Military & Aerospace

East Pakistan: The Problem
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Issue Book Excerpt: India\'s War since Independence | Date : 19 Nov , 2016

Undoubtedly India’s national interest lay in having a friendly regime in neighbouring East Pakistan as the economic and cultural affinities of the two Bengals were linked indivisibly. Part of the same province in undivided India, the correlation of industries and sources of raw materials had not foreseen the effect of the artificial territorial partition in 1947. At that time jute was grown in the Pakistani part of the province while the factories producing finished goods were in and around Calcutta.

The tea grown and processed in the Sylhet area of East Pakistan was sold in Calcutta along with the Assam product. Fish caught in the eastern rivers was eaten in Calcutta. Cheap river transport carried tea, teak and other commercial goods from Assam and northern Bengal to the markets of Calcutta. Although India had developed its own rail and road links with Assam after partition through the Siliguri-Charduar corridor, for reasons of economy it had used East Pakistan’s rail and river transport facilities till this was stopped by the Ayub regime when hostilities broke out in 1965 and never resumed despite the Tashkent agreement.

This minority looked to India for moral support, and in difficult times for their security.

Above all, unlike in West Pakistan, there had always been a sizable Hindu minority in the eastern wing as rightful citizens of Pakistan. This minority looked to India for moral support, and in difficult times for their security. It was in this context that India had all along followed a two-faced policy towards Pakistan, comprising continued and outright confrontation in the west and an extended hand of friendship and cooperation in the east. For instance, the Nehru-Liaquat pact of 1947 regarding the transfer of population from certain areas of India and Pakistan did not apply to the east. Later, the evacuee property law enforced by the two governments did not apply to this region. It was in pursuance of this policy of friendship towards East Pakistan that Lal Bahadur Shastri did not permit the extension of hostilities to this region in the conflict of 1965 despite the temptation of easy victory.[1]

India did not have to work, as Bhutto and other Pakistani politicians alleged, for the alienation of the eastern wing from the western or covertly encourage secessionist activities. The Pakistani rulers themselves encouraged this tendency over the years by treating East Pakistan like a colony rather than a part of their country.[2] The economic development of the western wing was carried out at the cost of the east to the extent that, enjoying the benefit of a captive market, West Pakistan industries monopolised the sale of products in the east and repatriated their profits to the west. The foreign exchange earnings from exports of tea and jute produced in the east paid for the west’s development.[3]

Mujib often accused the 58 million people of West Pakistan of keeping the 72 million of East Pakistan in a state of subservience in that the west took 70 per cent of the foreign aid the country received and 70 per cent of its imports, and practically monopolised the central bureaucracy and the army, its share of posts being 85 and 90 per cent respectively.[4] By contrast, the more populous East Pakistan remained the world’s most densely populated region and one of the poorest, as well as prone to disaster, afflicted with seasonal floods and cyclones which took a heavy toll in lives and property yearly.[5]

After narrating the brutalities of the Pakistani Army and the horrifying tales of genocide, the Indian press and other propaganda media advocated using this opportunity of a lifetime to settle scores with Pakistan.

This ruthless economic and political exploitation by successive West Pakistani-dominated governments and military dictatorships drove the east wing in desperation to open revolt. And the Pakistani Army, the instrument of power which was used or threatened to be used, became the target of Bengali hatred. The years of suppressed resentment against regional inequities and the military power responsible for it ignited the spark which engulfed the entire subcontinent in the crossfire of revolt.

After narrating the brutalities of the Pakistani Army and the horrifying tales of genocide, the Indian press and other propaganda media advocated using this opportunity of a lifetime to settle scores with Pakistan. All eyes were now focused on Indira Gandhi, known for her decisive, resolute and timely actions. Since she made no move, her colleagues, her party men, opposition politicians and the impatient public began to chafe at her inaction at such an opportune moment, although their protests were muffled.[6] Some retired generals publicly argued in favour of immediate military action for the liberation of the eastern wing before the Pakistani forces there could be strengthened by the arrival of heavier weapons and ammunition by sea. The more time India allowed Pakistan, they argued, the more costly would the venture become militarily. It was time to act now, they echoed.

Some of them accused Gen S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, Chief of Army Staff, of developing cold feet. It was remoured that Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, backed by Finance Minister Y.B.Chavan, had urged Mrs Gandhi to resort to armed action immediately, adding that if Manekshaw had any misgivings he should be replaced. But under no circumstances, they are said to have argued, should this opportunity, providentially offered to India, remain unavailed of.

But Manekshaw had his own justifiable reservations about instant action. He was the right Chief for this time of national crisis. He was the only senior general of his generation who combined military know how with acute political and strategic sense. Having risen in stature along with the growth of the Indian Army, he knew and understood India’s military capability so well that he was not prepared to fumble in a situation which he could not dominate in full measure. He was against half baked, inconclusive involvements, and he had the moral standing to withstand pressures against his convictions. He wanted to lead a victorious army and not a hastily committed rabble. And there he stuck, and for very valid reasons.

Firstly, he assessed that India’s strategic planning always envisaged the decisions to be obtained in any Indo-Pakistani conflict in the western wing, while contingency planning in the east catered only for the security of the Siliguri-Coach Behar corridor and the city of Calcutta. For this limited task in the east, only one infantry division plus was earmarked on the presumption that Pakistan would not reinforce this region. In the event, Pakistan had built up its eastern force to about three or more divisions, counting the communication troops and paramilitary forces.

Although because of the hurried airlift of men and material the normal complement of armour and artillery had not fetched up yet, the combined war potential of such a force level was nonetheless considerable in relation to our earmarked resources. Besides, the eastern region of Tripura lacked the necessary administrative and communication infrastructure to support worthwhile operations. Manekshaw felt, and quite rightly too, that the Indian Army was not well attuned to reorient operational plans rapidly at such short notice, nor had it the wherewithal to conduct operations without the necessary administrative infrastructural backing.

If India intervened without clearly justifying this action in foreign eyes, the charge that it was engineering the breakup of Pakistan would be established and Bangladesh would be refused recognition by the majority of nations.

Secondly, the quantum of force he needed to launch this operation would require time to collect, especially when the immediately available formations were tied up with the West Bengal elections[7] and others had to be found from operationally committed troops engaged in counter-insurgency and other holding roles in far-flung areas.[8] By the time the force was collected the monsoon would be on its way, thus leaving a very tight schedule for the operation.

Recalling his Burma campaign days, Manekshaw did not want his army to get stuck in the quagmire of the monsoon. Moreover, this would give China, a sympathiser of Pakistan and a foe of India, a chance to retaliate on India’s northern borders. China would have about eight months of campaigning, till the Himalayan passes closed sometime in November, to annexe the maximum Indian territory. Manekshaw preferred to fight one enemy at a time, and the weaker one first. He proposed to time his military action for November, when the possibility of Chinese participation was considerably reduced because the Himalayan passes would then be closed.

Thirdly, a reason he kept to himself was the shortage in stockpiled reserves of essential specialised and armoured vehicles and of bridging equipment which would need some time to make up and recoup. In addition, raising new units and formations and the introduction of newly acquired equipment was in progress, and this needed time to assimilate. Even with crash programmin, these tasks, could not be completed before the onset of the monsoon, and then it would be too late.

But political compulsions clinched the issue. What was the invasion of East Pakistan based on, what ostensibly was its internal problem to be justified in international circles? If the creation of an independent Bangladesh was achieved by Indian military action, how was its domestic and external viability to be assured without its recognition by the international forum, the United Nations? If India intervened without clearly justifying this action in foreign eyes, the charge that it was engineering the breakup of Pakistan would be established and Bangladesh would be refused recognition by the majority of nations. After considering the issue carefully, the Prime Minister accepted the postponement of intervention to an opportune moment in the future[9]and supported Manekshaw in his stand.

After this decision was taken, the Indian military planners proceeded to assess two vital parameters. One was: When would war come? India’s basic political philosophy did not envisage resort to force to seek solutions to national problems unless there were grave provocations to do so. The initiative would always lie with Pakistan, and as a result Yahya Khan could start hostilities at a time of his choosing. He could be called a “political novice” and an “unpredictable drunkard,” but he had a good professional reputation. It could be safely assumed that he would not commit his fighting machine to battle unless there was a reasonable chance of success. And more so when his survival as a military dictator depended solely on the out come of a war which he might start or which might be imposed on him.

The ideal time for hostilities from the Indian point of view would be December. The period from the time of this appreciation in April to December may be conveniently divided into pre-monsoon and post-monsoon. Militarily, the pre-monsoon period—April to mid—June 1971–was perhaps the most favourable to both countries provided the campaign could be successfully concluded well before the monsoon set in. India was however strategically unbalanced at that time because of the peacetime location of its reserve formations in the hinterland, as a result of which they would have taken some time to be concentrated on the battlefield.

Yahya Khan could easily have found an excuse for overrunning the guerilla bases in Indian territory as part of Tikka Khans counter-insurgency operations, but he had his own difficulties.

Before this deployment could be executed, Pakistan could launch a preemptive attack and follow its initial success to a tenable conclusion. Moreover, major reorganisation, equipping and repair programmes were afoot in this period, and war at that juncture would have meant committing ill-equipped and half-trained units hastily to battle. Yahya Khan could easily have found an excuse for overrunning the guerilla bases in Indian territory as part of Tikka Khan’s counter-insurgency operations, but he had his own difficulties.

He had recently transferred from the western wing two old and well-trained divisions, 9 and 16 Infantry, forming part of the Pakistani strike force north and south.[9] In addition, counterinsurgency operations in East Pakistan had claimed considerable numbers of paramilitary and communication zone troops[10] at the cost of reducing military capabilities in the west. Although these two divisions had left behind their integral artillery and other heavy weapons in the west, the woeful shortage of infantry with his strike force deterred Yahya Khan from undertaking a meaningful operation. He also had some shortages in his reserve war stockpile which needed recoupment. The US resource having dried up,[11]  he had to look around for other avenues of supply to make up at least his critical shortages.[12]

Politically, Yahya Khan still relied upon Tikka Khan to finish the counter-insurgency operations launched to suppress the revolt and the subsequent guerilla movement. “Give me a few days,” Tikka Khan was reported to have said, but Yahya Khan saw those days stretch into weeks and months and last deep into May that year. By the time some semblance of control could be assured, June had arrived and the impending monsoon was very much in sight. The heavy rains for the next three months hampered military operations in the eastern wing. The riverine nature of the terrain and low-lying paddy land turned the countryside into a swamp of mud, immobilising armour and other vehicular traffic. No serious campaigning could therefore proceed at a meaningful pace.

The next question which confronted the Indian military planners was whether the Chinese would act in collaboration with Pakistan, and if so in what strength?

Similarly, in the western wing, where decisions were envisaged through mobile warfare employing a predominance of armour, the armour would bog down in the rainsoaked plains of Punjab. There was no alternative for Pakistan but to wait till October, when the earth would harden after the rains, to enable military means to be employed in both wings. This gave India a much-needed respite for preparations to redress the strategic imbalance and to make up the critical shortages in arms and ammunition. India woefully lacked the requisite infrastructure in the eastern theatre to build up a sizable force for either defence of its own territory or for launching an offensive. This was particularly so in Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura, opposite the Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong line. Creation of this infrastructure meant developing roads, communications and administrative dumps to sustain a war, and these needed a considerable lead period to develop.

In addition, the buildup of troops in the eastern as well as the western theatres had to be completed to meet a likely preemptive attack. Troops for the eastern theatre had to be found from formations engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram, those facing the Chinese on the northern borders, and also what could be garnered from formations earmarked for the western theatre. Troop movements involving long distances from the hinterland and from the western to the eastern theatre needed from six to eight weeks to complete. The welcome monsoon would cover the time required to execute this buildup.

The next possibility was for war after the monsoon—from the middle of October onward. This would have suited India if the deadline could be pushed beyond the first week of December, as it was visualised that the Himalayan passes would then close for about five months. It would reduce the potentiality of Chinese collusion and would enable India to take greater risks against the Chinese by thinning out its holding force in the Hmalayas to create the required buildup of troops against Pakistan, particularly in the eastern theatre. It would also enable India to tilt international opinion in favour of Bangladesh, with a view to seeking help in meeting the crushing economic burden of looking after millions of refugees as well as a political solution with Yahya Khan which would create stability in the subcontinent.[13]

The next question which confronted the Indian military planners was whether the Chinese would act in collaboration with Pakistan, and if so in what strength? By the middle of April some indications were available from the statements of Chinese and Pakistani leaders. On 13 April, Prime Minister Chou En-lai promised all help to Yahya Khan in maintaining the “territorial integrity of Pakistan” against all “external interference,” which included the “handful of people” waging guerilla war in Bangladesh.

On 30 April, Bhutto, the most ardent pro-Chinese politician in Pakistan, declared that China would intervene in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh. This statement was soon followed by the Pakistani Ambassador in Peking, who hailed the ready Chinese support in Pakistan’s difficulties with India. On 19 July, Yahya Khan commented in an interview with a foreign correspondent: “Pakistan will not be alone if India forces a war on it.” Such loud claims continued to be repeated by different voices till he actually forced war on India. So far as Yahya Khan’s and Bhutto’s professions indicated, Chinese support was likely to be of a meaningful degree for Pakistan if war broke out.

On 30 April, Bhutto, the most ardent pro-Chinese politician in Pakistan, declared that China would intervene in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh.

At the beginning of November, Yahya Khan told Newsweek magazine that war with India was imminent and the Chinese could be counted on to come to Pakistan’s aid with supplies of arms and ammunition. He went a step further the following week in an interview with Columbia Broadcasting System when he asserted that China would intervene if India attacked Pakistan.[14] About the same time, Bhutto rushed to Peking, presumably for last-minute arrangements for intervention. At a banquet in Bhutto’s honour, the acting Foreign Minister of China promised that “should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people.” On his return to Islamabad, Bhutto triumphantly claimed: “We have achieved concrete results.[15]

China watchers in India however read differently between the lines of the Chinese and Pakistani statements. Firstly, the promise of Chinese support did not mean military intervention. This could mean only diplomatic support abroad and economic aid at home and supply of arms to equip additional formations being raised in Pakistan. Secondly, such intervention was conditional on “foreign aggression” against Pakistan. Since India had no intention of starting a war with Pakistan, the only question that would arise was that of Pakistani aggression against India.

Nevertheless, Chinese intervention could not be discounted altogether. But the indications available until then did not suggest such an eventuality. For instance, no joint statement was issued at the end of Bhutto’s visit to Peking. The foreign press in Islamabad accordingly concluded that Bhutto had returned without any specific commitments or assurances. He remarked in a press interview that “the question whether China would take any diversionary action in the north was a superficial matter.” In fact, militarily nothing was more pertinent than the correct answer to this question at the time.

Indian strategists had however to rely on their own political and military appreciation. Politically, with China’s isolation having decreased as a result of detente with the US, it was at the moment seeking an ideality and rightful role in international politics through the United Nations. It was therefore improbable that the Chinese would jeopardise their national interests by a military engagement in aid of Pakistan at this critical juncture of entry into the UN, including the Security Council.[8] Moreover, there had been no anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese mass media to indicate a psychlogical buildup for intervention although Pakistan projected such a possibility even up to the time of the Indian unilateral ceasefire.

The latest intelligence reports from Tibet assessed the Chinese strength there at approximately 150,000 troops. This was estimated to be composed of about eight divisions and communication zone troops for administrative backing. Of these eight divisions, five to six were employed in a holding role along the India-Tibet border while the remainder were stationed in the hinterland for internal security duties.[16] In 1970, the law and order situation was generally reported to be fairly stable in Tibet and the Chinese could muster two or three divisions to develop a thrust at a chosen point.

Lateral communications on the Tibetan plateau enabled the Chinese to concentrate speedily in any one of the four main sectors: Ladakh; UP-Tibet; Sikkim and western Bhutan; and eastern Bhutan, NEFA. In addition, they had a good network of roads leading to the Indo-Tibetan border from bases in the rear. On the Indian side however, the countryside is furrowed by high mountainous ridges forming deep and narrow valleys. These valleys canalise ingress. Thus, it is possible for China to develop several parallel thrust lines, but for India, because of intervening heights and lack of lateral communications, these cannot mutually support each other. Offensive deployment can therefore be plugged by moving troops in a given time frame according to the signs of a Chinese buildup across the passes. Road development since the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 ensures this capability in good measure.

One thing was certain: China was so conscious of its international prestige as a military power of consequence that it would not make an overt move, however small, unless assured of sufficient superiority in arms to guarantee success.

One thing was certain: China was so conscious of its international prestige as a military power of consequence that it would not make an overt move, however small, unless assured of sufficient superiority in arms to guarantee success. China would take no action which, if escalated, would land it in difficulties. No Chinese build-up along the Himalayan border had thus far been noticed by Indian intelligence, but our planners, having been bitten once in 1962, could not rely implicitly on intelligence agencies alone. They would have placed more reliance on closure of the Himalayan passes to discourage China from a military venture.

But history was in India’s favour. It was a fact that in 1962 the unilateral Chinese ceasefire and hasty withdrawal after the triump. hant march into NEFA against weak and panicstricken Indiantroops was less inspired by political magnanimity than by impending snowfall in the Tibetan passes. Cut off from their administrative bases, the Chinese troops could not have sustained further military operations against superior Indian strength hurriedly mustered in the plains of Assam to meet the incursion.

In 1965 however it was a different story. The Chinese coalition with Pakistan did not go beyond bellicose verbal threats on the f l imsy excuse of alleged abduction of goats and graziers on the part of India.[17] Without firing a single shot in support of its friend Pakistan, China managed to keep India on tenterhooks[3] to the extent that we were not able to move a substantial number of our troops facing China in the north to reinforce the western front till well after the conflict was over. Later analyses revealed that the Chinese had not built up their logistics as much as Indian intelligence had assessed. But then India could not afford to take chances with China.

It was unthinkable that the Burmese Government would connive tacitly at the roadbuilding activities and subsequent invasion of India on account of the friendly relations between New Delhi and Rangoon.

Snowfall could start as early as November or as late as December. Except for the two eastern passes at Khinzemane and Diphu, the snows are usually so heavy that no sizable trans-border movement is possible, at least not large enough to sustain major operations. In addition, there was an approach along the old Ledo Road through northern Burma. But an incursion through a third country, especially when Peking was trying to establish an international image, was ruled out.

The Ledo Road was in such a state of disrepair that it would have taken months of Chinese roadmending effort to make it serviceable for the heavy traffic required for a major thrust. Within that time the Burmese would certainly have noticed the unusual Chinese activity, even in that sparsely populated area, and raised serious objections. It was unthinkable that the Burmese Government would connive tacitly at the roadbuilding activities and subsequent invasion of India on account of the friendly relations between New Delhi and Rangoon. At the same time, minor border incursions would not work, for India had travelled far on the road of military preparedness since 1962 and could look after hit-and-run raids with the prevailing level of holding forces facing the Chinese.

India’s normal allocation of forces against East Pakistan was about a division plus against some eight or nine divisions for the north against the Chinese. The impending operations in Bangladesh needed a force level of some six to seven divisions to deal with Pakistan’s three to four divisions then operating in the eastern wing. Since the western theatre could not be denuded of manpower without jeopardising the offensive defence capability, additional formations had to be found from the holding force against the Chinese. This inevitable thinning out had however to be achieved without upsetting the security of the region to any appreciable degree, as politically China remained as inscrutable as ever. In any case, China could not be taken for granted.

Against the Chinese, the Indian planners leaned heavily on the snows. They proposed to maintain a maximum presence in sensitive sectors right up to the time the passes closed and denude the remainder of the northern front to the minimum desirable level so as to create the force required for the Bangladesh operations. But what would happen if Pakistan did not obligingly wait for the snows and China came to its aid much earlier? They believed that the magnitude of conflict China could generate within the force level obtaining in Tibet could be contained by the Indian resources available in the region—by accepting an initial loss of territory if necessary. What would happen if China attacked in a big way? In that case India would have to seek refuge behind more powerful protection, which we did through the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971.

The Indian planners decided to hold these sensitive sectors against the Chinese with sufficient strength to prevent a walkover and employ the withdrawn forces in such access of time and space that they could swiftly reinforce the threatened sectors from other deployment areas. This implied that the withdrawal from more sensitive areas had to be held up till the last moment, and the deployment of these forces in the Bangladesh operation had to be such that they could be withdrawn at short notice without jeopardising the vitals of the operational plan as such. This called for the closest coordination between the intelligence agencies and the operational planners, something hitherto unpractised in India.

There could be some miscalculation because of failure of intelligence or faulty weather forecasting, resulting in a premature pullout of reserve formations. But this miscalculation could be offset by making the holding formations sufficiently strong to withstand a Chinese attack till the reserve formations could be switched back if required. The mountainous terrain near the passes and the years of effort in developing our defence potential had endowed India with the capability to hold such an attack for a week or so. Any marginal loss of territory, if enforced by Chinese superiority, was acceptable temporarily.

The only way to cope with the problem of US intervention was to finish the job in East Pakistan before President Nixon was in a position to react.

This much risk had to be taken if India was to muster sufficient forces for the envisaged Bangladesh operations. But the operational plan for intervention had to be so contrived that its objectives would be secured with such speed that the borrowed formations from the north could revert in time to meet the likely Chinese re-action. This fitted well with the overall concept of a short war the Indian planners envisaged in view of the fear of international pressures. Even the overt intervention of the US in one form or other was not discounted. It was better to finish the war in Bangladesh before extraneous pressures came into play.

Although it would have paid India to keep the war localised to Bangladesh so that all effort could be concentrated there, unlike in 1965 when Pakistan wanted to confine the coflict to Kashmir, Yahya Khan now preferred to escalate it into a fullfledged confict on two fronts. In addition, he would spare no effort to persuade China to open a third front—if only to create more difficulties for India. He also had an eye on the naval and air might of the US to bail him out of his difficulties in Bangladesh if the evacuation of Pakistani troops from the region became necessary. In that event, the US Marines were expected to hold a beach head to permit the US Navy to do so.

It seemed very unlikely that Pakistan would allow the surrender of the four divisions in the east. As most of the Pakistani soldiery came from West Pakistan, their being taken captive could create such a political furore in the western wing that the military regime might topple. Yahya Khan was expected to ask for help to save his men only if things become operationally hopeless and withdrawal was absolutely imperative. This was expected to happen when the war in Bangladesh reached its final decisive stages.

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This implied that India had perforce to keep adequate forces on the West Pakistan border, in Jammu and Kashmir, and also against China along the northern border, to maintain a proper strategic balance,[18] and then to contrive such a concentration of strength in the east as to liberate Bangladesh swiftly and allow the Indian formations to be redeployed on other fronts. The order of priorities for India appeared to be Bangladesh, then West Pakistan, and finally China, if it chose to intervene overtly to aid Pakistan.

The only way to cope with the problem of US intervention was to finish the job in East Pakistan before President Nixon was in a position to react. The nearest US naval presence which could be used to evacuate the Pakistani garrison was in the Pacific, and this would take some time to reach its destination in East Pakistan. Although the Indo-Soviet treaty would theoretically look after such US action,[19] it was very unlikely that the two superpowers would come into open conflict on this issue, especially when detente was drawning in international politics. This was a pertinent matter, and the Indian planners were fully aware that in the end India must be prepared to fight alone.


  1. Lal Bahadur Shastri, broadcast to the nation on 23 September 1965.
  2. Stated by Sheikh Mujib in an interview with BBC on 18 March 1971.
  3. Cited by Sheikh Mujib at a public meeting in Chittagong in November 1971.
  4. Ibid. These charges were confirmed in a special World Bank report which stated that the disparities between the two wings of Pakistan were causing a “great deal of bitterness and recrimination.”
  5. Sheikh Mujib in BBC interview.
  6. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII. No 20, “Demand for Indian Recognition of Bangladesh,” p. 10158.
  7. West Bengal elections were scheduled on 9 March 1971.
  8. Troops engaged in quelling sporadic Naga rebellion.
  9. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 51, Mrs Gandhi’s statement in Parliament, p. 10511.
  10. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 18, “More Troops Arrive from West wing,” p. 10134.
  11. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 20, report of Free Bangla Radio, p. 10152.
  12. US embargo on military aid to Pakistan on 25 March 1971.
  13. Asion Recorder, Vol XVII, No 34, “French Arms Supply,” p. 10320.
  14. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 31. Mrs Candhi’s statement, in Parliament on developments in East Bengal, p. 10281.
  15. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 51, President Yahya Khan on Chinese help, p. 10520.
  16. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 49, “Chinese Support,” p. 10496.
  17. The UN General Assembly voted on 25 October 1971, to give China’s seat in UN to the government of the People’s Republic of China.
  18. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 30, Defence Ministry’s annual report, p. 10271.
  19. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 4, “Intrusions on Sikkim Border Chinese Allegation,” p. 6259.
  20. Asian Recorder, Vol XI, No 41, “Chinese Activity along Border,” p. 6716.
  21. Thirteen divisions were deployed in the western theatre, six out of ten mountain divisions in the Ladakh and NEFA areas, withdrawing only four for action in Bangladesh. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII No 24, Institute of Strategic Studies annual survey, p. 10815.
  22. Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 48, “Indo-Soviet Consultation,” p. 10479.
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