Indian Defence Review

The economic and military gap between India and China is growing. This weakens India strategically vis-a-vis China.

The challenge for India is to build its own economic and military strength while also forging partnerships with others that could act as restraints on muscle-flexing by China.

United States

India now has a strategic partnership with the US. Given the disparity of power between the two countries- the one being a global power and the other at best a regional one- the challenge is how to leverage the new relationship in political, economic and military terms to maximum advantage without losing independence of decision making.

India has to establish a constructive strategic partnership without losing its strategic autonomy. It is not an easy task as the US is used to leadership and not equal say in policy making.

India and the US do not as yet have sufficient convergence on basic principles that should govern international relations as well as on specific issues. India has views on sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, human rights, spreading democracy, the responsibility to protect etc which differ from those of the US.

On specific issues such as soft treatment of Pakistan, the willingness to accommodate the Taliban, sanctions on Iran, the earlier intervention in Libya and now in Syria there is divergence of thinking.

The challenge is to maintain the momentum of the relationship and manage differences with the least amount of contention.

The implications of the US pivot towards Asia have to be assessed by us very carefully.  US capacity to restrain China is limited by the reality of the economic and financial interdependence between the two countries, the inevitable reduction of US defence expenditure because of budgetary deficit issues and US’s military over-stretch.

The challenge for us is not to distance ourselves from US plans- however uncertain at this point in time- to hedge against China’s rise and also engage China productively as the US does.

We have to see what advantage we can take of rising China-Japan tensions to strengthen our political and economic linkages with Japan, especially with Prime Minster Abe in power.

We have to take a calibrated position on maritime differences between China and other littoral countries on jurisdiction in the South China Sea.

Look East Policy

Strengthening our Look East policy is necessary both to derive full benefit from our economic engagement with ASEAN and East Asian countries as well as to shape the agenda of the East Asia Summit and the emerging Asian security architecture.

Increased connectivity between India and ASEAN by land and sea corridors is essential to make our economic weight felt in this region, with a positive fall-out on political and cultural ties.

The civilizational ties between India and these countries are exceptionally rich but are not sufficiently leveraged for our overall relations with them. Myanmar and Thailand are key to such connectivity.

Russia

With Russia the challenge today is to nurture a relationship that has served our political, economic and security interests exceptionally well over decades but has lost its relative importance today with the transformation of international relations after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the phenomenon of globalisation, the vast improvement of India-US ties, and, in general, new opportunities that have arisen for India to build productive relationships with diverse countries.

Defence supplies is at the core of our relationship with Russia today; economic exchanges remain modest; Russia is not in a position to meet India’s needs for modernization of its industry, provide the technical inputs required or mobilize funds for developing its infrastructure.

The energy relationship with Russia, despite its vast resources in this sector has not broken new ground.

Nuclear cooperation has stalled because of our nuclear liability act and public agitation against the Kudankulam project following the Fukushima disaster. Space cooperation has not got galvanized.

India and Russia have similar views on several core principles that should guide the conduct of international relations, on a better redistribution of power in global institutions, and on building a multipolar world in general.

Even as we are becoming closer strategically to the US, we need a strategic relationship with Russia too for a better balance in our external relations and for preserving our strategic autonomy.

Europe

In any discussion on our strategic challenges, Europe has a tendency to get excluded, although two European countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and  Germany, France and the UK are the fourth, fifth and sixth largest economies in the world. We have strategic partnerships with  France, Germany and the UK.

The European Union is our largest trading partner. We have long-standing defence partnerships with major European countries. Europe also offers advanced industrial technologies. We have valuable nuclear and space cooperation with a country like France.

We have a tendency to downplay the strategic importance of Europe to us, believing that closer ties with the US are enough to take care of our relations with Europe. This is a mistake. Europe has interests in India independent of the US and, indeed, in several key areas- defence supplies and nuclear, for instance- there is severe competition between the two in India.

In the multipolar world in the making, India must work strategically with Europe, bilaterally and multilaterally.

Finally, we have the challenge of retaining our historical position in Africa, not the least in the face of the competition that China is posing to our interests.

Our Responses to Challenges

I have listed most of the foreign policy challenges. Let me now look at our responses and evaluate them, suggesting in the process how they could better adjusted to meet the challenges.

The caveat is that our positions on some matters are long standing ones and any change will be difficult. We should look at suitable opportunities to revise or nuance our policies, rather than be accused of an unprovoked, abrupt change of course.

Pakistan

Pakistan has never been only an issue of foreign policy; it is in many ways an issue of domestic politics too, linked to electoral considerations. We have even given Pakistan a role in Kashmir politics.

We are willing to discuss the Kashmir issue with Pakistan and dutifully include it any agenda of bilateral talks despite the latter’s history of military aggression, infiltration, terrorism and violation of accords.

We still consider Pakistan a valid interlocutor for a peaceful, negotiated solution. This gives Pakistan space to claim a political and legal right to discuss the Kashmir issue with us.

We have missed opportunities to reject any Pakistani role in Kashmir, as, for example, when last year the Pakistani parliament passed a resolution asking for a resolution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of UN resolutions in violation of the Simla Agreement.

We should move to a clear position that our full sovereignty over J&K is non-negotiable, but that we are willing to discuss a peaceful solution to Pakistan’s illegal occupation of POK, including the Northern Areas.

We have not only included Siachen in our composite dialogue, we eroded our negotiating position in advance by proposing that it be converted into a mountain of peace. The former Pakistani President General Musharraf has again lauded the Kargil aggression intended to destabilize our hold over Siachen.

We should remove Siachen from the agenda of our bilateral discussions. All the more so because of Chinese presence in POK. We should also demand that Pakistan first correct its maps that show the LOC extending to the Karakoram Pass contrary to the 1949 cease-fire agreement and the Simla Agreement.

Incidentally, we should also ask the US to undo the mischief done by its Defense Mapping Agency in this regard.

We have shown great anxiety to enter into a dialogue with Pakistan, despite major terrorist attacks against us, including the unpardonable Mumbai terrorist mayhem. We have, again, eroded our negotiating position in advance by announcing that we have no choice but to have a dialogue with Pakistan and even offering to go the extra mile if Pakistan walked the high road of peace with us.

We should cease giving signals of such over-anxiety to engage Pakistan and our readiness to make concessions.

We have committed a huge political error by conceding that Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as us, obliterating the fundamental distinction that India is a victim of Pakistani abetted terrorism and Pakistan a victim of local jihadi groups and jihadi culture that has been promoted in the country. We have also allowed Pakistan to equate the Mumbai terrorist attacks with the attack on the Samjhauta Express.

We should not repeat such formulations in any oral statement or written text in the future.

We have been pleading for the masterminds of the Mumbai attack to be brought to justice in Pakistan, without result. We have slipped into making such a demand pro forma because Pakistan’s recalcitrance has not affected our willingness to engage it.

We should no longer put ourselves in a position where we have to plead with Pakistan and invite the rebuff that we should now move beyond Mumbai or be insulted by innuendos by the erstwhile Pakistani Interior Minister that the Mumbai attack was a conspiracy against Pakistan in which India had a hand.

We allow the separatist Kashmiri leaders to meet Pakistani leaders both in India and in Pakistan. It is bizarre that those leaders who will not talk to the government of India are allowed to confabulate with the government of Pakistan.

This should stop.

We have been critical of the US for being soft on Pakistan. But we ourselves have been overly soft. Even when the US and others began to be publicly critical of Pakistan’s duplicity on terrorism, we have not only not taken advantage of such change in attitudes by helping increase international pressure on it, we have in fact helped to release the pressure  by continuing to engage Pakistan and treat it as a country we can do business with.

We have to be more thoughtful of our strategy towards Pakistan, give up wishful thinking, cease believing that the problem between us is one of “trust deficit”, when actually the problem is much deeper with historical, religious dimensions that condition the mind of Pakistan’s ruling classes.

China

Pragmatism no doubt demands that we contain our differences with China, avoid a two-front situation by having tensions on both the western front with Pakistan and the northern front with China, build trading links with a neighbour that has made impressive economic strides, separate to the necessary extent our bilateral differences from global issues on which we can work together to mutual advantage.

However, we have allowed China to dictate the terms of engagement with us. For instance, China has kept changing its position on the mechanisms for discussing the border issue.