications to these garrisons. As if all this was not enough, he was also made responsible for ‘the complete security of Srinagar’. Apparently, those at the helm had planned the operation on the assumption that Thimayya’s opposition would consist of Azad Kashmir troops and tribesmen. No consideration was given to Pakistan’s stake in Kashmir. The result was the loss of another opportunity to take Domel.
Thimayya’s plan was to advance with two brigades: 161 Brigade on the Uri-Domel axis and 163 Brigade on the Handwara-Tithwal axis. To give an element of surprise to the main effort—the advance to Domel—the operations of 163 Brigade were to commence a couple of days earlier. The defences of the Uri-Mahura area were to be taken over by 77 (Para) Brigade, under Brigadier P.S. Nair. He had under command 2 (Para) Madras, 2/3 Gorkha Rifles and the Sawai Man Guards. By the middle of May, all was set for Operation ‘Behram’, the code name for the plan; and to round off the briefing of unit commanders taking part, they were taken on an aerial reconnaissance of the area over which they were to operate. Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah paid a visit to the front a few days before the operation was due to commence.
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Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Harbakhsh Singh had recently taken over command of 163 Brigade and its progress was unexpectedly swift (see Fig. 3.5). The enemy was estimated to have over 1,600 men between Handwara and Tithwal, a distance of 64 kilometres. Under him, Harbakhsh Singh had 1 Sikh, 1 Madras, 3 (Royal) Garhwal, a squadron of armoured cars of 7 Light Cavalry, 4 J&K Mountain Battery and a battery from 11 Field Regiment. On the night of 18/19 May, this brigade, with its base at Handwara, struck out. Chowkibal was taken by the Sikhs on 20 May after the Madrassis and the Garhwalis had taken intermediate objectives in a two-pronged drive.
The enemy was surprised by their sudden appearance and bolted without a fight.
Between Chowkibal and Tithwal lay the 3,048-metre Nastachun Pass. The enemy was expected to make a stand on the pass, but the field guns could not move beyond Chowkibal, and the distance between the two places was just outside the range of the 25-pounders. The battery commander was, however, a resourceful person. He had left behind two brand new guns which were known to be overshooting by a few hundred yards, just enough to strike the pass. By dawn on 21 May, he had them moved to Chowkibal over the narrow, slippery road, and they fired a timed concentration before the Madrassis attacked. Surprisingly, there was little resistance; the enemy had fled.
The Madrassis spent the night on the pass without greatcoats and blankets: the advance had been so fast that the mules carrying the unit’s baggage had not been able to keep pace with the men. Meanwhile, the Sikhs had passed through and taken Chamkot, eight kilometres short of Tithwal, by the evening of 22 May. Then after a night move, they secured a spur overlooking Tithwal at first light the next day. The enemy was surprised by their sudden appearance and bolted without a fight. Thus, in five days, Harbakhsh Singh had advanced 64 kilometres across very difficult terrain and captured his objective. Besides killing 67 of the enemy, his brigade took a number of prisoners.
Intelligence estimates of enemy strength in the Uri-Domel area placed it at one infantry brigade and some tribesmen; although Sen put it at two brigades – one Azad Kashmir and one regular Pakistan Army – plus the tribesmen. He had four infantry battalions under him: 4 Kumaon, 2 Dogra, 7 Sikh and 6 Rajputana Rifles. In addition, he had 11 Field Regiment (less a battery), Patiala Mountain Battery, and a squadron of armoured cars from 7 Light Cavalry. The brigade plan was simple. To begin with, a battalion group was to advance along the Qazinag Range, North of the Jhelum and capture Pandu so as to threaten the enemy’s position at Chakothi, on the road to Domel (see Fig. 3.6). Another battle group was to advance along the hills South of the Uri-Domel road. In co-ordination with these moves, an armoured column was to move along the road.The advance on the Northern flank was entrusted to 4 Kumaon. The battalion’s route lay over extremely rugged terrain and entailed the climbing of a snow-covered mountain 3,962 metres high. The Kumaonis, under Lieutenant Colonel Man Mohan Khanna, were in their element and captured Pandu by the morning of 25 May. The Kumaonis had taken on an entrenched enemy battalion echeloned along the length of this high range, and ejected the whole lot with great dash. The story elsewhere was, however, different. On the Southern flank, the operation started off badly. The Dogras, who were to take the Salamabad feature on the night of 19/20 May, lost their way despite the moon, and failed to take the feature. Sen had to send his reserve battalion, the Rajputana Rifles, to extricate the Dogras, some of whom had been encircled. The hill was taken by the Rajputana Rifles on 21 May. The armoured column advanced thereafter, but came to a halt when it encountered two blown bridges. These could not be repaired due to hostile fire.
7 Sikh, however, made good progress by capturing Urusa, about 17 kilometres from Uri. By then it was clear that besides the tribals and the Azad Kashmir troops, four regular battalions of the Pakistan Army were opposing 161 Brigade and no further progress would be possible on the main road unless more troops could be brought up. But Thimayya had no reserves. As an alternative, he decided to take advantage of the success at Pandu and ordered Nair to bring up 77 (Para) Brigade, hold Pandu with it, and with 4 Kumaon and 2 Dogra under command, capture Points 6873 (Kathai) and 10027. At the same time, he ordered Harbakhsh Singh to send a battalion group from Tithwal towards Muzaffarabad to divert enemy strength to that sector. The Kumaonis took Point 6873 on 2 June after a stiff battle. The Dogras could not take Point 10027, and the move towards Muzaffarabad was not attempted as the extra battalion needed for the purpose was not available.
The Gunners of the Patiala Mountain Battery provided valuable support in driving the enemy from its bunkered positions. Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali were the dominating features in the area and were Sens objectives.
Balked for the second time, Thimayya did not give up. He now turned his eyes South of the Jhelum, and ordered Sen to attempt a sweep along the Pir Panjal Range. His aim again was to get behind the enemy. This time the 2/3 Gorkhas were to lead. This battalion and the Sawai Man Guards had been placed under Sen, the third battalion to take part in the mission being Rajputana Rifles. By 14 June, all three had captured their initial objectives. The Gunners of the Patiala Mountain Battery provided valuable support in driving the enemy from its bunkered positions. Pir Kanthi (3,330 metres) and Ledi Gali (3,315 metres) were the dominating features in the area and were Sen’s objectives. The Gorkhas’ first attack on Pir Kanthi failed but in the second attempt (on 28 June) they captured the ridge after a khukri charge. On the same day, the Sawai Man Guards captured Ledi Gali.32 Unfortunately, Brigadier Sen was taken ill during this operation and was evacuated to Delhi.
A few days after these successes, orders came from Delhi to stop all further offensive operations in Jammu & Kashmir. This was done in response to an appeal from the United Nations. The ban on offensive operations was a unilateral gesture by the Indian Government in the interests of peace on the sub-continent. There was no reciprocal response from Pakistan. On the other hand, she soon began a major offensive. It was a politico-military blunder of the first magnitude.
The capture of Tithwal had given a severe jolt to the enemy; Indian troops were now within striking distance of Muzaffarabad, just 29 kilometres away. It was therefore in this sector that the Pakistanis first reacted. The Sikhs and the Madrassis had established their picquets across the Kishanganga to guard against enemy infiltration. The Sikhs’ forward positions came under attack in the beginning of June but the enemy was thrown back after stiff hand-to-hand fighting. Later in July, enemy pressure increased and Indian troops withdrew from the West bank of the river.
There was no reciprocal response from Pakistan. On the other hand, she soon began a major offensive. It was a politico-military blunder of the first magnitude.
The enemy, however, wanted Tithwal itself and it put in several attacks on Indian positions. These attacks were supported by heavy shelling and they used large numbers to overwhelm the defences. In the fierce fighting some localities changed hands but the enemy was never allowed to retain possession of any vital ground for long. In the process of attack and counter-attack, many acts of gallantry were witnessed. A particularly noteworthy example was that of Company Havaldar Major Piru Singh of 6 Rajputana Rifles.
On the night of 17 July, Piru. Singh’s company was ordered to capture a hill South of Tithwal. The enemy had a well-dug position, and its machine guns covered all approaches to it. As the company charged up the hill, the leading men were mown down. Piru Singh, who was with the leading section, soon found that half of his men had been killed or wounded. He did not lose heart, rallied the remaining men, and charged the nearest machine-gun post. The enemy threw hand-grenades to stop the charge, but nothing could stop Piru Singh. Though his clothes had been ripped by grenade splinters and he was bleeding, he jumped into the trench and bayoneted the gun crew to death. Suddenly Piru Singh realized that he was the only man of his section still on his feet. A grenade thrown at him now wounded him in the face. This must have made him furious for he charged the next enemy position single-handed, after lobbing in a grenade. His bayonet again accounted for two of the enemy. When he emerged from the second enemy bunker to charge a third, he was hit in the head with a bullet and was seen to drop at the edge of the enemy trench. At the same time, there was an explosion in the trench, which showed that the grenade thrown by him had done its work.
It was courage of men like Piru Singh that kept the Indian flag flying over Tithwal. Try as they might, the Pakistanis could not retake it. When gallantry awards were instituted in India in 1950, Piru Singh’s valour was recognized with a posthumous award of the PVC.
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Between Chakothi and the Pir Panjal Range the enemy had built up its strength to three infantry battalions, a troop of tanks, a field battery, a mountain battery, two anti-aircraft guns and a machine-gun company. It was keen to recapture Pandu and Point 6873, and had put in several attacks between 5 and 17 June on these The Kumaonis,33 aided by the Gunners, had repulsed these. However, on 19 June the enemy got a chance and ambushed a party of this battalion. Of the 15 men who comprised the party, 13 were killed and 2 wounded, including Colonel Khanna. Timely assistance by a villager saved Khanna’s life. But when a cash reward was offered to this gallant man, Mohammad Jumma, he refused to take it. The Indian Government later conferred the Vir Chakra on him together with a life pension.
Try as they might, the Pakistanis could not retake it. When gallantry awards were instituted in India in 1950, Piru Singhs valour was recognized with a posthumous award of the PVC.
To strengthen 161 Brigade’s positions at Urusa, till then held by 7 Sikh, 4 Kumaon was moved there in the middle of July, after 2 Bihar had relieved the battalion at Pandu. The enemy put in several attacks on the Biharis on 21 July. These were thrown back, but the enemy returned two days later with a larger force. Due to bad weather no reinforcements could be sent to the Biharis nor could the Air Force come to their help. Pandu was lost due to an error of judgement of the battalion commander.
Running South-East from the Pamir Knot, the Great Himalayan Range acts as a watershed between the catchment areas of the Chenab and Jhelum Rivers on one side and the Indus on the other. The main passes, from West to East, are: Burzil (4,199 metres), connecting the Kashmir Valley to Gilgit; Zoji La34 (3,529 metres), on the caravan route between Srinagar and Leh; Umasi La (5,294 metres), linking Kishtwar to the Zanskar Valley; and Baralacha La (4,891 metres) on the Manali-Leh route.
The enemy plan was to capture both Baltistan and Ladakh and, at the same time, open a back-door to the Kashmir Valley by seizing the passes that led into it from the North. Gilgit and Baltistan were lost before the Indian Army could intervene. That a portion of the district of Ladakh was saved was a matter of great credit to Indian troops and their commanders and to the officers and men of the Indian Air Force, who supported them.
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As we have already seen, Gilgit fell into enemy hands early in November 1947. Pakistan’s ‘political agent’ arrived there soon after. There was a regular air service from Peshawar (in Pakistan) to Gilgit, and the latter was made a base for the march on Leh, the District Headquarters of Ladakh district. This picturesque town is situated at a height of 3,522 metres. The 480-kilometre track from Gilgit via Skardu lies mostly along the Indus. The route was hazardous, but the prize was well worth the trouble; the gompas of Ladakh were full of treasure.
“¦we have already seen, Gilgit fell into enemy hands early in November 1947. Pakistans “˜political agent arrived there soon after.
The enemy had secured its Southern flank quite early. A large tribal force had collected in the Bandipura region, North of Srinagar, in the beginning of November 1947. It was to attack Srinagar in conjunction with the main lashkar that was collecting West of the city. But Sen’s pre-emptive strike at Shalateng on 7 November routed the main lashkar, and the tribals in Bandipura were forced to withdraw. They retreated by way of Tragbal and the Razdanandan pass into the Gurais Valley and occupied it.
Some of the non-Muslim troops at Gilgit had managed to escape to Skardu, a small trading post on the route to Leh. Kashmir Infantry were deployed there under Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jang Thapa. He had come with a portion of the Leh garrison to bar the enemy’s march into Ladakh. When Skardu came under attack, Thapa withdrew the lightly held outposts around it and concentrated his men in its fort. About 300 refugees, including women and children, had taken shelter in the fort, and Thapa put the whole garrison on reduced rations to conserve his limited stock of food.
By January 1948, pressure against Skardu increased. Initial onslaughts were thrown back but realizing that Zoji La was closed for the winter and no help could reach him, Thapa requested 161 Brigade to permit him to withdraw to Kargil with the refugees and join hands with the garrison there. Sen relayed the request to Headquarters JAK Force, who rejected it. He tried again by pointing out that Skardu was of no strategic or tactical importance. But the request was again turned down, and the garrison was ordered to fight to the last man and the last round.35 The enemy brought up reinforcements and besieged the fort.
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A crucial information that is missing here is that – Ledi Gali was captured by the Sawai Man Guards under the command of Lt. Col. Raj Singh of Jaipur State Forces. This can be verified from the records.