Indian Defence Review

Strategic & Tactical Strike Capability

To develop a credible deterrent as also meet with its commitments of power projection in the region, the IAF would have to have a fleet of potent, long range, nuclear capable, multi role strike aircraft that would have the capability to neutralize any target system in the area of interest. The strike force must have at its disposal a variety of smart weapons with sizeable stand-off range, air launched cruise missiles and versatile electronic warfare suites to defeat known detection devices and fire control systems.

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The IAF is in the process of inducting 190 ( ten squadrons) of the state of the art, 40-ton class SU30 MKI multi-role aircraft. With in-flight refuelling, this fleet would have the attributes essential to fulfil the strategic commitments of the nation. With a lifespan of at least 30 years including a mid-life upgrade of avionics, the fleet of SU30 MKI would remain in service though the 2020s. However, the IAF would have to reassess the requirement of the size of the fleet periodically vis-à-vis changing scenarioand constantly upgrade its weapon systems for the fleet to retain its front line status.

The effective strength of the IAF is likely to deplete rapidly as we approach the 2020s. The IAF must therefore draw up concrete plans and take urgent steps to ensure that the fixed wing combat element of the IAF is restored to at least 40 squadrons if not more.

The IAF would also need a fleet of medium range Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) in the 20-ton class. Moves are already afoot to acquire 126 (six squadrons) of MRCA for air defence and strike tasks of tactical nature. With in-flight refuelling this fleet could also be used to augment the long range strike force. If the IAF is able to overcome the bureaucratic and procedural impediments and make the fleet operational in the next five years, this fleet too would remain in service well beyond the 2020s. The current fleet of Mig 21, MiG 27, MiG 29, Jaguars and Mirages will largely be obsolete by the 2020s and only a handful of upgraded aircraft may remain to undertake second tier tasks.

The effective strength of the IAF is likely to deplete rapidly as we approach the 2020s. The IAF must therefore draw up concrete plans and take urgent steps to ensure that the fixed wing combat element of the IAF is restored to at least 40 squadrons if not more. The LCA is a possible answer but only partly. Also, the uncertainty that has plagued the LCA project over the last two decades does not inspire much confidence. Acquisition of aircraft from foreign sources is a complicated process and cannot be conducted as a fire fighting exercise. Presently there is at least a five year gap in the assessment by the IAF and the Indian Aerospace Industry of the timeframe in which to expect the LCA to be available. In any case, the rate of production may not be adequate to close the gap of 24 squadrons in a respectable timeframe leaving the IAF with no option but to search for solutions elsewhere. Given the size of the deficit, the investment would involve an outflow of resources to the tune of billions of dollars if aircraft are to be acquired from foreign sources. The IAF may run in to affordability barriers and may be compelled to stretch the ageing fleets through expensive upgrades and suffer erosion of capability. The IAF must find answers to this challenge in the context of the security concerns and the emerging regional power status of the nation.

Air Defence

Apart from the combat fleet, the IAF would need to put in place a gap free and responsive automated air defence surveillance system comprising an overlapping integrated network of low, medium and high level radar coverage. In a nuclear environment, an air defence system must be totally impregnable as even a single aircraft or missile armed with a nuclear weapon could be catastrophic. Besides, own nuclear second strike capability must be protected against an attack by the enemy. Efforts to acquire AWACS and Aerostats even though in small numbers, are steps in the right direction but more needs to be done. Our scientific establishments need to move ahead quickly in their ambitious project to develop a space based reconnaissance and surveillance system to cover the airspace over the entire country.

The IAF needs to build up heliborne forces trained for operating both by day and night obtaining real time intelligence information from UAVs for vertical envelopment in counter insurgency operations in all types of terrain.

The existing ground based surveillance assets are woefully inadequate for even the current level of responsibility and need total revamp. Given the extent of our frontiers, infrastructure for total coverage solely through ground based surveillance systems would be prohibitively expensive and possibly unaffordable. The AWACS aircraft would be a more cost effective option as it would also provide low level cover deep inside enemy territory not only to direct own forces but also to track hostile aircraft departing for missions from their bases thus facilitating positive identification and increasing substantially the reaction time available to the air defence system.

While there is no debate over the necessity of AWACS aircraft, the question is that of numbers. In the event of imminent or outbreak of hostilities, AWACS aircraft would have to be ‘on station’ round the clock in adequate numbers to cover the entire length of hostile borders. Given the limitations of endurance of the aircraft and the crew, serviceability considerations of an infinitely complex machine and the volume of the airspace to be scanned, the IAF would have to reassess the size of the fleet required to be procured. The fleet of Phalcon equipped IL 76 aircraft being acquired in the next two to three years, will only provide a learning experience. To meet with needs of the 2020s, the size of the AWACS fleet would have to be significantly larger and hopefully augmented by the DRDO developed Embraer based system. Integrating the AWACS in to the Air Defence System, developing the technical skills to maintain and operate the platform and finding the resources to procure these machines in the requisite numbers would be some of the major challenges for the IAF and the nation. To exploit the advantage of extended low level cover provided by the AWACS, air defence aircraft must be armed with BVR missiles with range long enough to intercept hostile targets well before they are in a position to pose any threat.

Strategic & Tactical Airlift Capability

The emerging regional power status requires the nation to have the capability to intervene in the region to preserve peace and stability. Action of this nature was witnessed in the late eighties on a small scale in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Operations of this nature may have to be conducted on a larger scale in the future. The existing strategic airlift capability structured around the IL 76 fleet acquired in the mid-eighties is grossly inadequate for the perceived strategic role for reasons such as fleet size, poor state of serviceability and low residual calendar life of the fleet. The IAF must have strategic airlift capability to move at least a Brigade Group along with their combat equipment in a single wave over extended range to cover the area of interest without the need for intermediate refuelling stopover.

The IAF needs to reassess the shape and size of strategic airlift fleet and plan the induction of the replacement aircraft within ten years from now. Updated versions of the American C 17 and the C 130 or the European A400 could be some of the possible options. Contingency plans must include employment of the huge civil air fleet as well. In view of their larger reaction time however, the civil air fleet will be useful not for initial response but for induction of larger formations and for supporting operations that follow.

The IAF needs to reassess the shape and size of strategic airlift fleet and plan the induction of the replacement aircraft within ten years from now.

In addition to the strategic airlift capability, the nation will also need a sizeable tactical airlift capability which must combine medium tactical transport aircraft and heavy lift helicopters. Plans by HAL to develop a medium tactical transport aircraft in collaboration with renowned international partners, is yet in a nascent stage and need to be pursued with singular focus as the AN 32 fleet will have to be phased out in a decade or so. Tactical airlift capability will be required for inserting a battalion group directly into battle in airborne assault operations or for air mobility of ground forces for inter-theatre operational redeployment in response to rapid changes in the situation, for a variety of internal security tasks as nearly 30 per cent of the districts in this country are naxalite infested in addition to insurgency in J & K and the north eastern regions and the management of disaster.

The IAF needs to build up heliborne forces trained for operating both by day and night obtaining real time intelligence information from UAVs for vertical envelopment in counter insurgency operations in all types of terrain. Action is in hand to acquire 80 helicopters of the MI 17 class which will meet with current requirements. For the 2020s, a fresh assessment would be necessary.

Battlefield Strike

The constantly rising and prohibitive cost of fixed wing combat aircraft presently to the tune of Rs 200 crore or more apiece and the increasing lethality of the battlefield, it is becoming more and more difficult to employ fixed wing combat aircraft against low value targets in the battlefield. The responsibility to engage targets in the battlefield could shift to Battlefield Support Missiles which for enhanced accuracy, will be programmed with target information obtained in real time from UAV operating over or in the vicinity of the battle area.

The scientific establishments in India have made impressive strides in the field of space technology. It would be the responsibility of these organizations to provide the IAF with new capabilities in its drive to be an Aerospace Power.

Low value targets could be engaged more effectively, efficiently and economically by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV). Helicopters too may be employed for battlefield support in conjunction with real time intelligence information from UAVs. But in the battlefield of the future, helicopters would be highly vulnerable.

In-flight Refuelling

A force multiplier acquired in the recent past is the fleet of six IL 78 In-flight Refuelling Aircraft. Its rapid integration in to the IAF has been a remarkable feat by any standard. In-flight refuelling capability helps enhance the radius of action of combat aircraft and given the size of the combat fleet and the intensity of operations, the fleet of force multipliers acquired recently, is clearly inadequate. In-flight refuelling can also enhance the range and radius of action of medium tactical transport aircraft as well and help augment airlift capability. Thus apart from providing support to combat elements, this capability will have a crucial role in the security of the EEZ and the island territories as also in the discharge of responsibilities related to regional power status.

Exploitation of Space

One dimension that the IAF would need to exploit is that of space. The intent to do so is evident in its pronouncement to create an IAF Aerospace Command. While the concept of using space based lethal weapon systems may yet lie in the realms of imagination, considerable progress has been made in the regime of communication and surveillance by space based platforms using optical, IR sensors and radar. The scientific establishments in India have made impressive strides in the field of space technology. It would be the responsibility of these organizations to provide the IAF with new capabilities in its drive to be an Aerospace Power.

Training

Perhaps the weakest area that afflicts the IAF today is the inadequacy of training infrastructure. A fighting force equipped with the most sophisticated aircraft, smart weapon systems, complex sensors, space based surveillance & reconnaissance systems, a network centric environment needs to be supported by an equally advanced and sophisticated training environment with computer based training systems, elaborate simulation devices for all disciplines, automated distance learning and evaluation systems, all designed to train for the next war and not the last one.

he type of technological development that took ten years earlier may take perhaps two years in the future. This also means quicker obsolescence.

In this respect, the IAF is at the bottom of the hill. Human resources must be trained well enough to be able to meet with the challenges of new technology and concepts. Not only the training systems and methodology need to be upgraded, the entry thresholds and service conditions also need to be redefined and upgraded significantly to meet with the qualitative requirements of human resources of the future.

Technological Revolution

The closing years of the last century witnessed rapid changes in technology which will have a profound impact on the methodology of air warfare in the future. Emergence of digital and nano-technology will revolutionize military equipment by way of miniaturization and automation. Many of the tasks now performed by humans will shift to machines rendering it possible to reduce manpower in a technology intensive force such as the IAF. Also the pace of change in technology is increasing rapidly. The type of technological development that took ten years earlier may take perhaps two years in the future. This also means quicker obsolescence.

Advances in technology will also enhance the accuracy and lethality of weapon systems that could translate in to the overall reduction in the size of the force for the same level of commitment. Advances in Information Technology will transform the battlefield of the future in to a Network Centric Environment wherein information from a variety of ground based, airborne or space based sensors would be collected, processed and disseminated to end users in real time and easily comprehensible formats. Network Centric Environment will facilitate speedy decision making at command & control centres, quicker response by forces and better accuracy in weapon delivery. It will be a major challenge for the IAF to remain abreast of technology and reorient doctrine, strategy and tactics to operate in and exploit fully the new environment.

Conclusion

The evolving geo-political and go-strategic situation combined with rapid economic growth has placed India on track to emerging as a regional power with consequent enhanced level of responsibility. There is however no perceptible change in the overall security situation in the subcontinent. Internal security also continues to remain a major challenge for governance. Meanwhile, on account of obsolescence which is inevitable in a rapidly changing technological environment, it is necessary for the IAF to take stock and adopt appropriate measures to ensure that the IAF remains fully prepared to undertake a new range of tasks in its expanded envelope of responsibilities.

The IAF needs to redefine priorities and restructure itself to upgrade to the strategic level. As technology will be the force that will drive change in the future, the IAF cannot afford to lag behind. But most important of all, change of mindsets would be a prerequisite for any modernization plan to be meaningful. This perhaps would be the greatest challenge for the leadership.