Among the new measures was the grant of full pay and allowances for two months to the family of a man killed in action, and an adequate allowance thereafter till the special family pension was sanctioned. The rate of this pension was also liberalised to make it three-fourths a man’s basic pay. The rights of war widows who remarried were protected, and liberal gratuities were provided for the families of those killed in action to soften the initial blow. Adequate provision was made for children, including allowances for education. The rank and pay of those wounded in action were also safeguarded for the period of hospitalisation, and the rates of disability pension were liberalised.
A number of new medals were introduced to cover the coming campaign. A Silver Jubilee Medal to commemorate a quarter century of independence was also instituted. The most coveted among the new medals was the Wound Medal, which had a broad scarlet ribbon and could be worn ahead of other campaign medals with some pride. Entitlement for this award was backdated to cover all the campaigns after independence. Displayed on the chests of veterans, this medal instilled a sense of pride in having sustained wounds in the service of their country.
The Chief wanted these grievances redressed to ensure that the soldier would go into the oncoming war with the assurance that should he get killed his family would be looked after for life, and his children educated in a manner befitting his rank and status.
Steps were also taken to look after the families of soldiers suddenly moved to operational areas. These families were allowed to retain the accommodation they occupied. Those who wanted to shift their stations for reasons of personal convenience were allowed to do so, and “separated family quarters” were allotted to them at stations of their choice. Travel concessions were extended to the families for this purpose.
Thus, by painstaking care and great consideration for his men, Manekshaw built that psychological background which motivates soldiers to risk their lives. Never before did the Indian soldier go to war with so much assurance regarding his and his family’s well-being should misfortune befall him.
Meanwhile, the state of no war-no peace continued. There were the usual border incidents and instrusions on the uneasy ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.1 Counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram also went on. More than a division of troops was employed in maintaining internal security in West Bengal till August. The commitments relating to the insurgency in East Pakistan were mounting. A sizable organisation was needed to train and give operational guidance to the guerilla forces.
The reader may here like to know something of the system of higher direction of war obtaining in India. The Indian defence organisation is based on the British democratic system under which the elected head of government in the person of the Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament, and through it to the nation as a whole, for the defence of the country. Borrowed again from the British, there were various committees, like the Cabinet Defence Committee, to help the Prime Minister to carry out his duties. This role was later taken over by the Political Affairs Committee, the Defence Minister’s Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The rights of war widows who remarried were protected, and liberal gratuities were provided for the families of those killed in action to soften the initial blow.
Briefly, the role of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was to render to the Prime Minister professional advice on military strategy and the conduct of military operations, and to point out the military implications of a particular policy. The Chiefs had direct access to the Prime Minister. The role of the Defence Minister was to coordinate the requirements and priorities of the three services and allocate resources to them. Beyond this he had no hand in formulating defence policy individually, but being a member of the Political Affairs Committee he shared responsibility for its decisions. His effectiveness depended entirely on the force of his personality and the influence he wielded with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as a whole.
Historically, this British-inspired committee system has not worked well in India under a monolithic political power system and the abysmal ignorance of most politicians regarding military affairs. In the Jammu and Kashmir operations in 1947-48, higher direction was provided by Earl Mountbatten, the British Governor-General, and his adviser, Lord Ismay, through Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister. The only flaw in the conduct of that war was the acceptance of a ceasefire when the tide of Indian military operations was sweeping the invaders out of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This decision led to two more wars, and the problem of Kashmir still defies a political solution.
The most coveted among the new medals was the Wound Medal, which had a broad scarlet ribbon and could be worn ahead of other campaign medals with some pride.
The chain of events which led to the Chinese military collision with India was the result of three-cornered consultations between Nehru, Krishna Menon and Lt Gen BM Kaul. The professional advice of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was bypassed. Only when enraged public opinion forced his hand after a humiliating defeat did the politically shattered Nehru seek refuge in an enlarged National Defence Council and the Cabinet Defence Committee and hurriedly sought the advice of some retired generals.2 But then it was too late both for him and the country. Along with Nehru, the overdone defence counselling disappeared and bureaucratic routine once again established its hold.
Thereafter, up to the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965, military advice from Gen Chaudhuri prevailed both in shaping the military machine and the conduct of the war forced on India by Pakistan. The politician, having learnt his lesson from Nehru’s debacle, left the soldier alone. Shastri, Nehru’s successor, proved amenable to Chaudhuri’s advice and was courageous enough to accept full responsibility for his decisions. The strategy for the 1965 conflict was purely of Chaudhuri’s conception, with the tacit concurrence of Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh. It is a well-known fact that the Indian Navy was left out of the war altogether, to the extent that the flotilla harboured in Bombay did not even know when it started.
Clearly, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was not functioning. The reason was obvious: the committee system visualised a corporate existence where the three Chiefs were equal in status. The committee was supposed to decide collectively, the Chairman not possessing a special vote or veto. Agreed solutions resulted, and it could be safely inferred that the committee’s recommendations would at best be a compromise, which may look attractive in peace but seldom wins wars.
It was not realised that, unlike Britain, India was a subcontinent, separated from potential enemies by only land frontiers. Its wars would be fought mainly on land, where the Army was bound to play the predominant part. The other services would only have a sup. porting role. It was therefore no wonder that Chaudhuri’s counsel prevailed, with Arjan Singh in support. But modern wars are total in nature, and cannot be fought in isolation and, as is aptly said, the serious business of war cannot be left to soldiers alone.
Manekshaw was a soldier of vision…As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he pressed for the political involvement of Government in evolving a broad strategy and laying down clearcut directives to achieve our aims.
Manekshaw was a soldier of vision. He realised that major questions of defence policy could not be dealt with in purely military terms. They needed to be coordinated with foreign, economic and internal policies, and in the wider context they embraced the body politic of the entire nation. As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he pressed for the political involvement of Government in evolving a broad strategy and laying down clearcut directives to achieve our aims. This was done through his direct contact with the Prime Minister, and through her with the Political Affairs Committee.
In fact, this direct access and the conviction with which he made his recommendations antagonised quite a few of his colleagues and superiors and was the main cause of his difficulties with Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram later. For the first time a political representative in the person of D.P. Dhar, designated Chairman of the Planning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, was inducted into war councils.3 Dhar worked closely with Manekshaw throughout the war, and thereafter to settle its aftermath. There could not have been a better combination for the conduct of war. Their understanding of the combined potential of political and military means and their effective use of it was superb.
On the military side, Manekshaw activated the old joint services organs, and created some new ones. A Joint Intelligences Committee, consisting of representatives of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau and the Directors of Intelligence of the three services, was formed under the chairmanship of the Vice Chief of Army Staff. This ensured coordination at the top. Similarly, the Joint Planning Committee dealt with the inter-service coordination of operational plans, and work started on establishing a Combined Services Operational Headquarters. Thus, South Block and Vayu Bhavan became a well-knit team.
He had pledged to seek a victory for India, and he was to redeem that pledge in no uncertain terms.
Manekshaw knew all along that the Army, the predominant partner, would play the vital part, and he had no doubt that success entirely depended on the soundness of the Army’s operational plans and its ability to execute them. The Air Force and the Navy could only further these plans by efficient and timely support and their contribution would ease the Army’s task. It is to Manekshaw’s credit that with his charm and tact, he got the unreserved involvement of the other services in formulating the operational plans, and subsequently in their implementation. Throughout, he never let the other services feel they were not equal partners in the undertaking. In fact, he made it a point to magnify their contribution and was always lavish in his praise of them. Whenever there was a setback, as at a few places in the west, he gracefully accepted the whole blame.
Likewise, on the civil side, a Secretaries’ Committee was set up to take executive decisions dealing with preparations for war and their execution. The committee consisted of the Secretaries of Defence, Home, Finance and Foreign Affairs, and depending on the issues to be dealt with other secretaries were coopted. The committee’s business was transacted with dispatch. The Directors-General of the Border Security Force and of Civil Defence and other heads of para-military forces and allied war organisations were brought in at appropriate stages of planning. The apex of direction, coordination and supervision remained with Manekshaw and Dhar.
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The Prime Minister was kept in constant touch with developments, and so was the Political Affairs Committee when considered necessary. But the decision-making processes were never allowed to get tangled in the maze of bureaucratic redtape. The Chief brooked no delay, whether in giving decisions or oiling the sluggish wheels of official machinery to get things moving. He was on the spot if a holdup occurred, whether at headquarters or in the field. He wielded such influence and commanded such respect that invariably the bureaucracy looked up to him rather than attempt to dictate terms. Secretaries were seen hurrying in and out of his office with ready decisions concerning the business of war.
Grateful for the opportunity afforded to him and considering himself lucky to be in the saddle at such a critical time, he set the course towards victory with patriotic fervour and a rare verve. He had pledged to seek a victory for India, and he was to redeem that pledge in no uncertain terms.
Notes:
- The Statesman, Calcutta, reported an exodus from West Pakistan on 10 September.
- The Statesman and The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, reported the setting up of a top-level Military Affairs Committee which included three Chiefs of Staff and three distinguished retired generals, Gen K.S. Thimayya, Gen Rajendrasinhji and Lt Gen S.P. Thorat, with Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan as chairman.
- Radio Pakistan on 5 September 1971, said the Pakistani Government had noted with “much concern” the series of meetings D.P. Dhar, Chairman of Policy Planning in the External Affairs Ministry, had with Bangladesh leaders in Calcutta.
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At least generals and administrators new their job and doing it, can we say the same 4 currents players,
He really deserves Bharat Ratna than many who already hv got…
Our salutes to u sir…
“Brilliant General, great tactician, salute to you sir “.!!
India always proud of this field marshal. i salute you sir.
Tendulkar gets Bharat Ratna for playing cricket. Is’nt Sam Bahadur’s winning war and capturing 93000Paki POWs a greater service to the nation?
My experience about Field Marshal Manekshaw is quite different. I found him to be self-projecting at the cost of others; not giving their due to his subordinates, snubbing and even lowering down prestige of others to build his own image, bragging to build his image; creating caste disctinctions: This and many more unlike a true soldier.
About how the Field Marshal felt about the political leadership, it appears, he didn’t mention the role of the political govt. during the Indo-China war, which is notable to the public, and he didn’t mention the serving head of the army, before the hostilities commenced, who was, I presume, Gen. Thapar. He seems to have seen, that the political initiative of the political head Mr. Nehru, was greatly admirable and commendable, but the significance of the brotherhood initiative, had to be, that on the China border, the Indian soldier could not see himself as an enemy of the Chinese soldier, and in reality, there was no contact between the Chinese foot soldier, and his Indian counterpart. He did use a term of unusual endearment with Ms. Indira Gandhi, the sentence of which is very quoted, and he was trying to convey, that he didn’t feel bad, about the China situation, which was the past. I think he admired Gen. Thapar, but he felt it inappropriate to convey, when people serving in the army were not very happy, about the former army head. The plain fact is, if Gen. Thapar had remained the army chief, the Field Marshal then, would not have got his next responsibility when he did, and presumably, would not have become army chief. The army chiefs, after Gen. Thapar, were supposed to justify the political ideals of Nehru to the army, and the nation, and the Field Marshal was supposed to be the fighting general, when he took over the operations of the eastern sector, facing China.