Indian Defence Review

The rhetoric remains that the reconciliation process should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, but the manner in which the dialogue is being structured does not suggest that it will be an independent intra- Afghan process. President Karzai has already distanced himself from the US initiative. We feel that nothing should be done behind the back of the Kabul government. Latest statements from persons close to President Karzai express the deep concern of the Kabul government about understandings that the US may have reached with Pakistan and the possibility of south and eastern Afghanistan being handed over to the Taliban, which could divide the country and trigger an all-out conflict.

The end-game in Afghanistan is being played out in an atmosphere of great suspicion and bickering amongst the principal parties involved. The manner in which the Doha office of the Taliban was opened has made matters worse. The conduct of the Taliban in declaring themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan made their own end-game clear.

The link between the Taliban and Pakistan is evident. One will have to wait and watch whether the declared US position that no single country will be allowed to dominate poat-2014 Afghanistan can be sustained by it when its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan is so clear.

India has not been kept adequately in the picture about the dialogue with the Taliban, despite India’s vital concerns being involved. India suffered when the Taliban came to power in 1996. That was the only time India had no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and terrorists were being trained on its soil for attacks against India. If the Taliban were to be accommodated again, India has reason to be concerned.

We find that the policies our western friends in Afghanistan neither sufficiently steady nor transparent.

The argument that the Taliban has various currents in it and there are “moderate” Taliban has been exposed as hollow by what has transpired in Egypt where the same arguments distinguishing between various strands in the Muslim Brotherhood and welcoming their assumption of power have proved devoid of worth.

India does not want conditions of ethnic conflict to be created again in Afghanistan. The international community must safeguard against it. The post 2014 situation in Afghanistan remains very uncertain as the country will be faced with a political and military transition even when the external danger to the country has not been neutralized.

Establishing democracy in Afghanistan by integrating forces into the polity that are currently threatening the country will be a most difficult enterprise.

The root of the problem must be dealt with, which is external support for Afghan extremists and their instrumentalization for achieving the military ambitions of a third country. So long as there are safe havens for extremists outside Afghanistan the problems will not go away. If the Taliban retain influence in eastern and southern Afghanistan, it is because their staging grounds are outside.

India’s traditional ties have been with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. A large number of our development projects are in Pashtun areas, which have been very well received by the local people. We support ethnic harmony in Afghanistan, with the Pashtuns adequately represented in governance, but this has to emerge through a democratic process, without the shadow of externally supported violence.

Our strategic partnership with Afghanistan is not directed against any third country. The primary element in this strategic relationship is not military. India is willing to contribute to the capacity building of the Afghan national security forces through training and supply of non-lethal equipment so that they can better provide security to the people after the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Our goals are primarily economically oriented. We do not want to supplant NATO.

In principle, however, India could provide a limited amount of combat equipment too, as sought by the Afghan government. The concerns of Pakistan should be irrelevant in this regard. Pakistan is having a military relationship with Sri Lanka unbothered by our sensitivities. China is arming Pakistan, providing it even strategic capabilities, without any one advising Pakistan to defer to Indian sensitivities about the security threat posed to us. The US is arming Pakistan too, disregarding our sensitivities.

For elements in the US to caution us against increasing our military engagement with Afghanistan because of Pakistani sensitivities is inconsistent with the policy choices they make in our region in their national interest. India could argue, as the US does, that our arms assistance to Afghanistan will not change the balance of power between it and Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear capable state with large and well-equipped armed forces, whereas Afghanistan has a fledgling, ill equipped force that is no match for the Pakistani military. Our decision on the question should be based on our judgment on how far we want to or can go in giving arms assistance to Afghanistan, not what Pakistan or the US thinks. In our own interest we should be prudent.

It is a hugely perverse notion that the real problem in Afghanistan is India-Pakistan rivalry. Those who feel that their intervention in Afghanistan has not worked to stabilize the situation to the extent that they may have wanted and now want to cut costs at all cost, should not seek to transfer the responsibility for their failure on India’s shoulders.

India was not responsible for the rise of religious extremism in the region; it was not responsible for the civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure; it did not put the the Taliban in power in Kabul; it had no hand in the presence of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan; it had no responsibility for US/NATO military intervention in Afghanistan; the Taliban groups or the Haqqani group are not in India; NATO soldiers have not been killed by groups operating from Indian soil. If the US has had to resort to drone attacks against terrorists in Pakistan it is not because of India.

We seek a friendly relationship with Afghanistan. We seek no exclusive relationship. Afghanistan should have friendly relations with all its neighbours. We are willing to work with all of them. India and China are already talking to each other on Afghanistan. There should be no problem in discussing Afghanistan with Pakistan in a constructive way that opens up the doors for transit facilities eventually. The new government in Pakistan should think along those lines, rather than allowing Pakistan’s policies to be guided by the ambitions of its armed forces.

We have been very constructive in our dealings with the US on the Afghan issue. We have supported the international military intervention in Afghanistan and the ouster of the Taliban regime from power. We have been sensitive to US equities and concerns in Afghanistan despite serious provocations from Pakistan, including the terrorist attacks against the Indian Embassy in Kabul and India-related targets there. We continue to be willing to work with the US in a positive and mutually beneficial way in Afghanistan.

On June 27, US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Dobbins, sent to India to re-assure us about the US initiative to negotiate with the Taliban, did not convey the impression that the US was playing a sure hand, was confident about its strategy and had alternative options in view.

He said the US hoped for presidential candidates in Afghanistan that have cross-ethnic appeal. The US was not entering the dialogue with the Taliban with any certainty that it will start, how it will develop, whether progress will be made and whether it will result in diminished violence and peace. The Taliban had to say whether they will accept the conditions and meet the US and the Afghan High Peace Council. The issue of terrorism had to be directly addressed and that a pre-condition for starting talks was a statement that the Taliban will begin to distance themselves from the Al Qaida, but reaching an agreement will require concretely severing all ties. Ending violence was not a pre-condition for talks, but an agreement had to include cessation of hostilities and respect for the Afghan constitution. He concluded by stating that it was not certain that negotiations will end the war but that it was worth trying.

Such a tentative and uncertain reading of the situation, without a clear and confident road map, justifies our concerns about the wisdom of taking a step to politically accommodate such a retrograde and obscurantist force as the Taliban with the assistance of the Pakistani military whose disruptive strategic ambitions in Afghanistan are in fact at the root of the problem.

(Talk delivered by the author at “Afghanistn Region Conference” organized by FIIDS USA, USINPAC & AFPC on July 23, 2013 at Washington DC)