The capture of Ramadi by the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) has been termed as a strategic and morale boosting victory for Iraq and the US-led Coalition Forces. However, according to the ISW Intelligence Summary (Dec 19, 2015–Jan 9, 2016), there are pockets of Ramadi, the Capital of Anbar Governorates (Provinces) that are still under the control of the IS (Islamic State) or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) or ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).
Ramadi is still partially under the control of IS. About 80% of the city is in ruins. No one knows as to what is the state of the local population.
Within 10 days of the declaration by the ISF of the capture of the Ramadi Government Complex, IS has launched massive attacks on Haditha which is 140 km from Ramadi and controls the road to Al-Qaim. Al-Qaim, under the control of IS, lies on the strategic route to Syria. Capture of Hadith will ensure smooth flow of ISIS traffic between Syria and Iraq.
Ramadi is less than 100 km from the outskirts of Baghdad. It dominates the Euphrates valley and controls the flow of water to Baghdad. Ramadi has been under the control of the IS since May 2015. It also lies enroute to Mosul, which is about 300 km to the north of Ramadi. Capture of Ramadi will provide a launch pad to ISF for launching of operations on Mosul. But, there are several imponderables to consider about the strategic significance of the partial capture of Ramadi by the ISF.
Ramadi is still partially under the control of IS. About 80% of the city is in ruins. No one knows as to what is the state of the local population. Fallujah which is just 64 km from Baghdad is with the IS. This gives IS the capability to target the outskirts of Baghdad with its long range weapons. Capture of Ramadi, may temporarily isolate IS in Falluja but opening of Haditha by IS will prevent its isolation. The flip side of this is that till Falluja is captured, any attack on Mosul by ISF may not be successful.
In case the IS is defeated, who will replace them within the Sunni dominated provinces of Iraq? They would not like to be governed by Shia led governments…
The conflict in Iraq-Syria must be seen in the context ofinternational geopolitics. On 15 December 2015,Saudi Arabia announced the creation of Islamic Military Alliance of 34 nations, with the intention to fight terrorism. No one has yet defined who are the terrorists; IS or the ones supporting the Houthis, Hezbollah or Hamas. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan and Indonesia are yet to decide whether to join the Alliance. Several questions need to be asked.Will this alliance like to see the defeat of the Sunni IS led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi? Will they like that Sunnis of Iraq provinces be humiliated by the Shia militias led by Iran? During the rule of diehard Shia Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki, a prominent Sunni Vice President Tariq al- Hashmi had to flee to Erbil and later to Turkey because of the oppression of the Regime.
The answer to all the above questions is a big no. In case the IS is defeated, who will replace them within the Sunni dominated provinces of Iraq? They would not like to be governed by Shia led governments as they have lived through the horrifying experience of the regime of Nouri al–Maliki. Even the US and Coalition Forces during the occupation of Iraq, were unable to govern province of Ninewa (Mosul) and ultimately US gave up and appointed ex-Army Generals of Saddam’s days to govern these provinces.
During the period 15 Dec 2015 and 06 Jan 2016, the politics of the West Asia has undergone a dramatic change with the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. The Islamic Military Alliance has taken a back seat. The Shia-Sunni divide, which started in 670 CE, has not only widened but grown so wide that no ladder in the world can bridge the gap. This is an unexpected event which has taken the world by surprise. Strategic analysts are yet to analyse this; the UN is still to come to grips with the challenge. This unexpected development will have a major impact on the conduct of operations in Iraq and the proposed peace talks in Geneva. And, of course, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are pouring gasoline on this inferno.
The IS will never try to capture and control Baghdad lest it becomes a Stalingrad for them. However, terrorist attacks like blasts will carry on.
The ebb and flow of the tide in Ramadi, Haditha and Falluja will continue as local skirmishes with very little or no impact at all on the overall scenario in Syria and Iraq. Critical study of the military realities and the geopolitics of West Asia and WANA (West Asia and North Africa) or MENA (Middle East and North Africa) will reveal that:
- Air operations by the US and its partners will not destroy the IS and win the war;
- The Shia militia backed by Iran will never be allowed to have an outright victory over the IS – neither by the Sunni world nor by the US.
- Islamic Military Alliance as proposed by Saudi Arabia is still to define its enemy; it is unlikely to be Sunni IS;
- IS will continue to receive its finances from private contributions from Sunnis and sale of oil via Turkey (as alleged by Russia).
Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi is proving to be a capable strategist, possibly of the calibre of the German Generals who led the Blitzkrieg in the 1940s. The IS will never try to capture and control Baghdad lest it becomes a Stalingrad for them. However, terrorist attacks like blasts will carry on. Falluja will remain the last bastion of IS.
Finally, in the West Asian region mired in VULCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity), local military victories at Ramadi, Haditha or Falluja will not have any significant influence on the overall strategic situation.
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