Indian Defence Review

Put the missile out to sea
Where the real estate is free
And it is far away from me.

Operation Trident

Commander-in-Chief, West executed Operation Trident, the code name for the missile attack on Karachi. At the last moment Kadmat (Commander Tony Jain), who had been exercising with the ‘Killer Squadron’ was replaced by INS Kiltan (Commander Gopal Rao), who had not worked up with the ‘Killers’ as she could only rendezvous with them at sea on 3 December 1971. The Squadron Commander (K-25), Babru Yadav, was embarked on Nipat (Lieutenant Commander Kavina). Nirghat (Lieutenant Commander I. J. Sharma) and Veer (Lieutenant Commander Mehta) were the two other missile boats. Hence, no pre-attack briefing was possible before the boats commenced their fast run to Karachi. The excellent photo reconnaissance pictures of Karachi which No. 106 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron of IAF brought back were an asset for planning the attack on the heavily defended port.

The Osas were in an arrowhead formation with Nipat leading and Nirghat to port and Veer to starboard. INS Kiltan was line astern. The formation speed was 24 knots as the missile boats hugged the Saurashtra coast on their historic attack on Karachi where sunset was at 1812 hours. It also may be noted that there is a difference of 30 minutes between Pakistan and Indian Standard Time.

The oiler, Poshak, with fuel for the Osas was positioned midway and her latitude and longitude was promulgated to the Trident force. Vidyut (Lieutenant Commander B. B. Singh) with four fully prepared missiles remained well astern to act as a deterrent in case there was a counter-attack by Pakistani destroyers. This was contrary to the appreciation at Naval Headquarters, who had advocated that maximum missiles should be fired in the first attack as surprise was the dominant factor for overall success. Two Osa boats, Vinash (Lieutenant Commander V. Jerath), and Vijeta (Commander B. B. Parti) were allotted to the Western Fleet. Nashak (Lieutenant Commander R. B. Suri) and Nirbhik (Lieutenant Commander S. Issac) were temporarily unserviceable.

Kiltan continued to pick up contacts at longer ranges due to anomalous propagation although the radar of the smaller Osa boats was equally effective. However, until the radar of the missile boat fed the contact into the console, the missiles could not acquire the designated target. K-25 gives this first-hand account of the missile attack on the night of 4 December from the bridge of Nipat.

We were in an arrowhead formation with Nirgnat five miles on the port quarter and Veer lagging behind on the starboard quarter. We were about 40 miles from Karachi. Nirghat reported a firm contact at a distance of about 25 miles. I could see this blip on my radar and evaluated it as a warship coming towards me in view of the high rate of closing. I therefore ordered Nirghat to alter course and engage this target. Nirghat altered to port and soon after fired the first missile at a distance of about 20 miles. I ordered him to fire one more missile at the same target which was now about 17 miles. I also requested Kiltan to join Nirghat.

Nipat continued to steer North with Veer on my starboard quarter. Two firm contacts developed on my radar at about 25 miles. I fired a missile on each of these contacts. In hindsight, these could have been Shahjahan and Venus Challenger. By this time, the port of Karachi was about 32 miles and painting clearly on my radar. Veer who was 8 miles astern also reported a contact fine on her starboard bow. I ordered him to engage this target. The missile immediately locked on and the result was a direct hit which disintegrated the target. By this time the distance between the three boats had opened out. Time and distance precluded the two boats from rejoining Nipat. I, therefore, instructed them to a d independently and rendezvous as planned with the tanker Poshak.

I continued towards Karachi and when about 14 miles from the harbour, I fired a missile in the direction of the entrance, with the intention of following it up with my fourth missile, which, however, misfired.

I could by this time see an explosion on the horizon. I thought this was a warship as fires leapt into the sky. I then reversed course to get outside the air attack range by first light with the intention of fuelling and returning to Bombay at high speed to re-arm for the next missile attack. I then broke radio silence to transmit ‘Angar’ the code for a successful missile attack which was received at MOR Bombay on 4th December amidst great jubilation. Thereafter, we maintained strict radio silence until we arrived at our rendezvous with Poshak. This possibly gave rise to the Pakistani claim of having sunk a missile boat.

Wing Commander K. K. Badhwdr confirms Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal’s raconteur in his autobiography that he led a four-Canberra raid on Masroor air base on the nights of 4, 5 and 6 December 1971 which came in lo-lo and then climbed up to 8000 feet to release their bombs. The Squadron Commander also confirmed that no attack was carried out by Canberras on Karachi port or Keamri oil tanks on any of the above three nights He further confirmed that the oil tanks were not designated as targets in spite of his pleas that these tanks, which were not camouflaged and clearly visible in moonlight, should be put on the list of vital economic targets.

The Pakistani official history which was published in Islamabad in 1991 states that destroyer Khaibar and minesweeper Muhafiz were sunk by surface-to-surface missiles Khaibar transmitted a signal at 2245 to Maritime Headquarters at Karachi stating that ‘enemy aircraft attacked ship in position 020 FF 20. No. 1 boiler hit. Ship stopped.’¹ Khaibar also described the second missile attack on her as from an aircraft and engaged it with Bofors AA guns. It is to be borne in mind that the Styx missile is not a skimmer like the Exocet or Harpoon. The Styx climbs into the sky before descending on the target and hence appears like a ‘ball of fire’ descending at subsonic speed. Hence, Muhafiz which witnessed this attack on Khaibar also described the missile that struck her as an air attack. The Pakistan Navy’s official history of the 1971 conflict also stated that on the night of 4 December, two tanks in the Keamari oil farm caught fire after the missile attack which was again described as a ball of fire descending from above. These fires which enveloped the two tanks were put out after three days of concentrated fire fighting. The misinterpretation of the ‘missile attack’ as being an ‘air attack’ was again repeated during the subsequent missile attack.

At this juncture, one of Nipat’s lubrication oil hose pipes gave way reducing the boat’s speed to 7 knots. After about two hours, repairs were effected and Nipat increased speed to 30 knots keeping well below the maximum speed of 45 knots in order to avoid recurrence of the hose pipe failure. Further, to avoid being in the attack range of Pakistani aircraft, Nipat altered course by 90 degrees towards Aden and only when well clear of the air route from Karachi to Bombay, altered back to rendezvous Poshak. This detour however consumed additional fuel and Nipat barely limped back by manually transferring unpumpable fuel from one tank to another. After replenishing from Poshak on 5 December, Nipat returned to Bombay.’

In the official story of the Pakistan Navy,² it was stated that the first missile struck Khaibar on the starboard side, just below the aft galley in the electricians’ mess deck at about 2245. The ship immediately lost propulsion and plunged into darkness. A huge flame shot up in number one boiler room and thick black smoke poured out of the funnel. In complete darkness, the W/T office passed the message to Karachi of being under ‘air attack’. Unfortunately the position transmitted on the emergency wireless set was incorrect which delayed the rescue of the survivors by almost a day.

The second missile was seen approaching the ship at about 2249 (11 p.m.) and was engaged by the ship’s close range weapons. The missile hit No. 2 boiler room on the starboard side. The ship began to list to port and then to quote the official story of the Pakistan Navy,

At 2300 it was decided to abandon ship when the list to port became dangerous and the ship had become enveloped in uncontrollable fires. By 2315, it had been abandoned by all those who could leave the ship. More explosions due to the bursting of ammunition continued to rock the ship as men jumped overboard from the sinking destroyer. Khaibar went down at 2320, stern first with a heavy list to port.

The minesweeper Muhafiz which arrived at her station on the inner patrol area at about 2245 was just in time to witness the missile attack on Khaibar. The Commanding Officer also thought that the wavering ball of light descending on Khaibar was a ‘Star Shell’ and evaluated it as an ‘air attack’. She altered onto course 210 degrees heading towards the burning glow which was the wreckage of Khaibar. Suddenly, a ball of light came hurtling towards the minesweeper and Muhafiz suffered a direct hit on her port side, abaft the wooden hull and disintegrated without even being able to send out a distress message. The ship’s structure continued to burn while the few survivors floated around the burning debris. Although the Pakistan Navy has categorically stated that only Khaibar and Muhafiz were sunk and there was no damage to Shahjahan as reported by Keesing’s Archives in January 1972, it was not clear until later that the missile had homed on to the oil tanks at Keamari. The supporting Petyas had intercepted MHQ Karachi’s message to Shahjahan to assist Khaibar and hence concluded that Shahjahan had been also hit by missiles.

Maritime Headquarters, Karachi directed the gunboat Sadaqat to look for Khaibar’s survivors. It was nearly midnight of 4 December when Sadaqat steered towards a glow of light over the horizon and came upon the survivors of Muhafiz and thus learnt of its sinking. They returned back to harbour in the early hours of 5 December without locating the survivors of Khaibar. Immediately another search was ordered with Zulfiqar, Shahjahan , Madadgar combing the reported area but with no results. At 1000, Sadaqat was again ordered to locate Khaibar’s survivors which she did successfully at 1600 and returned back to harbour. In the meantime, Zulfiqar, Madadgar and Munsif were instructed to commence an expanding search which was abandoned at 1913 when a false alarm of another missile attack was received.

On the morning of 5 December, the Air Priority Board of Karachi provided an assorted bunch of aircraft including Cessnas, Aero Club Austers, Dakotas, Fokkers, Twin Otters with radar and even a light plant protection aircraft. This assorted Fleet Air Arm flown by civilian pilots with naval liaison officers, were lined up at Karachi civil airport. From the afternoon of 5 December, three to four aircraft were airborne searching an arc of 200 miles from Karachi.

On the morning of 6 December, a naval liaison officer in a Fokker aircraft reported missile boat activity in the area West of Cape Monza. PAF aircraft were launched and they strafed the Pakistan survey vessel Zulfiqar which is reported to have escaped with minor damage and a loss of few lives.

The stable doors had been locked after the proverbial mares had fled!

Operation Python

The Western fleet with two missile boats in tow was to deliver another missile attack on 5 December. The Western fleet which had sailed on 2 December were being shadowed by PAF reconnaissance aircraft. The Fleet Commander was conscious of the air and submarine threats and hence split his forces under cover of darkness to shake off the snoopers and then regroup for the attack on Karachi on the night of 6/7 December.

However in order to substitute another missile boat for Vijeta which had a material problem, Naval Headquarters ordered the fleet to rendezvous Tir off Saurashtra to pick up INS Vidyut. This further postponed the missile attack on Karachi which was to coincide with a simultaneous bombardment of the Makran Coast by the Surface Action Group (SAG) consisting of Mysore, Betwa and Ranjit. Naval Headquarters appreciated that to add to the confusion at Karachi, it was necessary for another missile strike to break the will of the Pakistani forces.

In the meantime, Khukri and Kirpan returned to Bombay with Kuthar in tow, as the latter suffered a major breakdown in the engine room. Kadmat had also a machinery malfunction and had to reduce her speed. She was detached by FOCWEF and while looking for a Pakistan merchant ship, she encountered a darkened dhow bound for Karachi from Dubai with gold worth Rs 65 lakh which was seized and handed over to the Government Mint at Bombay.

The weather was boisterous as described by the Flag Captain, Russi Ghandi, on 7 December and Operation Python was again postponed to the night of 8 December. After some hesitation, in view of the sea state, which made the Osas ‘bob up and down like a yo-yo’, Trishul and Talwar were detached to escort Vinash for another attack on Karachi.

En route, Talwar was ordered to sink a small vessel with a powerful transmitter which was relaying the position of the Indian ships to Maritime Headquarters, Karachi. Talwar opened fire with her main armament of 4.5 mm gun and then closed in with 40 mm guns sinking the floating communication link.

At 2345 (2315 IST), Vinash requested permission to engage the targets as his radar had just been restored after a temporary breakdown. Vinash fired all four missiles from a distance of 15 to 10 miles from Karachi. To quote the official account of the Pakistan Navy published by Naval Headquarters, Islamabad in 1991,

The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed Manora Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a huge explosion and flames shot up so high that Qamar House, a multistoreyed building in the city, was clearly visible. The fires caused by the attack on 4 December had only been put out a day earlier. Fires once again raged in the oil farm after a short-lived respite. A distressing sight no doubt for everyone, but particularly for those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the oil farm fires earlier.³

The other three missiles sank the merchant vessel Harmattan and damaged SS Gulf Star as also the Pakistan Navy tanker Dacca. The special report submitted by Dacca merits reproduction as it is a first-hand view from the receiving end of a missile attack.

At about 2245 (2215 IST) a pale light seen travelling towards Manora parallel to the breakwater and when it was abreast the AA School it turned right and directly hit the oil tank which immediately burst into flames. A little later, another light was seen travelling from the same direction and hit the ship anchored very close to the breakwater; the ship sank immediately. At that moment, action stations were sounded and in no time the ship had manned her guns and was ready to engage the targets. In the meantime, a third light was seen travelling towards another ship at the Southern corner of the anchorage. She caught fire immediately. A little Later, a bright light was seen coming up from behind the horizon gaining height on the port bow (ship was lying 280 degree – 100 degrees). It appeared stationary for some time and then rushed steeply towards the ship. It was engaged by the port guns. It hit the tanker on the port side piercing No. 7 port FFO tank just above the water line. It ripped open the cargo and jungle decks. The motor boat and spare fuel hoses caught fire immediately. Abandon ship was piped. A number of officers and men jumped into the sea but eight officers and 37 CPOs and sailors remained on board.

The Commanding Officer of PNS Dacca continued to state that ‘another ball of light was seen approaching’. Once again it was thought that it was an air attack and searchlights were switched on from the port defences to locate the aircraft. At about the same time an air attack was directed at the PAF air bases in Karachi. No damage was observed in the port area or in the vicinity of the oil tanks. He continues,

The approaching missile was reported by lookouts on Manora Island and the information was passed to the Air Defence Sector Operation Centre at Korangi by Commodore Commanding Karachi (COMKAR). Perceived by those who saw it to be an aircraft, it was not engaged because of the gun restrictions in force and not a single shot was fired as the missile whizzed past over the harbour defences and plunged into the oil tank. Nearly six minutes after the missile hit the tank, a tremendous barrage of fire was let loose by anti-aircraft guns in harbour when air raid warning ‘Red’ was promulgated at 2248 (2318 IST) and gun restrictions lifted. Star shells were fired by the gunnery establishment, PNS Himalaya which added to the confusion as the harbour reverberated to the sounds of gunfire together with exploding tanks in the Keamari area.⁴

Lieutenant Commander Jerath of Vinash on climbing out of the ‘citadel’ of the missile boat to the open bridge observed that ‘he saw the horizon lit up’. He also received the following message from Trishul: ‘This is the best Diwali we have seen.’

IAF bombs Karachi area

Air Commodore Badhwar has since clarified that the No. 35 Canberra Squadron mounted an air attack consisting of four aircraft from Jamnagar and an additional four Canberras from Pune on the night of 8 December (and not 9 December as stated by Air Chief Marshal Lal on page 294 of his biography) The target was Drigh Road which was attacked at 2200 IST by a section of Canberras coming in from the East and skirting the radar stations of Badin and Talhar as per the tactical routing. Wing Commander Badhwar who was leading the first section stated that he found the aluminium oil tanks which were not designated as targets too tempting. He therefore released his 1000 lb MC bombs from a height of 7500 feet, to avoid ack ack fire, on a cluster of tanks. It was a dark night and after releasing the bombs at a distance of 3.5 nautical miles from the target and at a speed of 350 knots, he maintained a westerly heading until over the sea and then turned South to return to base in time for dinner.

The official Pakistan version states that ‘the chance attack of IAF at about the same time as the missile attack has led to a controversy between the IAF and the Indian Navy for claiming credit for the damage to the oil tanks at Keamari’. However, this has been since cleared up as the Canberras attacked at about 2200 (IST). The missile attack by Vinash was at 2315 (IST). This difference of 30 minutes between Indian and Pakistan standard times, seemingly gave rise to this controversy. The eyewitness version which is contained in the official history of the Pakistan Navy has been corroborated by Pakistani naval, air force and civilian authorities after an adequate cooling-down period. This should lay to rest the various claims for the destruction of the vital oil storage tanks at Keamari.

It is now clear that the Keamari tanks were first hit by missiles from seaward on the night of 4 December when two tanks caught fire which were put out on 6 December. The tanks were again struck by a missile on the night of 8 December at 2315 when extensive fires raged for days with thick black smoke blanketing the city. This was also confirmed by the Soviet satellite pictures as also by Pakistani officers years later when they met on board merchant ships. This in no way diffuses the gallant IAF attacks on the heavily defended air bases of Masroor and Drigh Road near Karachi which had for a short time stranded Pakistani bombers from taking off as a culvert leading from the dispersal to the runway had been destroyed in the first air attack on Masroor air base.

Further, there is confirmation that IAF Canberras carried out an air attack in the vicinity of the port at about 2200 on the night of 8 December. As is well known, all dockyards and ports have various storage tanks located in its periphery containing fuels and lubricants which are ready for use by ships and submarines. At Karachi, these tanks are in the dockyard, a little below the Keamari oil farm. The result of an attack from a height of 7500 feet and from a distance of 3.5 nautical miles could hardly have been observed by the air crew with the bomber travelling at 350 knots on a dark moonless night.

It is also obvious that not having been at the receiving end of a missile attack, the high parabolic track of the subsonic Styx missile was mistaken for conventional air attacks. It was only later, after the eyewitness account given by the Commanding Officer of PNS Dacca, Captain S. Q. Raza, who was deservedly awarded the Sitara-i-Jurrat, and confirmed by minesweeper Munsif which had gone to pick up Dacca’s crew who had jumped overboard that India was conducting missile warfare.

The eleven missiles which were fired sank the destroyer Khaibar, minesweeper Muhafiz as also the merchant ship Harmattan, Venus Challenger and damaged SS Gulf Star and the naval tanker Dacca which ‘survived the attack’. In addition, a Styx missile struck the Keamari oil tanks on the nights of 4 and again 8 December.

Pakistani Naval Headquarters thereafter issued an order on 9 December to reduce the ammunition outfits of warships which was perhaps unpardonable during conflict. However, they programmed short random sorties at high speeds for designated ships. This illustrated the paralysis that had crept into the Pakistan Navy after the missile attack as ships were specifically ordered to take shelter behind merchant ships to prevent the Styx missiles from locking on to them. As the official history of the Pakistan Navy forthrightly admitted what was well known, ‘The neglect of the Navy over several decades came through clearly in the 1971 war.’

The third missile attack designated Operation Triumph scheduled for 10 December was postponed and by the time it was reintroduced, the instruments of surrender had been signed. Thus ended the missile warfare in the Indian Ocean. It is interesting to note that the next missile attack in this warm ocean was during the Iran-Iraq war in 1981 when the Indian bulk carrier Rishi Vishwamitra was hit by Iraqi missiles in the Persian Gulf with the object of paralysing Iranian oil exports.

Operation Grand Slam

On 8 December 1994 after Operation Python was executed, the Fleet Commander handed over tactical command to Mysore for the bombardment of the Makran Coast on the night of 8/9 December with the intention ‘to bum, to sink, to destroy’ Pakistani installations. This was to coincide with the missile attack on Karachi.

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Mysore, Ranjit and Betwa shaped course for the Makran Coast to carry out Operation Grand Slam. However, soon after, a merchantman was seen to turn away from this Bombardment Group and thereafter the W/T Office reported that the merchant vessel was transmitting the presence of three enemy warships. Both Mysore and Ranjit fired across her bows. The vessel stopped engines, switched on her lights, raised a white flag and identified herself as Madhumati of the Pakistan Shipping Corporation bound for Singapore with a cargo of Basmati rice. The boarding party from Mysore instructed Madhumati to hoist the Indian naval ensign superior to the Pakistani flag as per the rules of war and escorted her to Bombay. Perhaps this unintentional intervention by Madhumati saved Pakistan from a bombardment by warships, which, according to those who were at the receiving end as at Genoa, Normandy, Korea, Vietnam and Falklands, are of the opinion that it was the most frightening experience in their lives.

However, this diversion and the knowledge that their position was compromised, the Western fleet which found itself more Southwards, once again postponed the bombardment of the Pakistani coast and returned to Bombay on 15 December 1971 by a circuitous route skirting ‘Goa’. Hence, the fleet manoeuvred in a rectangle in the Arabian Sea from 24 degrees North to 15 degrees North and to use the favourite expression of a distinguished Flag Officer were ‘like Maltese taxis dashing around, with no urgency to reach their destination’!

1. Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal, My Years with the IAF, pp. 294-298.
2. Story of the Pakistan Navy, History Section, Naval HQ, Islamabad, 1991, p. 345.
3. Story of the Pakistan Navy, p. 345.
4. Story of the Pakistan Navy, History Section, Naval HQ, Islamabad, 1991, p. 352.