South China Sea
China’s has outstanding maritime-territorial disputes with many Southeast Asian countries in the hydrocarbon-rich South China Sea (SCS). Since the turn of the century, Beijing has been projecting a benign posture to these countries through measures like the 2002 signing of a ‘non-binding’ China-ASEAN ‘Declaration on Conduct of Parties in SCS’14 and the 2005 agreement with Vietnam and the Philippines for joint exploration of hydrocarbons in disputed areas.15
It is also evident that the organisational “˜centre of gravity of Chinese naval power is shifting towards its South Sea Fleet (SSF). This is best exemplified by the latest revelations with regard to the expanse of Chinas new naval base in Hainan, with an extensive underground acreage allocated for berthing up to as many as 20 submarines.
Notwithstanding several confidence-building measures (CBMs), military tensions have persisted until as recently as November 2007, when Chinese military exercises in the disputed Paracel Islands led Vietnam to lodge a protest.16 A month later, India was also sucked into this. Beijing declared that the exploration rights for blocks 127 and 128 (near Paracel Islands) given by Vietnam to ONGC Videsh was ‘illegal’, and issued a démarche to New Delhi.17 It implies that while Vietnam is permitted to explore for resources under China-Vietnam joint-exploration agreement, it cannot seek financial/technological assistance from India. This is not only symptomatic of China’s rivalry with India, but also indicative of China’s lack of sincerity to proceed to the next step after joint exploration with Vietnam & the Philippines, viz. production and sharing the resources. Such moves may further strengthen India-Southeast Asia strategic convergence.
China has lately increased its defence interactions with IOR-littorals and even major powers through exercises and warship visits. It has however been unwilling to make its military intentions transparent to the Southeast Asian littorals of western Pacific. The only exceptions are the Malacca Straits’ littorals: Malaysia and to some extent, Indonesia (for reasons mentioned earlier). Evidently, Beijing’s benign stance towards South-east Asia is a transient imperative until it achieves Taiwan’s “reunification”. Shen Dingli, a well-known Chinese strategic analyst indicated that “Once the Taiwan front is closed, we may turn to the South China Sea”.18 It is also evident that the organisational ‘centre of gravity’ of Chinese naval power is shifting towards its South Sea Fleet (SSF). This is best exemplified by the latest revelations with regard to the expanse of China’s new naval base in Hainan, with an extensive underground acreage allocated for berthing up to as many as 20 submarines.19 China is also building expeditionary capabilities for the SSF. This has led the Southeast Asian countries to seek strategic relationships with other powers. Amitav Acharya says that “India factors in this approach … (as Southeast Asia’s) countervailing strategy to future Chinese geopolitical assertiveness”.20
On its part, India has thus been steadily increasing its naval forays into the western Pacific. In 2000, India conducted a naval exercise in South China Sea with Vietnam. Although it was a low-level unstructured exercise, it represented an important milestone. It was India’s first-ever exercise in South China Sea that demonstrated India’s increasing naval reach. It invited China’s protest.21 The 2005 SIMBEX was also conducted in South China Sea. In Apr-May 2007, the Indian Navy participated in a series of exercises in the western Pacific.
Events in South-China Sea have a strong bearing on Chinas security. For India, the SouthChina Sea area is important for security of its trade and even energy imports, but is not as critical as it is to China.
Events in South-China Sea have a strong bearing on China’s security. For India, the SouthChina Sea area is important for security of its trade and even energy imports, but is not as critical as it is to China. What then is India’s motivation in the SouthChina Sea? In a seminar held at Chengdu soon after the 2005 SIMBEX, Colonel Pan Zheng from China’s National Defence University (NDU) called it India’s “revenge for China’s engagement of its South Asian neighbours”.22 Conceding the constraints of English grammar to a Chinese officer, he may be right. You Ji, a Chinese origin expert on the Chinese navy even says, “most analysts would see India’s ‘Look-east’ policy from the hidden position India has taken to support some of the claimants”.23 The validity of this argument cannot possibly be ascertained in the ‘public domain’.
It could nonetheless be stated that from the Indian perspective, ‘forward presence’ is a crucial national security imperative to achieve ‘domain awareness’ in areas of strategic interest, at both strategic and operational levels.24 More importantly, given the high probability of China’s inimical military-strategic intent in the in the Indian Ocean, Indian ‘presence’ in South China Sea becomes critical for ’strategic deterrence’ against Beijing. India’s Maritime-Military Strategy endorses this by stating, “While the option of formal alliances…is not available…we can however reach out to our maritime partners or collaborate with friendly nations to build deterrence.”25
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