Among the most hard-fought actions of the Bangladesh campaign were the battles around Hilli, East of Balurghat. The town was peculiarly situated. Lying on the old Calcutta-Siliguri rail-route, it had been a bustling trading centre in the pre-partition days. However, the Radcliffe Line divided the town, the railway station going to East Pakistan and the town itself to India. The Pakistani portion was sparsely populated and consisted of small villages. The enemy had fortified them and one of its crack infantry battalions, 4 Frontier Force, held the defences.
Hilli was important as it lay on the shortest route by which Indian troops could enter from the Balurghat bulge and cut the Pakistani lines of communication. The Pakistanis had been quite active around Hilli since May. On 1 November, they had shelled the Indian portion of the town and Balurghat. As a result, General Aurora decided to neutralize Hilli. Unfortunately, he chose to attack the enemy defences frontally. Thapan was opposed to the attack, but was overruled.12
The operation was launched under 202 Mountain Brigade, commanded by Brigadier F.P. Bhatty, sm, on the night of 22/23 November; 8 Guards were to put in the assault, while 5 Garhwal were to be in reserve. In support were two mountain regiments, one light battery, one medium regiment (less a battery) and a squadron of 63 Cavalry (T-55 tanks). The first enemy post fell without much trouble. However, at Morapara, the next village, the enemy fought back with all it had. Bitter fighting continued during the night but the Pakistanis managed to retain control of most of Morapara, with the Guards holding a small pocket. Towards dawn Brigadier Bhatty ordered 5 Garhwal to capture a locality from which the Pakistanis had been supporting Morapara. In a gallant assault, the battalion captured the enemy locality quickly.It had not been possible to employ armour at Morapara as two of the leading tanks bogged down during the approach. In aggressive patrolling on the following night, a major portion of Morapara was cleared, the Pakistanis later withdrawing from the village altogether. Indian losses killed and wounded in this action totalled 139, including 8 officers and 4 — JCOs.13 The Pakistanis too suffered heavy casualties.
Besides the security of the Siliguri corridor, the main task of 33 Corps was to contain Rangpur and Dinajpur in the North, capture Gaibanda and Bogra and thereafter exploit up to the Ganga. The earlier plan to advance through Hilli was given up after the action of 22/23 November. It was now to be outflanked from the North, after which the enemy lines of communication in the Pirganj-Gaibanda area were to be cut. With this in view, 165 Mountain Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R.S. Pannu, was ordered to hold the Balurghat base and relieve 202 Brigade at Hilli.
Indian losses killed and wounded in this action totalled 139, including 8 officers and 4 JCOs. The Pakistanis too suffered heavy casualties.
The later was to advance North and link up with 66 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier G.S. Sharma, vrc, at Charkai, a border village 11 kilometres North of Hilli. Sharma was to advance to Charkai from Samjia by way of Phulbari. After the capture of Charkai, the division was to move East, cut the enemy’s North-South communication lines and go for Bogra. The fourth brigade in the division, 340 Mountain Brigade, under Brigadier Joginder Singh Bakshi, vsm, was to contain Dinajpur and remain in reserve.
Sharma took Charkai on 4 December. The enemy was surprised for he had not expected an advance through this area as it was full of bils nullas and therefore, unfit for manoeuvre by armour. When the Pakistanis at Charkai saw Indian troops approaching on tanks and reported the fact to their superior Headquarters, the latter refused to believe the report. The post commander, a captain, was told that tanks could not come through marsh and bils and that he must have seen buffaloes. In reply, the captain is said to have made this submission: “You may be right, Sir. But I swear the buffaloes have 100-mm guns fitted on them and they are picking off our bunkers one by one”.14
Meanwhile, Bhatty found it impossible to link up with Sharma as an enemy position halfway between Hilli and Charkai held him. There was bitter fighting when 5 Garawal tried to force their way. The battalion suffered 65 casualties, including five officers and four JCOs. The Pakistani company commander, Major Akram of the Frontier Force, won a posthumous Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan’s highest award for gallantry, while defending the post. Only 40 of his men survived the battle.
The capture of Pirganj greatly surprised the Pakistanis. They had calculated that it would take the Indians several days to come…
On 5 December, Sharma captured Nawabganj, clearing the way to Pirganj, a town on the Rangpur-Bogra highway. With the stage thus set, the divisional commander ordered 340 Brigade to capture Pirganj. The brigade set out at first light on 7 December, with 2/5 Gorkha Rifles in the lead. By 1630 hours the highway had been cut. Considerable opposition had been expected but hardly any was met. The leading tanks shot up a small convoy of jeeps coming from the Rangpur side. Little did they know that one of the jeeps carried Major General Shah, the Pakistani divisional commander. His vehicle and a marked map were captured. He, however, escaped by jumping from the jeep and hiding behind a bush.
The capture of Pirganj greatly surprised the Pakistanis. They had calculated that it would take the Indians several days to come that far, as the advance required the building of a bridge over the Karatoya. Even after the ambush of the divisional commander’s party they thought that it was just a raid. In a hastily mounted counter-attack they lost a battalion commander and several men.
Lachhman Singh now decided to make for Bogra. He ordered 202 Brigade to advance East, link up with 66 Brigade in the Ghoraghat area and then march to Bogra by way of Khetal. Simultaneously, 66 Brigade was to capture Bhaduria, a village South of Nawabganj, and then advance to Ghoraghat and Gobindganj to link up with 340 Brigade. The latter was to push off from Pirganj, capture Gobindganj and then advance to Bogra by the main highway.
The multi-pronged approach resulted in a dispersal of the division’s resources. In the event it was Brigadier Bakshi who succeeded in getting to Bogra. Bhatty could clear the Hilli area only by 11 December. Thereafter, when his brigade was halfway to Bogra, an unbridged nulla held it up. By then it was realized that 340 Brigade would make Bogra on its own and Bhatty was ordered to countermarch and go for Rangpur, in the North. Sharma was held up at Bhaduria and the village could be cleared only on 11 December after a stiff battle in which 17 Kumaon lost 132 personnel, killed and wounded, including five officers and four JCOs.Gobindganj, on the South bank of the Karatoya, was taken by 5/11 Gorkha Rifles and a detachment of PT -76 tanks with an outflanking move. The Pakistanis had been expecting a frontal attack and in preparation they had blown up the bridge and were holding the South bank. Their surprise was great when they discovered on the afternoon of 11 December that the road behind them had been cut. They withdrew in small parties during the night, leaving all their heavy equipment behind.
The bridge at Gobindganj took time to rebuild. Meanwhile, 5/11 Gorkha Rifles and the tanks of 69 Armoured Regiment reached the Ichhamati River and found its South bank strongly held. However, during the night one company from the battalion managed to infiltrate to the South bank and establish a road-block about two kilometres South of the bridge. Later, the rest of the battalion crossed over and brushing aside the minor opposition they met, reached Mahasthan on the afternoon of 12 December. By the evening they had captured the bridge over the Karatoya.
All the same, both brigades had arrived on the Ghagat River, South-West of Rangpur, before the Pakistani surrender.
There was no water-obstacle now between 340 Brigade and Bogra. The Pakistani divisional commander knew where the next blow would fall and moved his Headquarters to Nator. Lachhman Singh’s plan was to cut off Bogra from the South with an outflanking move and then attack frontally. The first manoeuvre was completed on the morning of 14 December when 6 Guards and 69 Armoured Regiment (less a squadron) put up a road-block behind Bogra. The frontal attack was thereafter led by a squadron of 63 Cavalry and 2/5 Gorkha Rifles. To reinforce 340 Brigade, 4 Madras was now placed under its command.
The fighting in Bogra was stiff, especially after the centre of the town was reached and tanks found it difficult to manoeuvre. The Indian Air Force helped with close support. By midday on 14 December the whole area North of the railway-line had been taken, including the cantonment. A major portion of the enemy 205 Brigade was, however, still in the area and resisted the advance of the column from the South. Fighting continued on the following day with the Pakistanis sticking to a small perimeter. In the early hours of 16 December small groups began to surrender and later during the day came the orders to cease-fire.
On 13 December General Lachhman Singh had received orders for the immediate capture of Rangpur. This meant a 180-degree turn in his axis of advance. I have already mentioned the diversion of 202 Brigade to this task; another formation switched to it was 66 Brigade. The two were to make a two-pronged approach to the objective. However, on 15 December, while 202 Brigade was on its way to Rangpur, Lachhman Singh was ordered to despatch to Dacca the armour squadron that was supporting this brigade.15 The Pakistanis at Rangpur were known to have tanks and this order restricted the brigade’s advance to the hours of darkness. All the same, both brigades had arrived on the Ghagat River, South-West of Rangpur, before the Pakistani surrender.
The Pakistanis had been taking advantage of the proximity to the Indian lines of communication to the border. Shelling of Indian territory and sabotage were frequent and defensive measures had to be taken.
Of the two brigades under 6 Mountain Division, the 9th had taken Lalmanirhat by 6 December. Later it cleared the rest of the territory North of the Tista River. An ad hoc armoured squadron with 33 Corps had been given to 71 Brigade. Advancing from Thakurgaon this formation took Birganj on 5 December but could make no progress thereafter. After being informed that Dinajpur had been vacated by the enemy, Brigadier Kathpalia sent a raiding party of two companies to secure the town. However, the enemy was very much there and had armour. The raiding party not having taken armour with it the move failed. After this venture Kathpalia was ordered to go for Saidpur. The Pakistanis sent a motorized column to intercept Kathpalia but it was spotted in time by an air observation post pilot and dispersed with the help of artillery and air action. By the evening of 15 December, 71 Brigade had reached within a few kilometres of Saidpur. Its garrison surrendered to Kathpalia the next day.
Pakistan’s 57 Brigade, which had crossed over from the 2 Corps sector via Hardinge Bridge, took no part in the fighting in this sector. But it helped to swell the ranks of prisoners that surrendered to 33 Corps. The total came to 345 officers, 597 JCOs and 15,443 other ranks, besides 6,000 paramilitary personnel. The main contribution of the Mukti Bahini in this sector was the capture of Nawabganj, North-West of Rajshahi, on 12 December.
4 Corps:(Eastern area of operations)
As already mentioned, 4 Corps sector provided the shortest approach to Dacca, only 80 kilometres from Agartala by air. On both sides of the international border, surface communications ran mostly along it. Sylhet, at the Northern end of the sector, and Chittagong, near its Southern end, were connected with each other and with Dacca by rail and road, the bridge at Ashuganj providing the only link over the Meghna. The reader has already made his acquaintance with Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, the Corps Commander, in an earlier chapter. As Commander 50 (Para) Brigade he had led the Indian column that took Goa in 1961.16 The Pakistanis had been taking advantage of the proximity to the Indian lines of communication to the border. Shelling of Indian territory and sabotage were frequent and defensive measures had to be taken.
One of the early operations of this nature did not, however, go too well. It took place in the tea-garden area North of the border town of Kamalpur, in Tripura, which had been under frequent artillery and mortar fire. The Mukti Bahini could not eliminate the Pakistani locality at Dhalai, which had been responsible for the trouble. The problem was cleared by 61 Mountain Brigade after several attempts. The commander was wounded during one of these and there were other casualties as well.
The clearing of the Belonia bulge was another such operation. Here a tongue of East Pakistan territory, about 10 kilometres wide and 25 kilometres long, jutted into Tripura, and was a constant source of irritation. The area was cleared by 23 Mountain Division under Major General (later Lieutenant General) R.D. Hira, mvc, in operations spread over almost the whole of November.
Sylhet
In the Northern part of 4 Corps Zone, 8 Mountain Division, commanded by Major General (later General) K.V. Krishna Rao conducted an operation against Atgram (see Fig. 13.5). Lying on the North-East approach to Sylhet, the Pakistani locality here was held by a company of their 31 Punjab and Razakars. The Mukti Bahini having failed to tackle the enemy, 59 Brigade, under Brigadier C.A. Quinn, was given the task. Quinn ordered 4/5 Gorkha Rifles to go in during the night of 20/21 November. The battalion was able to cross the Surla River undetected but there was heavy fighting on the objective. Khukris came into play freely and almost the entire enemy company was wiped out, Rifleman Dil Bahadur Chhetri accounting for eight of the Pakistanis.17 A large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured.
Two East Bengal battalions and 5/5 Gorkha Rifles had earlier been formed into E Force which had been exerting pressure upon Sylhet from the Jaintiapur side. This and the Atgram episode led the Pakistanis to believe that when the time came Sylhet would be attacked from the North and the East and they strengthened their defences on these flanks. However, General Rao had other plans and assembled his two regular brigades for an advance from the South: 59 Brigade at Dharmanagar, 81 Brigade under Brigadier R.C.V. Apte, at Kailashahar. The enemy had two brigades of its 14 Division in this area: 202 (ad hoc) at Sylhet and 313 at Maulvi Bazar. Its third brigade was deployed around Akhaura, opposite Agartala. Rao’s main task was to cut off the retreat of the two brigades in the Sylhet area towards Bhairab Bazar, the Headquaters of their 14 Division.
Shamshernagar was secured by 81 Brigade against moderate opposition. Ghazipur proved more stubborn and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles were ordered to go in on the night of 4 December. The battalion cleared the place after a hardfought action, in which their losses were heavy. Among the nine killed was the second-in-command while the wounded numbered 64, including four officers. Meanwhile, 9 Guards had taken another Pakistani locality on the flank. This enabled the Gorkhas to capture Kulaura, unopposed, on 6 December. Kulaura was a road and rail centre of importance and its capture disorganized the enemy considerably. After its fall, 6 Rajput led the brigade’s advance towards Fenchuganj.
After 3 Punjab (81 Brigade) had taken Munshi Bazar, Indian intelligence concluded on the basis of radio intercepts that the Pakistanis were pulling out of Sylhet in a bid to concentrate around Ashuganj. The Corps Commander thought this was a good opportunity to seize Sylhet by a helicopter-borne operation. The assumption was that the town was lightly held and that E Force would link up with the heliborne troops within two days of the landing.Rao nominated 4/5 Gorkha Rifles for the mission. Though the battalion had earlier suffered fairly heavy casualties, the men were in good spirits, having got the better of the enemy every time. After an aerial reconnaissance on the morning of 7 December, the battalion began to land during the afternoon on the North bank of the Surma, about a kilometre and a half from the rail-bridge. The Indian Army had been using helicopters to lift troops for operations against insurgents in North-East India for some time but this was the first heliborne operation of the Bangladesh campaign.
The landing came as a complete surprise to the Sylhet garrison. However, the first flight was soon under small-arms and mortar fire and, after the second flight, the landings had to be suspended. By then, about 90 men, including Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Harolikar (later Brigadier Harolikar, MVC), the battalion commander, were on the ground. Harolikar’s orders were to capture the bridge over the Surma, the airfield and the radio station. However, with the enemy strength available in the town, this now looked impossible.
The wounded could not be evacuated as no landings were possible after 9 December. Only on 12 December did two helicopters brave enemy fire and take back the casualties.
Flights were resumed in the early hours of 8 December. By dawn the complete battalion group, together with two mountain guns, some engineer personnel and an air control team had landed. Meanwhile, Harolikar had kept the enemy at bay. Pakistani sources confirm that on 6 December their 313 Brigade was ordered by Major General Abdul Majid Qazi, GOC 14 Division, to link up with 27 Brigade in the Akhaura-Bhairab Bazar area. However, the Brigade Commander expressed his inability to do this as he was under pressure from Munshi Bazar and the Indian Air Force was strafing Maulvi Bazar heavily. As a result, he decided to fall back on Sylhet. He got there on the evening of 7 December and his troops followed him a day later.
Sylhet now had the remnants of two Pakistani brigades. Fortunately for 4/5 Gorkhas, Sylhet’s original garrison was mostly deployed on the Eastern and Northern approaches to the town. A welcome reinforcement for Harolikar was a company of 9 Guards, which was flown in on 9 December. The situation remained very tense for the small Indian force. The Gorkhas had landed with just a little over their pouch ammunition scale and shakarparas to last 48 hours. They were surrounded on three sides and there was no sign of the link-up from the North materializing. It had not been possible to drop food and ammunition to them owing to the proximity of the enemy and it was the Gorkha’s inborn ability to live off the land that helped the battalion. The wounded could not be evacuated as no landings were possible after 9 December. Only on 12 December did two helicopters brave enemy fire and take back the casualties.
A link-up from the South eventually took place on the night of 14 December when 6 Rajput reached the Southern bank of the Surma. By then 81 Brigade had also arrived in the vicinity of Sylhet. It would be pertinent to mention here that 59 Brigade (less 4/5 Gorkha Rifles) had been withdrawn to Kailashahar by the Corps Commander while it was advancing to Fenchuganj. He wanted the brigade to operate under 57 Mountain Division. However, when E Force failed to reach Sylhet, as planned, he switched back the brigade to this axis.
Things would have been very hard for the 4/5 Gorkhas had the Sylhet garrison made a determined effort to eject them. That it did not do so shows the demoralization that had set in amongst the enemy, as also the mettle of the men under Harolikar. In fact the Pakistanis had come to believe that a whole brigade had landed at Sylhet.
The operations of the other two divisions of 4 Corps were closely interlinked. The region they operated in was the vital quadrangle from which Dacca could be threatened closely. Allotted to the Northern portion of this region, 57 Mountain Division commanded by Major General B.F. Gonsalves, had the task of capturing Akhaura and then advancing South to reach the Meghna at Daudkandi. Of General Gonsalves’ three brigades, 61 Mountain Brigade was operating on a corps task with 23 Mountain Division. The remaining two – 73 Mountain Brigade under Brigadier M.L. Tuli and 311 Mountain Brigade commanded by Brigadier Misra – had concentrated in the Agartala area.
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