Indian Defence Review

Illegal Extortion

In view of rampant extortion drives by the banned GNLA in West Khasi Hills (WKH), the Chief Executive Member (CEM) of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) Adelbert Nongrum demanded deployment of additional forces to ensure safety and security of the people of the region. According to him, such incidents are on the rise owing to the fact that the National Green Tribunal (NGT) in its order issued had permitted and allowed the transportation of the already extracted coal. Groups of over 20 armed cadres of the GNLA visit the coal mining sites on a daily basis serving demand notes ranging from Rs. two to 25 lakhs, he stated.12

Impact of Ban on Rat-Hole Mining

Coal mining in Meghalaya is done by local individuals in the form of a long narrow tunnel known as “rat-hole” mining. Unscientific mining of minerals poses a serious threat to the environment, resulting in reduction of forest cover, erosion of soil, pollution of air, water and land as well as reduction in bio diversity. NGT has ordered a ban on rat-hole coal mining across Meghalaya. Acting on the orders of the Tribunal, the state government in May 2014 banned the rat-hole mining and transportation of coal in the entire state.13 This has impacted the financial resources of GNLA as the extortion from transporters and miners was the main source of funding. It has in turn led to GNLA extorting more from the common people.

Government Response

On July 11, 2014, the Meghalaya Police, along with Combat Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), launched Operation Hill Storm in the Durama Hills of Garo Hills to flush out cadres of GNLA, ULFA (I) and other militant outfits. During this month-long operation, a total of 25 militants belonging to GNLA, ULFA (I), ASAK and other militant groups were apprehended from various hideouts. However, many important GNLA cadres such as Savio, Baichung, Sacheng and Jarek had managed to flee.14 While there have been many successes for the Special Forces during Operation Hill Storm, but in a major setback on July 25, 2014 two police personnel were killed and another three constables were injured in an IED attack by suspected GNLA militants. Despite significant gains during Operation Hill Storm, the possibility of violent attacks by one or the other militant faction remains.

GNLA’s Willingness to Talk

As per a press release by GNLA’s publicity secretary, the militant outfit expressed its willingness to come forward for talks in February 2016. The outfit has asked the government to appoint an interlocutor for holding negotiations. The release said according to the constitution of the outfit, its ’chairman’ Champion R. Sangma is the right person to hold talks on behalf of the outfit. It added, “The GNLA will abide by the decisions arrived at a meeting between Champion R. Sangma and a government-appointed interlocutor.” The outfit also clearly stated clearly that to create conducive atmosphere for talks, it is willing to declare a unilateral ceasefire.15

In Shillong, the state government announced that it was “keen” and “open” for dialogue with proscribed outfits like the GNLA and HNLC provided they abjure violence. However, the recovery of 66 IEDs planted by the GNLA  from East Garo Hills in the last week of February 2016 raises pertinent questions on the sincerity of the GNLA for talks16 It is also a pointer for security establishment to continue with its operations against all insurgent groups so as to force them to seek early negotiations and agree to the terms of the Indian Government.

Recommendations
AFSPA for Short Duration

Presently, AFSPA is not in force in Meghalaya despite a series of violent acts by armed insurgent groups including GNLA. But areas within 20 km of the state’s boundary with Assam are under the purview of the Act. The central government has declared this 20-km belt “disturbed”, and armed forces deployed in Assam are permitted to go into this area in hot pursuit of rebel groups.17 Extension of AFSPA to the areas affected, i.e., Garo Hills and West Khasi Hills, may not be required immediately. However, extension of AFSPA to these areas for short duration should remain an option until GNLA continue with their violent acts.

Conditional Talks and Unconditional Surrender

To give a strong message to GNLA, the central government formally indicated to the state government that there can be no talks with the GNLA. The only option left before the group is to surrender or face the wrath of security forces which continue to conduct counter-insurgency operations.18 However, given their recent willingness, the idea of holding talks with GNLA could be considered. As is evident elsewhere, surrender by militants has had a positive impact at the local level. Therefore, the idea of holding conditional talks and offering ‘one time’ unconditional surrender could be explored for the sake of peace in the region.

Joint Operations with Bangladesh

Meghalaya shares a 443-km long border with Bangladesh, of which around 70 km is unfenced and has terrain which is difficult to patrol. Northeast militants particularly GNLA have long taken advantage of this to have safe havens in Bangladesh along the border with India. It has also been seen that when the security forces pressurise the militants, they slip across to militant camps in Bangladesh. Areas in Bangladesh close to the international border are also being used to supply arms and ammunition to the militant groups operating in Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura. Cox’s Bazaar, a completely unmonitored port in Bangladesh, has emerged as a major transit point for the supply of illegal arms and ammunition coming from Southeast Asia.19 Thus, there is a need to carry out joint operations with the Bangladesh Army to target these camps.

Joint Operations by the Security Forces

From the above analysis, it is clear that GNLA is a potent security threat to Meghalaya as well as Lower Assam. The growing influence of the group therefore needs to be neutralised. Hence, there is a need to clearly layout the Rules of Engagement (RoE) for our own troops while operating against GNLA. Empowering state police and equipping them with latest weapons and equipment is essential for their operational effectiveness. However, if the situation deteriorates to a point where it is difficult for the state security apparatus to manage, joint operations by army, paramilitary and police on the lines of Operation All Out in Assam is in order and should remain an option. Use of helicopters and other force multipliers will add to the success of such operations. Necessary co-ordination with Bangladesh Army again will be useful.

Rehabilitation of Surrendered/SoO Cadres

There are a large number of surrendered and SoO cadres in the area. There is a need to carry out an early and comprehensive rehabilitation of these individuals. At times such surrendered individuals have rejoined militancy or have launched a new outfit. To arrest such trends, early and fruitful rehabilitation of these cadres is imperative. The area is suitable for organic farming and has abundant natural resources. Thus productive measures for exploiting these avenues should be incorporated as a policy so as to generate employment for such individuals and help them lead a peaceful life.

Sustained Role of Church

The church plays an important role in the entire socio-political spectrum of the society in Meghalaya. It therefore can play a positive role in the conflict resolution particularly in Meghalaya. The Shillong Khasi-Jaintia Church Leaders’ Forum (SKJCLF), recognised by the Meghalaya Government as its official negotiator with the proscribed outfit HNLC, has been making efforts to bring the militant outfits to the negotiating table. The Roman Catholic Church has pledged to go all out to ensure that peace returns to the strife-torn region of Garo Hills. The message of Shalom Meghalaya20 is in fact simple, straight and uncomplicated. To the militants, “please return home and live as we live”. To the Meghalaya Government, “please ensure prevalence of rule of law in Garo hills.”21

Addressing Root Causes

1. Unemployment coupled with criminal nexus has its bearing on the rise of such militant groups. Easy money has often been a luring factor for the unemployed youth to pick up weapon. Coal mining and forest produce has also contributed to extortion demands which are avenues for easy money. Thus, creating employment opportunities along with proper enforcement of law and order needs to be prioritised.
2. The border with Bangladesh, despite being guarded, has ample gaps due to the nature of terrain. That, coupled with the anti-social elements on both sides of the border, contributes to the criminal nexus including gun running, kidnapping, killing and extortion. This aspect requires an immediate attention.
3. The lines of communication especially in the Garo Hills and interiors are under developed or almost absent. Lack of effective communication infrastructure inhibits the reach of security forces as well as the civil administration, which provides the insurgents a safe environment. There is an urgent need to improve infrastructure in the remote areas.
4. Addressing tribal aspirations through inclusive development will lead to inter-tribal harmony and promote peace in the state. Need for transparency and accountability on the part of ADCs and state government is necessary to ensure fair distribution of the benefits of the development projects including skill development.

—————————–

Courtesy: http://www.idsa.in/policybrief/garo-national-liberation-army_sksharma_180316