Military & Aerospace

The Indian Army: The first challenge - I
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Issue Book Excerpt: Indian Army After Independence | Date : 22 Oct , 2011

Baramula was a prosperous town, only 56 kilometres from Srinagar. Once the tribesmen got there, they let loose an orgy of primitive savagery.

For many months, the troops under Russell had undergone no training. They had been collecting and escorting refugees, and doing other odd jobs, such as flood relief work. Their weapons and equipment had suffered in the process and, what was worse, units were dispersed in detachments over large areas. But every man now rose to the occasion. Foreign observers were struck by the skill and speed with which the airlift was handled.

On receipt of the Maharaja’s request for help, an Army Airlift Committee had been formed on 25 October under the chairmanship of the Air Marshal commanding the Royal Indian Air Force. It had originally discussed only the ways and means of sending supplies and arms. Once the Cabinet decided to send in troops, the Committee drew up a schedule of flights from Willingdon (now Safdarjang) and Palam airports. Air Force liaison officers were posted at the Palam and Srinagar airfields and a radio link was established between Willingdon and Srinagar. All available civilian Dakotas (about 30 in number) were requisitioned. No rear airfield maintenance organization6 was then available at Delhi, and the Command staff, assisted by some officers from the Delhi Area, had to take on the responsibility of despatching troops and the equipment needed by them.

Included in their takings were young women, carried away forcibly, “˜to be sold like cattle in the streets, of Rawalpindi and Peshawar or to live and die as slaves in the mountain fastness of the distant tribal territory.

No reliable information was available regarding the strength of the tribal lashkar in the Kashmir Valley, and it was initially decided to fly an infantry battalion to Srinagar and despatch a brigade group to Jammu by road (see Fig. 3.2).7 But with every unit out on internal security duties, it was a problem to get hold of troops quickly enough. The nearest infantry unit was 1 Sikh; it had been operating around Gurgaon, 20 kilometre from New Delhi. A signal was flashed to it shortly before midnight (26/27 October) that the battalion, less two companies, should reach Palam airport by 0400 hours (27 October) ready to fly on an operational mission; the rest of the battalion would be flown the next day. Like many other units, 1 Sikh was not upto full strength. To make it up, Sikh personnel from 13 Field Regiment that happened to be at the Red Fort were organized into an infantry company and placed under the battalion temporarily.

Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai was in command of 1 Sikh. His companies were spread over a large area. Getting them together and fitting them out for an operation was not easy. But Rai knew this had to be done. With a quiet efficiency that was characteristic of him, he got his men together and reached Palam. There, thanks to the good work put in by the staff of Command Headquarters and the airport authorities, everything was ready – ammunition, rations and ordnance stores — to equip the troops for their mission.

The Dakota carrying Rai and his tactical Headquarters touched down at Srinagar’s dusty air-strip at 0830 hours on 27 October. His orders were that in case radio communication between him and the Srinagar air-strip could not be established and the signal to land was not given, he was to turn back and fly to Jammu, whence he was to reconnoitre the land route to Srinagar. In fact, no one was sure of the fate of Srinagar when the airlift was undertaken, and it was a good start to the rescue operation that his plane, and those that followed, landed without mishap.

Foreign observers were struck by the skill and speed with which the airlift was handled.

The situation on the ground, however, was far from good. Between Rai’s small force unloading its baggage at the air-strip and the tribal lashkar at Baramula there was only a detachment of about 40 state forces troops. These men were holding a position some 5 kilometres East of Baramula. Instead of waiting for the enemy to come and attack him, Rai at once sent one of his companies forward. By noon it had joined the state troops.

Rai realized that the strength with him was woefully inadequate for the defence of Srinagar and he sent a signal to Delhi asking for reinforcements. Brigadier (later Major General) Hira Lal Atal had been deputed as liaison officer with the state government. He also reported to Delhi that at least a brigade group should be positioned in the valley. That night, Rai was told that the enemy at Baramula would be strafed the next day. He was also given the welcome news that a brigade would soon be in position at Srinagar.

The next day (26 October) Menon brought the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja, and Sheikh Abdullah also joined in the appeal for troops.

On 28 October, after most of his battalion had arrived, Rai went forward with two more companies of his unit. His intention was to drive the tribals out of Baramula. It was a wise decision. Baramula lies at the mouth of the Srinagar Valley. Once the tribal lashkar debouched into the valley it would be more difficult to deal with it, he thought. But he was unaware of the fact that the tribesmen were equipped with mortars and machine guns.

The enemy attacked soon after Rai’s arrival at the position held by the company that he had sent the previous day. The Sikhs fought hard but were badly outnumbered. When the enemy began to outflank his position, Rai decided to pull out. Unfortunately, while he was seeing off the last of his men, he was hit by a bullet and died on the spot. The battalion also lost a JCO and 20 men in the action.8

The Sikhs and the state forces troops now made for Srinagar. The second-in-command of 1 Sikh took charge of the situation and deployed the three companies at Pattan, a village about 25 kilometres from Srinagar. The lashkar followed up and fanned out into the valley after bypassing the Sikhs’ position. After the arrival of more troops on 29 October, the remaining company of the battalion, till then guarding the air-strip, joined the main body at Pattan.

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