Indian Defence Review

Since it is a component of the gamut of warfare, the Indian Army, like the Indian Air Force, the Indian Navy and the Strategic Forces, cannot be labelled as ‘defence’ but ‘security’ forces. There is more in labels as they encapsulate the primary role and mission of the force – providing defence is ‘not’ their role, ‘security’ is. Though this may be dismissed as semantics, this is brought out to highlight India’s deep-rooted defensive mentality and it is this that mandates a rethink of how India approaches matters military – this is not a superficial change but psychological.

To reiterate the position, the military is there to provide ‘security’ and not ‘defence’ which is essentially the task of Border Guards, as is the practice the world over. In India, this translates to the BSF, ITBP, SSB and the like. Being tied down to defence is counter-productive for the Army’s larger aim, as this can only be at the cost of undertaking offensive operations – the prerequisite for victory. It goes without saying that for this to come about, a paradigm change in thinking is required at the highest level as it is more a matter of mindset of the leadership, involving issues of turf and empires, than a matter of training and equipment.

On the other hand, the task of Border Guards is Border Management, both in peace and war and includes ensuring the territorial integrity of the real estate they are entrusted with. The army may support but it essentially contributes by mitigating the threat by undertaking offensive actions. The practice of passing on the responsibility of defence of the borders during ‘Hot War,’ not only ties down the Army to static operations but keeps well-trained forces out of battle, when their presence can make a significant difference, entailing a heavy and unnecessary cost on the exchequer.

Higher Security Planning and Structures

Ensuring security from external threats is as a much a function of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), as it is of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), though the task of ensuring security is constitutionally mandated to the office of the Defence Secretary. While the National Security Advisor acts as the Principal Security Advisor, by default, his office has become the focal point for issues of external security. Though there is nothing against the existing system, it is recommended that a Nodal Military Officer to provide a single point source for military advice and synergise the functioning of the three services be added as the Defence Secretary has neither the experience nor the time. This arrangement has created an ‘functional’ void at the highest level.

The ideal solution being the appointment of a Chief of Defence (sic) Staff (CDS) to bring in the much required ‘jointness’ between the services. With his elevated stature, he would be able to interact with all Ministries on matters military, and in addition, he would be able to provide direction for defence research, development and production by co-opting them with the requirements of the military. More importantly, he would be able to articulate the Military Doctrine and ensure change.

It is important to highlight the point that even while impetus is being given to the modernisation of the Indian Military, mere infusion of technology and introduction of weapon systems would not automatically translate to ‘capability improvement.’ These need to be backed up by a well thought out doctrine to develop, organise and use these capabilities to achieve national aims and objectives.

Joint Commands

Warfare is an interplay of strengths and weaknesses and the requirements of high tempo – modern war necessitate synergistic application of different types of forces. In view of this requirement, ‘Integrated Commands’ is the norm the world over. Despite the acceptance of this operational requirement, the pace of integration has been tardy – more a result of turfs than a matter of principle, and is played up with the (convenient) ‘divide and rule’ policy of the bureaucracy and political class. This needs to change – the faster, the better as a mutually acceptable doctrine would provide an answer.

Strategic Guidance for Evolving an Indian Military Doctrine

At the strategic level, there are multiple factors that would provide guidance for evolving a Military Doctrine for India; the obvious ones being the threat from Pakistan, China or a collusive threat. At the same time, the role India feels it should be playing in the future – both within the South Asian and Indian Ocean Region, as also outside its immediate neighbourhood is another consideration. The last factor would be the issue of inter-operability with friendly foreign militaries – the question being with who? This obviously falls within the domain of Foreign Policy. The translation of these guidelines into Military Doctrine would provide direction to all components involved with external security and make them move in concert with one another.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s strength lies in its propensity to sustain low intensity conflict against India; the level may fluctuate but the threat remains ever present. By repeatedly playing the nuclear card, Pakistani military leadership, who call the shots behind the facade of democracy, are confident that they have created space for sub-conventional warfare. While there can be a number of counters from the Indian side, both conventional and unconventional, it makes sense in raising the cost for Pakistan. While it would be beyond the scope to discuss strategy, tactics and options, it is axiomatic that Pakistan is paid back in the same coin – only in greater measure and this means evolving a doctrine for sub-conventional warfare as an active sub-sect of the All-encompassing National Military Doctrine to deter Pakistan.

China

India needs to develop a different strategy to deter China and it makes practical sense to confront her on own terms by having the capabilities to target her vulnerabilities and sensitivities. A wide appreciation needs to be undertaken to identify her vulnerabilities – in Tibet, at sea, in space and in the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum. The point being made is simple – strike where it hurts, ideally away from the area of conflict, and as discretely as possible to avoid escalation and spill-over. The idea is to convey a clear but unambiguous signal: If confronted, India would react–‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ is immaterial. This roughly translates to ‘deny’ in the mountains and ‘strike’ through Air, Space and Maritime Forces – something that is recommended in the paper Non Alignment 2.0, the aim being to expand the operational envelope of counter-measures and to ensure retaliation against a weakness. Again, the aim is not to discuss specifics but to highlight the possibilities and avoid knee-jerk reactions.

The South Asian Region

Apart from the physical advantage India enjoys in terms of location, size and military capabilities, emerging India’s greatest strengths are the India success story and the global perception that it is not a ‘threatening’ power. While the current regime under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is making the right moves, it is recommended the ‘follow up’ especially in the immediate neighbourhood, stretching from Afghanistan to Myanmar must be taken up on a war footing. The SAARC forum may appear to be a weather beaten horse but reenergising it with economic prospects even at the cost of India, would be a rewarding investment in larger strategic terms.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

India is uniquely placed in terms her coastline and island territories. This puts her in an enviable position to play a key role in the power games being played in the IOR and the Asia-Pacific Maritime domain. The debate that India may or may not do so is immaterial – what is relevant is the necessity to do so for which building of demonstrable capability is required. By extension, it is axiomatic that India not only nurtures its relations with the maritime nations of the IOR, but also develops its capabilities of operating with friendly foreign forces since their aim in the region would be generally be in conformity with that of India.

Essentials for Evolving the Military Doctrine

Based on the discussion on the preceding paragraphs, ten essentials for outlining a robust Military Doctrine for India to inject dynamism and highlight outcome driven objectives, necessitate consideration of the following:

• The Sea, Air, Space and electro-magnetic domains need to be given priority to be able to strike deep and cause disproportionate damage – technology being the key to gain advantage – the Chinese A2/AD Model being a good example.
• The Army must be tasked beyond territorial defence and structured to cause disproportionate destruction in the battle zone and at the same time, it should be made capable for undertaking ‘out of area’ contingencies – attrition through unconventional means should be in-built in her tactical responses, especially in the mountains.
• Task of Border (Defence) Forces must be redefined and they should be enabled to undertake effective border management, both in peacetime and war. Such forces should be made capable to provide a sound firm base around which the regular army should be able to mount offensive operations. Apart from a change in tasking, this requires greater inter-operability between the forces.
• Undertaking unconventional operations should be inbuilt at the tactical, operational as well as strategic levels – development of these capabilities should be thrust areas against both Pakistan and China.
• Strategic partnerships with likeminded nations must be nurtured – both within South Asia and for operating jointly in the IOR.
• India’s diplomatic overtures in the immediate neighbourhood must offer a ‘Win-Win’ situation for all.
• India’s internal structures must be re-organised in keeping with national security aspirations.
• ‘Jointness’ at the functional levels must be the key – right from the portals of South Block to the formation level – re-organisation of the NSA, MOD and Theatre Commands being the bare requisites.
• Intelligence agencies and role of think-tanks to promote national interests need redefinition.
• While exploiting the electro-magnetic spectrum should be the aim and ensuring adequate redundancy against enemy cyber-attacks should be built in.

Conclusion

India is passing through historic times and the pace and direction she adopts in the current and coming decade would be defining. India stands at the threshold of a new future amidst a rapidly changing strategic landscape; a future that involves playing a larger role in the strategic affairs of the world. India needs to factor in the changes that are likely to manifest globally, and there are well-researched net assessments who predict the future – ‘Long View from Delhi’² and ‘Next 100 years’³ being some of them.

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The military, which is a major component of the nation’s CNP, needs to be contribute meaningfully to this future, for which it needs to be given direction and enabled in terms of capabilities. Evolving a Military Doctrine to channelise its growth and provide direction is, therefore, the need of the hour. This is a national requirement that merits intervention at the highest political levels to prevent turf battles which have proved to be the biggest impediment thus far. At the same time, it is reiterated that providing a Military Doctrine is not the requirement of the military but of the civil leadership and it is they who need to recognise the necessity to change and having done so, provide the necessary direction and impetus. Left to themselves, neither the bureaucracy nor the services or for that matter the Para Military Forces would solicit for change – they would be content with the status quo ensconced in the comfort of their respective empires.