The rise of China’s military power and its reach and capabilities has surprised the world. China has moved beyond the doctrine of “local wars under conditions of high tech environment” to domain i.e. “local wars under conditions of informationalisation” and “deep battle” beyond the Chinese border. China is in the process of building comprehensive capability for simultaneous campaign on land, sea, air, space and cyber space. This brings us to the question that is there a military compulsion for her to devote so much energy and efforts to build up military power with global reach? China’s leaders have yet to adequately explain the purposes or desired end-states of their military expansion1.
When Bharat Verma wrote, “China will attack India before 2012,” many rubbished it as figment of imagination. Probably they missed the point “¦
The peaceful rise of China is a matter of concern to India. More so because we have unresolved boundary dispute with China and we are economic competitors. It is time now that our military and strategic thinkers took note of the capabilities and security implications of resurgent China in the subcontinent. We need to carefully examine the threats from China in the near future and our capabilities to deter them. Is the threat from China only on land or do we need to guard other frontiers as well? We will miscalculate if we continue to perceive threat only from ground or air. The strategy of ‘People’s War Under Modern Conditions’ allowed for dramatic force restructuring in an atmosphere of absolute political stability allowing Beijing to overhaul its army to adapt to modern conditions.2 In the light of the above factors — future threat from China will be more potent and lethal encompassing space, air, land, sea and cyber domain.
China’s strategic intentions and military capabilities make it more unpredictable, and it may not hesitate to use strong arm tactics to resolve boundary disputes as and when the regime feels it appropriate. China’s National Defense Law identifies six military tasks. One of them is the underlying objective to support the Party’s reunification policies.3 This translates into the fact that China at some point in time can use military power to regain control over certain parts in the neighbourhood which it perceives to be its own. Considering the total lack of transparency and military build up, China is the biggest challenge for India in the years ahead. Therefore we need to find answers to the following questions:-
- Are we correctly assessing the threat from China?
- Are we doing enough to address the military imbalance to counter threat from China?
- Is the present force structure of India capable of effectively countering threat from China?
- Are we paying enough attention to secure and further develop our space, nuclear and electronic assets?
- Are we developing capabilities to exploit China’s vulnerabilities (overdependence on SLOC for energy security and economic development)?
War by military engagement in the modern time is fought when all other means are exhausted and China has not yet exhausted other options of war.
It is important to find answers to the above questions and embark on the direction to acquire military prowess before it is too late. Therefore, we have to examine our defence infrastructure, force structuring, (including Air Force and Navy) space, cyber and nuclear capabilities to effectively counter China. This must be done in a holistic manner by incorporating all wings of the security apparatus. But before we do that, we need to carry out an audit of our logistics set up, force ratio vis-a-vis the threat and infrastructure to support offensive/defensive operations in North East, Central Sector and Ladakh.
When Bharat Verma wrote, “China will attack India before 2012,”4 many rubbished it as figment of imagination. Probably they missed the point, and did not see it through the prism of “Art of War” by Sun Tzu. Is war fought only on the battlefields between two armies or there are other ways of fighting a war, which is economical, but having the same end-state? China continues to be driven by Sun Tzu’s philosophy. Sun Tzu had said:-
- For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.
- Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.
- The height of strategic wisdom is to avoid all conflicts and entanglements from which there are no realistic exits.
- Ideal winning is winning without bloodshed. By playing with psychological weaknesses of the opponent, by manoeuvering enemy to precarious position, by inducing feeling of frustration and confusion, a strategist can get the other side to break down mentally before surrendering physically or psychologically.
- Wisdom lies in defeating the strategy rather than the military.
China is doing nothing new but following the ‘Art of War’ and ‘Principles of War’ laid down by Sun Tzu. It is waging war on India without field armies. The intent is clear — to subdue India without fighting a war.
The present posturing by China is the extreme form of maneuver and aggression. In fact it is a classic case of exploiting maneuver to the hilt and its tremors are being felt. It is a well thought out strategy — never allow your adversary to rest in peace. It is strategic wisdom to continue war during peace time and keep the adversary guessing about the intentions and at the same time debilitate his will to fight. Through this strategy of aggressive posturing, China is probably sending following signals:-
India has no real bargaining leverage vis-Ã -vis China and negotiations rarely succeed in the absence of leverage.
- Come to the negotiation table to resolve the territorial dispute on its terms.
- Unbridled assertion as regional power.
- Do not work against the interest of China and refrain from being a strategic partner with extra-regional powers in the IOR.
- Allow economic inroads in India.
The warning given by Bharat Verma has substance, and needs careful examination. China may not physically attack India but aggressive posturing, in space, cyber and economic realms cannot be ruled out. The impact will be same if not more devastating. If it can achieve the same objective by this aggressive assertion, why go to war. War by military engagement in the modern time is fought when all other means are exhausted and China has not yet exhausted other options of war. China has embarked on the journey to its final objective i.e. super power status. It will not allow this march to be disrupted. Therefore, it is not keen to get entangled in an armed conflict in the region. At present China’s concerns are focused on economic development with the singular goal i.e. to double, triple and quadruple its US$ 4 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2050. Certainly, China is not contemplating any military engagement at the moment. But in the backdrop of the above, what are the options for India?
- Develop military and economic capabilities to build comprehensive national power to achieve strategic reach and depth to dissuade and contain China from waging war with India.
Or
- Piggy-back the US and become a front nation to guard US interests in the subcontinent.
The dignified and enduring option for India is to develop comprehensive national power. This is imperative for preparing for the future challenges. India should be able to look after her own interests without looking over its shoulders. Cooperation and alliances are bonus, but that bonus will only come to our benefit if we are strong enough to protect our interests and be counted at least in the region.
Sun Tzu had said “Don’t depend on enemy not coming; depend rather on being ready for him”5. Have we done enough diplomatically or militarily to negate or neutralise the threat from China after 1962? Well the answer is, No. Uneasy calm cannot be mistaken for ‘resolution’. We need to carry out audit of capabilities of our land forces vis-a-vis China. Some important facets we need to look into are:
- “Two-Front War Doctrine is based on this reality that India should expect and be prepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on the Northern borders and Pakistan on the Western borders”.6 In view of the foregoing it is imperative that forces are so disposed that India is capable of handling two-front threat.
- Threat from China can not be considered in isolation; therefore, we must not discount simultaneous threat from Pakistan in the garb of continued proxy war in J&K. The Defence Ministry’s Annual Report for 2008-09 tabled in Rajya Sabha recently noted with concern the possibility of China “enhancing connectivity with Pakistan through the illegally occupied territory in Jammu and Kashmir…”7
- “China’s stated objectives, in its White Paper, of developing strategic missile and space-based assets and of rapidly enhancing its blue-water navy to conduct operations in distant waters, as well as the systematic upgrading of infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance, quick response and operational capabilities in the border areas, will have an effect on the overall military environment in the neighbourhood of India”.8 Growing asymmetry in economy and military modernization needs to be carefully studied to carry out realistic assessment of India’s military preparedness.
- China has formulated “War Zone Campaign (WZC)” strategy aimed at achieving local superiority, since Chinese leadership does not visualize total war in the present milieu. The WZC strategies include “elite forces and sharp arms”, “gaining initiative by striking first” and “fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution”.9 The strategy is to prevent escalation and achieve superiority by employing combined arms with speed and surprise for quick resolution.
- “India has no real bargaining leverage vis-à-vis China and negotiations rarely succeed in the absence of leverage. India, moreover, is not making any serious effort to get any economic, diplomatic or military leverage vis-à-vis China.”10 This is causing unease with the rising gap between the two neighbours. The answer lies in building capability and forging strategic partnerships.
When we look at China as a neighbour with growing military power, we must rethink our national defence policy. The most alarming aspect of China’s military growth is development of anti satellite weapons, nuclear capable SLBMs and ICBMs with global ranges, cyber and information warfare capabilities, apart from a modernising conventional army. China recognizes that the army which is capable of achieving “information superiority” on the battlefield in future high-tech wars will seize the initiative and attain victory.11 Towards this end they have moved at much faster pace and have developed the EW/IW/cyber warfare capability to paralyze adversary’s command and control set up. China is yet develop Radio Frequency weapons but is expected to do so by 2015. They have already taken a step forward in this direction and developed “high-power microwave (HPM). In relation to this where are we? India must plan now to build the capabilities to meet the future challenges posed by China.
We must rethink our national defence policy. The most alarming aspect of Chinas military growth is development of anti satellite weapons, nuclear capable SLBMs and ICBMs with global ranges, cyber and information warfare capabilities, apart from a modernising conventional army.
Notwithstanding the above, China has certain vulnerabilities which need to be exploited as and when situation demands. India, therefore must build the capabilities and strategic partnerships to exploit these vulnerabilities. Some of them are as given below:-
- Layered chain of islands around South China Sea can assist encirclement of China with the help of US and its allies.
- China is heavily dependent upon Malacca Strait for oil supplies from Gulf and the “Malacca predicament” exposes the soft belly of China. Denial of Malacca Strait to China will create major oil crisis during peace and war.
- Squeeze the strategic space in the Indian Ocean as part of coercive policy to limit the area of influence of China in the littoral zone.
- China has yet not acquired a blue water navy, therefore it is a daunting task for her to secure the strategic space in the Indian Ocean and ensure security of SLOC.
- Encircle the encirclement, meaning thereby that India needs to build strategic partnerships with the allies and also develop capabilities to project hard military power outside the encirclement (string of pearls). This will create vulnerability for China in IOR.
- Develop economic and military cooperation with regional players including Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and other countries of East Asia to checkmate China.
- The internal picture in China appears to be equally dismal.12 There is growing internal unrest and demand for democracy. The internal unrest is making Beijing jittery.
Well these vulnerabilities only exist in realm of abstract reality and can only be exploited if India can build superior or comparable indices of national power. Are we in a position to establish strategic partnership with the US and its allies to the extent that they come out in open to extend military support to India to tame China? Well, it is a matter of conjecture. We must not forget the fact that China is ahead of India in most indices of national power. We can only expect the support from allies if we are able to develop soft and hard military power capable of withstanding military and coercive policy of China. That can only happen if we are able to project national power beyond the international borders. To achieve that we have a long way to go but we must start now. Time is running out and we must take appropriate actions now. We must accelerate our economic growth, and build robust hard and soft power. The Indian Army needs to immediate undertake some force restructuring measures.
There is a case for creation of all terrain offensive forces and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) on the Russian and Chinese model. Chinese RRF is capable of mobilising with speed and can be moved over large distances in the shortest possible time. China has already got 15 RRF Divisions which can mobilise within 24 to 96 hours.
Emphasis should be on enhancement and restructuring of Special Forces supported by technology as a force multiplier. Success of Special Forces in Gulf War II clearly brings out their real potential in making a strategic impact on a military campaign when employed skillfully and given directive control over the planning and execution of the roles assigned to them.13 India needs to look at this aspect and restructuring of Special Forces. Increase of technological prowess of the Indian Army is needed to fight modern wars under high technological environment.
Notes
1. Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006.
2. Dr Monica Chansoria, CLAWS Journal winter 2009, China’s Military Doctrine and Strategy: Continuity with Change.
3. Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 1998).
4. Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review Jul–Sep 2009, Unmasking China.
5. Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War, pp 9, The Art of war by Sun Tzu (fourth century BC).
6. Dr Subhash Kapila Indian Army new war doctrine analysed, South Asia Analysis Group, 15 Jan 2010.
7. India wary of Sino–Pak strategic link-up in occupied Kashmir, ExpressIndia.com.
8. Ibid.
9. Nan Li1, The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies.
10. Harsh V Pant, Sino-Indian ties: Troubled times ahead.
11. Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 1998).
12. Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review Jul–Sep 2009, Unmasking China.
13. Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, Security Research Review, Indian Special Forces: Reorganising for an Expanding Role.
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