The Ideological Factor
At the lower levels, the ideological factor of Maoism is clearly missing. The foot soldiers are just instruments of violence and part of the extortion industry. The lower level leaders are generally people with criminal records. Such people are selected as leaders by the top Maoist leadership because of their penchant for violence and their ability to create terror. This is out of design – reminiscent of Mao’s revolution. Mao too had collaborated with bandit leaders, when he made his ‘Red Base’ in South Hunan. He was asked by his Soviet masters to use the bandits and then eliminate them.
Indoctrination is certainly the key ingredient, and the ideological factor becomes more and more pronounced as one goes up the Maoist hierarchy. Ideologically, the Central Committee members are most focused and committed. Even more committed and dangerous are the benefactors and protagonists of the Maoists residing in the urban areas, enjoying the respectability of intellectuals, media personalities, lawyers, doctors, social activists and NGOs. Most of them are on the payroll of the Maoists. They are part of the Maoist agenda to destabilize India in every possible manner. Their respectability is their main weapon. It is for this reason that the same people take up causes ranging from Kashmir to Northeast, to Narmada project, to Singur. In Bihar, it is evident that wherever the Maoists hit a social and economic roadblock, they have bypassed and moved ahead to another area to create and exploit every imaginable fissure that exists in any society, any country or for that reason in any family. The reasons could be both – ‘lack of resources’ or ‘abundance of resources’. Such roadblocks that this author visited had only one attribute and that was the ability to match the armed power of the Maoists unitedly.
Even more committed and dangerous are the benefactors and protagonists of the Maoists residing in the urban areas, enjoying the respectability of intellectuals, media personalities, lawyers, doctors, social activists and NGOs.
Some of Maoists facilitators also imposed themselves on the latest anti-corruption movement by Anna Hazaare. Mao too considered himself basically an intellectual. In a letter to a friend in 1920 he remarked: “I think labourers in China do not really suffer poor physical conditions. Only scholar suffers.”
The authorities in Bihar and Jharkhand that this author interacted with were convinced that the Maoist infiltration is in other political parties as well. It has been the wont of the ultra-leftists to join hands with other groups in dislodging the dispensation, only to abandon them later. Nepal is the latest example. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were many CCP members, who joined the Nationalist Party and remained in it as a communist mole on Moscow’s directions. Similarly, there are elements within various political parties, who are known to be directly or indirectly furthering the cause of the Maoists.
The anti-India agenda of the Maoists was very clear, when some students of a university in Delhi celebrated the killing of 70 CRPF personnel in Chhattisgarh. It speaks of their level of indoctrination. Some of these elements will join bureaucracy and judiciary. Some of them will become politicians. Some of them failing in every endeavour will be thrust with the image of intellectuals and given international awards. These are the people who will lead candle marches when their activists are unmasked and arrested on charges of sedition. They will refuse to join any such march when passenger trains are attacked or security forces are killed by the Maoists. They all will subvert the Indian system and India’s territorial integrity. If not they, then who are enemies of India?
The infiltration of the Maoists in urban areas is formidable, not in terms of armed threat for now, but definitely in terms of disproportionate influence the so called intellectual cadres wield in the media and over the policy-making apparatus at the national level.
In Bihar, it is evident that wherever the Maoists hit a social and economic roadblock, they have bypassed and moved ahead to another area to create and exploit every imaginable fissure that exists in any society, any country or for that reason in any family.
In Jharkhand, the security forces authorities by timely intervention have been able to drive fear of law in to some academics, who were on the verge of being snared by the Maoists for monetary considerations.
Mao had said that the success of revolution is predicated 30 percent on arms strength and 70 percent on propaganda. The Maoists have been using the latter exceedingly well. The propaganda machinery of the Maoists comprises individuals, who are enjoying urban luxuries in the name of liberalism and intellectualism. These are the people who have not allowed Maoism to die in India. They have fantastic ability to reinvent themselves. They are part of an international network. The presence of some citizens of European Union countries during the trial of a social activist allegedly having links with Maoists in Chhattisgarh High Court is a stark indicator.
The Maoists carry out attacks by overwhelming the targets and that too, only when success is certain. When forced to go on defence, they are not averse to using children and women as shield. Any casualties of women and children give enormous propaganda ammunition to the national and international supporters of the Maoists thriving in the garb of human rights activists.
The international benefactors of the Maoists have no qualms about the medieval punishments meted out by the Jan Adalats of the Maoists. The authorities in Jharkhand and Bihar are exercised over the international network of the Maoists, especially CCOMPOSA i.e. Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia.
The CCOMPOSA in a recent meet held secretly in March 2011 in India, adopted a political resolution: “This conference is being held when the Indian new democratic revolution continues to confront the serious challenge of ‘Operation Green Hunt’ launched by the Indian State. While the initial victories in beating ‘this war on the people’, politically as well as militarily gives better conditions to revolutionaries, the gravity of challenges they face remains. The revolution in Nepal is at crossroads…”
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Further the CCOMPOSA resolution states: “Seize power where it is possible, develop ongoing war to higher levels, prepare and initiate ‘Peoples War’ where parties exist and buildup parties where they don’t…”
The ideological challenge posed by the Maoists is too sophisticated and its international dimensions are far to complex for the common man, and to an extent for the policy makers, to comprehend. The Maoists closely monitor India’s posturing with regard to various countries and international issues. The role of some of the church organizations in this regard is also suspect. Never have the Maoists targeted the interests of the church.
Given the international character of the Maoists, it will not be easy for the Indian state to crush the ideologues and without crushing them Maoism will remain a threat in being.
On the Indian stand on Libya, the CCOMPOSA resolution says: “… the compradore Indian government, instead of standing against the imperial attempts of interference in the going war in Libya, by firmly opposing the ‘Resolution’ play a role of cunning fox, abstaining in the voting…”
Given the international character of the Maoists, it will not be easy for the Indian state to crush the ideologues and without crushing them Maoism will remain a threat in being.
During this author’s visit to Gaya, the officials indicated that on the eve of Independence Day last year, the Maoists had issued a diktat that black flags will be hoisted in all schools instead of the Tricolour. One girl student was incensed enough to gather the gumption to pull down the black flag and hoist the Tricolour. She and her family have since been forced to leave the village. Does this kind of threat from the Maoists does not construe an inimical act against the nation? Are Maoists not anti-nationals?
Some observers in Jharkhand and Bihar are convinced that the CPI (ML) and at some level the CPI (M) are leverages controlled by the same external powers, who control the Maoists. They by design are made to operate at different levels. The CPI (M) is the parliamentary face, CPI (ML) the semi-parliamentary leverage, and Maoists, the revolutionary tools. In Bihar, CPI (ML) cadres double up as armed cadre of the Maoists during night and flag-bearing political activists of CPI (ML) during day.
In the ongoing panchayat elections in Bihar, the CPI (ML) candidates are being actively supported by the Maoist cadres even in places where the Maoists have issued poll boycott call. At places, the Maoists have held ‘Jan Adalats’ to intimidate and mobilize votes in favour of CPI (ML) candidates.
“¦the Maoist violence is not a mere question of casualties and violent incidents. It is about terror, which is as ugly and vicious as the terror industry of Taliban.
This multi-organ, multi-level and multi-thrust approach by the international benefactors of the Maoists ensures the survivability of the movement in all scenarios and against all odds. These different organs are made to believe that they are independent. The benefactors are not even averse to their infighting and internecine war, but at the critical time, they are prodded rather ordered to come together, something that is being done by China in Nepal. Moscow did the same while orchestrating the communist revolution in China.
Terror is the Key
Speaking on the anti-Maoist operation, one of the high government functionaries in Bihar quipped that we have to be lucky all the time while the Maoists have to be lucky only once.
Both in the Maoist affected areas of Jharkhand and Bihar, the level of intimidation and violence perpetrated by the Maoists has created terror amongst the people. In fact, a whole generation has grown up in this atmosphere. Therefore, the Maoist violence is not a mere question of casualties and violent incidents. It is about terror, which is as ugly and vicious as the terror industry of Taliban. The Maoists do not give a symbolic window for any reprieve as in the case of Islamic terrorism after the killing of Osama bin Laden.
Operation Green Hunt has so far failed in delivering people from fear. The bandh call given by the Maoists is hardly contested rather they are becoming increasingly frequent. A government functionary in Bihar was candid enough to admit that the administration does not contest Maoist bandhs for fear of casualties to common people. This author traveled on Ranchi-Jamshedpur road during one such bandh. Business was paralyzed and terror was palpable.
The Maoist threat in rural areas of Jharkhand and some areas of Bihar has compelled professionals like doctors and teachers to shift to middle level and district towns for security. It is one of the reasons for escalation of property prices in the urban areas.The methods used by the Maoists to silence detractors are so gruesome that the people are terrorized forever. Many of them are meted out in full public view in the ‘Jan Adalats’. It is all done to terrorize the people to increase the spread of the Maoist terror and extortion territory. Even in moderately affected areas, the terror factor is high. The Maoists have graduated to calling railway bandhs. India has capitulated. In last railway bandh called by the Maoists more than 20 trains were either cancelled or diverted. In many areas, night trains have been discontinued with.
One police official in Bihar lamented the fact that while the judiciary does not spare criminals, hard-core Maoists charged with dozens of murders are being granted bail. They come back only to unleash fresh round of terror.
Army was deployed in Punjab and continues to be so in Assam, Northeast and Kashmir. Never before, the phraseology “insurgents being own people, and not enemies” has so skillfully and irresponsibly been bandied before.
The Maoist expansion is primarily by means of terror, propaganda and indoctrination are only vehicles. The Red Corridor has been paved through Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand, not for reasons of underdevelopment, but because the strategic advantages that the terrain bestows for armed insurrection.
While the forests provide cover, isolation and insulation, the minerals provide the wealth. The area is an ideal ‘red base’ or ‘liberated zone’ to expand influence, and to fall back when pushed. It is pure military strategy, tribal disaffection is only a ruse.
Nothing stings the Maoist leadership as much as any group which rises to fight Maoist terror. The leadership then, apart from armed cadres, activates all its urban leverages in the intelligentsia, media, and judiciary.
In Jharkhand, people were of the opinion that the rapid expansion of Maoists in the state was because there were no resistance groups like ‘Salwan Juddum’ in Chhattisgarh or Ranvir Sena in Bihar. People in Bihar, including government functionaries said that but for Ranvir Sena in the 80s and 90s the entire state would have been taken over by the Maoists.
Government officials in Jharkhand also said that unlike Chhattisgarh, there was no displacement of population in Jharkhand on account of Maoist violence, primarily because the Maoist local and middle level leadership has traditionally been with the locals, who are part of the fabric of the society.
Government officials in Jharkhand also said that unlike Chhattisgarh, there was no displacement of population in Jharkhand on account of Maoist violence, primarily because the Maoist local and middle level leadership has traditionally been with the locals, who are part of the fabric of the society. They therefore, have affinities and also vulnerabilities. In Chhattisgarh, however, the leadership is from Andhra and lately also from Bihar. This leadership has no sense of belonging with the locals and therefore is very cruel in its methods. It sees things only in black and white. Those whom they perceive to be the black category are tortured, maimed and killed. To escape the Maoist terror, thousands have fled their villages, to find shelter in Salwan Juddum camps.
Taking leaf out of Mao’s revolution in China, the Maoists deliberately create their strongholds in the interstate junctions or tri-junctions in order to exploit the lack of coordination, weakness and diverse approach of different states in tackling Maoist terrorism. That is why the region of tri-junction of Andhra, Chhattisgarh and Orissa remains the most formidable stronghold of the Maoists. Geographically, Jharkhand is most vulnerable as almost all 24 districts have borders with other states. The areas of Bihar that border with Jharkhand are worst affected. Good governance by the state government has made very feeble dents. These areas are Aurangabad, Gaya and Sassaram. But, as one moves away farther from these areas, the feature of governance, which includes vigilant policing, has made tremendous impact.
The authorities in both the states, Jharkhand and Bihar, do not give much accent to the pan-India dimension of the Maoists problem. Their approach continues to be of that “law and order” problem rather than “insurgency”. While the Maoists cadres have time and again displayed tremendous mobility in the Red Corridor, the affected states are severely hamstrung by boundaries and territorial jurisdiction issues. However, they are loathe to accept the same and insist that there is indeed cooperation between the various states in coordinating anti-Maoist operation. Such claims have no robust and tangible manifestations so far.
The Strategic Dimension
While the Union Home Ministry and the law and order apparatus of various states focus on the internal security aspects, there are overwhelming strategic ramifications of the Maoist problem as far as the armed forces are concerned, but have not been dovetailed into the anti-Maoist response of the state. The MoD and the armed forces can allow this state of affairs to continue at the peril of India.
Considering the pan-Indian nature of Maoist terrorism through the heart of India, the strategic dimension of the Maoist threat is most pernicious. Apart from containing strategic minerals, the Red Corridor dominates the entire road and rail communication links connecting the eastern part of India, extending upto our frontiers with China. The Maoists, with their enormous IED resources have shown their ability to severely disrupt communications to the eastern part of India. This is the vulnerability, which can cost dearly in the event of hostilities with China and even Pakistan, as these communications serve as the precarious logistics links, and for switching over forces from one theatre to another.
This vulnerability must be viewed in the backdrop of the basic document of the Central Committee of the Maoists, which clearly states that the scenario of India being at war is most favourable and would be exploited for capturing state power. We therefore have fifth columnist in form of Maoists ready to act in concert with China or Pakistan, or both, in the event of war.
The Red Corridor not only has international boundaries with Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar, it is now creeping towards the eastern seaboard. They have registered some level of presence in pockets of eastern coast. Should they begin to control stretches on India’s eastern seaboard, it will add another dimension to the maritime security of the country. For the Maoists it will facilitate arms and logistics supplies from external sources by sea route.
The Red Corridor not only has international boundaries with Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar, it is now creeping towards the eastern seaboard. They have registered some level of presence in pockets of eastern coast.
The most immediate and pressing concern, some army authorities averred was that Maoism is impacting on the internal fabric of the army. The army draws substantial manpower from the 240 Maoist impacted districts of the country. One senior army officer, commanding his brigade in a Maoist affected region told this author that one fine morning he found police in the separated family area in his brigade premises, which was there to nab a Maoist cadre, who as intelligence sources revealed was to exchange arms in one of the family quarters. The Maoist cadre did arrive and was nabbed.
There are increasing number of cases of jawans coming back months late from leave, their alibi being that they were abducted by the Maoists. There is no way such claims can be verified. There are also instances of jawans while on leave being compelled by Maoists to take part in operations or sharing their professional training and expertise.
The authorities in Gaya district of Bihar spoke about ex-servicemen imparting training to Maoist cadres purely for monetary considerations. There were some army jawans, who complained to this author that they have to meet the extortion demands of the Maoists for the sake of protection of the families residing in the villages of Jharkhand.
Some of the army officers were of the firm view that the army must act against the Maoists before the Maoist ideology begins to make inroads into the organization and vitiates the internal fabric of the army.
The Solution
Left wing extremism in India since the 60s was never extinguished; it only reinvented itself and displayed extraordinary flexibility in adapting to changing geopolitical circumstances. Its biggest strength are its ideologues. The problem cannot be solved in any enduring manner till these ideologues residing in urban areas, leading respectable lives, are treated as white-collared terrorists and enemies of India. The home ministry has enough intelligence and legal ammunition against them. The government has to gather political gumption and drive the fear of law into them.
Some of the army officers were of the firm view that the army must act against the Maoists before the Maoist ideology begins to make inroads into the organization and vitiates the internal fabric of the army.
It is not the case that ‘Operation Green Hunt’ or the measures and operations of the state forces have not put the Maoists on the back foot. The progress, however, is unbearably slow. Moreover, the armed cadres of the Maoists are just limbs, even if severed, they re-grow. The heads have to be therefore crushed.
Though the police administration maintains that it can overcome the problem, they are ambivalent about the timeframe. Moreover, no agency in India has ever accepted that a particular problem is beyond its capability. Undoubtedly, there are efforts by the police to modernize and expand. The Jharkhand police is already in the process of expanding from 30,000 personnel to 70,000. This force will however require intense training and given the terrain they would be required to operate in, the training will have to be more of military in nature. Given the skewed operational hierarchy and lack of operational experience, a expanded police force with the bulk of men in the same age and service group may not be effective. Also, these men will also be employed on other police duties, which are contrary to the ethos and structure of any operational force.
It is doubtful whether an expanded police force without change in structure, basic ethos and most importantly leadership of the ‘Follow Me’ variety will achieve the desired results. The police so far has been designed for a different role i.e. for enforcing law and order. Deterrence, rather than force is the functional parameter of police forces in the civilized world. The security structure of India is such that the police, the para-military, and the military are used, in that order depending the level of increase in violence.
The Maoist terrorism, as it obtains today, needs to be addressed simultaneously at all levels in a manner i.e. the ideologues should be treated as terrorists”¦
General VK Singh, Chief of Army Staff has stated: “There are no Army operations against the Maoists. We are only involved in training and guiding the paramilitary forces fighting them.” In Bihar and Jharkhand, as also in Chhattisgarh, new training institutions have been created to bring the police equal to the operational challenges posed by Maoist terrorism. These are being run by army veterans. This indicates that the Maoist challenge is beyond the police. After all, training is a function of command. It cannot be the case that the policemen are trained by army personnel, commanded by Inspectors and administered by IPS officers. It cannot also be the case that the police force falls between two stools i.e. military imperatives of the Maoist challenge and exigencies of police duties. It is also not in the long term organizational interest of the police to have two parallel streams – military trained stream and police (untrained) stream.
Army was deployed in Punjab and continues to be so in Assam, Northeast and Kashmir. Never before, the phraseology “insurgents being own people, and not enemies” has so skillfully and irresponsibly been bandied before. This is the gift of the intellectual cadres of the Maoists.
The Maoist terrorism, therefore, as it obtains today, needs to be addressed simultaneously at all levels in a manner i.e. the ideologues should be treated as terrorists; the epicenter of terrorism in Abu Jamal forests should be dismantled by the Army; the bordering junctions and tri-junctions of other affected states, where the Maoists have strongholds should be dealt either by army or para-military depending on their formidability and remaining areas could be addressed by state police.
The people of the Maoist affected areas need quick deliverance by the state. They cannot afford to sacrifice one more generation.
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