This vulnerability must be viewed in the backdrop of the basic document of the Central Committee of the Maoists, which clearly states that the scenario of India being at war is most favourable and would be exploited for capturing state power. We therefore have fifth columnist in form of Maoists ready to act in concert with China or Pakistan, or both, in the event of war.
The Red Corridor not only has international boundaries with Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar, it is now creeping towards the eastern seaboard. They have registered some level of presence in pockets of eastern coast. Should they begin to control stretches on India’s eastern seaboard, it will add another dimension to the maritime security of the country. For the Maoists it will facilitate arms and logistics supplies from external sources by sea route.
The Red Corridor not only has international boundaries with Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar, it is now creeping towards the eastern seaboard. They have registered some level of presence in pockets of eastern coast.
The most immediate and pressing concern, some army authorities averred was that Maoism is impacting on the internal fabric of the army. The army draws substantial manpower from the 240 Maoist impacted districts of the country. One senior army officer, commanding his brigade in a Maoist affected region told this author that one fine morning he found police in the separated family area in his brigade premises, which was there to nab a Maoist cadre, who as intelligence sources revealed was to exchange arms in one of the family quarters. The Maoist cadre did arrive and was nabbed.
There are increasing number of cases of jawans coming back months late from leave, their alibi being that they were abducted by the Maoists. There is no way such claims can be verified. There are also instances of jawans while on leave being compelled by Maoists to take part in operations or sharing their professional training and expertise.
The authorities in Gaya district of Bihar spoke about ex-servicemen imparting training to Maoist cadres purely for monetary considerations. There were some army jawans, who complained to this author that they have to meet the extortion demands of the Maoists for the sake of protection of the families residing in the villages of Jharkhand.
Some of the army officers were of the firm view that the army must act against the Maoists before the Maoist ideology begins to make inroads into the organization and vitiates the internal fabric of the army.
The Solution
Left wing extremism in India since the 60s was never extinguished; it only reinvented itself and displayed extraordinary flexibility in adapting to changing geopolitical circumstances. Its biggest strength are its ideologues. The problem cannot be solved in any enduring manner till these ideologues residing in urban areas, leading respectable lives, are treated as white-collared terrorists and enemies of India. The home ministry has enough intelligence and legal ammunition against them. The government has to gather political gumption and drive the fear of law into them.
Some of the army officers were of the firm view that the army must act against the Maoists before the Maoist ideology begins to make inroads into the organization and vitiates the internal fabric of the army.
It is not the case that ‘Operation Green Hunt’ or the measures and operations of the state forces have not put the Maoists on the back foot. The progress, however, is unbearably slow. Moreover, the armed cadres of the Maoists are just limbs, even if severed, they re-grow. The heads have to be therefore crushed.
Though the police administration maintains that it can overcome the problem, they are ambivalent about the timeframe. Moreover, no agency in India has ever accepted that a particular problem is beyond its capability. Undoubtedly, there are efforts by the police to modernize and expand. The Jharkhand police is already in the process of expanding from 30,000 personnel to 70,000. This force will however require intense training and given the terrain they would be required to operate in, the training will have to be more of military in nature. Given the skewed operational hierarchy and lack of operational experience, a expanded police force with the bulk of men in the same age and service group may not be effective. Also, these men will also be employed on other police duties, which are contrary to the ethos and structure of any operational force.
It is doubtful whether an expanded police force without change in structure, basic ethos and most importantly leadership of the ‘Follow Me’ variety will achieve the desired results. The police so far has been designed for a different role i.e. for enforcing law and order. Deterrence, rather than force is the functional parameter of police forces in the civilized world. The security structure of India is such that the police, the para-military, and the military are used, in that order depending the level of increase in violence.
The Maoist terrorism, as it obtains today, needs to be addressed simultaneously at all levels in a manner i.e. the ideologues should be treated as terrorists”¦
General VK Singh, Chief of Army Staff has stated: “There are no Army operations against the Maoists. We are only involved in training and guiding the paramilitary forces fighting them.” In Bihar and Jharkhand, as also in Chhattisgarh, new training institutions have been created to bring the police equal to the operational challenges posed by Maoist terrorism. These are being run by army veterans. This indicates that the Maoist challenge is beyond the police. After all, training is a function of command. It cannot be the case that the policemen are trained by army personnel, commanded by Inspectors and administered by IPS officers. It cannot also be the case that the police force falls between two stools i.e. military imperatives of the Maoist challenge and exigencies of police duties. It is also not in the long term organizational interest of the police to have two parallel streams – military trained stream and police (untrained) stream.
Army was deployed in Punjab and continues to be so in Assam, Northeast and Kashmir. Never before, the phraseology “insurgents being own people, and not enemies” has so skillfully and irresponsibly been bandied before. This is the gift of the intellectual cadres of the Maoists.
The Maoist terrorism, therefore, as it obtains today, needs to be addressed simultaneously at all levels in a manner i.e. the ideologues should be treated as terrorists; the epicenter of terrorism in Abu Jamal forests should be dismantled by the Army; the bordering junctions and tri-junctions of other affected states, where the Maoists have strongholds should be dealt either by army or para-military depending on their formidability and remaining areas could be addressed by state police.
The people of the Maoist affected areas need quick deliverance by the state. They cannot afford to sacrifice one more generation.
Please wait...
