Geopolitics

Strategic Significance of Maldives
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 24 Mar , 2012

Strategic Importance

There have been persistent reports about China’s bid to establish a submarine base in Marao, a coral island (40 km south of Male). The reports gained currency following the visit of the then China Premier Zhu Rongji in 2001. The reports mentioned the Chinese design to base nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. Coral island make fine nature submarine base. There have also been reports that Pakistan has been using the Islamic card with Maldives to provide such facilities to China.

In fact, Maldives forms a geo-physical part of the same the ridge that extends to Diego Garcia. After relinquishment of the Gan base by Britain, the USSR made cogent efforts to acquire it…

Yet another dimension to strategic significance of Maldives with respect to India emerged about LeT plans to setup Indian Ocean base in the country. Reportedly, there were plans to use deserted islands to build bases and weapon storage facilities from where they could be moved to Kerala and then to the rest of India.

The geo-strategic location of Maldives with regard to Indian Ocean is an imperative that has driven super powers in the past like the Great Britain, the US and the erstwhile USSR to gain foothold in the country. The same imperatives are now driving India, China, Pakistan and Islamic terror groups.

Maldives straddles major maritime arteries and has the potential to be drawn in big power rivalry. During World War-II, the British had established an operational base on Gan Island in southern Adudu Atoll. In 1948, a mutual defence pact was signed between Britain and Maldives, which was followed by a 30-years agreement with the Sultan in 1956, as per which the Royal Air Force was to continue using the base at Gan as a staging post. The airbase at Gan provided much needed staging facilities between Europe and Far East. It provided clear and alternate communications to NATO, West Asia and East Asia. In 1974, consequent to a review of British Defence Policy, all British establishments east of Suez were to be liquidated. Accordingly, in 1976 the RAF base at Gan was handed over lock stock and barrel to Maldives. The facilities included a runway, building and equipment, and a modern medical centre. The base provided employment to 850 Maldivian personnel and contributed £ 50,000 to a total income of £ 3million. For Maldives the winding up of the RAF base at Gan did not mean the end of an environment of superpower rivalry in the region. Soon, 600 miles south of Gan, the US established a base at Diego Garcia.

Maldives, so far has faced no external threat in the conventional sense. Its vulnerability is owing to its size and geographical location in the Indian Ocean, which predisposes it to regional and extra regional strategic machinations.

In fact, Maldives forms a geo-physical part of the same the ridge that extends to Diego Garcia. After relinquishment of the Gan base by Britain, the USSR made cogent efforts to acquire it in 1977, and offered a monthly rental of US $ 1 million. Though the stated purpose for the Soviet move was to set-up a supply station for its fishing fleet, the actual purpose was to countervail the US base at Diego Garcia. President Gayoom who was then a transport minister, had vehemently opposed the Soviet proposal. Later in 1982, Gayoom as President had remarked, “the Soviet base would have militated against our non-aligned status, annoyed our brothers in the Muslim world and created suspicion in minds of our neighbours like India and Sri Lanka”. It is believed that Shah of Iran too had made overtures for leasing Gan Island to keep the Soviets out, and the Libyan President Gaddafi was determined to stymie Shah.

Threat Perception

Maldives, so far has faced no external threat in the conventional sense. Its vulnerability is owing to its size and geographical location in the Indian Ocean, which predisposes it to regional and extra regional strategic machinations. Maldives successfully warded off all attempts by extra regional powers to fill in the vacuum created by the British departure from the Gan Island. Most of the threat so far has been internal in nature given political schisms and difficult geographical framework. With a modest military capability, it is rather difficult to ensure the security of the country and also the EEZ due to spread of its atolls and islands. The Maldivian government therefore has been vulnerable to coups.

Besides, there are other economic and geographical vulnerabilities – the most serious being the problem of global warming, which as per many experts threatens to submerge the country as such. Given the axis of sea route emanating from the infamous Golden Triangle and burgeoning tourism – Maldives is vulnerable to illegal drugs and its trafficking.

Maldives, as a country is most worried about impact of erosion and global warming, as 80 percent of the country is one metre or less above sea level.

The society in Maldives is homogeneous mixture of people from Sinhalese, Dravidians, Australia-Asian, Arabs and African origin. There is one common language Dhivehi, which has loan words from Hindi, Arabic and Tamils. Despite the cohesiveness and homogeneity, the country has not been free from internal disorders and secessionist movements. In 1959, three southern atolls declared independence and a United Suvadian Republic with the combined population of 20,000. There are insinuations to suggest that the British had a hand in this, as the Maldivian rulers were putting increasing pressure for closure of the RAF base at Gan. All the three secessionist atolls immensely benefited from the base in terms of economy and employment opportunities. In 1962, the then Prime Minister Ibrahim Nassir sent gunboats with government police and re-established control over these atolls. The leader Abdulla Afid Didi fled to the British colony of Seychelles, where he was granted political asylum.

Further, internal imbalance and instability could arise owing to the following factors :-

President Gayoom wanted to avoid enlisting military help of any extra regional power. Possibly, he was convinced by the fact that India did not have grand strategic ambitions, which in any way could impinge on the sovereignty of Maldives.
  • The Male cluster of islands has attracted all capital investment and there has been resultant impoverishment in other atolls.
  • The feeling of discrimination and developmental imbalance is most intense in Addu Atoll. With the winding up of the RAF base at Gan, all able bodied men have moved to other beach resorts for work. They are fluent in Urdu owing to influence of the Pakistani non-commissioned personnel who were employed at the base.
  • The historical memory of not too distinct past when people of the various atolls were virtually free from control of Male, and had independent access to India and Sri Lanka persists.
  • The excessive dependence on tourism is yet another critical economic vulnerability of Maldives. 33 percent of the country’s GDP comes from tourism. One million tourists visit Maldives every year, which is almost three times the population of the country. Notwithstanding the contribution of tourism in the Maldivian economy, it continues to be vulnerable to nature as well as Islamic fundamentalists. At the behest of the latter, i.e. Islamist parties particularly the Adaalath Party, the government recently shut down spas and health centres at all island resorts, as it was alleged by them that they were operating as brothels. The government orders in this regard were subsequently rescinded due to acute economic and international compulsions. The vulnerability of tourism to nature was evidenced by Tsunami in December 2004. In relative terms Maldives suffered the sharpest blow. 21 of the 93 islands resorts were closed. Tourism was down by 40 percent and economic growth was negative by 3-4 percent.
  • Maldives, as a country is most worried about impact of erosion and global warming, as 80 percent of the country is one metre or less above sea level. Overall Maldives can be described as a success story of South Asia, which has moved from very poor country with people living in scattered islands to almost a middle income country.

India-Maldives Strategic Interface

India’s relations with Maldives are different in character and content when compared to other South Asian neighbours. Both India and Maldives have defied the difficulties of glaring power disparity in developing a mutually trustworthy relationship between a regional power and a micro-state. Some of the key catalysts that determine India-Maldives relationships are :-

A new reality has confronted India with regard to Maldives, i.e. Islamic radicalization and the prospect of the country being used to target Indian interests on land and sea including Mumbai 26/11 type attacks.
  • Absence of any territorial disputes or irritants. In 1976, both countries most amicably demarcated their maritime boundary based on the median line principle.
  • Relations are free of any colonial baggage, unlike India-Sri Lanka relations.
  • Indo-centrism hither-to-fore was not a factor in the relations between the two countries. It is lately being created by China, Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalists.
  • No problems of common ethnicity or Indian community. Some shades of common ethnicity are only found in India’s Minicoy Island, which is inhabited by Maliki sect to which Maldivians belong to.
  • The political and social discourse in Maldives till very recently never tried to question or counterpoise India’s pre-eminent position in the South Asian region by courting regional or extra regional powers. It is a nascent phenomenon in some segments.

Mrs Indira Gandhi was the second foreign dignitary to visit Maldives in 1975, the first being the British Queen. In the same year, India provided a grant of Rs 40 lacs for setting up a fish canning plant. In 1977, India assisted Maldives in setting up an international airline, which was managed and operated by the Indian Airlines. The commercial airport on Hulule Island was also modernised with Indian assistance. As per a five-year economic and technical agreement signed in 1986, India set-up a 200 hundred bed general hospital (India Gandhi Memorial Hospital) and deputes nearly 100 medical and para-medical staff to run the hospital. India has also been providing use of satellite by Maldives for meteorological data and television re-broadcasting. It has also been generous in providing scholarships and educational opportunities to Maldivian students. During the Tsunami in December 2004, the Indian Navy was quick to respond to the aid of Maldives despite the fact that some of India’s coastal areas itself had been ravaged. As part of ‘Operation Castor’, India deployed its aircraft, helicopters and naval vessels on search, rescue and rehabilitation missions. It also deployed two mobile surgical teams and provided assistance in communication and re-construction.

While the foreign policy and defence establishment have displayed great sensitivity about the strategic imperatives of India in respect to Maldives and have acted timely and appropriately…

The event that actually underwrote the special strategic context of India-Maldives relations was the Indian assistance in crushing the coup in 1988. The coup was attempted with the help of about 150 Sri Lankan Tamil separatists (PLOTE), who were led by two Maldivian dissident and Colombo based businessmen Abdullah Luthufi and Sagar Nasir. President Gayoom wanted to avoid enlisting military help of any extra regional power. Possibly, he was convinced by the fact that India did not have grand strategic ambitions, which in any way could impinge on the sovereignty of Maldives. For India too, any hesitancy in responding to the situation would have meant involvement of regional or extra regional powers with all the imponderables therein.

A new reality has confronted India with regard to Maldives, i.e. Islamic radicalization and the prospect of the country being used to target Indian interests on land and sea including Mumbai 26/11 type attacks. The other reality is the aggressive bid by China to secure footholds in the Indian Ocean region. Driven by these realities, India and Maldives signed a bilateral pact in August 2009 during the visit of India’s defence minister Mr AK Antony. As per the agreement, the two countries agreed to bolster defence cooperation and fortify the security of Maldives. The Indian Navy is to assist the Maldivian security forces in monitoring and safeguarding of the country’s vast EEZ. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard vessels will patrol pirate infested waters around Maldives. India’s BEL is setting up radars on all the 26 atolls of Maldives, which will be linked to the Indian coastal command. In October 2011, the Indian Navy based a Dornier aircraft to carry out surveillance of EEZ and anti-piracy vigil. Since 2009, India has been sending warships or naval aircraft to perform security roles for Maldives. It may be recalled that India transferred a fast-attack aircraft INS Tillanchang to the Maldivian Coast Guard in the year 2006. Speaking in the naval commanders conference, Mr A K Anthony said: “The Indian Navy has been mandated to be a net provider to the island nations in the Indian Ocean—.”

Conclusion

While the foreign policy and defence establishment have displayed great sensitivity about the strategic imperatives of India in respect to Maldives and have acted timely and appropriately, the same cannot be said about the Indian intelligence establishment. The charter of India’s external agency not only involves providing information and intelligence but more importantly to safeguard friendly regimes from inimical powers of India. The coup is a success of the agencies of inimical powers.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

RSN Singh

is a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research and Analysis Wing, or R&AW and author of books Asian Strategic and Military Perspective, The Military Factor in Pakistan and The Unmaking of Nepal. His latest books are Know the Anti-Nationals (English) and Know the एंटी-नेशनल्स (Hindi).

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One thought on “Strategic Significance of Maldives

  1. i am a maldivian, and we are proud to be muslims. our forefathers converted to islam because it is the one true religion and because us logically thinking, realized the hoards of bullshit behind buddism and idolatory. we do not want to remember our poor grandfathers and mothers who were not blessed with this, and was mislead. we dont want to keep any buddist artifacts as it is an embarrassment to us. please stop calling us a victim of islamic fundalism and portray falsely. respect us as we respect you. we dont go harrassing about people in india who are doing things we find ridiculous and bloody idiotic.

    There are also alot of error in your controversial story about our history, there are some context of truth but because of the false content the whole article is misguiding and has error. i hope you become more fruitful with knowledge and write more articles n documents with the truth and with respect.

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