Indian Defence Review

Trans MR Training

The CMC issued new training guidelines in 1999, which were codified by the GSD into an ‘Outline of Military Training and Evaluation’ (OMTE) in 2002 and revised in 2009 and have emphasized on operating in complex weather, terrain and electro-magnetic conditions and conducting military operations other than war.¹³ Accordingly over past few decades PLA has been conducting more and more Trans MR training and made a sustained effort to improve the quality and realism of the training.

Personnel Policies

Greater emphasis is being placed on inducting officers and men with higher educational qualifications. The service conditions are being improved with last significant pay upgrade in 2014. Chinese President Xi Jinping also said that in the future, military officers can only rely on their salaries for income, any unapproved income or illegal gains will be investigated and punished.¹⁴ Senior officers were also asked to serve as soldiers for at least two weeks under a measure by President Xi Jinping to shake up the military and boost morale.¹⁵

China’s armed forces are raising the qualification and training levels of NCOs to build a professional corps with the ability to operate increasingly sophisticated weapon systems with number of NCOs planned to be raised to 900,000 replacing many of the present officer held billets.¹⁶

Equipment and Technology upgrade

The most significant modernisation has taken place in these fields and has transcended all services. The PLA today fields a larger inventory of modern equipment. This includes stealth and transport aircraft, submarines, destroyers, tanks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, satellites, world’s first long-distance quantum encryption network and many others. This is supported by a robust and capable defence manufacturing industry.

Divestment of Non-Military Activities

The PLA controls a large number of firms which span diverse sectors from agriculture and mining to high-tech areas such as transportation, telecommunication, launching satellites and to real estate, shares and securities. Since President Jiang Zemin announced significant reforms in this field in 1998, many of such organisations have been wound up. These were also one of the primary sources of corruption and thus with the divestment it is felt that a new professional force could be formed.¹⁷

Doctrinal Reforms

While other reforms like induction of equipment is often the most visible face, changes in doctrines do not receive adequate attention. PLAs doctrinal reforms got a major boost in the mid-1980s. In January 1999, after at least four years of intensive work by the “PLA Operations Regulations Compilation Committee”, a new and comprehensive set of documented guidelines for the conduct of military operations was issued. Collectively, the new guidelines are referred to by the PLA as the “New Generation Operations Regulations”.¹⁸ These have been issued in a series of publications that are referred to by the PLA as gangyao (essentials). In addition to these “manuals” are a host of “operations regulations” that flesh out more details. These include Joint Campaigns and those of Army, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Corps.

China’s ‘Military Strategic guidelines for the New Period’, completed in 1993 and revised in 2004, contain the overarching strategic and operational guidance that directs the training, development, and employment of China’s Armed Forces.¹⁹

It also evolved its major significant doctrinal concept of Active Defence in the mid-1980s which along with fighting Local Wars under Conditions of Informatisation remains at the top of China’s military doctrine. At the campaign level, Integrated Joint Operations, Information Warfare, Integrated Firepower Operations and Mobility are the principles and doctrines on which China plans to fight and win wars in the 21st century even against a technologically superior enemy.

Organisational Reforms

The PLA has also been carrying out changes in the organisation of its field formations. These have included changing from Division to Brigades, creation of Rapid Reaction Forces, conversion of Infantry to Mechanised Infantry and development of significant IW capabilities and formations.

UN Troops and HADR Missions

In 2007, a Major General from the PLA became the first head of a UN Peacekeeping Force from China in Western Sahara and then again in Cyprus in 2011. China has also decided to extend its role in UN missions from logistics, medical and engineering support to combat troops in April 2015.

President Xi also committed that China will contribute 8,000 troops for a United Nations peacekeeping standby force. China has also been actively involved in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and evacuated 36,000 of its nationals from Libya in 2011 besides providing humanitarian relief after the natural calamities in Nepal and South-East Asia.

Reforms post Fifth Plenum

“The goal of military reforms is to build an army that “obeys the party command, is capable of winning battles and has a sound working style.” — 2013 communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of 18th CPC

The Key Tenets as listed above are the best indicators to the reform process, with party loyalty supreme over everything else. The current reforms owe their origin to decisions taken during the 3rd Plenum of the present congress issued in January 2014. They were discussed further after the 5th Plenum from November 24 to 26, by 200 delegates at the CMC. This is an indication of an attempt to build consensus and soothe any frayed nerves within the military towards these measures. The mouthpieces of the government and the PLA were quick to re-iterate the support of the forces, though some dissent was heard. “It is forbidden to speak nonsense, make irresponsible comments, have your own points of view, act as you see fit or feign compliance.”²⁰ The timeline given for the completion of reforms is 2020. They are also likely to face resistance from the well-established current order.

The timing of the reforms aims to exploit the window of opportunity China possesses. This includes a phase of rapid economic growth and relative peace on international and domestic fronts. On a more personal level, President Xi aims to utilise the high goodwill he enjoys among the Chinese people and portray the reforms as part of a strong military dream within the larger China dream. While the reforms indicate a move towards a more Westernised army by way of organisational structures, development of concepts and restructuring of field army, the Chinese are keen to portray these as those with Chinese characteristics.

Reduction in Personnel

There is a planned reduction of 300,000 personnel which is likely to occur in administrative posts, at the headquarters and for non-combat personnel. The PLAA is the one which might face the biggest cuts with some Chinese experts suggesting a ratio of 2:1:1 between the PLAA, PLAAF and PLAN as compared to almost 70 per cent strength of the total strength of the PLAA at present.²¹ The reduction, as was in earlier phases, is likely to occur in the forces in the North.

Reorganisation of MRs

The MRs within PLA are almost like independent Armies of their own. These have their own recruitment of personnel and training academies. A soldier or even an officer could spend his entire service within the MR. Significant movement of an officer out of the MR happens only after the rank of Major General. Also, the formations within the MR have traditionally exercised only within. Trans MR training of troops is only a two-decade old phenomenon. This movement is significant because the PLA aims to create local superiority in the area of operations and would thus require troops from outside the MR to create such a situation.

Two theories of the most visible form of reforms are being suggested. One in which the existing seven MRs are re-organised into four and in the second five. These could be North, South, East and West with Central (in case of five). There will be one MR each looking after the major threats i.e. from Russia, Central and South Asia, Taiwan-Japan and South-East Asia. Geographically, the Chengdu MR is also likely to become the largest.²²

Command and Control

The reforms aim to reiterate the role of CMC in military decision-making and reduce that of MR Commanders. It is planned to establish a ‘CMC-Battle Zone Commands-Troops’ command system. It is likely that PLAA, which does not have a separate office of its own, unlike the other three services, and functions from within the General Staff Department, will have a separate office. The National Security Council and Joint Operations Control Centre (announced earlier) are likely to function as National Defence planning body and Joint Chiefs of Staff respectively.

As per reports, the MRs (or their successor organisation) will not command any troops during peacetime. The troops will be under respective services. It is to be seen how this paradoxical arrangement is implemented.

Focus on Core Military Functions

President Xi said that PLA should close all paid services. This is likely to imply that the PLA will divest itself from non-military activities because it is felt that these activities are the major reason for corruption in the PLA.

Military Judicial System

The CMC will have an audit office and a political and legal affairs commission.

Defence Technology and Production

More to be done in this field with focus on developing new concepts and technologies.

Tackling Corruption

A new discipline inspection commission will be established within the CMC to eradicate the ‘soil’ of corruption.

Improved Service Conditions through better medical care, insurance, housing and pay for servicemen.

Further Implications

Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs combined will result in a single military leader in charge of all forces along India’s frontiers as opposed to four such commanders on Indian side. The Chinese though will have problems in command and control over such a large geographical area during operations.

Integrated Joint Operations is the key to future reforms and ‘jointness’ between services will be a cause of worry for its opponents. The other worrying aspect is preparations for Out of Area Contingency Operations which will impact conduct of operations in the IOR. All such previous reforms have been followed by doctrinal changes. ‘War Zone Concept’ followed by the PLA at the operational level will undergo a major change.

Conclusion

It is thus quite evident that the reforms have been ongoing for some time and have multiple aims. At the one end, it is meant to create a more professional, well-trained and equipped force and on the other, these will lead to substantial power shifts both between the PLA and civilian organs of the government and within the PLA. This will also consolidate power with President Xi. How these plan out in the future will be important as the PLA develops doctrines built along these lines which will have a greater impact.