Geopolitics

The normalization of relations between India and Israel : I
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Issue Book Excerpt: Rising India | Date : 14 Nov , 2010

Several hours after arriving in New Delhi, I went to the foreign ministry for my first visit with A. P. Gupta, director of the Consular Branch. He handed me a copy of the Indian foreign ministry’s press release which condemned the attack on the Israeli tourists in Srinagar and determined that it was an attack on India itself and on its tourist industry. The release further determined that such terror was aimed to harm not only Israelis, since it had already, previously, victimized European tourists. Gupta emphasized that the behaviour of the Indian government with regard to the attack was guided only by humanitarian considerations, and that the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries would be of no consequence. (Nevertheless, he was the only foreign ministry official with whom I was permitted to meet during my stay.) Gupta also informed me that the Indian security forces were continuing their house-to-house search for the abducted Israeli tourist, Ya’ir Yitzhaki, in Srinagar.

“¦ the Government of India would not negotiate with the terrorist organizations and rejected the claim published in the Pakistani press that the Israeli tourists in Srinagar were commando fighters and agents of the Israeli Mossad Secret Service tourists and come to prepare an attack on Pakistans nuclear installations”¦

I thanked Gupta for all that had been done up to that point, and told him that the main purpose of my visit was to bring Yitzhaki back home as quickly as possible. I asked that the Indian security forces to be careful not to take any step that might endanger the life of the abductee. I also sought to clarify another important point with him. Among the press clippings the Italian ambassador had given me, I found an announcement that had been published by the Muslim Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (J.K.L.F.) to the effect that Yitzhaki was in its hands and that he would be handed over to representatives of the United Nations.

I wanted to know how this transfer was to be carried out. Gupta replied that there were U.N. observers in Srinagar, but that this was a complex diplomatic issue which he would prefer to discuss at our next meeting scheduled for that afternoon, in which representatives of the interior ministry would participate. I understood that India was not happy with the U.N. presence in Kashmir.

At noon I visited the Swedish ambassador. He told me that two Swedish engineers had been abducted in Kashmir by another Muslim terrorist group some three months earlier, on March 31, and that they had not yet been released. He briefed me on the various Muslim terrorist groups which were fighting against the Indian government in Kashmir, pointing out the degree of radicalism of each group and the nature of its relations with Pakistan. I was pleased to hear from him that the “Liberation Front” which held Yitzhaki was considered to be a relatively moderate group.

And, indeed, it transpired that the group’s leader, Amanullah Khan, had issued a public statement from his place of exile in Pakistan calling upon the members of his organization to release Yitzhaki, since the holding of foreign hostages might result in the loss of international support for his “Liberation Front.” The Swedish ambassador told me about his governments efforts, which had failed to bring about the release of the Swedish abductees. My impression was that they had been doing very little.

In the afternoon I returned to the office of Gupta, director of the Consular Branch, where I found two men who were introduced to me as interior ministry officials. I understood quickly enough that they were members of the Indian secret service. Their portrayal as officials of the interior ministry was apparently to serve as camouflage. They told me that Yitzhaki was being held in an ancient quarter of Srinagar, which was populated by Muslims who supported the various underground separatist movements.

The two gentlemen facing me claimed to have had ways to contact those terrorist organizations and had in fact already suggested to them that they transfer Yitzhaki to the representative of the Israeli foreign ministry who was already on site. My interlocutors were convinced that the United Nations would not send a representative to take him. They were also certain that the goal of the terrorist organizations was to receive as much media coverage as possible.

I responded that it must be clear that Israel would not relax its efforts or ease its pressure in every possible venue and manner until the abductee was released. I emphasized that I saw two reasonable alternatives: the first – that the abductee be transferred to the U.N. observers in Srinagar or to the senior U.N. official in New Delhi; and, the second – that he be handed over either to Zipori or myself. I asked that these alternatives be conveyed to the abductors. We agreed to meet again the following morning.

India was at the time trying to secure a loan of 2-5 billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and they feared that the “Jewish Lobby” in the United States would prevent the granting of such a loan because of Indias negative attitude toward Israel.

The meeting in the foreign ministry was reported in the Indian media The spokesman of the Indian foreign ministry took the trouble to point out that diplomatic relations were not discussed, and that India’s relations with Israel would remain unchanged. He added that the Government of India would not negotiate with the terrorist organizations and rejected the claim published in the Pakistani press that the Israeli tourists in Srinagar were commando fighters and agents of the Israeli Mossad Secret Service who had disguised themselves as tourists and come to prepare an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations together with their Indian counterparts.3

The description of my remaining meetings with Gupta, the head of the Consular Branch, and the indirect negotiations I conducted with his help with that of the two “representatives of the interior ministry” with the J.K.L.F. terrorist organisation are not really relevant to this article. Suffice it to say that the abductee was freed following four days of coordinated and intensive diplomatic efforts conducted simultaneously in New Delhi and Washington, as well as at the U.N. headquarters in New York and Geneva. This is also the place to publicly condemn the behaviour of the U.N. observers in Srinagar, headed by Major Victorson of Sweden, for the obstacles they created. Let us return to Professor M. L. Sondhi and his activities.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Moshe Yegar

Moshe Yegar, Former Ambassador and Assistant Director General, Head of the Hasbara Department and Head of the Asia-Africa Department in the Foreign Ministry of Israel.

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