Indian Defence Review

Frederik Dahl during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague, reported that “Russia, China and 16 other countries shunned a separate initiative of the United States, the Netherlands and South Korea at the summit to incorporate U.N. nuclear agency security guidelines into national rules”.

An anonymous security analyst wrote that “American experts have described more vividly potential nuclear terrorist attacks on U.S. soil than have Russians, at least in the writings and conversations that are publicly accessible”.

So, from the above few evidences, four conclusions can be made on Russia’s nuclear Security situation.

• No Russian nuclear experts have agreed to an imminent threat or vulnerable state towards an attack from active NSA’s. However experts outside the region have showed immense concern towards the issue.
• If there is a security threat, then it is entirely due to the immense of the region followed by its large nuclear arsenals, but also due to institutional corruption
• Threats to Russia’s nuclear arsenal are likely to come from groups operating inside of Russia (other than Chechen rebels) and are likely to affect Russia first and foremost
• The Russian government does not seem to take the threats seriously as compared to other sovereign states and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) do.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Entanglement

As mentioned previously the other “nuclear power” that has ruled out any security threat to its nuclear arsenal is Pakistan.

There are three factors that make Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal vulnerable –

• Increased terrorist activities in Pakistan
• Political instability
• The growing size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

The first factor (and some second) is the most notable concern that international agencies, global nations have expressed from time to time. The attack on Minhas Air Force Base (known to have nuclear arsenal storage facility) was one “significant concern” and a question on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

A threat assessment report from the CSIS desk stated that “several Pakistani nuclear facilities, including the Khushab facility and the Gadwal uranium enrichment plant, are in proximity to areas under attack from the Taliban”

A threat assessment report by independent analyst Salik and Luongo stated that “Pakistani air bases cover a large area protected by barbed wire fences, which are not too difficult for an organized and determined attacker to breach. The aircraft parked on the runway are soft targets that can be observed from a distance and hit with relatively unsophisticated weapons”.

One concern amid threat and insecurity is the opacity of Islamabad towards their nuclear programs. For instance, Hassan Abbas, a former Senior Advisor to Harvard’s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, has written that:  “A lack of certainty about the extent and nature of earlier proliferation activity makes it difficult to assess Pakistan’s nuclear safety and control measures”

The situation in Pakistan with respect to the security of their nuclear weapons arsenal is “risky” not only in regards to what we do know, but also in the sense that we know relatively little about the nature of the country’s nuclear programme.

Comparative Analysis – Pakistan and Russia’s Issues of Nuclear Security

To begin with similarity, the clearest example is the stage of violence in the two nations, and lack of security/seriousness with respect to their nuclear arsenals. Russia’s unpreparedness was clearly seen in the recent Nuclear Summit while Gen. Majid’s remarks in 2009, made it quite clear that Pakistan is “willing” to take any chance with respect to their nuclear arsenals.

The second most important point which I saw was the national instability in the region. Both the nations have intelligence services and Russia’s FSB is one of the ruthless ones, but due to heavy political support, their movements are more “guided from the top”. In Russia political corruption is on its peak, as a result any NSA with heavy cash in their pockets could bribe a high ranking official for nuclear weapon technology (for the case of businessman) while Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have ties “with anti India militant groups”.

Now the difference between the two nations arise when we talk about their nuclear strength, surprisingly, “we don’t have much” on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal  and this is the part which makes Pakistan’s situation more concerning, more alarming as compared to Russia’s. However getting the information on the base of intelligence reports and speculation will limit the resource and cripple the threat analysis methodologies. After all when it comes to Pakistan, it’s not a question of how, it’s a question of when. With inadequate data in hand we will never identify Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal storage areas or the threats imposed by its quantity or capacity. Hence, with respect to NSA, the threat perception doubles as there is no adequate information about its nuclear programme.

Solutions – Till now

Coming to the “resolution” of the crisis described in length, three potential solutions have been implemented –

• Bilateral responses (strict nuclear agreements between Pakistan and the US)
• Multilateral responses
• United Nations Security Resolution 1540

Bilateral Responses

The biggest example of bilateral relations is that of Pakistan and the US, where the US have spent, as of 2007, around $100 million since 9/11 on improving Pakistan’s nuclear security.

As stated clearly in the pact “a raft of equipment… from helicopters to night- vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment” is supplied to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to secure Nuclear stockpile, under the widely criticised Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), which is “the main supervisory and policy-making body controlling Pakistan’s nuclear weapons” which is “said to be” partially separate from the Pakistani government.

The results of these bilateral relations have been very unsuccessful in improving Pakistan’s nuclear security. However international agencies are quite positive and describes this semi failed state as the “most improved nuclear- armed state”. The then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in an interview said “We have confidence in the Pakistani government and military’s control over its nuclear weapon”, and showed confidence in improving relations with Pakistan along with more financial assistance, “if required”.

It should also be noticed that insecurity is still an issue in Pakistan as globally Pakistan is among the worst “nuclear-armed states” with regards to nuclear security, and US officials have been confidently keeping a close eye on the situation.  Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff while giving a press conference said “clearly we are very watchful, as we should be”.

Multilateral Responses

When we talk about multilateral response, NSA’s are the first threats hence to counter it, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which came into formation in 2006 and now has support of 85 UN member nations (including all of the NWSs recognized under the terms of the NNPT as well as both India and Pakistan) followed by four observers (the EU, the IAEA, INTERPOL and UNODC).

The Organization was formed:

“To strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations”

The GICNT is functions on 8 main “Principles” as mentioned in the initiative’s ‘Statement of Principles’, starting from “improving accounting, control, and protection of nuclear/radiological material” and “Promoting information sharing to prevent and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism”.

The United Nations Security Council – Resolutions 1540

Although no international community has a right to enforce other sovereign nation with policies and reforms but the UN Security Council (UNSC), certainly does. The UNSC Resolution 1540 was passed unanimously in 2004, is equipped to handle NSA’s and the nuclear threat they posed, I would say, this entire concern was itself a confined to a forefront clause. The Clause 2 states –

“that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engaged in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them”

To address the conflicts within NNPT, the Clause 5 states that –

“None of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”

Nonetheless, moving down, the Clause 7 encourages bilateral agreements between states in order to strengthen security mechanisms and encourages security partnerships between two or more nations with regards to nuclear weapons. The Clause 7 states –

“Invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to… States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions”