A Case of Sleep-walk?
Recently, the ‘Ajay Vikram Singh Committee (AVSC) Report Part II’ was implemented in the armed forces amidst much satisfaction among the military hierarchy. Thus a large number of higher posts were created to ease the stiff pyramidal structure that permitted only a very few to rise. Some years back, Part I of this Report had been implemented that led to proliferation of middle level ranks in fighting units and quickened the pace of promotions – and consequently, a long over-due case of appropriate compensation for the hard life of the soldiery was addressed. Actually, the idea of ‘upgrade of rank structure’ was first mooted in early 1980’s when many appointments in military units, headquarters and training institutions were rendered tenable by one step higher ranks. That may have been appropriate then when seen in light of higher responsibilities and accountability under the prevailing dispensation, but it is obvious that this innocuous idea set in motion which came to be referred to as the AVSC Report, graciously named after its prime mover, the then Defence Secretary.
The sense of satisfaction in the military establishment was expected. It brought much needed economic succor to the deprived soldiery who were ordained to perform extraordinary exactions in return of ludicrously low pay and stagnation in each rank. Thus, confronted with a sense of moral responsibility, the government of the day sought to address the injustice in the only manner it was familiar with – mass upgrade of ranks, and inter alia, pay scales – regardless of its propriety or fallouts. If there could be ‘table-top’ hierarchy in civil services – even if the majority might hibernate on mundane assignments – why should not the same balm be applied on the military edifice, the policy makers may have wondered.
Indian policy makers have to understand that even as it takes many generations to build an army, it does not need more than a few years to undermine it and that the imperatives of war preparedness cannot be addressed with civil- specific norms, nor can the role of the Army be mixed with societal obligations of the state.
In any case, the more appropriate recourse to raising emoluments at various ranks and lateral transfer of middle level soldiery to other organisations to decongest higher military ranks was in no w ay acceptable to the civil servants, as it would, according to their zealously guarded sense of authority, upset the existing ‘equation’ of civil-military hierarchy, howsoever irrelevant it might be when seen in light of the completely distinct and mutually exclusive service conditions among the two services. Military leaders on their part, finding no way out on the horizon, took to the expediency of acquiescence, and went all out in implementing the scheme with much chest thumping. Thus each service succeeded in guarding its turf. Consequently, the Army is now burdened with a top heavy organisation that in no way helps in its mandate of war-fighting. This self-inflicted damage is further exacerbated when the upgrade of appointments, instead of fostering better military vision and competence, leads to the higher ranks downgrading their skills and usurping the role of their subordinates – a Havildar is just about as efficient as a Naik of yesteryears and Generals have started thinking and acting just as Colonels did in the past.
In continuum with the enhancement of age-profile – that has led to emergence of numerous domestic, administrative, fitness and psychological problems – another misconceived step to de-fang nation’s military strength had been taken. Consequently, provision of married accommodation, running schools, enhanced medicare and improvement of ‘quality of life’ competes for fiscal allocation with training facilities and modernisation of weaponry and equipment. Policy makers, bureaucrats, and sadly, even the military leadership, all have been party to this mutually convenient arrangement. There may not be a more representative case of collective sleep-walking.
Military Management in Democracy
Democracy functions on a basic principle that expects each section of the empowered people to seek better and better dispensation for itself and to act as pressure groups or ‘vote banks’ to achieve its goals. The system functions best when strength of such pulls and pressures causes the most appropriate course to emerge. Annual budgeting, policies on ‘reservation’ and languages, are some examples of such dispensation.
Besides, there are administrative decisions which may not be palatable to the powerful but shortsighted vested interests and yet are necessary to adopt in long term interests of the nation. To accommodate such decisions, the Government sheds some of its powers for the autonomous bodies to regulate somewhat free form political influences. Arbitration and regulatory commissions are some examples of such recourse where control over the contentious issues is exercised by logic rather than body count. Good governance, therefore, is possible only if all institutions of the state perform according to their charter; even if one of them does not, there would be imbalance.
“¦the simplistic idea that terrorism is a direct result of social ills and poverty, and can therefore be comprehensively addressed by socio-economic uplift alone, if that was so, then Ireland, Kosovo, Nagaland, Kashmir and Punjab would not have happened.
The armed forces is an unique institution created by the polity to guard its vital interests through constitutional application of force when all other measures fail. Yet, with ‘brand-India’ democracy having seeped into the national polity, it is only to be expected that demands from other institutions to seek application of their yardsticks over management of military affairs would manifest, and so would be the vocal calls for ‘reform’ from a vast citizenry that is closely related to the million strong Indian Army, many of whom perceive military practices as archaic. This situation is particularly applicable in India, with most of her society remaining just about superficially aware of the deeper nuances of military matters. Unless therefore, professionals of the armed forces engage in the systemic dispensation to protect the distinct and extraordinary characteristics of the military establishment, which is .imperative to their ability to fulfill the nation’s exacting mandate that is ordained upon them, there would be adverse fallouts.
Meanwhile, the pressure groups would remain oblivious of the harm their seemingly innocuous demands would cause to the institution of armed forces that they have maintained of necessity at heavy cost. Militaries in matured democracies the world over observe this principle and forcefully articulate their concerns, giving in to the final authority of government only at the end. It is therefore important that rather than just murmuring weak and disjointed suggestions and leaving the matter at that, Indian military leaders articulate their bonafide concerns with due force of conviction to the policy makers, who, even if unable to understand well the sensitivities of the military institution, are mostly appreciative of their armed forces’ needs. Had this step been taken without succumbing to the lure of ranks and pay, it is certain that a better solution than mass upgrade of ranks and acceptance of higher aged soldiery would have emerged in due course – and the Indian Army would have been better off in performing to its mandate.
The Concept of National Security
The celebrated political philosopher Samuel Huntington argues that there are three forms of national security policy. First comes the ‘military security policy’ that aims at neutralisation of armed threat from external adversaries, second comes the ‘internal security policy’ to thwart home-grown inimical forces, and the third is the ‘situational security policy’ to protect the state from social, demographic, economic and political threats.
As in two out of the three security concerns the Army remains a major factor, there is no escape from military preparedness, notwithstanding the pious but misplaced notions entertained by many schools. Wishful dreams of emergence of economic globalization, ‘soft power’ and democracy, that would supposedly repudiate security concerns may be enticing, but similar dreams have been articulated throughout the history and proved to be illusionary every time.
One of the visible examples is the simplistic idea that terrorism is a direct result of social ills and poverty, and can therefore be comprehensively addressed by socio-economic uplift alone, if that was so, then Ireland, Kosovo, Nagaland, Kashmir and Punjab would not have happened. The fact of human compulsions is that when increasing aspirations cannot be sustained within the opportunities at hand, there is strong urge to look beyond and lay claim upon other’s way of life. That is why the Nagas want to control what they perceive as “Greater Nagaland”, Salafists wish to dictate to the “Ummah”, Maoists want to change the political order and the Chinese eye Arunachal Pradesh.
In fact, ‘softness’ of state encourages inimical forces – even non-state actors and misguided citizens – to flex their muscles. They will be dissuaded from crossing the Rubicon and find more civilized solutions to their needs only by a threat of retaliatory force. Indeed, while old causes of war remain valid, new agenda of conflicts have emerged – energy, ecology, environment, health, water, ethnicity, and so on.
“¦ while build up of military arsenal and industry takes decades to fructify, development of military ethos needs generations to foster.
No doubt there is inter-state and intra-state warfare in our future – for the sake of maintaining peace. That is why, no country has chosen to civilianise its military establishment, nor have they shied away from keeping their ‘powder’ dry.
Imperatives of Military Preparedness
History is testimony to the fact that societal culture and articulation of its political goals are best promoted with the backing of military power, military preparedness being the most potent argument for the over-assertive adversaries to desist. The problem, however, is that military power takes long years to forge simply because warfare is much more than just a clash of physical force and techniques of weapon usage. War is an extraordinary recourse and its outcome is unbound by the laws of science, scales of funds and resources committed; physical force applied, technical skills, extreme courage and high intellect displayed by the soldiery and the supreme will of the state to engage in the extreme struggle at any cost, all playing crucial part in its successful prosecution. It is a mind game of strategic and tactical acumen that requires decades of painstaking development of such ethos and culture which are well above the normal course of life.
The other basic constituent of military preparedness, that is, its material dimension – in other words, quality and range of weapons and equipment of war – means little in securing victory if it is not tempered with the soldier’s code of conduct. Thus while build up of military arsenal and industry takes decades to fructify, development of military ethos needs generations to foster.
Rather than finding better emoluments within the same rank structure and a second career at the middle age, the Army is now required to win wars with bloated staff and personnel-deficient units”¦
Conversely, wars tend to appear in the horizon in a matter of few months. This leaves no choice to the nations but to remain prepared lest the time of reckoning goes unattended, leaving behind disconcerting ramifications of military debacle in near-perpetuity. Policy makers in India, therefore, would be wise to appreciate what Colin Gray states.., “A culture that anticipates no serious threat to its security is unlikely to organise the kind of armed forces that would be needed in more testing times”, and so repudiate attempts to fiddle with the institution of the armed forces in favour of short term expediency.
Inadequacies of Defence Policies
The fact that the Indian State is yet to mature in its military-specific policy making needs no emphasis. The most visible example of this limitation is that most of the rules and procedures applicable to the armed forces, barring certain provisions enshrined in the Constitution, are the same, if not more restrictive, as those applicable to other ministries/departments. Thus modernisation projects – force-structure, upgrade of hardware and personnel management – are stymied to an extent that the state’s military preparedness as well the cost to its exchequer stand adversely affected — a situation that does not bode well for a nation seized by inimical forces from within and without on one hand, and its people struggling at the end of survival ladder on the other. Some examples of this dichotomy, fostered by both the civilian as well as military hierarchy are indicative:-
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Force Structure. Redundant establishments, obsolete units, imbalanced formations and deficiency in cutting-edge junior leadership abound, while force-restructuring to build up of wholesome battle-capability remain stuck in the quagmire of systemic bondages that deter progress. Thus we have depots with little work load, units saddled with men and material suited for warfare of the 1970’s, fighting formations with voids in modern all-arm composition and crippling deficiency in battle leadership. Restructuring of forces and upgrade of military hardware do not fructify in isolation. When they do; it is usual to find one part of the indented system passing muster of the reorganisation and acquisition process that is designed to deny rather than facilitate, while it’s corresponding accessories are stuck due to ‘procedural hurdles’. The fallouts are disconcerting: the basic criteria of ‘balance in composition’ in terms of firepower, mobility, engineering, information technology and logistics, remains unfulfilled in field formations while units are hard put to find officers to lead men under fire. In absence of due integration of the wholesome elements of combat, usability of the force in war remains stymied, as indeed so remains the returns from high investment in military establishment.
Indeed, the situation did attract attention and much efforts are being made being to ameliorate it, yet there is a long way to go before the Indian Army can be stated to be fully cost-efficient.
Military Hardware. Upgrade of military hardware had been reduced to a charade of knee-jerk weapon procurement, ineffective defence research, shackled defence industry and restrictive rules and procedures — the unproductive burden being borne by the soldiery and the national exchequer. Indigenous development and production of military hardware is conditioned by the objectives of the scientists, bureaucrats, auditors and labour unions rather than the needs of the military establishment. Pressure of maintaining non-productive departments, factories and establishments overrides military reason and decision of the DRDO to develop the indented hardware, with no accountability in terms of quality or time-line, supersedes the soldiery’s need to be able to carry out its mandate with fair chances of success and longer life.
Thousands of crores of capital outlay for military procurements are surrendered year after year, unspent in the face of archaic procedures, shrouded in endless controversies, manipulated by vested interests and subjected to political mudslinging, while probity of the process, essentially to thwart insinuations from inimical parties, subsumes the intended goals of modernisation. Army’s most crucial weapon and equipment upgrades are thus so delayed that these are routinely overtaken by new developments even before these can fructify, setting the clock back by decades besides inviting mind boggling cost overruns.
Thus the Army lands up with guns sans corresponding target acquisition systems, weapons minus night fighting capability, tanks without transporter back up and soldiers denied adequate protective gear. Indeed, the situation did attract attention and much efforts are being made being to ameliorate it, yet there is a long way to go before the Indian Army can be stated to be fully cost-efficient.
Military Infrastructure. Strategic build-up – road building, revamp of base facilities and relativity of production-lines with the consumption-scales etc have to proceed at the same pace as of civil projects, there being no special dispensation from restrictive procedures and obligations; even an auditor, tehsildar or workers’ union can hold up progress after the burden of numerous environmental, legal, revenue and social stipulations are overcome after decade-long struggle. There is no dispensation for such strategic projects; time and cost over-runs are mind boggling. Strangely, only the Army is expected to deal with these numerous hurdles, as if the mandate of military preparedness is Army’s burden, not that of the state.
Continued…: Indian Army: Demilitarisation and Civilianisation – II
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