Indian Defence Review

The simple fact is that, if and when it suits her national interests, China will not hesitate to take physical action against India such as opening multiple land routes to the Indian Ocean to cater to her long term energy requirements. This is likely even while China’s power projection in the IOR remains constrained in the absence of credible air cover till aircraft carrier groups with accompanying airpower can be deployed. For the time being, her power projection in the IOR will, in all likelihood, be under the guise of what may be termed as ‘military operations other than war’.

Some Western strategists even feel that to shock India into territorial concessions, the PLA may consider a savage campaign including limited nuclear exchange. Although crossing the nuclear rubicon may be unlikely, we certainly cannot rule out the possibility altogether. What we should be ready for is the opening of multiple fronts as it has occurred before. Land-based enveloping actions of yesteryears will be replaced by vertical envelopment through helicopter-based RRF. Physical activation of the LAC will be preceded by full spectrum satellite surveillance, cyber attacks on the military, non-military networks and critical infrastructure, laser and plasma attacks. Conflict may be simultaneous at the operational, strategic and tactical levels that maybe intense but short with the use of PGMs to maximum effect.

Defence Against China

To advocate a tiered defence against China is no surprise as tiered defence is probably most effective against anything. In World War I, even the Maginot Line had obstacles thrown in ahead besides artillery barrages to stop the advancing enemy. The term ‘offensive defence’ has been in vogue since long. Besides the most simplistic explanation could well be that one cannot defend one’s house by simply barricading it, and that there must be elements outside to patrol the streets. The second issue is that of employing asymmetric approaches particularly in cyberspace and employing proxies in the sub-conventional segment of the conflict spectrum.

It is well known the PLA has invested in border villages, making inroads through smugglers, agents and Special Forces personnel besides using its soldiers in the garb of civilians in development projects in countries surrounding India particularly Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar in proximity of the LAC. What is important in planning the tiered defence against China is to carefully develop each tier taking into account Chinese concepts and attack methodology, realities of warfare in the twenty-first century and optimising advancements in technology to help buttress defence.

Significantly, China flight tested its new hypersonic vehicle in January 2014, which travels at a velocity at least five times faster than sound. China favours a pre-emptive strike as an option to break the enemy will to fight with damaging strikes, increasing ground operations simultaneously. We need to bridge such asymmetries.

First Tier

In the prevailing environment of global conflict, the first tier of defence must necessarily be deep inside enemy backyard; application of asymmetric approaches in reverse of what China has been waging against us for many years, which China terms as ‘unrestricted warfare’. Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare does not just span the use of proxies but is based on the three main pillars of the Military (atomic, conventional, bio-chemical, ecological, space, guerilla and terrorist warfare), Trans Military (diplomatic, network, intelligence, psychological, tactical, smuggling, drug and virtual warfare) and the Non-Military (financial, trade, resources, economic aid, regulatory, sanctions, media and ideological warfare).

Divorcing conventional defence from these forms of ongoing warfare would be foolish. Our first tier of defence as a country against China should, therefore, be aimed at not only negating her aggressive moves in each of these segments but also optimising such moves in India’s favour. As far as sub-conventional conflict is concerned, China has numerous faultlines and her buffer provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet are on the boil. While China, in conjunction with Pakistan, has been using her advanced sub-conventional potential against India, the latter has been relying on rather ineffective diplomacy and conventional force. Basing a policy against sub-conventional threats on idealism as a stand-alone factor only provides an inward looking policy which is more expensive in the long run and adversely affects our national security and development. In coping with asymmetric threats, establishment of offensive cyber warfare, space warfare and electro-magnetic capability including Directed Energy Weapons are vital as well.

Second Tier

The second tier of defence would be at the LAC itself. India needs to ensure that she does not present a weak front anywhere along the LAC. There should be unity of command with everything placed under the command of the Army. Sensitive areas such as Depsang and Chumar in Eastern Ladakh should be held by Ladakh Scouts who are the ‘sons of the soil’ rather than the ITBP. Similarly, the same pattern should follow along the rest of the LAC in Himachal, Sikkim, Arunachal and Meghalaya.

Existing levels of Scouts units in these regions need to reviewed considering the role they have in conflict across the LAC and subsequently fighting the enemy inside own territory cutting off the thrust lines, should such a need arise. The first tier must have continuous trans-border surveillance in place. This must consist of satellite cover, UAVs, MAVs and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS). Comprehensive battlefield transparency must be in place integrating space, areal and ground equipment such as LOROS, BFSR, HHTIs, UGS, Surveillance cameras and NVDs.

Modern electronic surveillance involves detection of movement, and is largely based on seismic, acoustic, inductive sensors, and infrared sensors – all of which should be optimised. Considering the length of the unsettled border, construction of a border fence akin to the Indo-Pak border is not feasible. However, it would be prudent to cater for the laying of obstacles, mines and IEDs on imminence of hostilities but fire or aerially lay mines on axes of enemy advance, as required. The forces deployed along the LAC (as also subsequent tiers and offensive reserves) need to be provisioned with the wherewithal for information dominance and assurance, ability to paralyse the enemy’s C4I2 infrastructure, stand-off weapons to pre-empt enemy attack, adequate mix of DEW, PGMs and ASATs, ability to disrupt enemy logistics/sustenance and mix of hard and soft kill options. Fielding of the Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS) and Battlefield Management System (BMS) must be expedited. Development of border infrastructure needs to be fine-tuned to cater for all types of day or night movement.

Third Tier

This essentially comprises the second layer of units and sub-units in support of the troops deployed along the LAC. There would be requirement of scouts, home guards, civil defence forces operating in the gaps in addition to extensive network of army patrols. Obstacles can be laid ab initio or as required along the assessed and actual thrust lines of the enemy. Areas that the PLA could possibly use for third dimension aerial envelopment (between the second and third tiers and behind the third tier) would need to be identified and measures instituted to negate their use; obstacles, fire plans and earmarking of reserves.

Mountain Strike Corps

Mountain-based operations are time consuming and more significantly, manpower intensive. In addition to the aerospace dimension, land-based conflict should be expected more in areas conducive to the deployment of mechanised forces; examples being Eastern Ladakh, North Sikkim and Chumbi Valley. Offensive operations essentially require uncommitted troops. To this end, there is a definite need to deploy an exclusive Mountain Strike Corps in Ladakh considering the collusive China-Pakistan threat including China’s strategic designs in the POK-Ladakh region. A second Mountain Strike Corps needs to be deployed to cater to Chinese claims to so-called “South Tibet” for appropriate response when required.

Conclusion

China is fast emulating Nazi Germany; her actions indicating her belief that she has achieved the level of CNP to extract whatever territorial gains she wants from her neighbours without challenging the US or daring it to intervene despite its declining economic strength. The 12 per cent hike in China’s defence budget points towards rising aggression. There is no reason to be overawed by China’s economic and military might but our forward infrastructure development needs to be undertaken on critical operational priority to ensure rapid mobilisation and switching of forces. In addition, we must strive to remove the asymmetry vis-à-vis China in aerospace, cyber and electro-magnetic domains as well as in rapid aerial deployments. The vital deterrent to irregular warfare must be established on priority. There is no reason that we cannot take on future challenges.