Indian Defence Review

The LeT has global ambitions and does not confine its activities only to South Asia. It has some unrealistic aims, like wanting to “plant the flag of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi.¹² However, LeT operatives have been active in various in central, southeast and west Asian countries, providing assistance to terrorist groups in:

• Fundraising in the Middle East, Europe, Australia and the United States
• Procurement of weapons, explosives and communications systems for terrorist operations from the international arms markets
• The recruiting of volunteers for suicide missions
• The creation of sleeper cells for executing or supporting future terrorist acts in several parts of the world
• Fuelling armed conflicts in India, Afghanistan and Pakistan¹³

The LeT has established connections and ideological affiliations with many radical Sunni groups of the world. It provides financial and material support to these groups for mounting attacks on “enemies of Islam.” Intelligence reports suggest that the LeT has deployed its agents in several countries worldwide with the intention of supporting terror attacks on the “infidels.”14 Although the LeT helps terrorist organisations in many parts of the globe, its main focus is to assist terrorist operations in south Asia, which remains its primary theatre of war.

The LeT is presently the main instrument of the ISI and the Pakistani army for waging a shadow war in India. Though its main battle ground is J&K, its target areas include the Indian heartland, in particular, in Delhi and Mumbai. Its target of influence is the entire Muslim community in India, and the LeT has been able to create a large number of sleeper cells in collaboration with indigenous groups, such as SIMI and the Indian Mujahedeen (IM). Most terror attacks in 2007 in India’s heartland were traced to the LeT from support bases within India, showing its extended reach in significant segments of Indian Muslims.

Information obtained from Lashkar-sponsored terrorists in India points to a possibility of an arrangement between Maoists and the Lashkar to facilitate procurement of weapons and sharing of training facilities with the jihadi elements. A Kashmiri terrorist arrested in Delhi admitted that he had set up base in the Maoist stronghold of Hazaribagh in Jharkhand to coordinate matters with the Maoists. There are significant indicators of a nexus between the Maoists and jihadis affiliated with the LeT.

The Lashkar’s subversive activities in the Kashmir valley continue unabated, and it is reorganising and upgrading its facilities in POK to renew attacks on Kashmir. Till the early ‘90s, the Lashkar confined its activities to Kashmir, but later, it became a part of its policy to attack sensitive targets in the rest of India. The attack on the Red Fort in 2000, the strike on the Indian parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai attack in 2008 clearly showed the footprints of the Lashkar.

It seems there has been a strategic shift in Pakistani policies after 26/11 to move its facilities for mounting terrorist attacks to several countries of south Asia. To avoid serious international repercussions and retaliation from India, the Lashkar was tasked to penetrate Indian terrorist outfits and expanded its base of operations in India. Presently, the Lashkar is using lone-wolf attacks in crowded areas through local groups but is reported to be planning to launch bigger attacks on India from its bases outside Pakistan.

Things have been rather quiet in India on the surface, perhaps due to the process of relocation of bases, but the LeT is continuing recruitment, training and motivation of youth for terror strikes within India without let up. Selected groups are being trained to hit crowded areas in important towns, and specialised groups will be tasked to attack airports, transportation systems and vital installations.

India has long been targeted by violent extremist groups from Pakistan with the help of various local communal, separatist and secessionist groups. India is yet to counter the activities of these groups; various incidents suggest all the counterterrorist forces in the country are not on the same page because of the fault lines in our security system. The threat from terrorism emanates from a wide spectrum from various quarters, ranging from external to indigenous radical grups to organisations and local groups affiliated to the LeT. Some Muslim groups have resorted to terrorism because of perceived wrongs done to them by the majority communities.

Kashmir-related terrorist violence draws international concerns because of its possible links to transnational jihadi terrorists. Indian extremists have been roped in by Pakistan intelligence agencies to join the LeT to create an impression in international circles that the terrorism in India is a domestic affair for which Pakistan cannot be blamed. Indian nationals willing to join the jihad are being trained by LeT operatives in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives and Nepal. India has yet to take effective measures to break the link between local organisations and the LeT. A more serious challenge to India will emerge if the LeT is allowed to spread its influence in India unchecked or is able to coordinate its plans of attacking targets in India with indigenous and foreign groups in India’s neighbourhood.

The LeT will continue to target India because it considers it an anti-Islamic Hindu state against which jihad must be waged. Its aim is to harm India as much as possible by causing mass casualties and attacking sensitive defence and economic infrastructure. In Kashmir, it has the capability to execute terrorist attacks independently and with the support of the separatist groups.

There is an ever-increasing need to counter the designs and the activities of the LeT in India more vigorously right across the country. The 26/11 attacks in Mumbai showed the determination of the LeT to mount mass casualty attacks on India, and the information revealed by Abu Jundal has provided a glimpse of the local support available to it in India. In these circumstances, merely strengthening the apparatus of internal security and the anti-terror laws, revamping intelligence agencies and creating special anti-terror police forces will not do as all these are defensive measures that do no harm to the basic structure and organisation of the LeT within and outside India.

In India, there are a large number of sensitive assets spread across the country that require protection against terrorist attacks. India has to deploy a massive force in a static role, just waiting to thwart any terrorist attack. The LeT, with the help of an elaborate network in India, has the capability to pose a simultaneous threat to multiple targets. Post 26/11, the domestic environments within Pakistan have given a fillip to the growth of fundamentalists and there is a need to start an offensive to deal directly with the LeT and its affiliates wherever they are rather than hoping that Pakistan will rein them in.

The LeT and al-Qaeda have joined hands to pose a new threat to the United States and other Western nations, as evident from their joint plots to target airliners and the Olympic venue in London. Various attempts in Europe have focused the attention of the U.S. intelligence agencies on the activities of the LeT both in and outside south Asia. This may give an opportunity to India to combine its effort with the United States to target the LeT. The problem is that the LeT and its leaders are under the protective umbrella of the Pakistan army and it is not easy to target them. The LeT and affiliate groups are also operating from Nepal and Bangladesh, from where most targets in India are within striking range because of porous borders and sleeper cells located in India.

On a global level, the United States, its Western allies and the Jewish community are the main targets of the al-Qaeda–LeT combine. Most terrorist attacks carried out in the United States and Britain were planned in the LeT training facilities in Pakistan. The LeT is the main arm of al-Qaeda at the global level to attack U.S. assets and the countries that are U.S. allies.15

War against the LeT

With the United States having given a clear message to Pakistan to hand over all the terrorist leaders and deny bases to terrorist groups, it is time for India to forge a strategic alliance with the United States and help the United States attempt to contain terrorism in south Asia. The U.S. focus, however, is on those terrorist groups that are attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. India must convince the United States to join India in its fight against those terrorist groups that are targeting India.

Pakistan is likely to remain in a denial mode and profess it does not shelter any terrorists in its territory, and the Pakistan army is no mood to give up its policy of using terrorism as a state policy. ISI help and protection to jihadi terrorism is continuing. Segments of Pakistani civil society against the ideology of jihadi terrorism are unable to challenge the radical groups or do not have the courage to become an instrument of fighting radical groups and their supporters.

Although India is in a position to organise covert forces to infiltrate inside Pakistan and damage the infrastructure of terrorist forces, it is reluctant to take any such step. As there is no viable military option open to India, it needs to adopt other means to combat terrorist forces of Pakistan. We need a strong political leadership with steely determination to sanction covert action to confront the terrorists in their home bases.

Some strategic thinkers believe India should wait till the inevitable self-destruction of Pakistan, which may take place sooner than later. In the meanwhile, the best course open to India is to start an all-out offensive against all the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist cells and support bases in India and neighbouring countries, like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. India has to give enough incentives to these countries to earn their cooperation. Above all else, India must liquidate all LeT cells operating with the help of domestic groups in India—without local support or bases, the LeT cannot operate in India. To eliminate local support now available to the LeT, certain political initiatives to win over the disgruntled segments of our population must be taken expeditiously.