Indian Defence Review

The Naxalites, also called Naxals, are groups who claim that they are waging a violent struggle on behalf of landless labourers and tribal people against landlords and the government. They say that they are fighting oppression and exploitation and are aiming to create a classless society.1 but are they as simple as they portray themselves to be?

The Naxal problem is not just a law and order problem. It started with the genuine grievances of the rural poor. The people generally affected are the adivasis and the peasants. But the grievances revolved around land alienation, land distribution, unemployment, exploitation by government officials and contractors, poor remuneration for forest produce, mindless prosecution for petty forest offences, etc

A Short History

According to Rajat Kujur, to understand the genesis of the Naxal movement, one needs to locate it within the framework of the communist movement in India. To be more specific, any study on the Naxal movement cannot overlook the importance of the rise and fall of the Telangana Movement (1946–1951) since Telangana will always remain the glorious chapter in the history of peasant struggles for Indian communists. In fact, it was the first serious effort by sections of the communist party leadership to learn from the experiences of the Chinese revolution and to develop a comprehensive line for India’s democratic revolution. On the other hand, the experience in Telangana also facilitated the growth of three distinct lines within the Indian communist movement.

The Naxal problem is not just a law and order problem.

The first one was promoted by Ranadev and his followers. The second was propagated by the Andhra secretariat, and the third was the dominance of a centrist line led by Ajay Ghosh and Dange. The line promoted by Ranadev and his followers rejected the significance of the Chinese revolution and advocated the simultaneous accomplishment of the democratic and socialist revolutions based on city-based working class insurrections. This group drew inspiration from Stalin and fiercely attacked Mao as another Tito.

The second line mainly professed and propagated by the Andhra secretariat drew heavily on the Chinese experiences and the teachings of Mao, in building up the struggle in Telangana. The Andhra leadership, while successfully managing to spearhead the movement against the Nizam, failed to tackle the complex question of meeting the challenge of the Government of India. The Nehru government embarked on the road to parliamentary democracy, conditioning it with reforms like the “abolition of the Zamindari system.” All these objective conditions facilitated the dominance of a centrist line put forward by Ajay Ghosh and Dange. This line characteristically pointed out the difference between Chinese and Indian conditions and pushed the party along the road to parliamentary democracy. In 1957, the communists succeeded in forming a government in Kerala, which however was soon overthrown.

While the Naxal movement has mostly been characterised by fragmented groups and innumerable splits, successive governments at the national and state levels were never able to follow a uniform approach to deal with the problem, thus leading to a marked impact in the growth of the Naxal movement.

Following the Indo-China war of 1962, the party split into two in 1964—the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI [M]). While the CPI preached the theory of a “peaceful road to non-capitalist development,” the CPI (M) adopted the centrist line. Though there were serious differences on ideological and tactical grounds, both parties went ahead with the parliamentary exercises and formed the United Front Government in West Bengal. In the backdrop of such organisational upheavals within the Indian communist movement, an incident in a remote area of Bengal transformed the history of left-wing extremism in India. In a remote village called Naxalbari in West Bengal, a tribal youth named Bimal Kissan, having obtained a judicial order, went to plough his land on 2 March 1967. The local landlords attacked him with the help of their goons. The tribal people of the area retaliated and started forcefully recapturing their lands. What followed was a rebellion which left one police subinspector and nine tribals dead. Within a short span of about two months, this incident acquired great visibility and tremendous support from cross-sections of communist revolutionaries belonging to the state units of the CPI (M) in West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.

The United Front Government of West Bengal, headed by the CPI (M), was able to contain the rebellion within 72 days using all repressive measures possible. These units had a formal meeting in November 1967, as a result of which in May 1968, the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed. The AICCCR adopted for its operations the two cardinal principles of “Allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections.” However, differences cropped up over how an armed struggle should be advanced, and this led to the exclusion of a section of the activists from Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, led respectively by T. Nagi Reddy and Kanhai Chatterjee.

On the question of the “annihilation of the class enemy,” the Kanhai Chatterjee group had serious objections, as they were of the view that the annihilation of the class enemy should only be undertaken after building up of mass agitation. However, a majority in the AICCCR rejected this and the AICCCR went ahead with the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in May 1969. This led Chatterjee to join the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The CPI (M-L) held its first congress in 1970 in Kolkata and Charu Mazumdar was formally elected its general secretary.

Naxals see the government, industrialists, traders and landlords as their enemies. They blame the rich classes for the deprivation and hunger suffered by the lower classes, adivasis and poor farmers. Their aim is to overthrow the present system”¦

Since then, both the CPI (M-L) and the MCC continued with their respective forms of armed struggle for the next couple of years. During this period, Charu Majumdar became the undisputed Naxalite guru and with the organisational skills of Kanu Sanyal and Jaghal Santhal, the movement spread to different corners of the country. The country witnessed the euphoria of a Maoist revolution. However, it was far more short lived than expected. What was generally perceived by Indian as well as Chinese communist revolutionaries as the final enactment of the revolution, in reality proved to be no more than a dress rehearsal. As hundreds of CPI (M-L) cadres lost their lives and thousands were put behind bars, the movement witnessed confusion, splits and disintegration. Charu Majumdar’s larger-than-life image also had its negative impact, for after his death in 1972, the central leadership of CPI (M-L) virtually collapsed.

The history of the Naxal movement post Charu Majumdar is characterised by a number of splits, brought about by personalised and narrow perceptions about the Maoist revolutionary line and attempts at course-correction by some of the major groups. Even Kanu Sanyal, one of the founders of the movement, could not escape this. He gave up the path of “dedicated armed struggle” by 1977 and accepted parliamentary practice as a form of revolutionary activity.

It was during 1974 when an influential group of the CPI (M-L), led by Jauhar (Subrata Dutt), Nagbhushan Pattnaik and Vinod Mishra, launched a major initiative, which they termed “course-correction.” This group renamed itself the CPI (M-L) Liberation in 1974, and in 1976, during the emergency, adopted a new line that called for the continuation of armed guerrilla struggles along with efforts to form a broad anti-Congress democratic front, consisting of even noncommunist parties. The group, in an attempt to provide an Indianised version of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism also suggested that pure military armed struggle should be limited and there should be greater emphasis on mass peasant struggles. However, during the next three years, the movement suffered further splits, with leaders such as Kondapalli Seetharamaiah (Andhra Pradesh) and N. Prasad (Bihar) dissociating themselves from the activities of the party. This led to Prasad forming the CPI (M-L) (Unity Organisation) and Seetharamaiah started the People’s War Group (PWG) in 1980. While Seetharamaiah’s line sought to restrict the “annihilation of class enemies,” the PWG’s emphasis was on building mass organisations, not developing a broad democratic front.

The Naxals claim that they are fighting for land- and livelihood-related issues. But their attitude is volatile. They believe that administrative and political institutions are inadequate, leading to dissatisfaction. They take advantage of this dissatisfaction.

Since then, the principal division within the Naxalite movement has been between the two lines of thought and action as advanced by the CPI (M-L) Liberation and the PWG. While Liberation branded the PWG a group of “left adventurists,” the PWG castigated the Liberation group as one of the “revisionists” imitating the CPI (M). On the other hand, the growth of the MCC as a major armed group in the same areas created the scope for multifarious organisational conflicts among the Naxal groups. Liberation took a theoretical stand correcting the past mistake of “completely rejecting parliamentary politics.” On the other hand, the PWG and the MCC completely rejected the parliamentary democratic system of governance and vowed to wage “people’s war for people’s government.” In the process, while the Liberation group registered its first electoral victory in Bihar in 1989, Naxalite factions such as the CPI (M-L) New Democracy, the CPI (M-L) S. R. Bhajjee Group and the CPI (M-L) Unity Initiative emerged in the state. The following years witnessed certain distinct phenomena in the history of the Naxal movement.

First, the intraorganisational conflict and rivalry among different groups touched several high points, resulting in the loss of a considerable number of cadres of rival groups. Second, despite the large-scale inner conflicts, there were always ongoing efforts at various levels to strive for unity. Thirdly, 1990 onwards, the affected state registered a considerable increase in the number of violent incidents and at the same time, a considerable change in the policy approach of the government was also witnessed. While the Naxal movement has mostly been characterised by fragmented groups and innumerable splits, successive governments at the national and state levels were never able to follow a uniform approach to deal with the problem, thus leading to a marked impact in the growth of the Naxal movement. At present, there are three broad currents of the Naxal movement and four major parties: the CPI (M-L) Liberation, the PWG, the MCC and the CPI (M).

The Naxal Problem

The Naxal problem3 is not just a law and order problem. It started with the genuine grievances of the rural poor. The people generally affected are the adivasis and the peasants. But the grievances revolved around land alienation, land distribution, unemployment, exploitation by government officials and contractors, etc., poor remuneration for forest produce, mindless prosecution for petty forest offences, etc. These grievances vary from state to state.

Seventy-six districts and nine states are at present affected by Naxalism. The Naxals have the latest weapons and are not adverse to using warlike extremism in their effort to capture power.

It is but natural that the Naxals see the government, industrialists, traders and landlords as their enemies. They blame the rich classes for the deprivation and hunger suffered by the lower classes, adivasis and poor farmers. Their aim is to overthrow the present system; hence, they target politicians, police officers and men, the CRPF, forest contractors and any one who represents the government in any form.

At the local level, the Naxalites have targeted landlords in the villages, often claiming protection money from them. They have also been known to collect tax from the adivasis and landless villagers under their control.

An indepth look at the problem of Naxalism

The government cannot blame the Naxals totally because they are also the subjects of this nation. But their violence is not acceptable. Naxal groups have been raising mainly land- and livelihood-related issues, and they blame the government and the bureaucracy. India has been facing many challenges in its social, economic and political spheres. Equality, justice and liberty are difficult values to be fulfilled in all spheres. These difficulties are increased and aggravated by the activities of Naxalites because much-needed funds for economic growth have to be diverted towards controlling the Naxal problem. Instead of looking towards the betterment of the people, the government is spending money towards controlling the violence perpetuated by the Naxals. This is nothing if not self-defeating.

The Naxals claim that they are fighting for land- and livelihood-related issues. But their attitude is volatile. They believe that administrative and political institutions are inadequate, leading to dissatisfaction. They take advantage of this dissatisfaction. They are trying to run a parallel government which promises to free the oppressed segments of the population from the clutches of the bureaucrats, landlords, etc.

Seventy-six districts and nine states are at present affected by Naxalism. The Naxals have the latest weapons and are not adverse to using warlike extremism in their effort to capture power.

In the last two years, armed attacks in force by the Naxals have grabbed the headlines. The massacre of the CRPF personnel in the Dandakaranya forests and Lalgarh, the attacks in Madhuban in Bihar, and on trains held hostages are all indication that the Naxalites have increased their power of striking. According to the Home Ministry’s estimate, they hold around 6,500 regular weapons, have a hard-core underground cadre of 9,300 and hold a large number of unlicensed country-made arms. Of course a large number of their arms have been looted from the police stations they have raided and the CRPF men they have ambushed and killed. The Naxalites have sophisticated weapons like the Kalashnikov rifles, Claymore landmines, modern wireless equipment and electronic gadgets. Also it has been assessed that the Naxal influence has spread in the past few years from 76 districts across 9 states to 118 districts in 12 states.

The Jharkhand government is setting up a state industrial security force on the lines of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) to protect industries as the Naxalites often destroy equipment of business establishments if they are not given extortion money.

The security forces involved in antinaxal operations are convinced, especially in the background of the Madhuban attack, which apparently involved Maoists from Nepal, too, that the CPI (M) is steadily building up a wider network involving associates in neighbouring countries. The Home Ministry is of the view that the wider strategic motive is that of carving out a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), or what is called a “Red Corridor of armed struggle,” spreading from Nepal through Bihar up to the Dandakarnaya region in Andhra Pradesh.

In the early 1970s, the movement seemed to have reached its peak, with the creation of vast guerrilla zones from West Bengal to Bihar to Uttar Pradesh to Andhra Pradesh. But within a couple of years, the government and the state machinery had them under control.

The PWG and the MCC did of course rebuild the movement, but what with their violent activities, which do not spare anyone, the task of retaining people’s support is daunting. In theoretical terms, Naxalites justify their actions as a political programme to overthrow the Indian state, comprising the big landlord-comprador, bureaucratic bourgeoisie classes and the imperialism that backs them, through armed struggle and establish a people’s democratic state under the leadership of the proletariat. It states that the principal and immediate task of the present stage of the revolution is to arouse and organise people for agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war in the countryside—specially in the remote countryside—and to build a people’s army and a rural base through guerrilla warfare.5

What the government has done so far

Individual states affected by the Naxal menace have done and are doing some things to mitigate and overcome this problem. The states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have decided to share information and coordinate with one another in adjoining border areas (to stop the naxals from escaping across the borders after launching attacks).

The spread of Naxalism indicates the sense of desperation and alienation that is sweeping over large sections of our nation who have not only been systematically marginalised but also cruelly exploited and dispossessed in their last homeland.

The Jharkhand government is setting up a state industrial security force on the lines of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) to protect industries as the Naxalites (who operate in 18 of the 24 districts in the state) often destroy equipment of business establishments if they are not given extortion money.

The Orissa state government will be getting 10,000 extra personnel for fighting the Naxals—long-term deployment of two battalions of CRPF in Orissa and an additional five India Reserve Battalions.

In Tamil Nadu, a 10-day guerrilla warfare training programme has begun for 320 cops in the seven districts falling under the Central Zone. The commandos of the elite STF will provide specialised training such as sophisticated arms training, combing operations in reserve forests and setting up of temporary tents and bunkers to the 320 cops.

The Kerala government is now surveying labourers from the other states as the Maoists are using the state as a hideout. The Maharashtra government and the state police are setting up a special force. The central government has ruled out the use of the army to fight the Naxal menace. Instead, it is investing in Rs 500 crore to fight the Naxals. This money will be used to provide critical mobility to the police, secure camping grounds and helipads at strategic locations and build basic roads for the forces so that they have mobility in otherwise inaccessible areas. India’s Interior Ministry has set up an antirebel cell to ensure periodic review and close monitoring of rebel activities.

The spread of Naxalism indicates the sense of desperation and alienation that is sweeping over large sections of our nation who have not only been systematically marginalised but also cruelly exploited and dispossessed in their last homeland. The adivasis are the original autochthonous people of India. Their presence in India predates that of the Dravidians, the Sryans and whoever else settled in this country. They are the original inhabitants, and in front of them, the rest are foreigners. These are ancient people with moral rights and claims thousands of years old. They were here first and should come first in our regard. Unfortunately, like indigenous people all over the world, the Indian adivasis too have been savaged and ravaged by later people claiming to be more civilised.

Naxals are targeting the poor in India, and there is no dearth of poor in India from whom they get their recruits.

The Times of India of 14 July reported that at a meeting of all the chief ministers of the affected states held under the chairmanship of Dr. Manmohan Singh, it was decided that Chattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal will have a unified command headed by the chief secretaries in their respective states so that there is better coordination among the police, paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies. A retired army major general will also be included in the panel.

“Unified Command will be formed in Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal while more helicopters will be deployed for logistic support, supplies and evacuation in Naxal-affected areas,” Home Minister P. Chidambaram told reporters after the meeting.

The meeting also cleared the government’s proposal to fund the establishment and strengthening of 400 police stations in the infested districts at the rate of Rs 2 crore per police station on 80:20 basis over a period of two years.

Some Hard Facts

The Times of India (14 July 2010),

The concentration of the Dalit population in the Naxal-infested areas is quite high. Poverty, lack of land reforms, caste discrimination and oppression and denial of access to justice push the Dalits closer to the Naxals.

Conclusion

At the national level, 45.86 percent of all adivasis live below the poverty line. This means that almost half of India’s original inhabitants go to bed every night starving. Several anthropometric studies have revealed that successive generations of adivasis are actually becoming smaller, unlike all other people in India, who benefit from better and increasingly nutritious diets. Adivasis are not the only group being targeted by the Naxals for recruitment. Overall, all poor people, including Dalits, are being targeted by them. The concentration of the Dalit population in the Naxal-infested areas is quite high. Poverty, lack of land reforms, caste discrimination and oppression and denial of access to justice push the Dalits closer to the Naxals.

The government has to tackle the Naxal problem on a war footing by using a multipronged attack. It has to gain the confidence of the local population by taking up more welfare-related activities and ensuring that these really reach those who need them.

According to R. S. N. Singh, associate editor IDR,6 the Maoist movement may have started off on purely altruistic terms but has metamorphosed over the years into an ugly monster indecipherable from its original avatar as encapsulated in this incisive description.

Shorn of its utopian charade, Naxalism in its present form boils down to a movement that is barbaric (as evidenced by Dantewada) at times, mercenary in a large measure, populist only in name and antinational in character. So, let us see this movement for what it actually is. It is time to strip the rosy glasses from the eyes of the local population which glorifies them. Why imbue them with a fake aura of moral rectitude?7

But is armed repression the answer? The Bihar chief minister, Nitish Kumar, has said “enforcement action” alone is not enough to tackle the problem—this actually could lead to further alienation of misguided youth, who are also part of the affected society.

According to Raman Singh, chief minister of Chattisgarh, the country must rise above the constriction that the Naxal problem is the concern of any single state. It is a national problem and a national strategy is needed.

The chief ministers at the recent meeting chaired by Dr. Manmohan Singh called for coordinated and integrated action and better equipment and logistics to fight the menace. On 19 April 2010, Aziz Haniffa reported on the speech given by ex-president Abdul Kalam at a packed reception at the Indian embassy in Washington, DC, hosted by Ambassador Meera Shankar.8 According to him, when Kalam was asked how the Naxal situation could be addressed since it was causing concern among foreign investors, including NRIs in the U.S., exploring investment opportunities in Chhattisgarh, where 76 police personnel were murdered by Naxal, he replied that wherever land reforms had not taken place, such conflicts were arising. “So, one requirement is we have to introduce land reform wherever it is not there. That’s number one.”

“Number two,” he continued and said that we had established 7,000 PURA, which is the economic standard. He gave the example of the 64 villages he has seen in Madhya Pradesh with a population of 100,000 which had been given access to electronic connectivity and knowledge connectivity. He argued that “This has resulted in economic connectivity, and that means economic prosperity.” According to him, “[W]herever the earning capacity is there, the conflicts in society will reduce.”

When asked on a broader level, how international terrorism, including cross-border terrorism, can be tackled, Kalam said: “When evil minds combine, good minds also combine to counter that, to combat that,” and this is what should be the priority, he said.

The CRPF and other paramilitary forces must be strengthened in the states affected. Their fire power and intelligence should be improved so that they are not sitting ducks for the Naxal extremists but can fight back at least on an equal footing.

Kalam felt it was imperative that the judicial system move expeditiously to sentence and punish terrorists who have been arrested but stressed that in order to eradicate terrorism, poverty alleviation is imperative.

Nita, on 11 March 2008,9 said that the spread of Naxalism indicates the sense of desperation and alienation that is sweeping over a large section of our nation who have not only been systematically marginalised but cruelly exploited and dispossessed in their last bastion or homeland. The Indian adivasis were “the original autochthonous people of India,” meaning that their presence in India predates even that of the Dravidians and of course the Aryans and whoever else settled in this country. They are the real swadeshy products of India. All others comparatively are foreigners. These ancient people are the ones who have moral rights and claims which are thousands of years old. They were here first and should come first in our regard. Unfortunately, like indigenous people all over the world, the Indian adivasis have been savaged and ravaged by later people claiming to be more ‘civilised’.

Adivasis are just one group of people being targeted by the Naxals for recruitment. Overall, all poor people are being targeted, including Dalits. Terror groups are making full use of the injustice being practiced and perpetuated in certain areas of our country. Because the “development” in India is not reaching all the population, the Naxals are having a field day, as they apparently champion the cause of the poor.

The government has to tackle the Naxal problem on a war footing by using a multipronged attack. It has to gain the confidence of the local population by taking up more welfare-related activities and ensuring that these really reach those who need them. Infrastructure to generate employment in the Naxal affected areas must be developed. Joint security operations with neighbouring states must be launched to eliminate left-wing extremists.

The CRPF and other paramilitary forces must be strengthened in the states affected. Their fire power and intelligence should be improved so that they are not sitting ducks for the Naxal extremists but can fight back at least on an equal footing.

Notes and References

1. Rediffnews.com. “Who are the Naxalites?” 2 October 2003. <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/02spec.htm> (accessed 25 July 2010).
2. Rajat Kujur. “Naxal Movement in India: a Profile.” IPCS research papers, September 2008. <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/848082154RP15-Kujur-Naxal.pdf> (accessed 25 July 2010).
3. V. S. Gopalakrishnan. “Understanding the Naxalite Menace.” v-s gopal.slekha.com, 11 April 2010. <http://v-s-gopal.sulekha.com/blog/post/2010/04/understanding-the-naxalite-menace.htm> (accessed 25 July 2010).
4. Indian Officer.com. “The Growth of Naxalism in India.” <http://www.indianofficer.com/forums/current-issues/1501-naxalism-india.html> (accessed 25 July 2010).
5. Venkatish Ramakrishnan. “The Naxalite Challenge.” Frontline vol. 22, no. 21, 21–8 October 2005. <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2221/stories/20051021006700400.htm> (accessed 25 July 2010).
6. R. S. N. Singh. “Maoist Threat and Politics.” Indian Defence Review vol. 25.1, January–March 2010.
7. Vivek Gumaste. “The Naxal Problem: Failure of political leadership.” Rediffnews.com, 27 April 2010.
8. Aziz Haniffa. “Kalam’s cure for the Naxalite problem.” Rediffnews.com, 19 April 2010.
9. Nita. “Naxalism – some reasons and some solutions.” 11 March 2008. <http://nitawriter.wordpress.com/2008/03/11/naxalism-some-plans-and-causes/> (accessed 25 July 2010).