Indian Defence Review

People are spreading the China Threat Theory and trying to split China, which not only hurts China, but also is not in the interest of world peace, stability and development. Those people who think that a developed and strong China will constitute a threat to other countries do not understand China’s situation and history. The Chinese people, who were subjected to imperialist powers’ aggression and plunder, are a peace-loving people. Today China is focusing its efforts on national economics construction and working hard to manage its own affairs properly. To build China into a modern country, we need internal stability and lasting peaceful international environment. China wants to develop friendly relation with all countries in the world on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
                                       — CMC Vice Chairman, Liu Huaqing. May 1996¹ 

China’s success in achieving economic growth as a result of post-Mao reforms has given rise to speculation that China would rise as a great power in the twenty-first century. Since the mid-1990s, the western media has begun to report on China as the “coming power, an economic center of gravity in Asia, a military mover and shaker, and a peer of any of the Western powers that once nibbled at China’s fringes and brought emperors low.”²

China’s move towards becoming the center of the world’s post-cold war security calculation has raised, once again, the oldest problem in diplomacy: How can the international community manage the ambitions of a rising power. From a realist view, some scholars have argued that the rising economics and military power of China, would, buy its own accord, make China a threat to Asian and global security. The mere emergence of an economically and militarily stronger China would upset the balance of power in Asia and spark realignments by China’s neighbors. As a rising power, China would tend to use force rather than consultation in disputes with other nations.

Whether China will become a military threat to its neighbors, a systemic challenge to the global order, or a cultural-ideological challenge to the West remain open questions.³

China’s sheer size and growing power are already altering the contours of Asian security, international commerce, and the global balance of power. The uncertainties about China’s future capabilities and intentions and the debate about alternative policy options have gripped the entire spectrum of analysts.

Emergence of China as a power has always stirred the imagination of the western world. Even Napoleon was so influenced as to remark that “China is a sleeping giant — when it awakens it will shake the world.” The demise of the Soviet Union saw the emergence of one superpower and a “crowd of heroes,” struggling to find a status amongst the powerful. The international “pecking” order itself is undergoing profound systemic change. China is seeking to be absorbed into a structurally rigid and hierarchical system. Historical precedent suggests that nations in economic transition tend to be assertive externally⁴ and that accommodating a rising power into the established order has proved difficult and disruptive. Moreover, scholars correlate war with transition from one system to another.

“Challengers [to the existing international system] are those powerful and dissatisfied great nations who have grown in power after the imposition of the existing international order. Their elite face circumstances where the main benefits of the international order have already been allocated. The conditions for conflict are present. Peace is threatened when challengers seek to establish a new place for themselves in the international order; a place to which they believe their increasing power entitles them.”⁵

Western analysts describe China as a dissatisfied and non-status quo power, which seeks to change the existing international order and norms of inter-state relations. Nor is it satisfied with the norms and “rules” created by the West in the international system. They also argue that China seeks to redress historical grievances and assume what it sees as its rightful place as a global power. At the same time, it also seeks to redress the Asian regional subsystem balance of power.⁶

It may not resort to conquer territory (except Taiwan) but would like to place itself at the top of a new hierarchical pyramid of power in the region. Much to the chagrin of China watchers who sympathize with China’s struggle against all odds, analysts suggest that a new kind of “tribute system” is emerging whereby patronage and protection is dispensed to other countries in return for their recognition of China’s superiority and sensitivities. International relations scholars recognize this as a classic benevolent hegemonic system.⁷ Having painfully built a capability for deterrence and coercion and with a past precedent of punitive forays “to teach a lesson”, the use of military might may remain a “threat in being” while the preferred tactics would be to command respect and “obeisance through patronage and preponderant power.”⁸

All these factors (visible and invisible), assumptions and prognosis have contributed to the “China Threat Theory”. It began in the mid-1990s over “if” and “to what degree” China threatens the international community.⁹

The threat emanates from two distinct factors — its capabilities and its intentions. The capabilities are tangible and quantifiable and they lead to the latent potential that can be translated into force projection or force extension. This can be plotted geographically as the area of direct influence. Intentions are non-tangible and can only be deduced from the capabilities being built up. As a corollary, thereby, when the capability exists the intention can be generated.

Proponents of the “China Threat” theory argue that it is inconceivable for China to have a peaceful rise; a superpower China will inevitably be a threat to others.¹⁰ China’s rise has been viewed with uncertainty and anxiousness. There are many reasons for such fears. Robert Kagan, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC and a columnist of the Washington Post, for example, has used history to argue that China’s rise will not be peaceful — “Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power.”¹¹

Others have expressed the threat in starker terms. Bill Gertz, the geopolitical editor and national security reporter of Washington Post, considers China to be the most serious national security threat to the USA and goes on to explain that the reason Americans should take the threat from China so seriously is that it puts at risk the very national existence of the United States.¹²

The US government has been more nuanced, but it has also sounded alarms. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report asserted that “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the US and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages.”¹³

Khalid Al-Rodhan in his paper “A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis”, has analysed the China threat theory from theoretical, methodological and strategic points of view.¹⁴ He highlights the theory’s flaws and questions the assumptions of linear projection while assessing future build-ups of capabilities and fallacy of neglecting the internal and external problems being faced by China. He explains that the theory is misleading and counterproductive.¹⁵

China itself has made concerted efforts to diffuse apprehensions raised by the “China Threat Theory”. Liu Xiaoying, a professor at the Communication Research Institute of Communication University of China, when asked about the justification behind this theory, attributed Chinese economic rise and the unjustified fears gripping the West as the main reasons.¹⁶

He said that “China is just regaining its long lost right to have its say in world affairs. Harmonious coexistence of countries entails diverse views, not a hegemonic monopoly (refers to USA) … Historically, the rise of a country has created controversies and raised the concern of its neighbors and above all the existing powers. It is natural for the West to nurse such views as the China Threat Theory. But it should not deny China from having its say.” According to him, the Chinese people can have their say by solving their problems, building the country’s image and ridding the rest of the world of its misunderstandings and prejudice through transparency. The government should have the confidence to face up to the problems that its fast paced economic development has created. The world should rid itself of its paranoia and appreciate the efforts of China to solve its problems and lift its people out of poverty.¹⁷

Despite a conscious attempt to cultivate the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states which dates back from the mid-1970s, China continues to cast a shadow over the states of Southeast Asia because of its huge size, enormous population, close geographic proximity and considerable economic potential. The future scenario seems more ominous because these nations see China asserting an irredentist agenda in the South China Sea with a “steely and self-righteous nationalist determination underpinned by a program of military modernization.”¹⁸

On October 9, 1991, President Yang Shangkun, speaking at massive rally commemorating the 1911 Revolution, noted, “Some foreign forces are instigating the Taiwan independence elements to split the motherland,” and he bluntly warned, “We will absolutely not permit any foreign forces to interfere. We will never sit by and watch any act of separating Taiwan from China …. Whoever plays with fire will perish by fire.”¹⁹

The display of military might “to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate high levels of military action if necessary,”²⁰ did not auger well for its image as a responsible neighbor in the region. China is also wary of dealing with ASEAN as a unit. It much prefers to deal with ASEAN’s members on a bilateral rather than on a multilateral basis so as to limit the constraints arising for interdependence.²¹ The Chinese game plan was:

The top priority of China’s foreign policy is to maintain a stable peripheral environment so as to safeguard normal economic circumstances at home. China regards the establishment of long-standing and stable good relations with ASEAN as an important factor in attaining this goal.²²

China has created for itself a niche in the Asian region to be taken by some not as a rising power but as an established regional power. It shares a bipolar relationship in the balance of power in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union as an element of a “Strategic triangle” in East Asia (composed of the US, Soviet Union and China).²³

The post Cold War bipolar regional structure is characterized by Chinese dominance of “mainland” East Asia and US dominance of “maritime” East Asia.²⁴

Today, just as the US has secured its vital East Asian maritime interests, China has secured its vital continental interests. Interestingly, those states with common land borders with China also have a maritime border away from China (excluding CIS countries and Mongolia). Geopoliticians and international relations theorists have long debated the ease with which maritime power can be used to develop land power. But local geography determines the efficacy of capabilities. The US military experience in Vietnam and Korea revealed how difficult it was to use maritime power to project air and land power on to East Asian terrain. The US mentality of “no more land wars in Asia,”²⁵ undermines a powerful deterrent factor to any expanding Chinese sphere of influence in the region, which in turn, places these countries in a strategic security dilemma.

China remains vigilant to land threats. It is bordered by thirteen countries, second only to Russia. Its most important security concern is its long border with Russia — since Chinese commentators observe, Russia retains the geographic resources required to redevelop formidable capabilities. On the other hand China’s Central Asian frontier is its strategic vulnerability, just as Russia’s Far East is its strategic vulnerability.²⁶

Central Asia is close to the Russian heartland but far from China’s industrial and population centers and separated by inhospitable desert climate and terrain. The prospect of Sino-Soviet competition for the allegiance of Central Asian States, in a re-enactment of the nineteenth century “great game” between Russia and Britain, is a quaint possibility.²⁷

These Central Asian countries have weak governments and could be used to threaten Chinese territorial integrity. China is forced to consider the long-term prospect for domestic instability in its western provinces, where religious and ethnic minorities identify with the majority populations of China’s potentially hostile and unstable neighbors.²⁸

Southwest China is bordered by India, which has great power aspirations, and southern China is bordered by Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Vietnam yearns for a great power ally to enable it to come out from under China’s strategic shadow. In northeast Asia, Korea could be used by a great power to threaten China’s industrial heartland, as Japan and then the US did for much of the twentieth century.²⁹

China thus also faces multi-front security challenges. It would have to rely on diplomatic juggling to maintain a long-term stable strategic status quo on its land borders to divert adequate resources to its maritime front. Alfred Mahan has argued that, “history has conclusively demonstrated the inability of a State with even a single continental frontier to compete in naval development with one that is insular, although of similar population and resources.”³⁰

The challenge for China to develop a credible maritime force would be formidable. In the interim, the existing bi-polarity is contributing to a stable regional order. China towers over its smaller neighbors, and the US towers over its security partners, with the partial exception of Japan.³¹

The spheres of influence of both the “poles” are geographically distinct and separated by water; intervention by one power in its own sphere may not appear as a threat to the interest of the other power in its sphere. On the negative side, it is only a matter of time when a relative gain by one pole will result in immediate response due to an intense concern for reputation and repeated “tests of will”, creating a situation of heightened tension in the region.

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There are many who believe that Beijing is waging an economics focused diplomacy of reassurance to counter the China Threat Theory and to augment its political clout particularly in the Asia Pacific and the European Regions.³²

China is expected to use the country’s economic muscle to convince the global community that the quasi-superpower’s precipitous rise will bring about win-win scenarios particularly on the business and foreign trade fronts. This is in view of foreign-policy setbacks that China has suffered in the past one year and due mainly to heightened territorial disputes with countries including Japan and India, as well as the members of ASEAN. In light of the country’s $2.5 trillion foreign exchange reserves, Beijing has an unprecedentedly large war chest to engage in economic diplomacy.³³

Smaller countries around China’s periphery have had a serious look at the likely “China Threat”. Their perceptions highlight their concerns and the steps each nation, in its individual capacity and collectively in the region, contemplate on adopting to ensure enduring security for their peoples. In the light of this backdrop, the perception of some of the prominent neighbors of China on the threat China poses to them will help in identifying the possible course of future security dynamics of this region.